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ABSTRACT 
The topic of this dissertation is the Tennessee State Guard and its activities from 
1867 to 1869. The Radical (Republican) Governor William G. Brownlow used this 
militia organization to uphold his fledgling Reconstruction administration and provide 
some protection to the recently enfranchised freedmen. In the process, the State Guard 
policed elections, in accordance with the state's controversial Franchise Acts, and 
operated against the ex-Confederate opposition, including the emergent Ku Klux Klan. 
Drawing principally on the rich, but little used, papers of the Tennessee Adjutant 
General's Office, my thesis is that the State Guard was remarkably successful at 
enforcing the Recqnstruction policies of the Radical government. Although it was a 
partisan law enforcement body-a Radical Army in effect-the State Guard usually 
conducted itself with a high degree of professionalism and restraint; it was not an 
instrument of tyranny. When it was deployed-during the political campaigns of 1867 
and under the martial law decrees of early 1869-it effectively thwarted ex-Confederate 
vigilantism. When it was not employed-as in 1868 when the Klan terrorized large 
sections of the state-the Radical party and the freedmen suffered. By not maintaining a 
consistent and active militia presence, the Radicals may have forfeited their best means 
for completing the Reconstruction of their state. 
The historical value of this topic is that the role of the State Guard in Tennessee's 
Reconstruction has never received detailed attention. Given that the politics of 
Reconstruction was often the politics of force, this is a serious oversight. The Brownlow 
administration has been criticized for its abuse of executive power, particularly over 
elections, but the one organization most responsible for carrying out the governor's 
decrees-the State Guard-is only vaguely discussed by the period's leading scholars. 
This dissertation seeks to bring this militia organization into the light and, in doing so, 
reopen the question of whether a more forceful, military Reconstruction could have 
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"That the sure and certain defense of a free people is a well-regulated militia; and, as 
standing armies in time of peace are dangerous to freedom, they ought to be avoided as 
far as the circumstances and safety of the community will admit; and that in all cases the 
military shall be kept in strict subordination to the civil authority."-1834 Tennessee 
Constitution, Article I, Section 24. 
War offers numerous opportunities for political realignment. And long, 
destructive wars can produce vicious and desperate peacetime political struggles. This is 
certainly true for the Reconstruction period in the South following the American Civil 
War. The former Confederate states may have conceded defeat on the battlefield, but in 
the post-war political arena, they proved astonishingly "unrepentant" and openly defiant 
toward their northern conquerors. As a result, the politics of Reconstruction increasingly 
became the politics of force as the contestants strove to instigate or obstruct the various 
plans for national reunification. Nowhere is this plunge into the politics of force more 
evident than in the state of Tennessee. Here, wartime Unionists who later styled 
themselves Radical Republicans briefly held the reins of power and, to the enduring 
infamy of their name, opted to wield their power through authoritarian force. 
The main Radical weapon in this Reconstruction power play was the Tennessee 
State Guard. Following its legislative creation, Radical governor William G. Brownlow 
used this militia organization to uphold his administration and to provide some protection 
to the freedmen. In the process, the State Guard helped police elections and operated 
against a seemingly ubiquitous ex-Confederate opposition, particularly the emergent Ku 
Klux Klan. To its opponents, the Tennessee State Guard constituted the worst 
manifestation of a standing army as a danger to freedom. To its proponents, the State 
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Guard was the epitome of a "well-regulated militia" necessary for the defense of a free 
people. Needless to say, the militia provisions of the state constitution took on profound 
significance for the Reconstruction period. 
This resort to force in Tennessee (and throughout the South for that matter) 
should come as no surprise. Although the Civii War ended in 1865, Reconstruction was 
neither a time of peace nor one of normal relations between the sections. Rather, as the 
word suggests, Reconstruction was a process that entailed substantial social and political 
restructuring. Consequently, Reconstruction was, in many respects, a militant 
continuation of the Civil War. Historian George Rable cleverly alters Karl von 
Clausewitz's dictum on politics and war when he states, "for the South, peace became 
war carried on by other means." The conduct of Tennessee's Radicals certainly suggests 
that many Reconstruction contemporaries felt that way. As men who had participated in 
a war fought to an unconditional surrender, the Radicals expected the vanquished rebels 
to submit to whatever peace terms were presented. These terms included Radical control 
of the government and civil equality for the freedmen. In pursuing these goals, the 
Radicals treated their state as if it was still within the "grasp of war," meaning that the 
victors monopolized formal power. To this end, the Radicals disfranchised the political 
opposition while they tried to build up their party's apparatus throughout the state. When 
the ex-Confederates balked at these stem terms, the Radicals responded with coercion, 
most notably the Tennessee State Guard. Under the circumstances, it seemed to the 
Radicals a perfectly acceptable course of action. 1 
1 George C. Rable, But There Was No Peace: The Role of Violence in the Politics of Reconstruction 
(Athens, 1984), 15; Michael Les Benedict, The Fruits ofVictOiy: Alternatives in Restoring the Union, 
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Historians have long debated the role of force in Reconstruction. Could the 
nation secure its goals, namely a readmitted South under sincerely loyal governments and 
with genuine civil equality for the freedmen, with a minimum force? For the most part, 
while sympathizing with the North's frustration with southern intransigence, historians 
agree that draconian force would likely have only further alienated an already hostile 
white South. Moreover, such a course of action would have required a huge, long-tenn 
military occupation that few Americans at the time were willing to tolerate. If the 
Reconstruction state governments of the South were to survive, they would have to do so 
without endless infusions of Federal power. Nevertheless, an articulate minority of 
historians insists that coercion was the most logical approach to Reconstruction. Because 
the sections remained polarized after the war, they say, Reconstruction should have been 
a time of dictation, not negotiation. A more forceful Reconstruction, however 
unpalatable, was essential in breaking white southern resistance and making 
Reconstruction work. 2 
The Tennessee State Guard offers a valuable case study of force politics in action 
during Reconstruction. If coercive control could have succeeded anywhere, that place 
was Tennessee. No other reconstructed state contained so large a native, white Unionist 
1865-1877 (Philadelphia, 1975), 21, 98-99. Benedict contends that the "grasp of war" concept greatly 
influenced the thinking of many Republicans throughout the nation. 
2 For some critics of force, see James E. Sefton, The United States Army and Reconstruction, 1865-1877 
(Baton Rouge, 1967), 207-10; and Rable, But There Was No Peace, 189-91: For some advocates of force, 
see Michael Perman, Reunion Without Compromise: The South and Reconstruction, 1865-1868 (New 
York, 1973), 3-12, 346; and Allen W. Trelease, White Terror: The Ku Klux Klan Conspiracy and Southern 
Reconstruction (Baton Rouge, 1971), xxix-xxxix. Without talcing sides on the matter, Hugh Davis Graham 
and Ted Robert Gurr make the provocative statement that "the North won the Civil War, but in its very 
triumph created hostilities that contributed to one of the greatest and most successful waves of vigilante 
violence in [U.S.] history." Graham and Gurr, Violence in America: Historical and Comparative 
Perspectives (Washington, D. C., 1969), 636. 
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element. No other state instigated sweeping disfranchisement of its ex-Confederate 
opposition at the very beginning of Reconstruction. No other state possessed a Radical 
safe haven like East Tennessee from which to draw strength. No other state had a better 
claim to national legitimacy, thanks to Tennessee's early readmission. And in only a few 
other states did the Radical government employ as effective an internal enforcing agent 
as the State Guard. For good reason then did William M. Connelly of Memphis declare 
in 1868 that "Tennessee is really the place where southern Radicalism must make its 
stand, or all will be lost. "3 
As interesting as Reconstruction in Tennessee was, there is relatively little 
scholarly work on the subject. Most of the important monographs are outdated and their 
treatment of Reconstruction and the Radical party is highly slanted. Generally, the 
Radical Unionists are depicted as petty, vindictive men who lacked political maturity. 
The heavy-handed gubernatorial leadership of William G. Brownlow is especially 
criticized. In the course of this harsh criticism, the Tennessee State Guard is typically 
discussed as merely one more example of despotic rule in the state. Its role in 
Reconstruction has never received detailed scholarly attention. (In fact, there have been 
few studies of any state militias during Reconstruction.) This is unfortunate, because the 
State Guard was a key component of Radical Reconstruction in the Volunteer State, the 
organization most responsible for carrying out the Brownlow administration's decrees. 
The importance of the State Guard is underscored when one remembers that Tennessee, 
having been readmitted to the Union in July 1866, did not come under the Reconstruction 
3 David W. Crofts, "Reconstruction in Tennessee: An Assessment for Thaddeus Stevens," West Tennessee 
Historical Society Papers 43 (1989): 27. 
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Acts of 1867, which divided the former Confederacy into military districts. Therefore, 
the state neither experienced large-scale Federal intervention nor had the kind of access 
to U. S. troops that other southern Republicans enjoyed. In other words, Tennessee 
Unionists had to effect Reconstruction largely on their own. A reliable, native coercive 
arm was imperative for Radical success--enter the State Guard. 4 
Generally speaking, scholars have simply described the Tennessee State Guard as 
a partisan military force that the Radicals used to suppress opposition, control elections, 
protect black voters, and uphold the governor's arbitrary power, or what was known as 
"Brownlowism." The earliest appraisal of the State Guard comes from the voluminous 
congressional investigations into the Ku Klux Klan. In the report on Tennessee, the Joint 
Select Committee branded the State Guard a pack of"ignorant and debased men" who 
spread "terror across the state." This view is contradicted in an obscure 1890 essay by Ira 
Jones. While regarding the Radicals as highhanded political opportunists, Jones offers a 
rather innocuous description of the militiamen as "licensed disturbers of the public-
repose." The author goes on to state that Governor Brownlow enjoyed "carte blanche" 
power over the militia, but he insists that the State Guard itself was remarkably well-
behaved and generally respectful toward those Tennesseans over whom they watched. 
These would remain the last friendly words about the State Guard for the next half-
century. 5 
4 James W. Patton, Unionism and Reconstruction in Tennessee, 1860-1869 (Chapel Hill, 1934), 83-123; E. 
Merton Coulter, William G. Brownlow, Fighting Parson of the Southern Highlands (Chapel Hill, 1937), 
262-374; Thomas B. Alexander, Political Reconstruction in Tennessee (Nashville, 1950), 163-75. 
5 Ku Klux Conspiracy, Report of the Joint Select Committee into the Condition of Affairs in the Late 




In the 1930s, two books appeared in which Tennessee's Reconstruction figured 
prominently: James Patton's Unionism and Reconstruction and E. Merton Coulter's 
entertaining biography William G. Brownlow. Both say little about the State Guard 
specifically, and then only within the context of "Brownlow's Wars" for political power, 
but they concur that the performance ofthis organization was in keeping with the 
authoritarian style of its commander-in-chief Coulter goes so far as to compare the State 
Guard to the New Model Army of the seventeenth-century English dictator Oliver 
Cromwell-Brownlow's militia as "modem Ironsides.',6 
In 1950, Thomas B. Alexander presented the fullest study of Reconstruction 
politics in Tennessee. His observations on the State Guard are no different from those of 
his predecessors of the 1930s, but he does tie this militia body more closely to Brownlow 
himself The State Guard is depicted as the governor's "personal possession" and his 
"private army." Not surprisingly, Alexander sees it as an instrument oftyranny. 7 
Negative observations about the State Guard culminate with the overtly anti-
Brownlow commentary of Robert White, editor of several volumes of the Messages of 
the Governors of Tennessee. Invoking the Cromwell imagery again, he condemns the 
actions of the State Guard, with its "clanking swords and rattling militia musketry" and 
its "rampant Radical" leadership, as nothing more than legalized oppression. It is 
Tennessee," in Why the Solid South? Or Reconstruction and its Results, ed. Herbert A. Hilary (Baltimore, 
1890), 191-98. 
6 Patton, Unionism and Reconstruction, 176-77, 235; Coulter, Brownlow, 332. 
7 Alexander, Political Reconstruction, 149-50, 167. 
scholarship such as this that may have contributed to James Sefton's curt dismissal of all 
Reconstruction militias as "worse than useless. "8 
Since the 1950s, no scholarly study of Tennessee Reconstruction has emerged 
beyond several articles, none of which addresses the State Guard. Nevertheless, some 
noteworthy monographs on the Reconstruction South as a whole have appeared which 
cast the State Guard in a more favorable light. Otis Singletary' s Negro Militia and 
/ 
7 
Reconstruction stands as the only published study specifically on Reconstruction militias. 
In this sympathetic work, the author aptly notes that "the need for the militia grew out of 
the stem dictates of political self-preservation." Although Singletary's main focus is on 
militia activities in Louisiana, Arkansas, and Mississippi, he does offer some interesting 
commentary on the Tennessee State Guard. His conclusion is that it "proved more 
annoying than overpowering." Overall, he judges the entire militia experiment a failure 
because the Radical governors lacked the courage to "employ the militia forces to the full 
extent of their power."9 
Another work that offers sympathetic treatment of the plight of southern 
Republicans is Allen Trelease's White Terror, perhaps the definitive study of the Ku 
Klux Klan during Reconstruction. The book includes detailed chapters on Klan activities 
in Tennessee and the state government's confrontations with this organization. Trelease 
says that the State Guard was created to suppress "an endemic spirit of lawlessness" that 
pervaded the middle and western portions of Tennessee. Although the organization was 
8 Robert H. White, Stephen V. Ash and Wayne C. Moore eds., Messages of the Governors of Tennessee 
(11 vols. to date; Nashville, 1952-), 5: 552-53; Sefton, United States Army and Reconstruction., 236. 
9 Otis Singletary, Negro Militia and Reconstruction (New York, 1957), 4, 13, 145. 
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effective at controlling elections, its ability to defeat the Klan cannot be fairly measured, 
in the author's view, due to its abrupt disbandment in 1869. In short, the State Guard's 
war against the KKK could have been decisive, but proved "anticlimactic" in the end. 10 
Since White Terror, there has been no significant commentary on the Tennessee 
State Guard. While the old school-Patton, Coulter, and Alexander-appears to still 
hold sway on both this subject and their conclusions about "Brownlowism" as a whole, 
the truth about this particular militia probably lies somewhere within John Hope 
Franklin's brief and inadvertently contradictory appraisal of the State Guard. At one 
point in his book Reconstruction, Franklin claims that Governor Brownlow was "among 
the most vigorous defenders of Radical Reconstruction," a man who "did not hesitate to 
use [the militia]." However, at another point, he laments that the Tennessee militia 
"served more as a warning ... than as an actual fighting force." Which statement is 
correct? Was the militia a genuine weapon or merely a threat? 11 
With all due respect to previous scholarship on Tennessee's Reconstruction, 
denouncing the Radicals as tyrants without examining in detail this group's mailed fist-
the State Guard-is a serious deficiency. This dissertation seeks to bring Tennessee's 
militia organization into the light and, in so doing, offer a re-evaluation of supposed 
Radical tyranny and reopen the question of whether a more forceful military-style 
Reconstruction could have succeeded in Tennessee ( and by extension, in the rest of the 
South). To this end, a number of questions are addressed, all of which revolve around the 
10 Trelease, White Terror, 9, 18, 182. While deferring to Trelease's findings, Eric Foner credits the State 
Guard with a "drastic curtailment" of Klan activities in the early months of 1869. See Eric Foner, 
Reconstruction, America's Unfinished Revolution: 1863-1877 (New York, 1988), 439-40. 
11 John Hope Franklin, Reconstruction After the Civil War (Chicago, 1961), 121, 161-62. 
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central issue of the State Guard's effectiveness during Reconstruction: What was the 
precise mission of the State Guard? When did the situation justify its activation and for 
how long? Who served in the State Guard, and who were the leaders? Where exactly 
was it employed and what were the rules of engagement? What were the limitations of 
the State Guard as an instrument of force? Finally, how might the State Guard have been 
used differently? 
With these questions in mind, this dissertation offers the following thesis: the 
Tennessee State Guard was remarkably effective at enforcing the Reconstruction policies 
of the Radical Republican government. Although it was a partisan law enforcement 
body-a Radical Army, in effect-the State Guard usually conducted itself with a 
marked degree of professionalism and restraint. To be sure, the militia officers generally 
despised the "rebel" majority, but the State Guard was never used to avenge the suffering 
of Unionists during the Civil War; it was not an instrument of tyranny. Rather, the State 
Guard operated fully within the laws of the state (however questionable the 
constitutionality of some of those laws). When it was used, in 1867 and early 1869, it 
successfully thwarted ex-Confederate resistance and ensured Radical success and safety. 
Its employment, however, was inconsistent. In 1868, a year that witnessed widespread 
Ku Klux Klan depredations, the State Guard was never called into service. And in the 
summer of 1869 the executive abruptly disbanded it before the Klan was sufficiently 
suppressed. By not maintaining an active State Guard presence throughout the 
Reconstruction period, the Radical Republicans forfeited perhaps the best means for 
preserving their hold on the state and completing their plans for a New Tennessee. Thus, 
10 
Reconstruction failed in Tennessee, in large part, because the Radicals were too cautious 
in their use of force. 
Reconstruction in Tennessee has been lambasted by historians for far too long. 
The performance of the State Guard demonstrates that the Radicals were not that 
"radical" (if the term is used to mean despotic) and that Governor Brownlow, while 
certainly intemperate in his rhetoric, was usually levelheaded in his approach to 
governing. He did not recklessly engage in the politics of force, nor did any other 
important Radical for that matter. While rehabilitating the Radical image is beyond the 
scope of this dissertation, a full discussion of the State Guard must bring the Radical 
record into consideration and thereby permit a qualified reconsideration. The unsavory 
Governor Brownlow is too often the focus of attention while the many other important 
leaders both in the General Assembly and among the State Guard officer corps are 
ignored. This dissertation looks at the more than two thousand militiamen who were 
simultaneously Radical leaders and followers. They played a larger role in 
Reconstruction than mere thugs marching to the governor's tune. To be sure, these 
militiamen, especially the officers, were all dedicated Radicals, but they had a vested 
interest in securing for the party not only power, but legitimacy. In this sense, the 
militiamen were active agents in making Reconstruction work for the Radical party and 
the Unionist populace. In the process, they made the State Guard an effective, and well-
regulated, instrument of force. 
11 
CHAPTER ONE 
The Creation of a Radical Army 
On 11 January 1867, an ex-Confederate guerrilla shot and killed Almon Case, a 
Radical State Senator, near his home in Troy, Tennessee. Troy is in Obion County, in 
northwestern Tennessee, and it was a dangerous place for Radicals to live in the post-
Civil War period. The majority of Obion's white males had voted for secession in 1861, 
and during the war the county was a haven for Rebel guerrillas. These whites did not like 
Senator Case, a wartime Unionist, who firmly supported the Reconstruction 
administration of Governor William G. Brownlow. Case represented a small 
constituency that increasingly found itself the target of ex-Confederate harassment. In 
September 1866, an assailant had murdered Case's son, Emmit. And at the time Case 
himself was killed, his assassin, Frank Farris, also wounded two Obion County deputy 
sheriffs. Although a reward of $2,000 was placed on his head, Farris enjoyed the 
protection of local Obion whites and was never arrested. 1 
Case's death sounded the political tocsin for the Radicals. After two years, the 
Radicals' hold on power was still precarious in much of the state. Although the Radicals 
controlled all branches of the state government, their authority was routinely flouted by 
the state's large populace of ex-Confederates and a sizeable group of Conservative 
Unionists--collectively, the anti-Radicals. The General Assembly condemned the 
assassination. Radicals, in particular, regarded it as another example of"the spirit of 
1 Charles L. Lutkin, "A Forgotten Controversy: The Assassination of Senator Almon Case of Tennessee," 
West Tennessee Historical Society Papers 39 (1985): 37-50; Acts of Tennessee, 34th General Assembly, 2nd 
Adjourned Session (Nashville, 1867), Resolution No. 68. 
12 
hatred, malice, and uncharitableness, the legitimate fruits of treason" that plagued much 
of the state. According to the Radical Samuel Amell, "No explanation but political 
feeling could be offered for the act." The time had come, so it seemed, for the Brownlow 
administration to crack down hard on lawlessness. The Obion incident added impetus to 
Radical efforts to secure the passage of a militia bill, one that envisioned a powerful State 
Guard as a means of protection for the party and the Reconstruction process, and a new 
franchise bill, one that extended suffrage to blacks. (Both bills were then being debated 
in the second session of the 34th General Assembly.) The Radicals viewed 1867 as a 
critical year for Reconstruction and for their hold on power. The first of August would 
mark the first peacetime statewide election since 1860, and the first time that southern 
blacks had ever voted. Case's death, however, marked an ominous start to that year. 2 
The Civil War had produced great enmity between those Tennesseans who 
supported the Union and those who advocated secession. As the sectional crisis unfolded 
in early 1861, most Tennesseans generally repudiated the idea of disunion. Public 
opinion changed, however, with the outbreak of war in April. In early May, secessionist 
Governor Isham G. Harris and his allies in the General Assembly effected a declaration 
of independence, subject to approval by the voters on 8 June. Harris then entered into a 
"military league" with the Confederacy and began raising an army to defend the state 
against Federal invasion. Unionists from East Tennessee, the stronghold of Unionism in 
the state, gathered in Knoxville (30 May) and denounced Harris's fait accompli. 
Nevertheless, their efforts to halt the slide into secession failed. With aroused passions, 
2 Acts of Tennessee, 34th General Assembly, 2nd Adjourned Session, Resolution No. 58; Samuel Mayes 
Arnell, "The Southern Unionist" (unpublished manuscript, Special Collections, University of Tennessee, 
Knoxville, no date), 313; White, Messages, 5: 550-51. 
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West and Middle Tennessee voted overwhelmingly for secession on 8 June. A second 
convention of East Tennessee Unionists gathered in Greeneville (17 June) and called for 
separate statehood, but the Harris regime ignored their application. 3 
Thwarted in their peaceable efforts to resolve the situation, many Tennessee 
Unionists resorted to violence. With the Civil War well underway, Unionist guerrillas in 
East Tennessee launched an uprising in November 1861. They burned five important 
railroad bridges and threw the region into pandemonium. The Confederacy countered 
with military occupation and martial law. Nevertheless, Unionists in East Tennessee as 
well as the other regions of the state continued to fight; at least 30,000 of them joined the 
Federal army, forming more than twenty regiments of Tennessee volunteers. These 
Unionists fought not only for their nation, but also for the defense of their own homes 
and communities, which had been overrun by Confederate forces. For four years, 
Tennessee suffered a violent mixture of conventional and guerrilla warfare, along with 
political persecution and social and economic chaos. In many localities, the war 
descended to the level of personal vendetta where atrocity begot counter-atrocity.4 
As the Confederacy collapsed in 1864-65, Tennessee Unionists quarreled over 
how to restore civil government. Two competing political factions emerged: the so-
called Unconditional Unionists, men who wholeheartedly supported the Lincoln 
3 Patton, Unionism and Reconstruction, 3-25; Paul H. Bergeron, Stephen V. Ash, and Jeanette Keith, 
Tennesseans and Their Histol)'. (Knoxville, 1999), 132-39. 
4 David Madden, "Unionist Resistance to Confederate Occupation: The Bridge Burners of East Tennessee," 
East Tennessee Historical Society Publications 52/53 (1980/81): 22-39; Bergeron, Tennesseans, 139-57; 
James M. McPherson, What They Fought For, 1861-1865 (Baton Rouge, 1994), 38; Stephen V. Ash, 
Middle Tennessee Society Transformed, 1860-1870: War and Peace in the Upper South (Baton Rouge, 
1988), 84-106, 143-74; Noel C. Fisher, War At Eve!)' Door: Partisan Politics and Guerrilla Violence in 
East Tennessee, 1860-1869 ( Chapel Hill, 1997). 
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administration and the Republican Party, especially the Radical wing, and the 
Conservative Unionists, men who opposed secession, but also opposed emancipation. 
The Unconditional Unionists, who increasingly identified themselves as Radicals, viewed 
the ex-Confederate majority as "traitors" and "rebels" who deserved some kind of 
punishment for rending the Union and disrupting the lives of loyal men. Conservative 
Uniortists urged a more conciliatory attitude toward ex-Confederates. At a convention in 
Nashville in January 1865, the Radicals, most of whom came from East Tennessee, 
dominated the proceedings and restored civil government on their terms. William G. 
Brownlow, a prominent Radical Unionist whose Knoxville Whig and Rebel Ventilator 
had waged a venomous propaganda war against the Confederacy, became the new 
governor on 4 March 1865. Intent on consolidating Radical power, this former circuit-
riding Methodist preacher implemented a stem Reconstruction program. 5 
From the outset of Reconstruction, Governor Brownlow's main priority was to 
establish an electorate in Tennessee "that shall be thoroughly loyal." To this end, the 
Radical Unionists in the General Assembly enacted a franchise law in June 1865 that 
temporarily forbade some 80,000 ex-Confederates from voting. To the Radicals, such~ 
measure seemed logical and justifiable. As State Senator Samuel Amell reasoned, 
"rebellion had no right or privilege of citizenship whatever. This was the legal status 
brought about by secession .... To say that people conquered with arms in their hands 
are to be handed over to themselves for reconstruction is to talk absurdly, without sense." 
To the anti-Radicals, however, such thinking was spurious reasoning for what amounted 
5 Yerton M. Queener, "The Origin of the Republican Party in East Tennessee," East Tennessee Historical 
Society Publications 13 (1941): 77-84; Alexander, Political Reconstruction, 18-32; Coulter, Brownlow, 
235-93. 
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to a naked power grab--the essence of"Brownlowism." The fall Congressional elections 
of 1865 proved a disappointment for the Radicals. In many instances, anti-Radical forces 
violated the franchise provisions, particularly the discriminatory loyalty oaths, and only 
three Radicals, all from East Tennessee, won their races. Amell later prevailed in his 
Middle Tennessee district, but only after Brownlow tossed out thousands of "illegal" 
votes. Similarly, county elections held in March 1866 resulted in numerous victories for 
former Confederates in West and Middle Tennessee. In the eyes of the Radicals, 
Conservative opponents of the Brownlow administration, in league with their ex-
Confederate partners, were manipulating the letter of the Franchise Act in order to pervert 
its spirit. 6 
In May 1866, a second, more severe, franchise law was passed. This new act 
created Commissioners of Registration for each county under direct executive control and 
permanently disfranchised all ex-Confederates. Brownlow admitted that this franchise 
amendment was "a terrible bill," but necessary under the circumstances. Resistance to 
this measure resulted in the resignation of twenty-one Conservative members of the 
House in an effort to prevent a voting quorum. Once again, Brownlow resorted to 
makeshift countermeasures to thwart what the Radicals called the "little rebellion.;, He 
held special elections and then seated candidates of Radical proclivities who helped pass 
the revised franchise bill. 7 
6 White, Messages, 5: 456; Amell, "Southern Unionist," 272-74; Alexander, Political Reconstruction, 87, 
104-105; Jones, "Reconstruction in Tennessee," 182-83. 
7 Queener, "Republican Party in East Tennessee," 86-87; White, Messages, 5: 488-500. 
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These franchise restrictions were crucial to Radical Reconstruction in Tennessee. 
There was simply no other practical way to ensure that those who had ruptured the Union 
in 1861 did not regain power in 1865. Brownlow said as much in one of his first 
executive proclamations, when he declared that the Franchise Act "IS THE SUPREME 
LAW OF THE LAND, and will be rigidly enforced." He said further that those who 
defied its precepts would be "dealt with as rebels." As events demonstrated, Radicals 
increasingly viewed even Conservative Unionists as "rebels." Unfortunately for the 
Brownlow administration, the Radicals were discovering that proscriptive legislative 
decrees, stringent loyalty oaths, and truculent gubernatorial proclamations were hollow 
measures without the coercive power to back them up. In the absence of an armed 
deterrent, these measures only inflamed the opposition and invited defiance. 
"Brownlowism" in 1865 and 1866 had spawned hatred, not fear. 8 
Hatred contributed to Senator Case's death. His assassination, however, was not 
an isolated event, but the culmination of over a year of anti-Radical agitation throughout 
the state. Governor Brownlow warned his followers as early as 1865 "that the spirit of 
Rebellion and nullification still exists and must be defeated." Lawlessness in 1865, 
however, was attributable more to Civil War aftershocks than to a premeditated plan for 
counter-Reconstruction. But events in 1866 portended trouble for the Radicals. The 
most infamous example of Reconstruction violence in Tennessee is the oft-cited 
Memphis race riot in May. This terrible event left forty-six blacks dead and a nation in 
shock. To the Radicals, this atrocity was a harbinger of things to come. To be sure, the 
8 White, Messages, 5: 443. 
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riot was a product of racial hostility, not political outrage, but it highlighted the 
precarious freedom enjoyed by blacks, a freedom the Radical party had the responsibility 
of defending. To protect blacks, and to overcome the numerical weakness of the Radical 
party in West and Middle Tennessee, the Radicals in the General Assembly began to 
consider black suffrage in 1866. Brownlow, like most other Radicals, had misgivings 
about bestowing the right to vote on blacks, but political survival demanded it: "without 
their votes, the State will pass into disloyal hands, and a reign of terror ... will be the 
result." Strengthening the party was understandable, but disrupting the racial order was 
risky. With blacks as voters, ones presumably loyal to the Radical party, the racial 
hostility and political tension already manifest in the state would be magnified.9 
Anti-Radicals steadily fueled the political tension. Widespread criticism, 
especially from Conservative and ex-Confederate newspaper editors, tormented the 
Brownlow administration. These spokesmen rejected the legitimacy of Radical 
Reconstruction. A Sedition Act, passed by the General Assembly in June 1865, 
theoretically stifled such criticism, but there is no indication that this law was ever 
enforced. The U. S. army did arrest Emerson Etheridge, a prominent Conservative from 
Weakley County, for sedition and treason against the Brownlow administration, but he 
was exonerated by a Federal military tribunal in November 1865, and soon resumed his 
vocal opposition to the Radicals. For the most part, the anti-Radical press, be it 
9 White, Messages, 5:445, 462, 546-48; Bobby L. Lovett, "Memphis Riots: White Reactions to Blacks in 
Memphis, May 1865-July 1866," Tennessee HistoricaL.Q!mrterly 38 (1979): 9-33; Alexander, Political 
ReconstructioQ, 99-iO, 123-24. 
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Conservative or ex-Confederate, lambasted the Brownlow government without mercy 
and without reprisal. 10 
More unsettling to the Radicals than "seditious" editorials and speeches was the 
emergence of a concerted anti-Radical effort to usurp political power. Through the 
spring of 1866, a political conspiracy unfolded in West and Middle Tennessee. 
Disgusted by the second Franchise Act, a caucus of Conservative leaders met in April to 
devise a plan to overthrow the Radical state government. Anti-Radical newspapers in 
West Tennessee unabashedly promoted the conspiracy. The conspirators sought the 
backing of President Andrew Johnson. A schism between the President and the 
Congressional Republicans had emerged, and this Tennessee cabal hoped that Johnson's 
political struggle would translate into support for a coup. Horace Maynard, one of 
Tennessee's Radical congressmen, assured Governor Brownlow that "the project of 
overturning the present state government ... will not prevail." But Brownlow had 
already braced himself for conflict: "No earthly power can drive me from the support of 
the men and party who fought the battles of the late war, and put down the rebellion." 
Many Conservatives condemned this conspiracy (as did President Johnson), and the 
threatened coup never materialized, but to the Radicals, it was part of a pattern of 
growing insurrectionary opposition. 11 
10 Alexander, Political Reconstruction, 88-89, 127-29; Ku Klux Conspiracy. 1: 455-56. Several times in 
July 1865, Etheridge declared Brownlow's governorship a tyranny, urged Tennesseans to disregard the 
franchise laws, and countenanced violence against blacks. 
11 Thomas B. Alexander, "Political Reconstruction in Tennessee, 1865-1870," in Radicalism, Racism. and 
Party Realignment: The Border States During Reconstruction, ed. Richard 0. Curry (Baltimore, 1969), 59-
61; LeRoy P. Graf, Ralph W. Haskins, and Paul H: Bergeron, eds., The Papers of Andrew Johnson, 16 vols. 
(Knoxville, 1967-2000), 10: 512-14; Horace Maynard to Governor Brownlow, 26 May 1866, W. G. 
Brownlow Papers (MS 1940), Box I, Folder 9, Special Collections, University of Tennessee, Knoxville; 
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Attempts at counter-Reconstruction reached a climax during a special session of 
the General Assembly to consider ratification of the 14th Amendment and the readmission 
of Tennessee to the Union that would follow. President Johnson's obstruction of 
Congressional Reconstruction encouraged many Tennessee Conservatives to block 
efforts by the Radicals to ratify the amendment. Governor Brownlow resorted to forcible 
measures to ensure passage. He initially called on the Federal garrison for help, but 
General George H. Thomas demurred. Therefore, Brownlow ordered the sergeant at 
arms to arrest certain "refractory" members (i.e., Conservatives who opposed the 
amendment) in order to achieve a quorum, but forbade them to vote. The amendment 
was ratified on 19 July 1866 and Tennessee rejoined the Union on 24 July. A Tennessee 
judge who later ruled the ratification process unconstitutional was impeached and 
removed by the Radicals. Coupled with his vote-tossing in 1865, Brownlow's conduct 
during these proceedings provided the anti-Radicals with plenty of propaganda 
ammunition. From the Radical perspective, however, these were imperative measures 
taken against an intransigent foe. 12 
Unfortunately for the Radicals, readmission to the Union did not end their 
troubles. Stymied by Radical authority, many frustrated Rebels began resorting to 
political violence in 1866; the state government found itself calling on the Federal 
garrison for aid on numerous occasions. During the March county elections, Brownlow, 
Governor Brownlow to W. E. Kelley, 8 March 1866, E. E. Patton Collection, McClung Historical 
Collection, Knoxville. 
12 Eugene G. Feistman, "Radical Disfranchisement and the Restoration of Tennessee, 1865-1866," 
Tennessee Historical Quarterly 12 (1953): 145-47; William J. Ulrich, "The Northern Military Mind in 
Regard to Reconstruction, 1865-1872: The Attitudes of Ten Leading Union Generals" (Ph.D. dissertation, 
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dismayed by ex-Confederate audacity in violating the Franchise Act, managed to get 
Federal troops deployed to Marshall County, where they prevented efforts to disrupt the 
voting. Brownlow even reluctantly acquiesced to the U.S. army's continued presence in 
his beloved East Tennessee due to open resistance in that area. By the summer, 
conditions had deteriorated to such an extent that one army officer compared the disloyal 
lawlessness of Middle and West Tennessee to the ex-Confederate defiance he had 
witnessed in Mississippi. According to another officer, conditions in the rural parts of 
Tennessee were "most deplorable .... Outrages of all kinds [were] being committed 
without any effort on the part of the civil authorities to arrest the offenders."13 
It was during these restless months that the Ku Klux Klan was spawned in Giles 
County. Originating as a fraternal organization, the infamous KKK soon developed into 
an unofficial paramilitary wing of the anti-Radical forces. Although its full terror would 
not occur until 1867, by the end of 1866 the nascent Klan frequently engaged in racial 
and political intimidation in Giles and its neighboring counties of Middle Tennessee. As 
one historian of the Klan has written, "if Giles County ... was not the most lawless 
county in Tennessee in 1866 and 1867, it ranked high on the list."14 
Ohio State University, 1959), 233-35; Acts of Tennessee, 34th General Assembly, Extra Session, Chapters 
2-3; Alexander, Political Reconstruction, 110-11. 
13 Governor Brownlow to W. D. Kelley, 8 March 1866, Patton Collection; Robert Ramsey to Governor 
Brownlow, 5 March 1866, Brownlow Papers (MS 1940), Box 1, Folder 9; Feistman, "Radical 
Disfranchisement," 148; 40th Congress, 2nd Session, House Executive Documents, Report of the Secretary 
of War (Washington, 1867), 182-83. 
14 Alexander, Political Reconstruction, 177-79; Trelease, White Terror, 8-10. An army investigation into 
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Beyond the Klan's activities, instances of political obstruction and violence 
increased as the year went on. In August, Chancellor J. J. Noah of Maury County 
complained to Governor Brownlow that outgoing chancellor David Campbell, a 
Conservative in league with local ex-Confederates including Klan leader John C. Brown, 
had "contwnaciously" refused to permit him to take office and had, in effect, shut down 
the court system. Noah believed that Campbell's "pow-wow" of"rebel friends" was 
trying to incite trouble. He requested assistance, but immediate relief was not 
forthcoming. Army general George H. Thomas corroborated Noah's allegations in his 
annual report to the secretary of war and added that local law enforcers throughout the 
region were basically "rebel sympathizers. " 15 
Maury's neighboring counties in Middle Tennessee experienced similar 
disturbances. Discharged Federal soldiers from Grundy County petitioned the governor 
for aid in their ongoing fight against local Rebel outlaws. And one desperate farmer from 
Marshall County described an atmosphere of virulent hostility toward Unionists and 
blacks: "We cannot get justice here .... It is dangerous for us to go about, particularly a 
man who has served in the Federal army. . . . Here the civil law is a dead letter. . . . If 
the Governor and General Thomas don't send us some help, we are gone under .... We 
are in a worse condition than we had in 1861." While troops may have quelled disorder 
in March, during a special November election, with no troops in the vicinity, Marshall 
Conservatives violated the Franchise Act, ignored the registrar, and defeated a Radical 
candidate for local office. The Radical Nashville Daily Press ~ Times claimed that the 
15 J. J. Noah to Governor Brownlow, 20 August 1866, Patton Collection; J. J. Noah to Governor Brownlow, 
24 August 1866, Governor Brownlow Papers (GP 21), Reel 1, Box 1, Folder 8, Tennessee Library and 
Archives, Nashville; Report of the Secretary of War (1867), 183. 
22 
situation in Marshall County was representative of that in many other parts of the state. 
To this newspaper, "the spirit which provoked secession and dragged the South into war 
is neither dead nor dormant, but a living and active feeling in the hearts of the 
reconstructed traitors. "16 
The Daily Press and Times was not exaggerating, for ex-Confederate lawlessness 
erupted elsewhere in Middle Tennessee. General Thomas reported that Unionists and 
blacks in Robertson County were "in constant danger of their lives." Sumner County 
proved especially troublesome. Under their old guerrilla commander, "King" Ellis 
Harper, a "gang" of about 150 ex-Confederates ruled the county like warlords, terrorizing 
Unionists and freedmen alike. The situation became so intolerable that the army sent a 
cavalry detachment under Captain Edwin H. Leib to drive Harper's band out. Leib spent 
most of November and December hunting down these guerrilla outlaws, his efforts taking 
him throughout much of northern Middle Tennessee and into parts of Kentucky. 
Referring to the ex-Confederates as "barbarians," Leib informed his superiors that "if the 
troops are withdrawn ... there will be no peace or quiet for the black man and the very 
few Union men in those counties." Leib's campaign was, in its essentials, 
indistinguishable from the dozens of such operations conducted in that region during the 
Civil War. 17 
Unfortunately for the Radicals, the withdrawal of Federal troops was well under 
way in 1866. President Johnson, whom Governor Brownlow had recently dismissed as a 
16 Arnell, "Southern Unionist,"~89; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 16 September, 9 November 1866. 
17 Report of the Secretary of War (1867), 183, 199-202; Paul D. Phillips, "A History of the Freedmen's 
Bureau in Tennessee" (Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 1964), 275-76. 
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"dead dog," saw no reason to maintain a large garrison in the Volunteer State. After 
readmission to the Union, troop strength in Tennessee dwindled from over 7,000 at the 
beginning of the year to less than 2,000 by the end. Moreover, with the exception of 
Captain Leib's detachment, most of the Federal troops were stationed in Nashville and 
remained in camp. 18 
Increasing anti-Radical defiance coupled with the decreasing presence of the 
Federal garrison boded ill for the Radicals. The situation prompted a delegation of 
twenty-two East Tennesseans to submit a petition to their Congressmen. These Radicals 
proclaimed that "our prosperity as a people ... depends almost entirely on the action of 
the loyal people of this section of the state." They urged their government to take 
decisive measures to subdue the opposition. Governor Brownlow and other Radicals 
believed a second Civil War within the state of Tennessee was inevitable, perhaps 
imminent. A rumor of an assassination attempt against Brownlow himself circulated in 
October, charging certain ex-Confederates with trying to derail a train the governor had 
planned to use on a trip to Knoxville. In the autumn of 1866, Brownlow participated in 
the Convention of Union Loyalists, a group of southern Republicans that toured the North 
as part of a campaign to counter Andrew Johnson's anti-Radical stump of Northern cities, 
the so-called "Swing around the Circle." The Tennessee governor harangued his 
audiences about ex-Confederate efforts to restart the Civil War. He vividly described a 
condition of incessant rebel hostilities and spoke of the need to march fresh armies into 
the South and finish off the traitors once and for all. Regardless of whether his 
18 White, Messages, 5: 527; Sefton, United States Army and Reconstruction, 261. 
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assessment was accurate, it is notable that the key ingredient in his plan was military 
strength, something his own government lacked. 19 
On 6 November, in an address before the General Assembly, Governor Brownlow 
formally condemned the growing anti-Radical agitation and violence. Describing what 
he called "The Threatened State of Revolution," Brownlow recited a familiar litany of 
political sedition, intimidation, and conspiracy, all designed to disrupt the state election 
of August 1867 and topple the loyal government. Explaining that "there is no military 
organization anywhere in the State," Brownlow implored the Assembly to take "fearless 
action." "I recommend that you authorize the enlistment of a few regiments of loyal 
militia, to be armed and held as minute men, subject to the call of the Executive, to 
suppress insurrection or protect the ballot-box." Brownlow closed by promising to 
sustain the laws "be the consequences what they may." No doubt, Brownlow 
exaggerated the threat of a second civil war and his own government's impotence, but 
given the unrepentant nature of many ex-Confederates, the Radicals were certainly 
confronted by an opponent who was hostile, and disloyal. 20 
Some three months after this address, on 20 February 1867, the General Assembly 
passed an "Act to Organize and Equip a State Guard." Brownlow now had his much 
desired military strength. For all of the criticism of Radical "tyranny" and "oppression," 
the Brownlow administration was remarkably slow to develop a reliable coercive 
19 Petition to Leonidas C. Houk, 8 August 1866, Houk Papers, McClung Historical Collection; Coulter, 
Brownlow, 3 I 8-19; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 9 October 1866; Forrest Conklin, "Wiping Out 
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Tennessee Historical Quarterly 52 (1993): 125-27. 
20 White, Messages, 5: 534-35. 
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instrument akin to a state militia. Not until two years after gaining power did the 
Radicals create this "loyal militia." A number of factors account for this delay. Cost was 
a primary concern for the state government. In the aftermath of the war, Tennessee was 
essentially bankrupt; many Tennessee legislators were loathe to add another expense, 
such as a militia organization, to the civil government's budget. State authorities 
preferred using the services of the free Federal garrison in combating lawlessness, as long 
as it was available. Additionally, the issue of political legitimacy played a tacit, but 
crucial, role. Despite their suppression of ex-Confederate political liberties, the Radicals 
genuinely wanted a republican form of government. Cognizant of their minority political 
status, they were reluctant to create an armed force that would perforce be partisan. Only 
exigent circumstances could justify a standing army in peacetime. Besides, Conservative 
factions in the legislature were sure to oppose any militia bill that suggested the slightest 
political intent. To be sure, the anti-Radicals accused the Brownlow admirustration of 
tyranny anyway, but an arbitrary and excessive use of force would have confirmed it and 
possibly undermined Radical solidarity. Thus, Governor Brownlow adopted an 
incremental approach to the use of force. In this respect, the Tennessee State Guard 
marked a last resort, not the first choice, ofBrownlow's so-called "iron-glove regime."21 
The Radical path to the State Guard Act of 1867 was circuitous and strewn with 
political obstacles. Tennessee legislators did debate the creation of a militia force from 
the time civil government was restored in the spring of 1865, but this early effort to 
augment executive power ultimately came to naught. In his inaugural address, Governor 
21 White, Messages, 5: 555. "Iron-glove regime" is a typical example of White's negative attitude toward 
the Brownlow administration. 
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Brownlow stressed that armed bands of rebel guerrillas continued to roam the state and 
that the freedmen needed protection. Accordingly, he urged the creation of a "military 
contingent fund ... confiding it under the control of the Executive." Unionists in the 
General Assembly agreed and soon presented several bills that went beyond a mere 
contingency fund and called for an actual militia. Roderick R. Butler, a leading member 
of the largely Republican State Senate, presented a bill on 21 April entitled, "Amend the 
Militia Laws." Butler insisted that the militiamen be drawn from those Tennesseans 
mustering out of the Federal army, and believed that about 3,000 would be sufficient. 
West Tennessean Fielding Hurst agreed, and endorsed the militia bill as a law that would 
"inspire confidence in the people." Similarly, the Radical John Trimble, echoing the 
sentiments of President Johnson, stated that "the people must form home companies and 
protect themselves like men." Despite some concerns over cost and priorities, W. K. Hall 
believed that the militia bill was "about as good as we shall be likely to obtain." In the 
course of this debate, some Radicals even suggested conscripting secessionist clergymen 
into the militia as a means of punishment. Amidst such support, Butler's militia bill 
easily passed its third reading after only a few days of deliberation, 16-4. 22 
Meanwhile, in the House, William J. Smith, the chairman of the military 
committee, forcefully moved various pieces of militia legislation. At the time, Smith was 
probably the most zealous advocate for a state militia. A wartime Unionist and 
slaveholder from the West Tennessee county of Hardeman, Smith had been arrested by 
Confederate authorities in 1861 and charged with treason. Although he was acquitted, 
22 James W. Patton, Unionism and Reconstruction, 86, 93; White, Messages, 5: 413; Senate Journal, 34th 
General Assembly, 1st Session, 54, 58, 61; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 25, 26 April, 6 May 1865. 
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local secessionists threatened Smith's life. At this point, he joined the Federal army, 
serving as a scout in West Tennessee and later commanding the 13th Union Cavalry. He 
finished the war with a brevet brigadier generalship. A staunch Republican by 1865, 
Smith was a loud proponent of Radical Reconstruction for whom a loyal militia force was 
second in importance only to a strict franchise law. From the end of April to the 
beginning of June, Smith directed efforts to move some four militia bills through the 
House. He replaced Butler's original Senate bill with his own bill, "to Organize a State 
Guard." The substantial number of Conservatives in the House, however, defeated this 
piece of legislation. Perhaps angered, Smith resisted efforts to pass a revised version of 
Butler's Senate bill. Eager to get something passed before the session ended on 12 June, 
however, he readily supported a new Senate bill for ''the Military Discipline and Defense 
of the State." Nevertheless, this bill was defeated, as was the hasty reintroduction of the 
Butler bill on 7 June. Smith's parliamentary inexperience coupled with his apparent 
stubbornness contributed to the Assembly's failure to enact any militia laws in 1865.23 
However attractive a state militia may have sounded to Tennessee Radicals, there 
was no sense of urgency about creating such an organization in 1865. Many elected 
officials, most notably James R. Hood, a House Conservative who voted against all of the 
militia bills, believed a state militia was fiscally impractical and unnecessary given the 
presence of a large Federal garrison (over 16,000 soldiers were stationed in Tennessee at 
the time). Accordingly, the Assembly petitioned the President for military aid, reminding 
23 House Journal, 34th General Assembly, 1st Session, 36, 80, 104, 132, 176-77, 186,194,230,260; Robert 
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him of his constitutional duty to "guarantee ... a Republican form of government." 
President Andrew Johnson assured the Brownlow administration that General Thomas, 
the department commander, would furnish "whatever amount of military force is 
necessary to sustain the civil authority and enforce the law." Brownlow and most 
Radicals happily accepted this military force. As the defender of Nashville against 
Confederate General John B. Hood's invasion in 1864, Thomas was popular with 
Tennessee Unionists. Moreover, Thomas was sympathetic to the Radical cause in the 
state. Though content to rely on U. S. troops, the General Assembly did offer some 
comfort to county. authorities confronted with guerrilla bands left over from the war. The 
"Sheriffs Act" of June authorized the creation of"County Guards," posses of twenty-five 
men that local sheriffs could employ to combat outlaws. 24 
By 1866, as political tensions mounted, these means of law enforcement proved 
inadequate. The Sheriffs Act was designed to combat leftover guerrillas, not enforce a 
Reconstruction political agenda. Brownlow was generally pleased with how sheriffs in 
East Tennessee suppressed ex-Confederate lawlessness, but sheriffs elsewhere were less 
interested in promoting Radical policy. As for the Federal garrison, General Thomas, in 
accordance with President Johnson's final proclamation ending the war, scaled down 
U.S. army operations (fewer than 2,000 soldiers were stationed in the state for most of the 
24 Graf, Papers of Andrew Johnson, 8: 99,440; Sefton, United States Army and Reconstruction, 261; 
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year). Moreover, after Tennessee's readmission, the Federal government properly 
expected the state government to solve its own problems. 25 
To this end, the Radicals enacted the controversial Metropolitan Police Act in 
May 1866. This law granted the governor significant control over the police forces in 
three of the state's major urban centers: Memphis, Nashville, and Chattanooga. 
(Knoxville, Brownlow' s hometown, was considered secure for the Radicals, although it 
did have a self-appointed "secret" police to keep crime in check). The disappointing 
results of the March elections and the horrors of the Memphis race riot seemed to justify 
this increase in the executive's coercive powers, but the Metropolitan Police was only 
partially effective in suppressing anti-Radical activities. In Chattanooga, police 
commissioners appointed by Brownlow did help the Radicals win that city's December 
municipal elections, but most of the city's residents found this use of force distasteful and 
protested the partisanship of the police. In Memphis, the Metropolitan Police became 
mired in that city's complicated politics. The commissioners divided their loyalties 
between rival Republican factions, undermining Brownlow's influence in the process. In 
Nashville, the popular Conservative mayor Matt Brown, who habitually reminded people 
of his steadfast refusal to take the state's loyalty oaths, levied an injunction against 
Brownlow' s Commissioners that inhibited the organization of the Metropolitan Police for 
months. Not until October 1867, when the Radicals won mayoral power, would a viable 
Radical police force materialize in Nashville. Even when fully employed, however, the 
25 Graf, Papers of Andrew Johnson 9: 367; Sefton, United States Army and Reconstruction, 261; Coulter, 
Brownlow, 331. 
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Police Act limited Brownlow's reach to the cities, leaving the majority of the state 
unpoliced. 26 
To achieve real and lasting power, the Radicals needed a strong, reliable force at 
the Governor's immediate disposal. Enter the Tennessee State Guard. Past elections 
demonstrated to the Radicals that the Franchise Act required vigilant enforcement, 
something only a militia force could provide. Furthermore, the necessity for the State 
Guard was decidedly urgent given the Radicals' pending efforts to enfranchise blacks. 
The Radical party was making a major effort in 1867 to implement its final version of 
Reconstruction-a Republican political hegemony that promoted public education, 
economic development, and a measure of racial equality. The potential for a second Civil 
War-Brownlow's "state of revolution"-threatened to wreck these plans. The success 
of this Reconstruction venture, and the political survival of the Radicals, demanded a 
powerful militia to counter any armed resistance. By the autumn of 1866, the Radicals 
moved to the verge of force politics. 
Conservatives viewed with growing alarm both Brownlow' s request for a militia 
force to prevent a rumored second Civil War and the Radical party's gravitation toward 
black suffrage. Misperceptions concerning the creation of a large state militia circulated 
throughout the autumn. Edward H. East believed that the Radicals intended to "arm 
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about 30,000 soldiers (white & negroes)." Alvan C. Gillem claimed that the recent 
political tension was the fault of the Radicals, who sought a "pretext to arm the militia, 
which in Middle & West Tennessee will be.mostly colored." John S. Brien urged 
President Johnson to replace General Thomas with an army commander more favorable 
to the Conservatives. According to Brien, "if Brownlow Sucedes in arming the negroes 
and organizing them as Malitia," then Conservatives would need white troops to maintain 
order. 27 
Governor Brownlow left the particulars of the militia to the discretion of his 
Radical cohorts in the General Assembly. Within weeks of the Governor's November 
"State of Revolution" address, they dutifully presented two militia bills for consideration. 
Words of encouragement came from the Radical Daily Press and Times, which declared 
"A Well Organized Loyal Militia" to be one of the party's principal objectives for the 
upcoming year. The sense of urgency notwithstanding, the House military committee 
took a long time-nearly two months-to draft a single, suitable bill. The assassination 
of Senator Case, however, accelerated the process. Shortly after this tragedy, William J. 
Smith, the champion of earlier efforts to create a state militia, presented a lengthy, 
complex militia bill that incorporated ideas from all previous bills on the matter. Smith's 
bill-No. 727: " To Provide for Organizing, Arming, and Disciplining the Militia"-
contained twenty-nine sections dealing with every imaginable detail and contingency 
from personnel qualifications and recruitment procedures to training regulations and 
supply matters. Smith envisioned militia formations as large as divisions and volunteers 
27 Graf, Papers of Andrew Johnson, 11: 234, 288, 362. 
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who would serve for three years. The bill further stipulated that regiments would 
comprise an equal number of white and black troops. But the bill was plagued by 
extraneous details. Section 7 explained at length the adjutant general's responsibilities, 
although James P. Brownlow had already been performing quite ably in that capacity for 
two years. Section 10 described how soldiers were to dress and exactly what gear they 
would cany. Section 16 required so many days of military exercise per calendar year. 
Section 17 explained how and when subordinate commands were to report to higher 
headquarters. Section 24 provided instructions on employing artillery ( a "four gun 
battery" was assigned for each brigade), even though there were no field pieces in the 
Tennessee arsenal. One portion of the bill even forbade the enrollment of"idiots and 
luriatics." A Conservative newspaper mockingly declared that this so-called "lunatic 
clause" exempted the Radicals from participat1on in the militia altogether. 28 
However cumbersome Smith's bill, the Radicals passionately pushed for its 
"immediate passage." James A. Doughty of Campbell County reportedly exclaimed that 
"the loyal men intended to control the State; if they could not control her peaceably they 
would control her by blood-shed." As an afterthought, he added, "there had not been 
blood enough shed." James S. Mulloy of Robertson County echoed Doughty's 
statements. Accusing the ex-Confederates of"rape, robbery, murder and arson" 
throughout the state, he endorsed the militia bill, claiming that he "had rather be radically 
right that radically wrong." The Conservatives were appalled by such statements and 
attempted to postpone the bill's passage. John Lellyett of Davidson County warned "that 
28 House Journal, 34th General Assembly, 2nd Adjourned Session, 37, 85, 177; Nashville Daily Press and 
Times, 21 December 1866, 24 January, 1 February 1867; Fayetteville Observer, 14 February 1867. 
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armies and troops produced more murders and crimes than they suppressed." 
Nevertheless, Conservative delay tactics were defeated when William J. Smith forced a 
roll-call vote on the bill. It passed its second reading 39-23, but the tally reflected 
significant opposition. 29 
Outside observers took a keen interest in Smith's militia bill No. 727, and state 
newspapers weighed in on the legislative discussions. The Radical Nashville Daily Press 
and Times applauded the Assembly's decisive action. It described the bill as the surest 
means to "exterminate the intolerable evil" of ex-Confederate violence, and it reminded 
readers that this bill limited Governor Brownlow to little more than 8,000 men, whereas 
Confederate governor Isham Harris had mobilized 55,000 men in 1861. The 
Conservative Nashville Union and Dispatch condemned the militia bill as a "despotic 
scheme" engineered by the Radicals to secure their tyranny. Repudiating the Radical 
claim of rebel lawlessness and ignoring the manifest political violence, the Union and 
Dispatch marveled that such legislation could be provoked by the death of a single man-
Almon Case. This newspaper claimed that a state militia "will be a disgrace to the 
civilization of the age." In response to such criticism, the Daily Press and Times smugly 
retorted, "let them wail." The Knoxville Whig, Brownlow' s personal propaganda 
machine, offered a reasoned justification for the militia. It reassured Conservatives that 
"no very large number [ of militiamen] will ever be called into actual service." It further 
insisted that the militia was not designed to control elections, but to uphold the law where 
"a general spirit of defiance reigns supreme." Finally, it proclaimed that the Radicals 
29 Nashville Union and Dispatch, 27 January 1867; House Journal, 34th General Assembly, 2nd Adjourned 
Session, 192-93. 
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would triumph "without brute force," and that with a militia, the governor could ensure 
that the Rebels also refrained from "brute force." Unconvinced, the Union and Dispatch 
rhetorically asked, "how much of republican government will there be left when these 
Praetorian bands are turned loose?"30 
Realizing the seriousness of creating a standing army for the governor, even some 
Radical politicians urged caution. Smith's version of the militia bill ultimately proved 
too unwieldy, and other bills paraded the Assembly floor in early February. In an effort 
to conciliate fellow Radicals and maintain his ·central role on the militia issue, Smith 
submitted a simplified version of his militia bill, but the House rejected it in a close vote 
(30-26). Conservatives consistently maintained that a militia was an excessive response 
to "the usual criminal outcroppings incident to every community," and recommended the 
cessation of debate on the topic. The Radicals, however, though still undecided on a final 
version, made the militia the "special order" of business for the House.31 
As House legislators wrangled over the issue, Radicals in the Senate crafted the 
militia bill that eventually passed into law. Alfred M. Cate, one of the Unionist heroes of 
the 1861 bridge-burning episode in East Tennessee, maneuvered a more succinct militia 
bill, entitled "An Act to Organize a State Guard," through the Senate despite some 
reservations by several members. Conservatives presented two amendments which 
stipulated that the militia could be deployed only after two-thirds of a county's civil 
authorities requested aid, and that the militia would be forbidden to assemble around 
30 Nashville Daily Press and Times, 19, 26 January, 1 February 1867; Nashville Union and Dispatch, 27 
January, 2, 17 February 1867; Knoxville Whig. 30 January, 27 February 1867. 
31 House Journal, 34th General Assembly, 2nd Adjourned Session, 233, 257, 263-65; Nashville Union and 
Dispatch, 17 February 1867. 
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polling places. Both amendments were defeated by a straight party vote. To further 
delay the bill's passage, Conservatives read a petition from Rutherford stating that the 
residents of that county opposed the creation of any militia force. In the end, however, 
Cate's bill passed 15-7.32 
William J. Smith eagerly received the Senate militia bill and moved its adoption 
in lieu of all other House versions. Successfully thwarting Conservative efforts to debate 
the merits of this new bill, the Radicals effected its passage, but only after the addition of 
a crucial amendment, presented by "bloodshed" James Doughty no less, which stipulated 
that "the militia is not to be armed until actually called up." On 19 February, the House 
passed this latest militia bill 41-25. It became law the next day when the Senate 
concurred with the newly amended bill, 22-1, and the governor affixed his signature. 
Ignoring the many legislative objections, the Daily Press and Times cheered the "Union 
Phalanx" that brought the "loyal militia" into being. The Brownlow "regime" of 
Tennessee finally had a Radical army at its disposal. 33 
The final version of the militia law, "An Act to Organize and Equip a State 
Guard," was short and to the point, containing only three sections. The militia force was 
to be known as the "Tennessee State Guard" and was to be "composed of loyal men." 
The governor was to serve as Commander-in-Chief Each congressional district was 
permitted one or more regiments to operate in accordance with U. S. army regulations. 
Given that there were eight districts in Tennessee and that an army regiment comprised 
32 Senate Journal, 34th General Assembly, 2nd Adjourned Session, 280, 284, 301-309; Nashville Union and 
Dispatch, 17 February 1867. 
33 House Journal, 34th General Assembly, 2nd Adjourned Session, 294-96, 300-301; Senate Journal, 34th 
General Assembly, 2nd Adjourned Session, 327; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 20 February 1867. 
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about 1,000 men, the Militia Act authorized Governor Brownlow to raise at least 8,000 
men.34 
After weeks of heated debate, months of anti-Radical lawlessness and rumors of a 
second civil war, and almost two years of experimentation with alternative approaches to 
law enforcement, the Radicals of Tennessee had conceived a military force-the State 
Guard-that they hoped would finally bring peace and make Reconstruction work. The 
time involved reflects remarkable forbearance by the Radicals. To be sure, through the 
Franchise Act, they implemented a hard Reconstruction policy toward the ex-
Confederates, but they refrained, for as long as possible, from resorting to a standing 
army to enforce this policy. The process of enacting the Militia Act reveals that 
Governor Brownlow was not the sole power within the Radical party. Historian Robert 
H. White unfairly characterizes the Radical legislators as "a bunch of trained seals," who 
did whatever Brownlow ordered. But White overlooks the important role of several 
Radical leaders. In the House, William J. Smith, a former Civil War general, was a key 
figure·behind the militia bill. Similarly, in the Senate, Alfred M. Cate, another war 
veteran, helped make the State Guard a reality. These men were not dupes of the 
governor, but confident, ambitious men with a Reconstruction vision of their own. At the 
end of February 1867, they had done their part. Now, the party needed to find men who 
were militarily competent and politically reliable to command and serve in the new 
Radical army. 35 
34 Acts of Tennessee, 34th General Assembly, 2nd Adjourned Session, Chapter 24. 
35 White, Messages, 5: 499. 
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Mobilizing the State Guard 
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Following the passage of the Militia Act, Radicals met in convention at Nashville 
(22 February) to prepare formally for the upcoming campaign. At this convention, the 
Radical party apparatus assumed full shape. Leonidas C. Houk, a leading East Tennessee 
Radical, fired up the gathering with a rousing speech. He warned the ex-Confederates 
not to interfere with the election or "we will get the Militia after you and whip you into 
the ranks of law and order, and execute you if necessary." Reminding his listeners of 
Confederate oppression during the Civil War, Houk closed his address with a firm 
promise that "red-hand rebels shall not rule." In keeping with such rhetoric, the delegates 
passed a platform resolution that reflected how the Militia Act instilled new confidence 
among the rank-and-file. Resolution No. 5 read: "Lawless violence, reckless disregard of 
the rights of person and property, murder, assassination, arson and kindred crime, must 
be put down by the strong arm of power, and be made to feel that law is indeed a terror to 
evil doers." To ensure the continued success of Radicalism, the convention unanimously 
nominated William G. Brownlow for re-election as governor. 1 
Inspired by the convention proceedings, Governor Brownlow threw down his 
executive gauntlet with a bellicose proclamation (25 February) stating his intention to 
mobilize the State Guard. He declared that the recent trend of lawlessness "must and 
shall cease," and that "the present State Government of Tennessee ... will be sustained 
and preserved, despite all the efforts of disappointed traitors." Urging the citizens to 
1 Knoxville Whig. 6 March 1867; White, Messages, 5: 559-60. 
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obey the laws and keep the peace, he assured them that "prudent and experienced men 
will be placed in charge of the State Guard" and that Guard units would be deployed only 
in selected counties. Stressing the apolitical nature of the State Guard, Brownlow 
claimed that "the number of troops called into active service will be increased or 
diminished as the good or bad conduct of the people shall be developed." "Old Proc," as 
the anti-Radicals often called Brownlow, had spoken.2 
The boldness of the proclamation was indicative of the new, revolutionary 
momentum of Radical Reconstruction. On the same day, Brownlow signed into law the 
third Franchise Act, bestowing suffrage on the freedmen. For the first time in southern 
history, black men enjoyed the unqualified right to vote. In anticipation of this event, 
Radical leaders had already moved to mobilize, register, and indoctrinate the 
approximately 40,000 new black voters. The political vehicle by which these tasks were 
accomplished was the Union League. Formed by Northerners during the war as a means 
of orchestrating support for the Union, this organization made an easy transition into a 
peacetime political club. In 1867, hundreds of Union League chapters sprouted over the 
state enrolling most white Radicals and thousands of freedmen. The secret meetings and 
political activities of this organization, known also as the Loyal League and the Radical 
League, alarmed many whites among the anti-Radical forces. Angry ex-Confederates in 
Wilson County, for example, posted warnings in February that they would kill any 
"Yankee" (i.e. white Radical) and bum out any freedman who engaged in political 
activity. To such men, in addition to imposing military tyranny the Radicals had now 
2 White, Messages, 5: 553-55. In a private letter to a concerned Conservative, Brownlow vaguely 
explained that the militia would deploy only to the "most rebellious counties." Brownlow to S. L. Warren, 
16 March 1867, GP 21, Reel 2, Box 3, Folder 1. 
39 
perverted white supremacy by ushering in "the nightmare of the South"-racial equality 
via the Union League. 3 
The provisions of the both the Militia Act and the third Franchise Act elicited a 
belligerent Conservative response. Referring to the Militia Act, in particular, as "that 
monster of iniquity," the Fayetteville Observer contended that, through armed force, 
Governor Brownlow would "execute the Franchise Act in defiance of any decision the 
Supreme Court might make on the subject." Other organs claimed that the Militia Act 
was simply a ploy to gain favor with the North by portraying the ex-Confederates as 
bandits. The Union and Dispatch, citing "despicable demagoguery" on the part of the 
Radicals as the moving force behind the militia and black suffrage laws, desperately 
exhorted its readers: "Radicalism must be hurled from power." The Pulaski Citizen 
unleashed a similarly damning assessment of this latest example of Radical 
Reconstruction: "Thus that immaculate conclave of scoundrels at the capital are drawing 
the cords more closely about our necks." To this newspaper, the State Guard and its 
eventual inclusion of black militiamen represented the end of white supremacy and an 
insult to southern honor. The Citizen sarcastically suggested that Tennessee be renamed 
"Miscegenia. ,,4 
Perhaps mindful of this anti-Radical outcry, many Tennessee politicians hoped 
that the militia would not have to be called into service. On 1 March, the members of the 
3 Alexander, Political Reconstruction, 142-46; Susie Lee Owens, "The Union League of America: Political 
Activities in Tennessee, the Carolinas, and Virginia, 1865-1870" (Ph.D. dissertation, New York University, 
1943), 40-81; Phillips, "Freedmen's Bureau in Tennessee," 272; Arnell, "Southern Unionist," 285. 
4 Fayetteville Observer, 21 February, 7 March 1867; Knoxville Whig, 27 March 1867; Nashville Union and 
Dispatch, 24 February 1867; Pulaski Citizen, 22 February 1867. 
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General Assembly unanimously resolved to petition General Thomas for military support 
in the upcoming election. One Conservative confided to President Johnson that no 
military force was needed at all, but that he hoped that U. S. troops could at least keep 
Brownlow' s militia of "thieves" from despoiling the state. The Union and Dispatch 
echoed such sentiments: "of the two armies, we should infinitely prefer those of the 
regular service." Brownlow dutifully requested Thomas's cooperation in deploying 
troops to any county that proved unruly. General Thomas agreed to help preserve order, 
but reminded Brownlow that since Tennessee was now back in the Union, "the laws can 
be enforced therein by proper civil authority." Accordingly, he stressed that his men 
would "act as aids only ... and not assume control." Moreover, Thomas placed 
numerous constraints on his units, insisting that his troops would move only after a 
specific instance of disorder had been reported and corroborated by the civil authorities 
and only after a strict chain of command had been established between such authorities 
and the regular officer in charge. Although sympathetic to the Radicals' plight, Thomas 
was essentially telling Brownlow to use his own resources to enforce his own laws. 5 
Undeterred by General Thomas's understandable reservations about involving 
Federal troops in a civil election, the governor committed to a state military build-up. On 
6 March, in accordance with the Militia Act, Brownlow issued his official call, known as 
General Order No. 1, for volunteer militia companies. Prospective company commanders 
would hold the rank of captain. These captains were authorized to enlist one hundred 
'Coulter, Brownlow, 332-33; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 25 February 1867; Acts of Tennessee, 34th 
General Assembly, 2nd Adjourned Session, Resolution No. 91; Graf, Papers of Andrew Johnson, 12:81; 
Nashville Union and Dispatch, l March 1867; Governor Brownlow to George H. Thomas, 1 March 1867, 
GP 21, Reel 2, Box 3, Folder l; The American Annual Cyclopedia and Register oflmportant Events (New 
York, 1867), 705. 
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men for three-year terms, "unless sooner discharged." Each company was permitted 
twenty-five mounted personnel. Two lieutenants would be elected by each company. All 
personnel, prior to muster, were required to take the Franchise oath, one that required 
them to swear unconditional allegiance to the United States and swear that they had never 
voluntarily supported the Confederacy. After organizing, each company was to report to 
Nashville in order to draw equipment and arms. Under these instructions, a completed 
State Guard company would ideally have three officers, thirteen non-commissioned 
officers, and eighty-four privates. 6 
The Radical faithful throughout the state responded enthusiastically to 
Brownlow' s call-up. Many prospective commanders emphasized politics and duty as 
their primary reasons for requesting a commission. East Tennessean Newton T. Beal 
went straight to the point: "wishing the Radical Union Party to have every advantage of 
the Law is why I apply." John T. Rushing informed Governor Brownlow that the militia 
call-up "kindled anew the patriotic fire" within him, and that a commission in the State 
Guard would allow him "to live and die a soldier." Russ B. Davis of Warren County 
plainly stated that he would "proudly command anything you may give me." Other 
applicants stressed endemic lawlessness in their counties as reasons for wanting a 
commission. C. Underwood of Weakley begged for a commission lest the county fall to 
the "Rebills." He further stated that "If I was to Diclair for Brownlow in Company I 
Don't Believe I would Live 5 minuts." To Underwood, the militia mobilization was 
imperative, "the sooner the better." Robert Galbraith of Bedford warned that "under the 
6 General Order No. 1, 6 March 1867, Tennessee's Adjutant General's Office (RG 21), Tennessee State 
Library and Archives, Nashville, (hereafter TAGO), Reel 8, Vol. 26. 
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teachings of the infamous traitor Andy our section is beginning to assume the same 
aspect and attitude that it had in 1861 & 2 and I desire to be in a condition to combat 
Rebels, Copperheads, (and] Conservatives." John Enoch of Hickman wanted to serve in 
order to "quell the riots that spring up." He believed a thirty-man company would 
suffice. William Bunker of Polk promised Governor Brownlow that he would "hold in 
check the Treasonable portion" and "keep them from overthrowing your State 
government." With evident zeal, he added, "I would love very much to be one of its 
defenders. . . . Do not think that it is for money that I would enter your State Guard ... 
but the love I have for my birth right. "7 
Whether motivated by partisanship or self-preservation, over sixty requests to 
form a militia company crossed the adjutant general's desk between March and June 
(twenty-seven from East Tennessee, twenty-four from Middle, and ten from West, with 
one from Kentucky). One Hawkins County Unionist, taking the Militia Act's passage for 
granted, requested permission to raise a company as early as 2 February. James P. 
Brownlow, the adjutant general and the governor's son, diligently went about 
administering the militia call-up (with his cousin Samuel Hunt serving as assistant). He 
sent all newly commissioned militia captains a copy of General Order No. 1, along with 
several blank muster rolls and morning reports with instructions to complete all forms in 
triplicate. Commanders were ordered to "proceed with as little delay as possible" in 
7 Newton T. Beal to Governor Brownlow, 30 March 1867, GP 21, Reel 1, Box 2, Folder l; John T. Rushing 
to Governor Brownlow, 24 May 1867, GP 21, Reel 1, Box 2, Folder 2; Russ B. Davis to Governor 
Brownlow, 22 February 1867, GP 21, Reel 1, Box 2, Folder l; C. Underwood to Governor Brownlow, 29 
March 1867, GP 21, Reel 1, Box 2, Folder 2; Robert Galbraith to Governor Brownlow, 4 March 1867, GP 
21, Reel 1, Box 2, Folder l; John Enoch to H. H. Thomas, 24 June 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 5; 
William Bunk.er to Governor Brownlow, 8 June 1867, GP 21, Reel 1, Box 2, Folder 1. 
organizing their companies. Only when the adjutant general was satisfied with the 
paperwork would the unit be mustered into service. 8 
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The difference between what Adjutant General Brownlow expected and what he 
often got made for some annoying administrative snarls. One prospective captain 
announced that he was recruiting volunteers although he did not have a signed 
commission, while twelve other men quit shortly after receiving their commissions. One 
such captain, W. 0. White, explained that he had decided to run for the General 
Assembly instead. Others, such as James M. Dickerson, cited personal or business 
reasons for their resignations. Although each applicant typically displayed a strong 
desire to raise a company, the actual work involved may have proved too taxing for many 
of them. Not lacking for volunteers, Brownlow gave their commissions to other worthy 
candidates, but company letter designations fluctuated throughout the spring as the 
adjutant general's office untangled the organizational jumble. 9 
Not surprisingly, the adjutant general's office expanded to meet the administrative 
challenge. To assist him in organizing the militia, James P. Brownlow commissioned 
William T. Cate and David M. Nelson to serve as mustering officers, both at the rank of 
8 All requests for commissions are contained in either the Tennessee Adjutant General files or the 
Governor's Papers. Samuel S. Couch to James Hale, 2 February 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 5; 
Coulter, Brownlow, 267; James P. Brownlow to W. 0. White, 8 March 1867, TAGO, Reel 10, Vol. 45 (this 
letter is an example of the form letters Adjutant General Brownlow sent to all commissioned officers). 
9 James H. Watson to adjutant general's office, 27 May 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 3; W. 0. 
White to Samuel Hunt, 3 April 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 3; James M. Dickerson to James P. 
Brownlow, 23 May 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 5; Nashville Union and Dispatch, 9 June 1867; 
George E. Grisham to H. H. Thomas, 27 June 1867, T AGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 3. The fluctuating 
company letter designations have also created some headaches for the researcher. For example, the T AGO 
folder labeled "Company A, 1st Regiment" contains early muster-rolls for three different companies, the 
final Company A, and two which were subsequently reclassified. Fortunately, this confusion occurs in 
only a few instances. 
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colonel. Cate was the brother of Radical state senator Alfred M. Cate, one of the 
important architects of the Militia Act. The two brothers displayed their fierce Unionism 
early in the Civil War as participants in the Unionist bridge-burning operation of 
November 1861. W. T. Cate helped destroy two railroad bridges near Chattanooga. He 
spent the rest of the war in various irregular capacities for the Federal army. Nelson, son 
of prominent East Tennessee Unionist T.A.R. Nelson, spent the war, in turn, as an 
artillery officer and a staff officer. The 23-year-old Nelson hailed from Bradley County, 
where he pursued law. Both colonels greatly facilitated the militia call-up. Cate would 
supervise the swearing in of six companies, Nelson eleven. 10 
While the adjutant general mustered the volunteer companies, the quartermaster 
general provided logistical support. Horace H. Thomas, a carpetbagger who also served 
as Governor Brownlow's private secretary, headed the quartermaster department. 
Assisting him was Captain Albert E. Boone, a 22-year-old from Benton County whom an 
associate described as "a gentleman familiarly acquainted with the [logistics] business." 
This reputed experience would prove invaluable, for, unlike the U.S. army quartermaster, 
the Tennessee quartermaster was responsible for ordnance, commissariat, and 
transportation, as well as uniforms and camp gear. Moreover, the Tennessee 
quartermaster was essentially starting from scratch: the state possessed virtually no 
military equipment. Throughout the spring, Thomas negotiated food contracts with 
various Nashville distributors and uniform contracts with clothing warehouses in 
10 Madden, "Unionist Resistance to Confederate Occupation," 28-35; Thomas B. Alexander, Thomas A. R. 
Nelson of East Tennessee (Nashville, 1956), 18, 112-13; Index to Compiled Service Records of Volunteer 
Union Soldiers Who Served in Organizations from the State of Tennessee [hereafter CSR Index], Reel 11; 
Report of the Adjutant General of the State of Tennessee of the Militaty Forces of the State, from 1861-
1866 (Nashville, 1866), ix. 
Cincinnati. In the meantime, company commanders were authorized either to make 
purchases locally using state vouchers or to forage, compensating private property 
owners as needed. Many companies also obtained supplies from sutlers, opportunistic 
vendors who followed the militia units from one campsite to the next. 11 
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Although Thomas and Boone did their best, they were initially unprepared for the 
large-scale militia build-up. In ordering only thirty tents at the beginning of the 
mobilization, for instance, Thomas seriously underestimated the State Guard's 
campground needs. Even if the tents were Sibleys, a common Civil War tent that could 
accommodate twelve to twenty men, the requested number would not have provided 
shelter for more than five or six companies. The acquisition of uniforms also proved 
problematic and time consuming. State Guardsmen were supposed to be clothed in blue 
uniforms, complete with shoes, hats, and haversacks, but the quartermaster had to 
purchase these items from northern warehouses at a cost of more than $16.00 per 
uniform. Until these shipments arrived, many volunteer companies spent their first 
weeks on duty drilling in civilian clothes, albeit blue jeans in many cases. Supply delays 
not only left many units without uniforms, but without blankets as well. "Destitute" was 
a word commonly used by captains to describe their soldiers during the mobilization 
period. 12 
11 Coulter, Brownlow, 289, 345; Commission for A. E. Boone, 25 April 1867, TAGO, Reel 5, Box 25, 
Folder 7; Frank Travis to H. H. Thomas, 23 April 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 3; General Order 
No. 1, 6 March 1867, TAGO, Reel 8, Vol. 26; Expenditures of Account of the Quartermaster Department, 
Tennessee State Guard, March 1867-July 1868, TAGO, Reel 4, Box 22, Folder 7; H. H. Thomas to Joseph 
H. Blackburn, 27 March 1867, GP 21, Reel 2, Box 3, Folder 1. A list of some of the quartermaster's field 
agents is included in TAGO, Reel 4, Box 22, Folder 5. 
12 Governor Brownlow to W. E. Alcorn, 20 April 1867, GP 21, Reel 2, Box 3, Folder l; William C. Davis, 
Rebels & Yankees: The Fighting Men of the Civil War (New York, 1989), 132; Itemized Costs for a 
Standard Issue Militia Uniform (1867-1869), TAGO, Reel 13, Vols. 75, 76, 82; captains R. L. Hall, G. W. 
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The importance of food, clothing, and shelter notwithstanding, the quartermaster's 
top priority in the first weeks of mobilization was ensuring an adequate supply of 
munitions. In this matter, it enjoyed quick and complete success. The Brownlow 
administration hoped that the Federal government would furnish weaponry from its large 
stockpile of wartime armaments. As early as May 1866, in the wake of the Memphis race 
riot, the General Assembly petitioned Washington D.C. for "five thousand stand of 
arms," a request that was ignored at the time. With the militia call-up of 1867, Brownlow 
tried again, asking the secretary of war for 2,000 rifles. He justified this request by 
rightly stating that Tennessee's pre-war arsenal had been "stolen by rebels in 1861." In 
the meantime, Horace Thomas looked into the purchase of firearms. He considered 
buying breech-loading carbines from a Philadelphia dealer, while a gun manufacturer in 
Connecticut offered to sell the state any number of rifles "cheaper than the same quality 
could bought elsewhere." In the end, the War Department agreed to make available as 
many as 10,000 rifles, free of charge, from its depots in Indiana and Michigan. On 10 
April, the first shipment-348 rifles, with accoutrements, and over 56,000 rounds of 
ammunition-arrived in Nashville. Denied permission to store these armaments in the 
Federal garrison's Ash Barracks, the quartermaster converted the Nashville courthouse 
into a temporary magazine. 13 
Kirk, and G. E. Grisham to H. H. Thomas, 10, 20, 22 June 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 3; Captain 
J. L. Kirk to General Cooper, 22 June 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 3. 
13 House Journal, 34th General Assembly, 1st Adjourned Session, 535; Governor Brownlow to E. M. 
Stanton, 26 February 1867, GP 21, Reel 2, Box 3, Folder l; H. H. Thomas to Benjamin Franklin, 27 
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As they mustered, the majority of militia companies were armed with what turned 
out to be used Enfield rifled muskets. This weapon had been a favorite during the Civil 
War, particularly among Confederate soldiers. With its .577 caliber, the eight-pound 
Enfield was powerful but not overly weighty. Throughout the spring and summer, the 
quartermaster received and distributed crate-loads ofEnfields, along with enough 
ammunition to equip each volunteer with at least sixty rounds. Thanks to the Federal 
government's generous loan, the State Guard was always able to outgun its opponents 
throughout the Reconstruction years. 14 
Conservatives were dismayed by the growing reality of a standing army. Fanning 
the fires of anti-Radicalism, John Baxter, a virulent opponent of Brownlow, decried the 
mobilization of "8000 men in a time of peace." Addressing the state's anti-Radical 
majority, he explained that the militia would be "paid by taxes to be gathered from you 
and I." All the while, Baxter asserted that "a formidable military power is being 
organized, in violation of the constitution ... for no other purpose than to control 
elections." The Union and Dispatch offered a similarly gloomy forecast: "It is evident 
that a terrible convulsion is anticipated. . . . A pall, terribly dark and threatening, hangs 
over the destiny of our people." As the militia units began to form, the Republican 
Banner predicted that the State Guard would cost the taxpayers between five and ten 
million dollars annually, the free use of the Federal arsenal notwithstanding. Some 
Conservatives found solace in the hope that assembling 8,000 men would prove too 
14 Nashville Republican Banner, 30 April, 3 May 1867; Davis, Rebels & Yankees, 54-58; Equipment Turn-
in Report, Company F, 1st Regiment, 31 December 1867, TAGO, Reel 4, Box 23, Folder 2; James P. 
Brownlow to Captain Thompson McKinley, 7 June 1867, and Samuel Hunt to Lieutenant Philip Fleming, 
30 July 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 9, Folder 5; Shipping Invoice, 30 May 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box IO, 
Folder 3. 
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difficult for the Brownlow administration. The Pulaski Citizen, cognizant of ex-
Confederate power in Giles County, smugly asked, "who is to be captain of the militia in 
this county?" A local Radical took up the challenge and applied for a State Guard 
commission. Although this man purportedly had "extensive influence among the loyal 
men of Giles," he failed to raise a company. A similar result occurred in Marshall 
County. 15 
Such setbacks, however, appear to have been the exception rather than rule. The 
pool of militia applications was so large that Governor Brownlow expressed confidence 
in mobilizing a·sizeable State Guard. "I find no trouble in raising companies," he 
informed the people through one of his many proclamations. But it was never his 
intention to muster into service the entire force that was potentially at his disposal. When 
two would-be captains from Carroll and Marion counties informed the adjutant general's 
office that they could easily raise local units for the State Guard, the administration 
replied that it had found sufficient manpower elsewhere. Overall, the widespread 
response to the March call-up must have heartened Radicals everywhere. 16 
Eventually, the Tennessee State Guard would comprise twenty-one companies in 
two full regiments often companies and a third regiment with one company. Over 1,800 
men enlisted. Most units came from East Tennessee, but all sections were represented. 
Moreover, Governor Brownlow, faithful to his new, if uneasy, alliance with black voters, 
15 Bristol News, 7 March 1867; Nashville Union and Dispatch, 17 March, IO May 1867; Pulaski Citizen, 8 
March 1867; Nashville Republican Banner, 4, 24 May 1867; W. A. Tucker to Governor Brownlow, 9 
March 1867, GP 21, Reel I, Box 2, Folder I. 
16 General Order No. 2, 7 June 1867, TAGO, Reel 8, Vol. 26; Jebukiah Anderson to James P. Brownlow, 
10 May 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 4; Robert L. Raulston to James P. Brownlow, 15 June 1867, 
TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 2. 
encouraged the involvement of blacks in the militia. Seven companies contained black 
troopers, one of which was commanded entirely by black officers. 
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The first company raised under the new Militia Act was an all-white unit from 
DeKalb County. The 24-year-old Joseph H. Blackbum served as its captain. Blackbum 
possessed excellent Radical credentials. At 18 he enlisted in the 5th Tennessee Cavalry 
and, despite his youth, was immediately elected a company commander. His war record 
was impressive. Serving mostly in Middle Tennessee, because "he knew the country 
perfectly," Blackbum participated in the Murfreesboro campaign and in numerous 
skirmishes with the troops of such Confederate cavalry raiders as John Hunt Morgan and 
Joseph Wheeler. He was wounded on more than one occasion, and suffered the loss of 
his brother, Charley, who was killed in action in 1863. Known for riding into battle with 
a plume in his hat, Blackbum was praised for his "daring and efficient conduct" when on 
the attack, and for his "stubborn and desperate resistance" when on the defensive. At the 
battle of Nashville, Blackburn, then a colonel commanding the 4th Tennessee Mounted 
Infantry, was instrumental in cutting off the retreat of some Confederate units attempting 
to escape toward East Tennessee. He finished the war clearing guerrilla bands out of 
Middle Tennessee, operations that led to his capture of the infamous Champ Ferguson, a 
Rebel guerrilla leader subsequently executed for wartime atrocities. 17 
17 Muster Roll for Company A, 1st Tennessee State Guard, 1867, T AGO, Reel 4, Box 22, Folder 1; CSR 
Index, Reel l; Report of the Adjutant General, iii; The Goodspeed Histories of Cannon, Coffee, DeKalb. 
Warren and White Counties (McMinnville, 1972), 953; War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the 
Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 70 vols. (Washington, 1880-1901), Series One, 
23(1): 17, 155-58, 202, 23(2): 834, 32(1): 55,162,494, 45(1): 415, 45(2): 433, 49(1): 891-92, 49(2): 460, 
904, 911; Will T. Hale, History ofDeKalb County. Tennessee (Nashville, 1915), 222; Thomas G. Webb, 
DeKalb County (Memphis, 1986), 31, 39-40; Graf, Papers of Andrew Johnson, 8: 155. 
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Blackbum gained a small measure of notoriety shortly after the war when he paid 
an unfriendly visit on Confederate general Wheeler. Wheeler had just been released as a 
prisoner of war and was staying in a Nashville hotel when Blackbum, accompanied by a 
comrade, knocked at Wheeler's door. A brief altercation followed, including an apparent 
accusation that Wheeler had pillaged the homes of Middle Tennessee Unionists. At this 
point, Blackbum commenced beating the Confederate veteran about the head with "a 
club of considerable dimensions." A bloodied Wheeler staved off the assault and 
subsequently protested what he considered an attempt on his life. Blackbum received a 
stem letter of reprimand from General George H. Thomas, but the incident only enhanced 
the young colonel's reputation among DeKalb County Unionists. 18 
Back home in Liberty, Tennessee, Blackbum joined the Republican Party and 
pursued a career in law, but devoted much of his time to running his 500-acre farm and 
raising his family. He was among the first to respond to Brownlow's March 
mobilization. Local ex-Confederates, reportedly veterans of Champ Ferguson's outfit, 
tried to thwart Blackburn's efforts by circulating a death list of prominent county 
Radicals. The circular promised a reward of$4,000 for the assassination of Blackburn. 
Undaunted, Blackbum recruited seventy-five men (later augmented to ninety-five) in a 
matter of weeks and mustered his company on 1 April. In accordance with the Militia 
Act, two lieutenants were elected~ both proved good choices. First Lieutenant William L. 
Hathaway, age 25, had served in the war with Blackbum as one his officers. He, too, 
displayed courage and ability on the battlefield. During a conventional engagement, 
18 War of the Rebellion, Series Two, 8: 726-29. 
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Hathaway helped drive a Confederate unit from a ridgeline position as part of a general 
Federal advance through Middle Tennessee. During a counter-guerrilla operation, he 
personally killed Pomp Kersey, a DeKalb County Confederate and leader of a "gang of 
bushwhackers." Second Lieutenant William C. Cravens, age 29, had served as a private 
in Blackburn's Civil War regiment. Both lieutenants were DeKalb County farmers, as 
were most of this unit's enlisted men. Overall, the rank-and-file were middle-to-lower-
middle class family men averaging 24 years of age. 19 
A month after the muster of Blackburn's unit, a second company from Middle 
Tennessee formed. The man in command was William 0. Rickman, a 33-year-old farmer 
from Franklin County. Wartime and Reconstruction experiences help explain Rickman's 
diehard Radicalism. He spent the Civil War commanding a company in the same 
regiment as Blackbum. But while Blackbum was engaged in some of the more 
glamorous aspects of the war, Rickman was assigned mostly to anti-guerrilla operations. 
Toward the end of the war, he received orders to pursue a band of Rebels who refused to 
surrender. The harsh and explicit tenns of this assignment, namely to "exterminate" and 
"show no quarter," may have permanently colored his view of ex-Confederates. These 
punitive activities came back to haunt him after the war. In February 1867, a large band 
of ex-Confederates surrounded his farm, plundered his smokehouse, and destroyed 
various produce and farm equipment. All the while, Rickman single-handedly defended 
his home and family with s!eady fire from a Henry rifle. Rickman embellished the 
19 Goodspeed Histories, 953; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 4 February 1867; Joseph Blackburn to H. H. 
Thomas, 4 May 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 4; Muster Roll for Company A, 1st Tennessee State 
Guard, TAGO; CSR Index, Reels 4 and 6; Report of the Adjutant General, vi; War of the Rebellion, Series 
One, 23(1): 209-10; Webb, DeKalb County. 33; Census of Tennessee, 1870, Schedule of Population 
(DeKalb County) provides information on thirty-seven of the company's personnel. 
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encounter for journalists, putting the number of attackers at several hundred 
"desperadoes." A skeptical Union and Dispatch sarcastically quipped, "why don't Old 
Brownlow get four of five more 'cool and courageous' Rickmans and garrison the 
State?" Exaggeration or not, this episode undoubtedly contributed to Rickman's decision 
to raise a company for the State Guard only a few weeks after the incident.20 
Whereas Blackburn raised a company from a single county, Rickman recruited 
volunteers from five-Bedford, Coffee, Franklin, Lincoln, and Marshall. Moreover, 
while Blackburn's recruitment was relatively painless and quick, Rickman's proved 
frustrating. He assured the adjutant general that he did not lack for recruits, but noted 
growing ex-Confederate interference with his activities. For some time, local Unionists 
had been complaining of a "lawless band" of ex-Confederates who were acting "quite 
belligerent ... making heavy threats." Many ofRickman's recruits reported being 
harassed, with some allegedly driven from their homes, by these "Rebel Gurilers." 
Accordingly, Rickman requested permission to establish a fortified encampment near 
Tullahoma (Franklin County) and to muster and equip volunteers as he recruited. The 
adjutant general denied this request, probably because adequate ordnance was 
unavailable at that time. Perhaps desperate to increase his strength, Rickman refused to 
release one Private Tucker whose father claimed that the boy, being only 17, was too 
young to serve. Rickman accepted the boy's claim of being 20 years old and told the 
father to go home. Further complications arose in April when Rickman reported he was 
20 Muster Roll for Company H, 1st Tennessee State Guard, TAGO, Reel 5, Box 23, Folder 4; CSR Index, 
Reel 13; Report of the Adjutant General, x; War of the Rebellion, Series One, 49(2): 543,608; 41 st 
Congress, 2nd Session, House Misc. Doc. 53, Sheafe v. Tillman, 265; Nashville Union and Dispatch, 30 
March 1867. 
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in bad health and needed at least one commissioned officer to assist him. Assistant AG 
Samuel Hunt arrived at the end of the month and helped Rickman complete his 
organization. On 1 May, seventy-one white men were officially sworn into service.21 
The ·election of lieutenants did not please Captain Rickman. In a close vote, only 
27-year-old Jordan C. Holt received a majority. Acting First Sergeant G. W. Farnum 
believed that Holt, a small farmer from Bedford, was incompetent and he refused to serve 
under him. When Rickman ignored his request for a direct appointment to first 
lieutenant, Farnum protested to the adjutant general, but received no relief Instead, a 
falling out occurred between Farnum and Rickman, and before the month was out, 
Farnum quit, apparently without reprisal. Farnum's assessment of Holt ultimately proved 
accurate. Following a violent clash with local ex-Confederates at the end of May, Holt 
resigned his commission and returned to the ranks as a private, admitting his unfitness for 
the job. Rather than hold another election, Rickman elevated a trusted non-
commissioned officer, John J. Mankin, to the first lieutenancy. The 42-year-old Mankin 
had served the Federal army as a scout and then enjoyed relative prosperity after the war 
as a farmer raising a large family. Rickman and Mankin worked well together and, with 
this harmony at the top, the company increased its strength to ninety-two enlisted 
personnel during June. Adjutant General Brownlow retroactively approved the selection 
21 William 0. Rickman to James P. Brownlow, 27 March, 2, 25 April, I May 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, 
Folder 2; Joseph Ramsey to Governor Brownlow, 23 March 1867; Muster Roll for Company H, 1st 
Tennessee State Guard, TAGO. 
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of Mankin, however irregular its manner, and Rickman's company was fully functional 
two months before the state election. 22 
Rounding out the white militia companies from Middle Tennessee was one 
commanded by William S. Stuart, a resident of Putnam County. Only 22 years old, 
Stuart secured his commission thanks to the efforts of eighteen fellow Putnam residents 
who petitioned the governor in Stuart's behalf shortly after the mobilization 
proclamation. A former corporal (in Blackburn's regiment) during the Civil War, Stuart 
went about his recruitment duties with great purpose. Like Rickman, Stuart drew 
volunteers from five counties-Putnam, Smith, Van Buren, Warren, and White. Also 
like Rickman, he encountered obstacles. Stuart notified Nashville that a pronounced 
contempt for the Militia Act pervaded the entire region. He described one group of local 
ex-Confederates as the "worst men [who] threaten & carry arms & kepp the country in a 
confusion." Some would-be recruits feared that they would be "murdered some night" if 
they joined the militia. Others stated a willingness to serve, but insisted on assurances of 
timely pay and a promise that they would be home for the autumn harvest (the Militia 
Act's stipulation of a three-year term was a disincentive to these men). Stuart further 
complained that local Rebels were falsely taking the required enlistment oath in an 
attempt to undermine his efforts. Adjutant General Brownlow warned Stuart that Rebels 
throughout the state were perverting the concept ofloyalty oaths, yet he urged Stuart to 
protect the integrity of the Militia oath. Taking the adjutant general's concerns to heart, 
22 William 0. Rickman to James P. Brownlow, 13 May and 3 June 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 2; 
Census of Tennessee, 1870, Schedule of Population (Bedford County), 400; G. W. Farnum to Samuel Hunt, 
8 May 1867, IAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 4; G. W. Farnum to James P. Brownlow, 13 June 1867, 
TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder l; Sheafe v. Tillman, 264; Census of Tennessee, 1870, Schedule of 
Population (Franklin County), 141/125; Muster Roll for Company H, 1st Tennessee State Guard, TAGO. 
55 
Stuart threatened scores of ex-Confederates with arrest if they persisted in defying his 
duty to raise a militia company. On 11 April, Stuart made good his threat when he 
forcibly arrested two men in Sparta for an alleged breach of the peace. Anti-Radical 
residents in White County, one of Stuart's recruitment areas, lodged a complaint against 
the beleaguered militia officer after witnessing his heavy-handed methods. The 
petitioners resented what they called "military rule" and insisted that all was quiet in their 
county. They recommended Stuart's immediate replacement by an officer of their 
choosing. 23 
Stuart was not replaced, but completed his organization on 1 June, mustering in a 
small company of forty-eight men at Cookeville. By the end of the month, however, the 
unit's strength increased to eighty-six, at which point Stuart conducted officer elections 
and gained the services of two lieutenants. Edmund D. Pennington, age 41, became 
Stuart's first lieutenant. Pennington, a former Civil War captain from Carthage (Smith 
County), was described by his many friends as a "true man ... a fighting man." David C. 
Patton, age 30, became the second lieutenant. He had served as a private in Captain 
Blackburn's 5th Tennessee Cavalry company. For unspecified reasons, however, Patton 
would resign before the August election.24 
23 Putnam County Petition to Governor Brownlow, 13 March 1867, GP 21, Reel I, Box 2, Folder 2; CSR 
Index, Reel 14; William S. Stuart to James P. Brownlow, 29 March 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 3; 
William S. Stuart to Governor Brownlow, I April 1867, GP 21, Reel I, Box 2, Folder 2; James P. 
Brownlow to William S. Stuart, 6 April 1867, IAGO, Reel 10, Vol. 45; White County Petition to Governor 
Brownlow, 22 April 1867, Brownlow Papers (MS 1940), Box I, Folder 10. 
24 Muster Roll for Company K, I st Tennessee State Guard, T AGO, Reel 5, Box 24, Folders I and 2; 
William S. Stuart to James P. Brownlow, 8 May 1867, IAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 3; William S. Stuart 
to Governor Brownlow, 26 June 1867, GP 21, Reel I, Box 2, Folder 2; Smith County Petition to Joseph A. 
Cooper, 28 July 1867, T AGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 2; William B. Stokes to Joseph A. Cooper, IO August 
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During these same weeks, two companies of State Guard formed in West 
Tennessee. Despite the sizeable black populace in the west, only one of these companies 
contained black militiamen. The region was heavily ex-Confederate and the adjutant 
general may have judged the enlistment oflarge numbers of blacks too risky. 
Unfortunately, white Unionists were few in number and still on edge following the 
assassination of Senator Case only a few months before; assembling sufficient volunteers 
for the militia posed a tremendous challenge. Moreover, ineffective law enforcement, as 
evidenced by the widespread intimidation of blacks by white regulators, made the 
peaceable registration of black voters nearly impossible. Conservative newspapers 
mocked Radical efforts to organize militia companies in the west, predicting that they 
would find few volunteers. Nonetheless, 26-year-old John T. Robeson of Carroll County, 
formerly a captain in the 7th Tennessee Cavalry, embraced the opportunity to serve his 
state and his party in what promised to be an exciting peacetime military capacity. Anti-
Radicals in Gibson denounced Robeson's activities, claiming that all was peaceful in 
their county. Elsewhere, however, Rebel intimidation of freedmen and white Unionists 
increased as Robeson went about his duties. In neighboring Weakley County, for 
instance, a Republican official was fired on by nightriders. A local Unionist opined, "any 
man attempting to raise a company here without protection would do it at the risk of his 
life." These obstacles notwithstanding, Robeson persevered, drawing on four counties 
for men-Carroll, Gibson, Obion, and Weakley. Like Rickman, Robeson took just about 
any loyal white man he could get, but unlike Rickman, he acquiesced when one irate 
father insisted on having his underage son's enlistment invalidated. Although he 
prematurely reported his command's readiness in mid-March (perhaps to receive arms 
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and equipment with which to fend off Rebel assailants), Robeson did officially muster his 
all-white company, sixty-five strong, on 8 May at Huntingdon. Robeson continued 
recruiting, however, and increased his company strength to seventy-six within a month 
after muster. Both of his lieutenants hailed from Weakley County and both had served as 
privates during the war: First Lieutenant Charles B. Simpson, age 25, and Second 
Lieutenant William G. Fuller, age 37. 25 
While Robeson was successful in raising an all-white militia company in West 
Tennessee, William C. Holt of Gibson County was not. A 49-year-old farmer and a Civil 
War captain, Holt recruited volunteers from Gibson and Obion counties, and even 
enlisted a few men from East Tennessee. Adjutant General Brownlow appears to have 
wrongly assumed that Holt would enlist more men. One of Holt's soldiers, Moses H. 
Kinman, a future lieutenant in the State Guard, claimed he could easily help his 
commander recruit seventy-five men. A former cavalry private, the 31-year-old Kinman 
was one of the Obion County deputy sheriffs wounded by the outlaw Farris at the time 
Senator Case was murdered. Although the muster-roll for this unit is cursory and 
ambiguous, it indicates that while Holt may have held a genuine commission, he 
recruited only thirty-three men, not enough for a separate State Guard company. 26 
25 Phillips, "History of the Freedmen's Bureau," 272; William G. McBride, "Blacks and the Race Issue in 
Tennessee Politics, 1865-1876" (Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 1989), 214; Muster Roll for 
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Sometime in July, the adjutant general merged Holt's partial command with 
Captain Robeson's recently mustered company. Coupled with his ongoing recruitment 
efforts, this decision swelled the manpower under Robeson to at least 110, but it 
produced an awkward command situation, for Holt retained his commission. Thus, two 
captains ran the unit that would become Company E, 1st Tennessee State Guard. The 
adjutant general recognized Robeson as the overall commander (and would formalize this 
appointment with an eventual promotion to major after the election), while Holt either ran 
the day-to-day affairs of the newly combined company or served in a detached capacity 
with the men he had recruited. Neither Robeson nor Holt was ever quite satisfied with 
this peculiar arrangement, and events would demonstrate that the relationship between 
these two officers was one of rivalry. A perturbed Robeson tried throughout the 
campaign to gain a commission for his brother, Jeptha, but these efforts came to naught.27 
The other militia unit formed in West Tennessee appears to have been racially 
mixed. On 5 July, George Hamilton (white) mustered sixty-four men into service at 
Purdy (McNairy County). Information on this unit is sketchy, but census data confirm 
that at least three of these men were black. Ever since Brownlow' s March proclamation, 
McNairy Radicals had begged the executive to take "speedy action in recruiting" a militia 
company in their county for the purpose of protecting free speech, among other liberties. 
Hamilton, a cavalry private during the Civil War, found recruitment slow and frustrating, 
Reel 1, Box 2, Folder 2; Obion County Petition to Governor Brownlow, 13 April 1867, GP 21, Reel 2, Box 
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but managed to find an adequate number of men from McNairy and neighboring Hardin 
and Humphreys counties. Perhaps because of its size, the company elected only one 
lieutenant-Thomas Randolph-a former sergeant in the 6th Tennessee Cavalry.28 
The Brownlow administration could not have been surprised at the dearth of white 
Radical manpower in West Tennessee, but it was apparently reluctant to employ blacks in 
the State Guard. Nevertheless, the governor was counting on the region's many blacks to 
help him win the August election. He was concerned, however, that the large number of 
ex-Confederates in the region would both intimidate these black voters and attempt to 
vote illegally themselves. To make matters worse, Brownlow's rival gubernatorial 
candidate, Emerson Etheridge, was a native of Weakley County. Although the governor 
would show no hesitation in deploying militia companies from East Tennessee to the 
west, the administration would have preferred a stronger local show of force. 
The majority of the Tennessee State Guard's companies came from East 
Tennessee. Radical strength in this section was great and none of the twelve eventual 
company commanders had any difficulty in recruiting volunteers. One of the first 
companies of East Tennessee militia came from Bradley County and was commanded by 
Judge K. Clingan. Known as a "brave and gallant officer," Clingan had served as a 
company commander in the 5th Tennessee Infantry in the early part of the Civil War. He 
later commanded a battery of six-pounders and participated in operations to capture 
Chattanooga. He was commended for his "meritorious services" by being placed on 
28 Muster Roll for Company E, 2nd Tennessee State Guard, T AGO, Reel 5, Box 24, Folder 7; Census of 
Tennessee, 1870, Schedules of Population (Hardin County), 346, (Humphreys County), 16, (McNairy 
County), 244; R. M. Thompson and Fielding Hurst to Governor Brownlow, 21 March, GP 21, Reel 1, Box 
2, Folder 2; CSR Index, Reels 6 and 13. 
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General William S. Rosecrans's elite "Roll of Honor," one of only ten officers from 
Tennessee so recognized. 29 
J. K. Clingan was the son of Alexander A Clingan, a wealthy farmer and 
longtime sheriff of Bradley County. Family connections likely helped the younger 
Clingan win election to complete the term of Jesse Gaut in the 34th General Assembly. 
Although a confirmed Unionist and Republican, Clingan was not an unconditional 
Radical. His family had maintained cordial relations with local Confederates during the 
war, and in the Assembly, while ultimately voting for all major Radical legislation, 
particularly black suffrage, Clingan demonstrated that he was his own man. He initially 
opposed the Metropolitan Police Act, especially its centralization of power over 
Hamilton, a county neighboring his home in Bradley. He supported amendments to this 
controversial law that moderated executive influence. Similarly, during the controversy 
over the state's ratification of the 14th Amendment, Clingan joined five other legislators 
in formally protesting the Assembly's extra-legal method of ratification. Finally, he 
resisted William J. Smith's efforts to push through the militia bill before the issue had 
received what Clingan considered adequate debate. He did vote "aye" in the end.30 
Declining to run for a second term, the 29-year-old Clingan instead offered his 
services to the new State Guard that he had helped bring into existence. His 
29 Muster Roll for Company D, 1st Tennessee State Guard, TAGO, Reel 4, Box 22, Folder 4; CSR Index, 
Reel 3; War of the Rebellion, Series One, 10(1): 70, 23(2): 582, 31(3): 144, 52(1): 49; Report of the 
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conscientious devotion to constitutional procedures apparently did not earn the 
governor's wrath; the adjutant general's office commissioned him at the end of April. 
Captain Clingan went about recruiting his company with great alacrity, despite the loud 
threats of R. M. Edwards, a local Conservative, who howled, "if Gov. Brownlow dare 
call out any portion of the militia, the people ... [ will] rise and wrench their arms from 
their hands and exterminate them." On 4 May, Clingan reported the election of his 
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. Iieutenants-R. A Armstrong, age 29, and George W. Kelley, age 21, both enlisted men 
during the Civil War-and announced that his ninety-two volunteers (drawn from 
Bradley, Hamilton, McMinn, and Polk counties) were ready for muster.31 
It was at this point that Clingan's otherwise smooth organizational effort suffered 
a needless complication. The mustering officer, Colonel David M. Nelson, arrived and 
attended a local church service as Clingan readied his men for the swearing in ceremony. 
Something in the sermon offended Nelson and he publicly denounced the preacher for 
expressing treason in the pulpit. Local ex-Confederates then levied a lawsuit for slander 
against Nelson, who would not be acquitted of the charge until September. This 
awkward incident notwithstanding, Clingan's company mustered on 11 May. 32 
Throughout May, Governor Brownlow, convalescing in Knoxville, personally 
involved himself in the organization of four militia companies. These four would muster 
within two weeks of each other. The first was Robert L. Hall's company of 109 white 
31 Muster Roll for Company D, 1st Tennessee State Guard, T AGO, Reel 4, Box 22, Folder 4; Knoxville 
Whig. 20 March 1867; J. K. Clingan to Adjutant General, 4 May 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 5; 
CSR Index, Reels 1 and 8. Otis A. Singletary wrongly assumes that there were black volunteers in 
Clingan's company. See Singletary, Negro Militia and Reconstruction, 47. 
32 Knoxville Whig, 25 September 1867; Muster Roll for D Company, 1st Tennessee State Guard, Reel 4, 
Box 22, Folder 4. 
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recruits from Knox County (a few came from Blount). Although there is no concrete 
evidence that either the 28-year-old Hall or his first lieutenant, Robert G. Miner, had 
served in the Civil War, Radical newspapers referred to them as veterans. The unit's 
second lieutenant, 22-year-old Isaac H. Watson, had been a non-commissioned officer in 
the 5th Tennessee Infantry. Regardless of his military credentials, Captain Hall appears to 
have been a good organizer. His company was applauded, by Conservatives no less, for 
its impressive military bearing during muster (31 May). 33 
Another company that Brownlow took a special interest in was Shadrick T. 
Harris's all-white unit from Jefferson County. "Shade" Harris brought a unique 
perspective to his command. Like many other State Guard commanders, Harris had 
served as an officer during the Civil War, but his experience was markedly different from 
that of his colleagues. He was conscripted by the Confederacy in 1862, but escaped to 
Federal lines before reporting for duty. After a few months of service with the 3rd 
Tennessee Cavalry, he was captured in January 1863, tried by the Confederate military 
authorities for desertion, and sentenced to be shot. Jefferson Davis commuted the 
sentence, but Harris spent the next twenty-five months as a prisoner of war, much of it 
confined in "heavy chains" in South Carolina. According to an escaped Federal officer, 
Harris was poorly treated, having "all the indignities heaped upon him by his brutal 
captors." Federal officials, moved by his plight, negotiated a prisoner exchange in March 
33 Knoxville Whig, 15 May 1867; Governor Brownlow to Joseph A Cooper, 22 June 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, 
Box 10, Folder 4; Graf, Papers of Andrew Johnson, 12: 254; Governor Brownlow to Samuel Hunt, 31 May 
1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 4; Muster Roll for Company C, 1st Tennessee State Guard, TAGO, 
Reel 4, Box 22, Folder 3; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 20 July 1867; CSR Index, Reel 15; Nashville 
Union and Dispatch, 20 July 1867. 
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1865, although Confederate officials steadfastly regarded Harris a criminal, not a soldier 
worthy of such consideration. 34 
After the Confederacy's defeat, Harris, described as "a zealous, high-spirited and 
gallant officer," returned to East Tennessee in an unforgiving mood. The prison shackles 
had so warped his legs that he limped about on the sides of his feet. In the summer of 
1865, Harris assaulted an ex-Confederate named William Beard on the streets of 
Knoxville. Apparently, Beard had abused Harris while the latter was briefly imprisoned 
in Knoxville, and had tried to summarily execute Harris after a failed escape attempt. 
Shaped by such an unusual wartime ordeal, "Shade" was just the kind of Radical the 
Brownlow government could count on. And Harris came through for his government, 
raising a company of 112 men-from Jefferson and Cocke counties-and gaining the 
services of two capable lieutenants. First Lieutenant Edwin R. Hall, age 28, was one of 
the few carpetbaggers among the State Guard's officer corps. Originally from Vermont, 
he rose from private to captain in a Michigan regiment before his muster-out in 1866. He 
participated in the battle of Gettysburg, and spent the closing months of the war hunting 
guerrillas in East Tennessee, where he subsequently settled down. Harris's other 
lieutenant, John W. Roberts, age 22, had served as a private in the 6th Tennessee Infantry. 
At 6 feet, 11 inches, Roberts was undoubtedly a physically imposing character. 35 
34 CSR Index, Reel 6; War of the Rebellion, Series Two, 6:-416, 998, 7: 16, 23, 1175, 1229, 1263-64, 8: 6, 
71, 159, 208, 225, 230, 307, 364; Knoxville Whig. 24 May 1865. 
35 War of the Rebellion, Series Two, 8: 6; Knoxville Whig. 24 May 1865; Fisher, War at Evety Door, 157; 
Muster Roll for Company F, 1st Tennessee State Guard, TAGO, Reel 4, Box 23, Folder 2; War of the 
Rebellion, Series One, 45(2): 592; Census of Tennessee, 1870, Schedule of Population (Jefferson County), 
316; CSR Index, Reel 13. 
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On 1 June, Harris mustered in his command at Dandridge. Many of the men were 
small farmers and most of them were quite young. The average age of the recruits was 
21 years, and sixty-two of them were teenagers. A Conservative newspaper 
correspondent watched Harris's muster with disgust: "A harder looking gang I never saw 
in my life." The correspondent criticized the company's youth and inexperience, and 
contended that the rank-and-file habitually harassed local blacks. This observer 
claimed-perhaps wishfully-that most of these militiamen were "opposed to 
Brownlow. "36 
The rapid recruitment of militia companies under Brownlow' s supervision 
continued with the commissioning of James R. Evans of Claiborne County. The 21-year-
old Evans was a former non-commissioned officer in the 4th Tennessee Cavalry. A man 
of substantial wealth (he was worth $19,000 in 1870), Evans presumably had a talent for 
organization and leadership. Operating out of Tazewell, Evans happily informed the 
adjutant general that "My boys are anxious," and he promised that he would have his 
company ready by 15 April. This promise was not kept, for although Evans steadily 
recruited volunteers from Claiborne and neighboring Grainger County, he encountered 
considerable local opposition. Ex-Confederates made a habit of gathering outside of 
Evans's recruitment office and heckling prospective recruits. Evans twice extended his 
self-appointed muster deadline, citing growing "Rebel and Copperhead" interference. On 
one occasion, an alarmed Evans reported that an ex-Confederate had burst into the town 
firing a pistol and "swearing he was going to kill me." On another, ex-Confederates 
36 Muster Roll for Company F, 1st Tennessee State Guard, TAGO, Reel 4, Box 23, Folder 2; Nashville 
Union and Dispatch, 15 May 1867. 
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caused a disturbance when they blocked the efforts of"colored people" to register for the 
upcoming election. Adding to the tension was a rumor that Rebels from Grainger 
intended to burn railroad bridges to inhibit the deployment of Evans' s men. Although he 
reassured the state government that Claiborne was loyal and would vote Radical, Evans 
insisted that unless it was provided with arms his unit would be compelled to depart 
Tazewell. 37 
By mid-May, Evans's company attained the impressive strength of 100 men, but 
for the sake of civic peace he transferred his unit from Tazewell to Morristown (Grainger 
County). The young militia captain, however, could not resist a parting shot. En route to 
Morristown, his unarmed column marched past some road workers who were evidently 
anti-Radical. When Evans called on the workers to give a cheer for Brownlow, they 
refused. Evans' s men then "arrested" the workers and herded them down the road for a 
few miles before releasing them. Local Conservatives were not amused by these militia 
antics and complained to President Johnson. Once in Morristown, Evans's official 
muster passed off without incident on 3 June. His all-white company elected as first 
lieutenant 46-year~old John N, Ellis, a well-to-do farmer who had served as an officer in 
the 3rd Tennessee Infantry. James A England, a corporal in Ellis's wartime company, 
37 CSR Index, Reel 5; Census of Tennessee, 1870, Schedule of Population (Claiborne County), 303; James 
R. Evans to James P. Brownlow, 27 March, 3, IO April 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 5; James R. 
Evans to James P. Brownlow, 14 May 1867, Patton Collection, Folder 471; Allen P. Tate to James P. 
Brownlow, 27 April 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 3. 
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became second lieutenant. Difficulties notwithstanding, Evans was one of the few militia 
commanders to raise a full-strength company. 38 
The last company that Brownlow took a personal interest in raising was an all-
white outfit under Silas L. Chambers. The 29-year-old Chambers was a merchant from 
Huntsville, Scott County, and had served as a first sergeant in the 2nd Tennessee Infantry. 
Commissioned in April, Chambers drew on four counties-Anderson, Campbell, 
Morgan, and Scott-for recruits and soon had over 100 men ready to enlist. 
Unfortunately, he experienced an embarrassing, and tragic, setback. When he and 
Colonel D. M. Nelson attempted to muster the company in Huntsville on 25 April, a 
"general melee" broke out among the recruits over the election oflieutenants. More than 
a dozen men were injured and one died. The incident prompted a Conservative 
correspondent to comment that "there is no telling what bad whiskey and Radicalism may 
do." Such blunt sarcasm was in some respects apt, for Chambers had a strong taste for 
whiskey, a vice that would cause problems during the campaign. The company reformed 
on 15 May with two ostensibly acceptable lieutenants: James W. Newport, age 23, an 
enlisted veteran of Tennessee's wartime Civil Guards and a post-war farm laborer, and 
Alvin Parker, age 18, a wartime private and post-war farm hand. The unit then marched 
to Clinton (Anderson County) to muster. There, the town's anti-Radicals spread a rumor 
that the militia had arrived to supplant the civil court with its own military court. 
Chambers, however, was struggling to hold his own command together. On the day of 
official muster (10 June), twenty-three recruits were listed as "absent-without-leave" and 
38 Muster Roll for Company I, 1st Tennessee State Guard, TAGO, Reel 5, Box 23, Folder 5; James R. Evans 
to James P. Brownlow, 15 May 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 5; Graf, Papers of Andrew Johnson, 
12: 311; CSR Index, Reel 5; Census of Tennessee, 1870, Schedule of Population (Claiborne County), 291. 
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eventually branded as deserters. Four more men deserted within the week. One 
Conservative derided Chambers's men as "the verry trash of the earth." In the end, only 
eighty-three of the original 106 volunteers were mustered into service.39 
Brownlow may have busied himself with the administrative details of several 
militia companies, but most East Tennessee companies formed without his help. One 
was George W. Kirk's company from Greene County. Few other company commanders 
in the State Guard possessed as extensive a Civil War record as Kirk. Enlisting as a 
private, Kirk soon gained company command in the 8th Tennessee Cavalry. Most of his 
service took place in East Tennessee and western North Carolina, areas wracked by 
guerrilla warfare. There, Kirk helped "pilot" Unionists to a Federal recruitment center at 
Camp Dick Robinson, Kentucky. In 1864, he was commissioned to raise a regiment of 
loyal mountaineers and conduct raids into Confederate-held territory. In the process, he 
became a skilled guerrilla fighter. His most spectacular success came in June 1864, when 
his raiding party destroyed a Confederate supply depot at Camp Vance, North Carolina, 
and captured 277 enemy soldiers. He made several other forays into North Carolina, 
earning praise from General John M. Schofield for the "gallant and successful manner" of 
his operations. 40 
39 Census of Tennessee, 1870, Schedule of Population (Scott County), 245, 252; CSR Index, Reel 3; Muster 
Roll for Company G, 1st Tennessee State Guard, TAGO, Reel 5, Box 23, Folder 3; Nashville Union and 
Dispatch, 5 May 1867; Silas L. Chambers to H. H. Thomas, 15 May 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 
5; CSR Index, Reels 11 and 12; Census of Tennessee, 1870, Schedule of Population (Union County), 234; 
"Alpha" to editor of Cincinnati Gazette, 27 May 1867, Houk Papers; Graf, Papers of Andrew Johnson, 12: 
342. 
4° CSR Index, Reel 8; Fisher, War at Eveiy Door, 68, 87; War of the Rebellion, Series One, 32(2): 386, 
39(1): 232-34, 52(1): 517. 
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Confederate authorities had regarded Kirk as a "renegade" whose commission 
was little more than a Federal letter of marque. Confederate officers from North Carolina 
claimed that his unit was composed of deserters, Indians, and freedmen, and that Kirk 
himself was a "notorious tory and traitor, vagabond and scoundrel." As the war came to 
a close, Kirk, with a brevet colonelcy, was ordered to clear the mountains of Rebels. His 
orders contained the same harsh instructions to "exterminate" guerrillas that Captain 
Rickman received in Middle Tennessee. Kirk apparently did his job well, killing over 
100 Rebels and capturing an elusive guerrilla leader named Palmer. In the process, he 
allowed his men undue freedom to plunder. Federal authorities complained of his 
"excesses" and finally terminated his command in May 1865.41 
After the war, "Colonel" Kirk became a thoroughgoing Radical. Governor 
Brownlow was anxious to gain the "valuable" services and "matchless heroism" of this 
28-year-old Greene County Unionist. As the campaign of 1867 approached, Kirk 
publicly welcomed a showdown with the ex-Confederates: "If nothing else will do the 
rebels and copperheads but a fight, I say give it to them on all sides." Such audacity 
pleased Radicals and attracted many recruits from Greene County and its neighbors, 
Hawkins and Washington. On 6 June, Kirk's company was mustered into service. In all, 
Kirk commanded eighty-five men, many of whom were barely out of their teens (the 
average age was 19.3 years). Francis Kirk, age 18, possibly a relative, was elected first 
lieutenant. Henry C. Sanders, a 22-year-old veteran of the 4th Tennessee Mounted 
Infantry, served as second lieutenant. In the days leading up to the activation of this 
41 War of the Rebellion, Series One, 39(1), 235-37, 45(1), 810, 45(2): 608, 49(1): 325, 337-39, 550, 49(2): 
446-47, 509, 556, 622, 738. 
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militia company, a Radical newspaper confidently boasted that "Rebels and their 
despicable and despised sympathizers must 'lay low' when Col. Kirk comes round."42 
From Roane County came a small company of State Guard under Joseph M. 
Alexander, age 23. Although Roane was a mostly Unionist county, Alexander suffered 
for his loyalty during the Civil War. During the first year of the war, he worked quietly 
in his father's general store in Loudon. In 1862 and 1863, however, he and his family 
were "molested in every conceivable way" by Confederate occupation forces. On one 
occasion, Rebel soldiers ransacked the elder Alexander's store. On another, they raided 
the Alexander home, where the intruders and occupants "had quite a fight." While his 
brother was conscripted into the Confederate army, Joseph avoided taking up arms and 
instead operated as a civilian informant for the Federal army during General Ambrose 
Burnside's occupation of the region. Evidently ready to serve in a military capacity in 
1867, Alexander applied for a militia captaincy and assured the Brownlow administration 
of his patriotic devotion to the Radical cause: "I am making arrangements to protect the 
Loyal people ohhis dear old State of East Tennessee who sent forth her sons to protect 
the flag that we are supporters of." Commissioned in June, he recruited fifty-four men 
(drawn from McMinn and Monroe counties as well as Roane) and on 6 July his company 
was mustered into service. His only lieutenant was a man named E. R. Brown.43 
42 Knoxville Whig. 27 March 1867; Governor Brownlow to Joseph S. Fowler, 23 March 1867, GP 21, Reel 
2, Box 3, Folder l; Muster Roll for Company A, 2nd Tennessee State Guard, TAGO, Reel 5, Box 24, Folder 
3; CSR Index, Reel 13; Jonesboro Union Flag, 19 April, quoted in Nashville Union and Dispatch, 21 April 
1867. 
43 Fisher, War at Every Door, 188; Petition of Joseph M. Alexander to the Commissioner of Claims, 1873, 
Southern Claims Commission, Case File No. 19833; Joseph M. Alexander to James P. Brownlow, 22 June 
1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 4; Joseph M. Alexander to Joseph A. Cooper, 30 June 1867, TAGO, 
Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 4; Muster Roll for Company F, 2nd Tennessee State Guard, TAGO, Reel 5, Box 25, 
Folder 1. In his petition to the Federal government, Alexander claimed that the U. S. army confiscated his 
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The most eastern of the State Guard companies was Kemp Murphy's outfit from 
Johnson County. Murphy had been a 19-year-old delegate to the Greeneville Convention 
in 1861 and later served in the 4th Tennessee Infantry as a private. At 25, he mustered his 
seventy-two white volunteers into service on 19 July, a fortnight before the election. 
Like many of the other companies, Murphy's was basically made up of boys: 20.2 was 
the average age in his unit. His first lieutenant was William C. Arnold, age 21, a 
subsistence farmer who had been a first sergeant during the Civil War. His second 
lieutenant was Joseph A. Grace, age 26, who had been a private during the war. The two 
lieutenants had served together in the 13th Tennessee Cavalry.44 
In the final week of the gubernatorial campaign, Governor Brownlow authorized 
the creation of two more white companies from East Tennessee. Little is known about 
these officers and men. William N. Purdy, age 34, organized a half-strength company 
(fifty men) from Monroe County on 22 July. A former hospital steward, Purdy 
commanded alone; he had no lieutenants. On 26 July, 21-year-old A. M. Clapp, a Knox 
County farmer, hastily mustered into service an indeterminate number of men from 
Grainger, Hawkins, Jefferson, and Knox counties. The company roster lists two 
lieutenants-R. M. Stone and 20-year-old James S. Clapp-but only forty-one enlisted 
men are on the muster-roll. Probably, there were more men in this unit.45 
horse (valued at $200) and 400 pounds of tobacco from his store (valued at $400). His claim was 
"disallowed" for lack of corroborating evidence. 
44 Oliver P. Temple, East Tennessee and the Civil War (Cincinnati, 1899), 572; CSR Index, Reels 1, 6, and 
11; Muster Roll for Company D, 2nd Tennessee State Guard, TAGO, Reel 5, Box 24, Folder 6; Census of 
Tennessee, 1870, Schedule of Population (Johnson County), 38. 
45 Muster Roll for Company I, 2nd Tennessee State Guard, T AGO, Reel 5, Box 25, Folder 4; CSR Index, 
Reel 12; Muster Roll for Company H, 2nd Tennessee State Guard, TAGO, Reel 5, Box 25, Folder 3; Census 
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The majority of the Tennessee State Guard was white. Significantly, however, 
seven militia companies contained blacks, including the previously discussed West 
Tennessee company under George Hamilton. Having enfranchised the freedmen, the 
Brownlow administration saw no reason not to employ them as militiamen. Presumably, 
the Radicals hoped that the black electorate would respond to the political campaign 
more enthusiastically knowing some of their own were in the ranks of the State Guard. 
Several commission-seekers informed the state government of their willingness to 
organize and command a black company. One applicant used political alliteration to 
make his case: "Lincoln, Liberty, Law, Loyal, League." Nevertheless, the decision to 
recruit black militiamen was controversial and not taken lightly. White Southerners had 
long trembled at the idea of blacks with guns. The praiseworthy performance of black 
Civil War soldiers (20,000 of whom came from Tennessee) did not allay these white 
supremacist concerns. Anti-Radical whites blamed black soldiers for the Memphis race 
riot. Other incidents, such as a shoot-out between white youths and black troops in 
Montgomery County on Christmas Day 1865, only exacerbated race relations. In the 
aftermath of the Civil War, President Johnson urged General Thomas to exercise tight 
control over his black soldiers in Tennessee: "In the event of an insurrection it is feared 
that the colored troops, so great in number, could not be controlled." Thomas dismissed 
such concerns as unfounded, but Governor Brownlow also worried about the possibility 
of race war, although he may have privately delighted at the prospect of covering West 
J 
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Tennessee with black troops. In the end, he prudently kept black numbers in the militia 
small.46 
The first blacks to join the State Guard came from Washington County. They 
would serve in a racially mixed company under white officers, most notably George E. 
Grisham, who issued a call for militia volunteers shortly after receiving his commission 
in April. At 33 years of age, Grisham was a rising star among the Radicals of East 
Tennessee, and a seemingly good choice to command black militiamen. During the Civil 
War, he served as a company commander in the 8th Tennessee Cavalry and later as a staff 
officer under Major General Alvan C. Gillem. Local ex-Confederates tried to disparage 
his character by claiming he was a Rebel deserter, but Grisham served the Union with 
distinction. Following the war, he became the postmaster of Jonesboro, but his primary 
activity was running his newspaper, the Jonesboro Union Flag. Initially a moderate in 
politics, Grisham grew enamored with Brownlow's leadership and his news organ 
became increasingly radical. In October 1865, Grisham ran unsuccessfully for an open 
seat in the General Assembly. His simple platform called for public education, 
compensation for Unionists, and tax reforms. Throughout his campaign, Grisham 
denounced the ex-Confederates. To him, Reconstruction meant "Union construction and 
Rebel destruction." The following year, Grisham co-authored a petition to Radical leader 
L. C. Houk that urged an uncompromising stance toward the growing anti-Radical forces 
46 Coulter, Brownlow, 290,333; N. C. Davis to Governor Brownlow, 18 May 1867, GP 21, Reel I, Box 2, 
Folder I; Caleb Gain to Samuel Hunt, 29 March 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder l; Joseph T. Wilson, 
The Black Phalanx (New York, 1968), 142; Joseph T. Glatthaar, Forged in Battle: The Civil War Alliance 
of Black Soldiers and White Officers (New York, 1990), 256-60; Stephen V. Ash, "Postwar Recovery: 
Montgomery County, 1865-1870," Tennessee Historical Quarterly 36 (1977): 212; Graf, Papers of Andrew 
Johnson, 9:48-49; Ulrich, "Northern Military Mind," 220-21. 
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in the state. "We must fight the enemies of our country, and fight them everywhere and 
in every way. We are on the tower watching and must do all we can to save ourselves." 
County conservatives, dismayed by such hard-line sentiments, persuaded President 
Johnson to remove Grisham from his postmaster position. Local ex-Confederates 
employed more violent measures. In October 1866, two attempts were made to burn the 
office of the Union Flag to the ground, both while the printing staff was on duty.47 
Grisham eagerly responded to Governor Brownlow's militia proclamation. When 
applying for his commission, Grisham oddly requested assignment to the Middle 
Tennessee county of Franklin in order "to keep the Rebs straight [and] hold that line of 
communication open for yours." As he recruited loyal volunteers, the energetic Grisham 
helped get Washington County on a solid political footing. He was instrumental in 
forming Union Leagues throughout the county, and he served as secretary to the county's 
Radical nominating convention. In the process, Grisham described the upcoming 
political campaign in do-or-die terms: "The man that does not understand that this State is 
to remain under the control and management of its friends at any cost or sacrifice, is 
certainly too far behind the times .... The Radicals will rule this State peaceably, if they 
can; forcibly, if they must." Conservatives were appalled at such militancy and regarded 
47 CSR Index, Reel 6; War of the Rebellion, Series One, 39(1): 846; Census of Tennessee, 1870, Schedule 
of Population (Washington County), 330; History of Washington County, Tennessee (Jonesboro, 1988), 92, 
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Grisham's commission in the State Guard as a prime example of partisan politics-a 
militia captain, Radical politician, and newspaper editor rolled into one. 48 
On 13 April, Grisham reported that his company of approximately 114 men was 
fully organized. About half of Grisham' s command was black, quite likely members of 
the new Washington County Union Leagues. Additionally, many of these men claimed 
to have served in U. S. Colored regiments during the war. How blacks voted in the 
election for lieutenants is unknown, but both junior officers were white men. First 
Lieutenant Nelson McLaughlin, age 40, was a well-respected Washington County farmer. 
Additionally, McLaughlin was a veteran of both the Mexican and Civil Wars, serving in 
the latter as a company commander alongside Grisham in the 8th Tennessee Cavalry. The 
21-year-old Joseph A February won the second lieutenancy. Affectionately referred to 
as "Jo," February was a veteran of the 4th Tennessee Infantry. In the forthcoming 
campaign, Grisham usually commanded the black contingent of his company, while 
McLaughlin often commanded the whites on detached assignments. 49 
Using his printing office as a command center, Grisham issued orders through the 
Union Flag for his recruits to muster on 1 May: "Every volunteer is required to be 
punctually present." The swearing-in ceremony was a prominent part of a grand political 
rally in Jonesboro that included speeches by various Radical politicos, all of whom 
denounced President Johnson. Some three thousand people attended, including Governor 
48 George E. Grisham to James P. Brownlow, 20 March 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder l; Jonesboro 
Union Flag. 5 April 1867; Nashville Union and Dispatch, 21 April 1867. 
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Reel 4, Box 22, Folder 2; CSR Index, Reels 5 and 10; Census of Tennessee, 1870, Schedule of Population 
(Washington County), 212. 
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Brownlow. At the end of the day, Grisham's company led a parade procession through 
the streets amid great cheering. "The measured tread of the soldiery, the bristling array 
of gleaming bayonets, and the martial music of fife and drum" entertained the crowd. 
Fellow militia officer George W. Kirk served as marshal. On~ Radical correspondent 
expressed delight over the mustering of Grisham' s company: "They again go forth to 
protect Union men from the violence ofresuscitated treason." The next day, Grisham's 
unit deployed to the East Tennessee county of Sullivan, most of whose residents had 
supported the Confederacy during the war and defied the Radicals afterwards. The duty 
was temporary and the mission was simply to "regulate these bad men. "50 
Not long after Grisham's unit embarked on its first assignment for the State Guard 
a second mixed militia company began forming in East Tennessee. The officer in charge 
was John L. Kirk of Greene County. It is unclear whether John Kirk was related to 
George Kirk, but both came from Greene County and served together as company 
commanders in the 8th Tennessee Cavalry. Like G. W. Kirk and Grisham before him, J. 
L. Kirk recruited volunteers from Greene and Washington counties, land rich in Radical 
manpower. On 6 June, he mustered his sixty-eight recruits (race-ratio unknown) who 
then elected two white lieutenants: David E. Burchfield and Joseph S. Lawrence, the 
latter a veteran enlisted man. Several weeks later, while deployed in Montgomery 
County in Middle Tennessee, Kirk apparently recruited another sixty-one men. Many of 
these new volunteers were black. Moreover, his command added a third lieutenant, Page 
50 Jonesboro Union Flag. 5 April 1867; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 19 April 1867; Nashville Union 
and Dispatch, 7 May 1867; Knoxville Whig. 8 May 1867. 
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McKinney, about whom little is known. Overall, by the time of the election, Captain 
Kirk appears to have commanded as many as 129 men. 51 
While the two "Negro" militia companies from East Tennessee were racially 
I
I mixed and under white officers, four companies from Middle Tennessee were virtually 
all-black. At the end of March, Thompson McKinley, a 35-year-old white Radical from 
\ 
Sumner County, was commissioned explicitly "to organize a company of Colored 
Troops" as a reward for black loyalty and as a means of self-protection in that strife-
ridden part of the state. One of the few carpetbaggers in the State Guard, McKinley was 
an unsavory character to many Sumner County whites. The Conservative press described 
him as "a dirty trickster" and a "second Brownlow," while former guerrilla leader Ellis 
Harper "vowed his intention to blow Mr. T. McKinley's d-d brains out." In addition to 
becoming a militia captain, McKinley was the county's Commissioner of Registration 
and he was running as the county's Radical candidate for the General Assembly in 1867. 
He may also have been involved in the formation of a Union League in Gallatin. 
Conservatives believed his performance as registrar was crooked and self-serving and 
that his political aspiration was wholly dependent on black votes. They understandably 
protested his acceptance of a captaincy in the State Guard, a position that would allow 
him considerable control over the polling places, as a flagrant conflict of interest. 
Moreover, they insisted that Sumner was safe and peaceful, and they resented the arming 
51 Samuel Hunt to John L. Kirk, 8 June 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 9, Folder 5; CSR Index, Reel 8; Muster 
Roll for Company C, 2nd Tennessee State Guard, TAGO, Reel 5, Box 24, Folder 5. 
of blacks in their midst. Memories of Federal occupation in 1865, when black soldiers 
allegedly committed several felonies, including rape, haunted this white community. 52 
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Undaunted by local animus, Thompson McKinley accepted the dual role of 
candidate and captain, and proceeded to assemble his command. Ex-Confederates 
hampered recruitment, just as they had disrupted an election for constable of Gallatin in 
February, but McKinley and his fellow Radicals were assured by the Brownlow 
administration that "the disregard of law evinced by many of the people of Sumner Co. 
may invite some very unpleasant consequences in the future." McKinley's command 
would give this threat genuine punch. He mustered in 100 black volunteers on 10 June in 
Gallatin. Many of these men may have served in the 14th U.S. Colored Infantry, which 
formed in Sumner in 1863. The average age of the enlistees was 22.3, but the company 
roster reflects a couple of irregularities. One soldier is listed as 16 years of age, and one 
of the unit's sergeants is listed as 14.53 
Although no one appears to have objected to McKinley's recruitment of 
adolescents, many black volunteers challenged the captain's decision to appoint white 
lieutenants instead of conducting an election. Led by First Sergeant Nelson Turner, the 
enlisted men flatly refused to serve under McKinley's choice for first lieutenant, a 
52 James P. Brownlow to Thompson McKinley, 25 March 1867, TAGO, Reel 10, Vol. 45; Walter T. 
Durham, Rebellion Revisited: A Riston: of Sumner County, Tennessee from 1861 to 1870 (Gallatin, 1982), 
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reputedly unsavory fellow named George Weaver. They did agree, however, to serve 
under McKinley's other appointee, Lieutenant I. N. Phillips. Phillips was a 22-year-old 
schoolteacher from Vermont, and was apparently well liked by the men and by Sumner's 
black community. In 1866, the Freedmen's Bureau sponsored his journey to Sumner 
County where Phillips became an education superintendent and later an active member in 
the Gallatin Union League. 54 
Governor Brownlow took a bold step toward racial integration in the State Guard 
when he commissioned James H. Sumner to command an all-black company. A free, 
native black before the war, and an active Nashville Radical and saloon keeper after the 
war, the 27-year-old Sumner was the only black captain in the State Guard. As a result, 
he endured particularly scathing scrutiny from Conservative newspapers. The Pulaski 
Citizen mocked Sumner's commission, claiming that "he now carries [it] in his breeches 
pocket" in order to be ready to prove his title to a skeptical world. The Union and 
Dispatch dismissed Sumner as a "mere civilian" while the extolling the virtues of a 
Conservative black veteran, Joseph Williams, a man who campaigned with the 
Conservative Emerson Etheridge in 1867. This newspaper challenged Brownlow to 
commission Williams. Brownlow, of course, did not commission Williams, but Sumner 
did engage his Conservative counter-part in debate during the campaign. 55 
54 Nelson Turner to General Cooper, 4 July 1867, IAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 3; Nashville Union and 
Dispatch, 28 July 1867; Durham, Rebellion Revisited, 271-71, 300,314; Nashville Republican Banner, 3 
May 1867. 
" Bobby L. Lovett, The African-American History ofNashville Tennessee, 1780-1930 (Fayetteville, 
1999), 209; Rose, "Nashville and its Leadership Elite," 68; Pulaski Citizen, 29 March 1867; Nashville 
Union and Dispatch, 28 March 1867; Memphis Daily Appeal, 11 June 1867. 
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Conservatives predicted that Sumner would fail to recruit enough men for a 
company. They were wrong. Sumner organized one of the largest companies in the State 
Guard-113 black men, drawn from Davidson and Williamson counties-and mustered 
them into service on 27 June. The average age of his command was 24.2 years. His 
lieutenants were George Sumner, age 23 (relation to James unknown), a veteran of the 
51 st United States Colored Infantry, and 24-year-old Henry H. Mitchell, who also served 
in the U. S. C. T.56 
Sumner's company remained stationed in Nashville for several days after muster 
and became the target of Conservative abuse. The anti-Radical press branded these 
militiamen a "band of cut-throats," while the white community ostracized Captain 
Sumner. In one telling incident, Sumner boarded a Nashville streetcar while in uniform, 
but was told by the driver that he had to leave. When he refused, the white passengers 
got off in protest. Sumner then got off himself, but when the driver then called the white 
passengers to return, Sumner hopped back on. Again the passengers left, and after a brief 
standoff, the driver reluctantly transported Sumner, the lone passenger, to his destination. 
A Conservative correspondent concluded that "it was the intention of this militiaman to 
provoke a difficulty, no doubt. "57 
The last two black militia companies and the last two companies recruited in 1867 
were both from the Nashville area. Philip J. Flemming (white) mustered sixty blacks 
56 Nashville Union and Dispatch, 28 March 1867; Muster Roll for Company G, 2nd Tennessee State Guard, 
TAGO, Reel 5, Box 25, Folder 2; Janet B. Hewett, ed., The Roster of Union Soldiers, 1861-1865, 21 vols. 
(Wilmington, 1997), 5: 138,405. The size of this company was soon reduced by one when Private 
Pleasant Terry accidentally shot and killed his comrade, Private Tony Cato, during a barroom brawl. 
Nashville Republican Banner, 30 June 1867. 
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from Williamson County on 29 July, likely from the politically active Union League of 
the county seat, Franklin. Michael Houston, a white officer, mustered ninety-one blacks 
from Davidson County on 30 July. At least one of his two lieutenants was black and a 
veteran: First Lieutenant Alexander Gleaves, age 35, served as a sergeant in the 13th U. S. 
Colored Infantry, a unit that saw intense action at the battle of Nashville. Houston's 
second lieutenant was John S. Durham. Described by the anti-Radical press as "a certain 
Tueton," Durham appears to have been a German-American. If true, then Gleaves's 
seniority may mark one of the first instances in American military history where a white 
man served under a black. Both of these companies, about which little is known, were 
organized a few days before the August election. 58 
In all, twenty-one companies of State Guard were mustered into service between 
1 April and 30 July 1867 (see Appendix A). Many units failed to attain the 100 men 
desired by Brownlow, but all were considered fit for duty. Two companies came from 
West Tennessee, one white and one mixed, totaling 175 men. Seven came from Middle 
Tennessee, three white and four black, totaling about 707 men (366 blacks, plus as many 
as sixty-one more who joined John Kirk's East Tennessee command). Twelve companies 
were organized in East Tennessee, ten white and two mixed, totaling at least 993 men (A. 
M. Clapp's extant muster-roll seems incomplete). Due to lack of information on the 
racial make-up of the companies of George Grisham, John Kirk, and George Hamilton, 
57 Memphis Daily Appeal, 16 July 1867: Nashville Union and Dispatch, 9 July 1867; Nashville Daily Press 
and Times, 10 July 1867. 
58 Muster Roll for Company K, 2nd Tennessee State Guard, TAGO, Reel 5, Box 25, Folder 5; Nashville 
Union and Dispatch, 16 August 1867; Muster Roll for Company A, 3nl Tennessee State Guard, TAGO, 
Reel 5, Box 25, Folder 6; Hewett, Roster of Union Soldiers, 4: 389; Wilson, Black Phalanx, 468; Bobby L. 
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the exact figures on black personnel are estimates only. Sources indicate that about half 
of Grisham's 114 militiamen were black (about fifty-seven men). Kirk recruited blacks 
from East Tennessee and more while stationed in Montgomery County. If half of his 
original sixty-eight enlisted volunteers were black (thirty-four men), then approximately 
ninety-one blacks from East Tennessee served in the State Guard. Using the same 
methodology for Hamilton's company of sixty-four men, it can be estimated that thirty-
two black militiamen came from West Tennessee. Overall, at least 1,875 men (not 
counting staff personnel) served in the Tennessee State Guard of 1867: between 1,331 
and 1,392 whites and between 483 and 544 blacks. Thus, some 25 to 29 percent of the 
State Guardsmen were black, most of them from Middle Tennessee. 
There has been a good deal of misinformation in the scholarship on the Tennessee 
State Guard, which the above statistics should help correct. E. Merton Coulter claims 
that there were nineteen companies comprising 1,500 men. Allen Trelease states that 
there were only twelve comprising 900 men. James Patton and Robert White correctly 
report twenty-one companies, but offer no specific figures on manpower. With regard to 
race ratios, Coulter and Thomas Alexander state that the units raised and stationed in 
Middle and West Tennessee were mostly black. While this is true, these scholars neglect 
to address the overwhelmingly white companies from East Tennessee. Allen Trelease 
rightly asserts that the State Guard throughout Tennessee was mostly white, but, like 
Coulter and Alexander, he is vague about exact numbers. Robert White erroneously 
insists that black militiamen were in the majority. Otis Singletary, who acknowledges 
Lovett, "The Negro's Civil War in Tennessee, 1861-1865," Journal ofNegro Histoiy 61 (1976): 47-48; 
Nashville Daily Press and Times, 31 July 1867; Nashville Republican Banner, 3 August 1867. 
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that the Tennessee militia was racially mixed, notes that the fixation--during and since 
Reconstruction-on "Negro militia" overlooks the significant role native whites played in 
upholding the Republican Party and reflects "the longstanding Southern [white] 
indifference to logic when considering questions involving race. "59 
Sixty-one men served as company officers in the State Guard, four of whom were 
black. At least forty-four of these men (72 percent) possessed Civil War experience, 
sixteen as officers. Moreover, fifteen company commanders were veterans, nine as 
officers. Several militia officers, such as Blackburn, Hathaway, Rickman, G. W. Kirk, 
and E. R. Hall, were skilled in anti-guerrilla fighting, a useful talent given the persistence 
of ex-Confederate lawlessness in rural areas. The average age of the officer corps was 
27.5 years. Additionally, 1870 census data on twenty-one company officers suggest that 
these militia leaders were for the most part married farmers with children, whose property 
value averaged more than $3,000. Overall, the officers of the State Guard were battle-
hardened, vigorous, mature men. Furthermore, their settled, moderately prosperous 
status militated against politically reckless conduct, an important consideration in the 
volatile election atmosphere of 1867. 
In general, this State Guard officer corps represents a fair profile of the Radical 
mindset. They joined because the party and its Reconstruction program were important 
to them, and because they believed that the survival of both were at stake in 1867. Such 
political partisanship, however, was tempered by a military devotion to duty. While the 
backgrounds of William Rickman and Shadrack Harris suggest a potential for 
59 Coulter, Brownlow, 333, 338-39; Trelease, White Terror, 24; Patton, Unionism and Reconstruction, 176; 
White, Messages, 5: 570; Alexander, Political Reconstruction, 149; Otis Singletary, Negro Militia and 
Reconstruction (New York, 1957), 15. 
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vindictiveness, the background of Judge Clingan reveals a preference for moderation. 
And despite the Rebel-bashing rhetoric of such captains as George Grisham and G. W. 
Kirk, the State Guard was hardly an instrument of repression, at least during the 
mobilization phase. In fact, the reverse was often the case in Middle and West 
Tennessee, where many prospective militiamen found themselves assailed by an angry 
ex-Confederate populace. Nevertheless, the State Guard officers, through their public 
recruitment activities, acted in effect as political agents and helped invigorate the white 
and black supporters of Radicalism at the grassroots level. As the campaign unfolded, 
the Brownlow administration was confident that it had assembled a militia leadership that 
was both dedicated to the Radical cause and professional enough to uphold the law and 
prevent open warfare. 
The political proclivities of the 1,816 enlisted men are less clear, and for the most 
part can only be assumed. Many of the rank-and-file were U. S. army veterans, but a 
substantial number were teenagers who never served in any regular military forces. 
Interestingly, considering that they were members of an organization designed in part to 
protect the ballot-box, hundreds of militiamen were under the legal voting age of twenty-
one. The socioeconomic status is hard to determine, but many were small farmers who 
presumably had lived in Unionist households during the war. Why they joined the State 
Guard is unclear. They probably wanted to help Radicalism triumph, particularly the 
black recruits, but they may have simply wanted a steady monthly wage. Blacks, in 
particular, believed that service in the militia (like service in the Federal army) would 
grant them the power and respect needed to secure their new status as citizens. Lastly, 
many volunteers may have enlisted simply for adventure. Sociologist Eric Hoffer argues 
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that in the aftermath of great struggles, many of the youths who missed out on the 
conflict eagerly seek equivalent experiences. For those Unionists too young to fight 
against the Confederacy, the State Guard promised a measure of martial glory.60 
By the beginning of June 1867, the Tennessee State Guard comprised twelve 
companies already deployed, with several others in the process of mustering. At this 
point, Governor Brownlow believed it was time for an overall militia field commander. 
On 7 June, he placed Joseph A Cooper in charge with the rank of brigadier general. It 
proved an excellent choice. Cooper was a dedicated Radical and a distinguished military 
officer-a veteran of the Mexican War and the Civil War. Like most other leading 
Radicals, Cooper was from East Tennessee. He was a respectable and relatively 
prosperous farmer with a large family. During the secession crisis, he attended the 
Greeneville Convention as Campbell County's lone delegate. Throughout the 
proceedings, he maintained a hawkish stance toward the Confederacy, and at the 
convention's close, he was one of the first Tennessee Unionists to raise volunteers for the 
Federal army. He rose quickly through the ranks, ending the war with a brevet major 
generalship. He fought in some of the western theater's grimmest battles: Murfreesboro, 
Lookout Mountain, Resaca (where his brigade suffered 30 percent casualties), and 
Nashville. In this last battle, Cooper's division helped crush the left flank of General 
John B. Hood's besieging Confederate army.61 
60 Singletary, Negro Militi~ 22-25; Eric Hoffer, The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass 
Movements (New York, 1951), 39-47, 99. 
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General Cooper never received any formal military training, but was, by all 
accounts, a natural leader. Contemporaries noted his "modest" yet "imperious" style of 
leadership. During Hood's campaign, for example, Cooper was anxious to link his 
detached unit with General Thomas's command at Nashville. Marching through the 
night, he reportedly "forced a countryman who knew all the roads to guide him under 
penalty of death in case of betrayal." Discipline and training were his constant priorities, 
and Cooper expected his men to face such wartime trials as poor supply, inadequate pay, 
and miserable camp conditions with stoic calm. Years after the war, at a reunion, Cooper 
gave his men laconic praise: "All that I am, you made me, by obeying my orders.',62 
A Whig before the war, Cooper was one of the 521 Unionists who gathered at 
Nashville in January 1865 to restore civil government to the state. Like many other 
Unionists, Cooper initially applauded President Andrew Johnson's Reconstruction 
policies. · In a letter to the president rife with spelling and grammatical errors, Cooper 
expressed his support of Johnson's plan for Reconstruction, but pointed out that "the 
rebels are verry bold and defiant." He then related to the President the essence of his 
political views: "I still hold to the old doctrin the Union the constitution the enforement 
of the law." He soon gravitated into the Radical fold, however. When Brownlow and the 
Radical party broke with Johnson over his increasing obstruction of Congressional 
Reconstruction and his alignment with Conservative Democrats, Cooper followed suit. 
East Tennessee Conservatives noted with alarm Cooper's public denunciations of 
1779 to 1900 (New York, 1900), 782; W.R. Cooper, A Survivor of Two Wars: Biographical Sketch of 
Gen. Joseph A. Cooper (Knoxville, 1895), 3, 7-13. 
62 Temple, Notable Men of Tennessee, 101, 106-108; Cooper, SurvivorofTwo Wars, 6, 8-11, 17-18. 
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Johnson. One observer described Cooper as "one of [Johnson's] most violent enemies," 
and urged his dismissal as Knoxville's collector of internal revenue. When Cooper's 
friends warned him that his employment was in jeopardy, the general reportedly boasted, 
"I will split rails ... sooner than desert the Union party ... and tum rebel." Cooper 
shortly thereafter lost his post and its $4,000 per year salary. 63 
The tempo of political events in Tennessee seemed to excite Cooper. After 
moving his family to Knox County, he entered politics. Unfortunately, in seeking 
nomination for Congress in 1865 and 1867, he was defeated by the politically savvy 
Horace Maynard. Although he had a "sharp, quick voice," Cooper lacked the oratorical 
skills of his opponent, and the political experience as well. Perhaps dejected, Cooper 
declined calls to run for the General Assembly. 64 
Out of a job and frustrated in his bid for elected office, the 44-year-old Cooper 
probably welcomed the opportunity to serve as commander of the newly created 
Tennessee State Guard. It would mark a return to an environment where he had 
previously enjoyed success and prestige. And it would reunite him with many of the 
officers he had commanded. Radical newspapers hailed his appointment, describing 
Cooper as "brave as a lion" and "preeminently the officer for the post." The Knoxville 
Whig, in particular, interpreted his failed political career in a positive light, declaring that 
"Gen. Cooper has shown himself unwilling to sacrifice the good of the cause to his 
personal ambition." Most Conservative newspapers withheld their judgment of Cooper at 
63 Nashville Daily Press and Times, 16 November, 7 December 1866; Graf, Papers of Andrew Johnson, 10: 
176-77, 11: 147-48, 381-82. 
64 Graf, Papers of Andrew Johnson, 8: 471, 553, 12: 265; Joseph A. Cooper to L. C. Houk, 28 April 1867, 
Houk Papers; Temple, Notable Men of Tennessee, 101; Knoxville Whig. 17 July 1867. 
the time, but the Republican Banner did tersely note that the new militia general "may 
prove as good a cat's paw as the next." Given the political stakes involved, as well as 
Governor Brownlow' s manifest decline in health, the campaign of 1867 posed a 
challenging test.of Cooper's leadership skills.65 
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On 19 June, General Cooper established his headquarters in Nashville and 
completed the organization of his staff, which included colonels Cate and Nelson, and his 
newly appointed aide-de-camp, Fir~t Lieutenant Larken B. Gamble, yet another Civil 
War officer. Gamble helped muster in the final companies during the closing weeks of 
the campaign. On Governor Brownlow' s recommendation, Cooper also accepted the 
services of Dr. Fredrick W. Sparling as the chief surgeon of the State Guard.66 
At the beginning of July, Cooper helped ameliorate the State Guard's early 
difficulties with supply. He instructed company commanders to pay closer attention to 
proper procedure (i.e., army regulations) and to cooperate more closely with the 
quartermaster. For several weeks, many officers had unwittingly contributed to their 
own supply deficiencies through their ignorance of, or indifference to, logistical matters. 
For example, Captain James Evans neglected to keep an inventory of his supplies, while 
Captain George Grisham lost copies of his requisitions during a movement. Captain 
William Rickman occasionally failed to report his voucher purchases, while Captain 
Joseph Blackburn submitted vouchers with mathematical errors. And Captain Robert 
65 Nashville Daily Press and Times, 8 June 1867; Knoxville Whig. 17 July 1867; Nashville Republican 
Banner, 9 June 1867. 
66 Circular No. 1, 19 June 1867, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 27; Order No. 2, 10 July 1867, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 
27; Governor Brownlow to General Cooper, 18 July 1867, GP 21, Reel 1, Box, 1, Folder l; Special Order 
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Hall apparently entrusted his unit's supply to "an old Q. M." named J. K. Woodard, an 
agent not affiliated with the quartermaster department. Virtually all of these men at one 
time or another forgot to sign the appropriate forms for goods requested or received. 
With General Cooper's help, however, supply improved, and, as the numerous 
transactions recorded in the State Guard's ledger indicate, each company eventually 
received everything it needed.67 
With his staff organized and the militia's supply problems presumably solved, 
General Cooper formalized the structure of the State Guard and finalized the company 
letter designations that had fluctuated_ during the mobilization period (see Appendix A). 
Perhaps by intention, the two full regiments had an equal number of companies from 
each section of the state. Oddly, the State Guard of 1867 never had any regimental 
commanders~ all company commanders reported directly to either Cooper or the adjutant 
general. Less than a week before the election, Cooper informed the adjutant general that 
the State Guard was ready and that no new companies were being formed. All the while, 
Cooper judiciously deployed his twenty-one companies so as to cover as many 
potentially troublesome counties as his relatively small force would permit.68 
67 Special Order No. 7, 1 July 1867, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 33; Governor Brownlow to H. H Thomas, 5 June 
1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 3; Captain Grisham to A. E. Boone, 27 July 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, 
Box 10, Folder 3; H. H. Thomas to captains Rickman and Blackburn, 26 April, 23 May 1867, GP 21, Reel 
2, Box 3, Folder l; J. K. Woodard to H. H. Thomas, 6 June 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 3; H. H. 
Thomas to captains Grisham, Hall, Rickman, and Robeson, 23-26 April 1867, GP 21, Reel 2, Box 3, Folder 
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adding "if the requisition is not correct, you will please correct it." Captain Clapp to A. E. Boone, 15 
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The mobilization of Tennessee's Radical Army had taken much time and effort, 
but the product was satisfying. Comprising nearly 2,000 men under seasoned leadership, 
the State Guard served as the spearhead of a Radical party that claimed approximately 
40,000 white Unionists and about as many newly enfranchised freedmen. Pitted against 
this array of Radical power was an indeterminate number of legal and illegal 
Conservative voters (perhaps 20,000) and over 80,000 disfranchised ex-Confederates. 
Franchise restrictions notwithstanding, the anti-Radical forces fully intended to defy 
"Brownlowism." The performance of the Tennessee State Guard would largely 
determine whether law and order or civil strife prevailed during the campaign. 
90 
CHAPTER THREE 
The Opening Shots of the Campaign of 1867 
Anti-Radicals throughout Tennessee were alarmed by the creation of 
"Brownlow's Melish." The Union and Dispatch declared that the State Guard had 
transformed Tennessee into a "military republic, a government founded on mock 
elections, and supported only by the sword." A few days after Governor Brownlow 
promulgated his General Order No. 1, twenty-four Conservative members of the General 
Assembly issued a call for "a Convention of all who oppose the tendencies and ruinous 
policy and practices of the dominant party." Declaring that they were "deeply impressed 
with the dangers which imperil our beloved country," these men demanded the formation 
of a Conservative Unionist Party and the nomination of a full slate of candidates to run 
against the Radicals. 1 
On 16 April, Conservative delegates gathered in Nashville, formulated a platform 
and nominated a candidate for governor. Notable among the party's resolutions was a 
promise to restore the suffrage to those disfranchised by the Brownlow administration. 
The convention also denounced the State Guard: "the establishment of a standing army in 
our state in times of peace, is a flagrant and dangerous encroachment on the rights and 
liberties of the citizens, violent and oppressive to the taxpayers, and evidently designed to 
over-awe the voters at the ballot-box." For governor, the convention selected Henry 
1 Nashville Union and Dispatch, 21 March 1867; White, Messages, 5: 561. 
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Emerson Etheridge, a powerful stump speaker, as the man best suited to enter the 
political arena against Brownlow. 2 
The 48-year-old Etheridge was a prominent Conservative Unionist from Weakley 
County in West Tennessee. He was vilified by the Confederacy for staying loyal to the 
Union, but after the war, he incurred the wrath of both the Republican Party for opposing 
emancipation (he was a former slaveholder) and the Tennessee Radicals for opposing the 
Franchise Acts, especially black suffrage. In 1865, he was briefly arrested for sedition 
against the Brownlow government, although the charges were subsequently dropped. In 
May 1867, as gubernatorial candidate, he condemned the Tennessee State Guard, 
particularly the arming of black militiamen, and claimed that one of its main functions 
was to force freedmen into the Radical-controlled Union Leagues. At one point, he was 
alleged to have said that anyone encouraging black citizenship should be shot. 
Nevertheless, he officially urged his followers to refrain from violence. His racism 
notwithstanding, Etheridge predicted that he would defeat the incumbent Brownlow by 
winning over the new black electorate.3 
Etheridge opened his canvass of the state on 11 May with a speech in Union City 
(Obion County), only miles from the site of Senator Almon Case's assassination. Given 
the strong anti-Radical feeling in West Tennessee, Etheridge rightly expected large 
receptions at each of his stops in that part of the state. Most of his summer campaigning, 
2 White, Messages, 5: 562; Lonnie E. Maness, "Henry Emerson Etheridge and the Gubernatorial Election 
of 1867: A Study in Futility," West Tennessee Historical Society Papers 47 (1993): 41-42; Alexander, 
Political Reconstruction, 142. 
3 Lonnie E. Maness, "Emerson Etheridge and the Union," Tennessee Historical Quarterly 48 (1989): 97-
105; Maness, "Henry Emerson Etheridge," 43; Nashville Republican Banner, 26 May 1867; Patton, 
Unionism and Reconstruction, 136. 
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however, was in Middle and East Tennessee. His speeches were pure billingsgate, with 
"Brownlowism" the target. In his efforts to convert blacks to his banner, Etheridge added 
Joseph E. Williams, a Conservative black war veteran, to his speaking tour. Etheridge's 
dubious tactic of portraying Brownlow's racism as worse than his own, however, earned 
little black applause. Governor Brownlow, no amateur when it came to mudslinging 
rhetoric, was too ill to participate personally in the canvass. However, several leading 
Radicals, such as Samuel Amell, William B. Stokes, L. C. Houk, and Horace Maynard, 
made a point of attending Etheridge's meetings and "dividing time" whenever possible.4 
Governor Brownlow was incensed by the nomination of Etheridge, claiming that 
it "was not made in the expectation of electing him, but to produce mischief." Branding 
Etheridge a disloyal demagogue, he warned the Conservatives through one of his 
proclamations that "wherever ... violent speeches are made, inflaming the bad passions 
of bad men, I deem it my duty to station troops." Though insisting that he had no 
intention of suppressing free speech, he did "not conceive it to be the duty of the State 
Guards to stand quietly by and hear any man excite the mob spirit." Alarmed by this 
threatening language, East Tennessean John P. Holtsinger asked the governor whether the 
Conservative Party would be permitted to canvass the state "without being overawed or 
intimidated by the State troops." In reply, Brownlow assured all Conservatives that 
"however severe the speakers may be, no State Guards will be allowed to interrupt them, 
or be upheld in doing so." Nonetheless, the governor reiterated his desire to maintain law 
and order: "If bad men, from disloyal motives, shall venture to deliver incendiary 
4 Maness, "Henry Emerson Etheridge," 43-45; White, Messages, 5: 565-66; Coulter, Brownlow, 336. 
speeches, and advise the overthrow of the State government by mob violence, I should 
think the State Guards ... greatly at fault to tolerate such men."5 
93 
Given the tenor ofBrownlow's comments and his "extreme activity" in 
organizing his Radical army, distrustful Conservatives feared Brownlow would use any 
anti-Radical speech or meeting as a justification to cover.the state with militia. The 
Fayetteville Observer, in a sensational editorial entitled "Brownlow Counselling 
Murder," declared that a Radical victory at the polls was possible only through the 
"bullying intimidation of that 'loyal militia."' To anti-Radicals from Henry County, the 
mobilization of the militia "look[ s] like preparations for another war." The editor of this 
county's principal newspaper, the Paris Intelligencer, believed that the militia would 
quash free speech and prevent an honest election. "Brownlow had better declare himself 
King," this paper exclaimed. "If you want Peace, vote for Etheridge-if you prefer to go 
to war, then vote for Brownlow." In a letter to President Johnson, Conservative John C. 
Gaut presented a similarly frightening picture of oppression. Defining "Brownlowism" 
as "despicable tyranny," Gaut informed Johnson that the governor had perverted 
democracy while "organizing his malitia & arming them ... as fast as he can." 
According to Gaut, "Brownlow and faction intend to carry the August elections, by force, 
and intimidation." He beseeched the President "to take charge of Brownlow'' s malitia. ,.6 
These anti-Radical statements expressed fears, not reality, for at the time they 
were uttered, barely half-a-dozen companies of State Guard had been mustered into 
5 Knoxville Whig. 8 May 1867; American Annual Cyclopedia (1867), 707. 
6 Fayetteville Observer, 9 May 1867; Paris Intelligencer, 11 May 1867; Graf, Papers of Andrew Johnson, 
12: 254, 263-64. 
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service, and only a few had been deployed. Far from terrorizing the state, these units 
were drawing equipment and training within the confines of their encampments (when 
not fending off hostile ex-Confederates in West and Middle Tennessee). Governor 
Brownlow had made it clear to his militia officers that they were to conduct themselves 
and employ their commands in accordance with U.S. army regulations. To this end, 
Captain J. K. Clingan, shortly after mustering in his Company D, 1st Regiment, requested 
a copy ofHardee's drill manual, Rifle and Light Infantry Tactics. Like his fellow 
company commanders, Clingan wanted to instill a modicum of discipline and uniformity 
among his men before undertaking his mission. While the anti-Radical press was 
portraying the militia as a band of armed thugs, the State Guard leadership was taking 
time to transform its raw recruits into trained soldiers who would obey orders during the 
forthcoming political battles. 7 
Although the suppression of Rebel vigilantism would rank high as a militia 
priority, the Brownlow administration's most immediate concern in the spring of 1867 
was the registration of black voters, whose numbers were crucial for Radical success at 
the polls. Unfortunately, registration difficulties occurred throughout the state. Anderson 
H. Walker, the registrar of Weakley County, bluntly informed the governor that "it will 
be dangerous to attempt to register voters in this county without some protection." 
Similar complaints came from Sumner County, where ex-Confederates were obtaining 
phony certificates~ from Perry County, where "villainous Rebel papers" were warning 
7 Knoxville Whig. 22 May 1867; General Order No. 1, 6 March 1867, TAGO, Reel 8, Vol. 26; Captain 
Clingan to James P. Brownlow, 25 May 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 5. Perhaps motivated by 
Clingan's request, the state legislature printed 4,000 copies ofHardee's training manual. Nashville Daily 
Press and Times, 17 June 186 7. 
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blacks not to register; from Bedford County, where the poll books were "wickedly 
stolen" by unidentified thieves; and from Stewart County, where Registrar Russell A 
Salisbury felt compelled to re-register all eligible voters in an effort to make sure he 
certified only loyal men. Such reports led the governor's office to conclude that "in 
counties where the disloyal element is largely in the majority all sorts of obstacles are 
placed in the way of colored men being properly registered." Reminding these 
correspondents that "the office of Registrar is really the most important one politically," 
the executive department urged them to execute their duties faithfully and await the 
deployment of the State Guard.8 
No single, complete mission statement for the State Guard of 1867 exists, but its 
task, as suggested by the Militia Act and various executive proclamations and general 
orders, was apparently threefold. First, the State Guard was to preserve the integrity of 
the electoral process through the rigid enforcement of the Franchise Acts. To this end, 
militia commanders were instructed to assist county registrars in compiling rosters of 
loyal voters and then protecting the polling sites on election-day to prevent interference 
or illegal voting. (Arguments against the constitutionality of disfranchisement are thus 
irrelevant in judging the State Guard. The organization was duty-bound to enforce laws, 
not interpret them.) Second, the State Guard was to defend the lives and property of the 
recently enfranchised freedmen, whose right to vote was an affront to the ex-Confederate 
majority, which could not vote. Radical whites in West and Middle Tennessee, where the 
8 A.H. Walker to Governor Brownlow, 15 April 1867, and E. Cooper to Governor Brownlow, 27 May 
1867, Brownlow Papers (MS 1940), Box 1, Folder 10; J.P. Ledbetter to L. C. Houk, 29 April 1867, Houk 
Papers; Horace H. Thomas to Russell A Salisbury, 8 April 1867, H. H. Thomas to James Cockerell, 6 May 
1867, and H. H. Thomas to William Coward, 6May 1867, GP 21, Reel 2, Box 3, Folder 1. 
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loyalty of local sheriffs was often suspect, also required protection. Third, the State 
Guard was to ensure that no anti-Radical conspiracies or insurrections threatened the 
state. Accordingly, company commanders were authorized to patrol the hinterlands of 
counties with strong "rebel" sympathies and to monitor the Conservative canvass of the 
state. In this respect, the State Guard would serve as a super-sized constabulary. 
Indubitably, the State Guard was also a partisan, political army, whose broader 
Reconstruction mission, as enunciated by Horace Maynard, was "bringing the unruly 
opposers of Radicalism to terms. "9 
The nature of the Tennessee State Guard's mission, coupled with the animosity of 
the ex-Confederate populace toward Radicalism, required that the new company 
commanders carry out their assignments as if they were occupying enemy territory. The 
anti-Radicals closely watched militia movements throughout the campaign, anticipating, 
even hoping for, a flagrant abuse of power that would confirm their allegations that the 
State Guard was nothing more than an instrument of military oppression. They would 
not have to wait long. Toward the end of May and into June 1867, the activities of six 
companies of the 1st Regiment-Rickman's (Company H), Blackburn's (Company A), 
Clingan's (Company D), Robeson's (Company E), Grisham's (Company B), and Evans's 
(Company !}--would stir up controversy in all three sections of the state. Although some 
of their activities would tarnish the Radical campaign, their performance was precisely 
the show of force that the Brownlow administration wanted from its Radical army. 
9 White, Messages, 5: 534-35, 553-55; General Order No. 2, 7 June 1867, TAGO, Reel 8, Vol. 26; 
Knoxville Whig. 8 May 1867; Philip M. Hamer, Tennessee: A History, 1673-1932, 4 vols. (New York, 
1933), 2: 619-20; Alexander, Political Reconstruction, 150; Jones, "Reconstruction in Tennessee," 196; 
Nashville Republican Banner, 11 May 1867. 
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Captain William 0. Rickman's initial area of operations was Franklin County 
(Middle Tennessee). In 1861, Franklin whites had voted unanimously for secession. In 
1867, the county was, according to one local Radical, a den for the "Hell Hounds of 
Rebellion." These "hell hounds" were reportedly ordering blacks who had registered to 
vote to leave the region or face some terrible reprisal. This ex-Confederate activity likely 
explains why no Union League formed in Franklin and why the Freedmen's Bureau agent 
in neighboring Bedford County rarely visited. The few white Radicals in the county 
feared to campaign openly for their party lest they be shot down by "midnight assassins." 
Efforts to form a local Radical defense force fell short due to lack of weaponry. Captain 
Rickman moved aggressively to rectify the situation. 10 
Shortly after muster (1 May), Rickman established a base of operations in the 
Franklin countryside, "Camp New Hope." This encampment was eleven miles from the 
county seat, Winchester-the "Rebel City." On 10 May, Rickman issued a proclamation 
"to the Citizens of Franklin and adjoining counties." In this manifesto, he acknowledged 
the "great excitement" that his deployment had caused but reminded his readers of his 
lawful mission to preserve order. "No citizen that is obeying the laws of Tennessee will 
be molested by my command, but protected regardless of past political sentiments." 
Noting that "parts of this county are overrun by robbers and assassins," he expressed his 
disappointment that these criminals, in addition to receiving aid and comfort from the 
citizenry, were seen as heroes for having fought against the Union. Rickman explained 
that his intention was "to bring to justice all violators of the law" and vowed that "as long 
1° Fisher, War At Every Door, 189; J. W. Brown to Governor Brownlow, 21 May 1867, GP 21, Reel 1, Box 
2, Folder 1; Arthur Cyrus Hill, "The History of the Black People ofFranklin County, Tennessee" (M.A. 
Thesis, University of Minnesota, 1982), 112-116. 
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as these outlaws are allowed to run at large ... you will have the Tennessee State 
Guard." 11 
Anti-Radicals were appalled by the "vile slander" ofRickman's proclamation. 
The Fayetteville Observer protested that Rickman's statements were more applicable to 
the Radical stronghold of East Tennessee than to the peaceful citizens of Middle 
Tennessee. Nevertheless, Rickman soon commenced a series of mounted patrols 
throughout the county. One such patrol reported that several "rebel citizens" in 
Winchester carried side-arms in public and that the townspeople displayed open contempt 
for the militia. Demonstrating sound tactical judgment, Rickman tried to dissuade the 
adjutant general from dividing Company H into small squads to be stationed in the 
county's towns and villages. He reasoned that by keeping his infantry together in a 
central location he could respond to crises more effectively and protect his troops from 
ambush. Moreover, by staying in the countryside, Rickman believed that he could keep 
the ex-Confederates in the dark about his activities. Although sympathetic to Rickman's 
concerns, Adjutant General Brownlow ordered him to post a twenty-man detachment in 
Winchester. A recent Radical meeting in that town, attended by many blacks, had been 
disrupted by "an armed mob." Moreover, Registrar Daniel E. Davenport complained that 
he was heckled whenever he left his office. The adjutant general felt that a display of 
I 
strength was needed to encourage these local Radicals. 12 
11 Report of the Secretary of War (1867), 226. 
12 Fayetteville Observer, 23 May 1867; Captain Rickman to James P. Brownlow, 28 May 1867, TAGO, 
Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 2; Report of the Secretary of War (1867), 227. 
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Toward the end of May, after about two weeks of deployment, Rickman sensed 
that the county's "hell hounds" were preparing for a showdown. On 21 May, a white 
Radical was murdered near his home. Rickman sent out a mounted detachment in a 
fruitless pursuit of the killer. A few days later, a black man was "brutally shot down" for 
no apparent reason. Rickman learned that the perpetrators were all members of a band of 
ex-Confederate outlaws under former guerrilla leader Joe Rodgers. It was the expressed 
intention of this group "to clean out Rickman's command." On 25 May, in a pre-emptive 
move, Rickman ordered Lieutenant Jordan Holt to search the homes of all suspected 
members of Rodgers' outfit and confiscate their firearms. 13 
Lieutenant Holt carried out his orders enthusiastically. Over the next few days, 
his mounted detachment moved from residence to residence and confiscated several 
weapons. In the process, however, Company H overstepped the bounds of its authority. 
In several instances, Holt's men needlessly insulted the family members of the accused 
and, in some cases, allegedly threatened to kill the adult males. When the militia arrived 
at the home of Dr. J. J. Abernathy, a well-respected citizen, whose association with 
Rodgers' band was never established, the doctor insisted on seeing a search warrant. 
Lieutenant Holt reportedly put his hands on his holsters and said, "This is my authority." 
Later, at the home of ex-Confederate E. H. Poe, the militiamen encountered an armed 
Mrs. Poe and her intoxicated 15-year-old son. When the younger Poe brazenly 
threatened to kill Captain Rickman, Holt's men wrested the rifle from Mrs. Poe and then 
13 Report of the Secretary of War (1867), 227; Captain Rickman to James P. Brownlow, 31 May 1867, 
TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 2; Samuel Hunt to Governor Brownlow, 3 June 1867, Brownlow Papers 
(MS 1940), Box 1, Folder 10. 
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arrested her son. Lieutenant Holt then returned to camp on 28 May, leaving the Franklin 
countryside in an uproar. 14 
Although Registrar Davenport worried that Holt's recklessness would undermine 
his efforts to get out the Radical vote, Captain Rickman seemed satisfied with the 
dragnet. As for prisoner Poe, Rickman did not take seriously the teenager's threats and, 
after talking "very kindly" to him, sent the boy home. Rickman did, however, take 
seriously some intelligence he had received during Holt's absence. One of his scouts, 
Private Samuel Heath, in searching for his bolted horse, had struck up a conversation 
with a local man named James Brown. Brown foolishly confided in Heath his 
membership in Rodgers' "company of bushwhackers," and he identified a James 
Simmons as a fellow member. Brown further boasted that he "had never surrendered" 
and regaled Heath with his wartime exploits, including the killing of two Federal soldiers, 
whose bones apparently still lay nearby. Rickman acted decisively on this fresh 
information, making plans to apprehend both Brown and Simmons. 15 
In the early morning hours of29 May, an infantry squad marched to the home of 
Simmons, while Lieutenant Holt and a cavalry squad raced to Brown's. Holt was under 
orders to compel Brown to disclose the location of "his graveyard." Simmons caught 
wind of the raid, and managed to evade the infantry squad, which fired on him as he fled 
into the woods. Brown was not so lucky. Holt's men arrested him, but at this point 
14 Report of the Secretary of War (1867), 225, 227-28; Samuel Hunt to Governor Brownlow, 3 June 1867, 
Brownlow Papers (MS 1940), Box 1, Folder 10. 
1' Nashville Republican Banner, 26 May 1867; Samuel Hunt to Governor Brownlow, 3 June 1867, 
Brownlow Papers (MS 1940), Box 1, Folder 10; Report of the Secretary of War (1867), 228-29; Captain 
Rickman to James P. Brownlow, 29 May 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 2. 
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tragedy occurred. While leading his captors toward the gravesite of the Federal soldiers, 
Brown reportedly "broke and run" toward a ravine, but was shot fatally through the head 
before he could escape. Captain Rickman matter-of-factly related the particulars to 
Adjutant General Brownlow, his letter beginning, "I have the honor to report that my men 
this morning killed a man by the name of James Brown. " 16 
The killing of Brown and the general conduct of Company Hon 25-29 May, 
sparked an outcry against the Brownlow administration. Over the next several days, the 
residents of Franklin held anti-Radical rallies. Led by Arthur S. Colyar, a former 
member of the Confederate Congress, Franklin whites drew up a list of grievances 
·against the State Guard. The somewhat exaggerated petition accused Rickman's 
company of having, "in a most violent manner," conducted illegal searches and seizures; 
of having frightened women and children; of having jeopardized the economic prosperity 
of the county; of having arrested Poe, "an inoffensive boy," trying him by drum-head 
court, and sentencing him to be shot; and of having murdered James Brown, "a 
peaceable, quiet citizen ... in a most heartless and cruel manner." In short, as the Union 
and Dispatch declared, Rickman had instigated a "Reign of Terror." The Winchester 
petition, which was transmitted to President Johnson, concluded with a warning aimed at 
the Brownlow administration: "if the depredations of this militia are continued ... we 
recommend that the people combine and protect themselves."17 
16 Report of the Secretary of War (1867), 228-29; Samuel Hunt to Governor Brownlow, 3 June 1867, 
Brownlow Papers (MS 1940), Box 1 Folder 10; Captain Rickman to James P. Brownlow, 29 May 1867, 
TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 2. 
17 Report of the Secretacy of War (1867), 225-26; Nashville Union and Dispatch, 31 May 1867; Graf, 
Papers of Andrew Johnson, 12: 299-301. 
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The rabidly anti-Radical Republican Banner devoted space in ten of its issues to 
the militia in Franklin. Every local white seemed to have an exciting story to tell about 
Lieutenant Holt's rampage and the Brown killing. Mixing fact with fiction, they all 
related a tale of "pillage and violence unrestrained." Some accounts stressed that several 
militiamen were Franklin natives who exploited their uniform to exact revenge on their 
secessionist neighbors. Others elaborated on the manner in which Brown was killed, 
until his death took on grotesque proportions. It was stated that the militia took Brown 
"into the woods, tied him to a tree with thongs of bark and literally riddled his body with 
balls." In all, nearly twenty affidavits were printed for public consumption. The Banner 
damned the Radicals: "the blood of poor Brown is on the hands of every man who voted 
for the militia bill." Surprisingly, despite the propaganda capital of Brown's death, 
Etheridge rarely mentioned the incident in his stump speeches. 18 
As the Conservative press built Brown's death into "the worst, unprovoked, 
dastardly and cruel murder ever perpetrated in the country," Radical editors engaged in 
damage control. They predictably portrayed the anti-Radical newspaper versions as gross 
exaggerations. They further denounced the Winchester petition as "inflammatory," an 
irresponsible call for "armed resistance against the state authorities." Captain Rickman 
himself dismissed the Winchester accusations as sheer hyperbole: "This County is full of 
Bushwhackers, and if wee go to arest one of them thare is a big hue and Cry rased by the 
Rebels." Determined to continue his mission, he arrested six more men in the days 
18 Nashville Republican Banner, 26, 30, 31 May, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 25 June, 9 July 1867. 
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following Brown's death, presumably members of Rodgers' band, and turned them over 
to the civil authorities. 19 
The outcry over the killing of Brown prompted two official investigations into the 
conduct of Company H. Assistant AG Samuel Hunt represented the state of Tennessee 
and General William D. Whipple represented the Federal authorities. On most matters, 
Hunt and Whipple were in agreement. Both men acknowledged ex-Confederate 
animosity as a mitigating circumstance for all of the alleged militia transgressions. 
Furthermore, both rejected the charge that Poe was unfairly tried and nearly executed. 
Poe, it was noted, later stated that Captain Rickman "had treated him well." Overall, 
Rickman was judged a capable officer (Hunt especially expressed confidence in his 
leadership). However, both reports cited instances of "bad conduct." Hunt stated that 
"some of the men ... have been imprudent ... and guilty of trespasses, which they were 
not guaranteed in doing." Whipple was more critical, particularly in his evaluation of 
Holt's performance. He chastised the militia lieutenant for excessive use of force. He 
also noted that the cavalry squad under Holt prevented Brown's father from participating 
in the trek to the gravesite. To Whipple, this fact "is perhaps sufficient to excite 
suspicion of intent to murder on the part of the militia." In the end, however, both 
investigations exonerated Captain Rickman and his men of any major wrongdoing. 
Whipple, in particular, expressed satisfaction that both Rickman and Holt regretted the 
whole affair; he saw no reason for any Federal intervention. Department commander 
General George H. Thomas endorsed his subordinate's findings and explained to 
19 Pulaski Citizen, 7 June 1867; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 1, 3 June 1867; Knoxville Whig, 5 June 
1867; Captain Rickman to James P. Brownlow, 31 May 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 2. 
104 
President Johnson that "the terror among the people of Franklin County ... is very much 
magnified for political purposes." As for the killing of Brown, Thomas assured the 
President that "there is no danger whatever of a repetition of a similar offence. "20 
As the story unfolded, Captain Rickman, unflappable in the face of anti-Radical 
criticism, privately expressed disappointment in Holt. He rebuked his lieutenant for 
harassing Dr. Abernathy and for not exercising tighter control over his men during the 
arrests of Poe and Brown. The reprimands and the stress of command proved too much 
for Holt~ he resigned his commission of his own volition and returned to ranks as a 
private. Sergeant John Mankin replaced him as first lieutenant. In mid-June, Rickman 
reported, "I have got my men under tolerable good discipline."21 
While the investigations were underway, Governor Brownlow announced that he 
was placing Rickman under arrest and that the captain would stand trial for his misdeeds. 
This arrest, however, never occurred, and the Conservative press depicted Brownlow's 
order as a hoax. "We have heard of no arrests," exclaimed the Union and Dispatch, "no 
dismissal of [Rickman] from the State service." In fact, later in June, Rickman was seen 
"swaggering through the streets" of Nashville. These newspapers further ridiculed the 
"official" investigations, claiming that Samuel Hunt "hunted" evidence only from the 
militia while ignoring the Republican Banner's large collection of affidavits. Rather than 
20 Nashville Union and Dispatch, 7 June 1867; Samuel Hunt to Governor Brownlow, 3 June 1867, 
Brownlow Papers (MS 1940), Box 1, Folder 10; Report of the Secretary of War (1867), 225-30; Captain 
Rickman to Samuel Hunt, 4 June 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, box 1, Folder 2; Graf, Papers of Andrew Johnson, 
12: 315-17. 
21 Captain Rickman to James P. Brownlow, 31 May, 3, 12 June 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 2; 
Muster Roll for Company H, 1st Regiment, T AGO, Reel 5, Box 23, Folder 4. Rickman later tried to 
appoint Corporal Joseph B. Clark to the still vacant second lieutenancy, but headquarters never granted 
Clark a commission. Captain Rickman to General Cooper 9 July 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 2. 
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arresting Rickman, the executive department transferred his company to Marshall 
County. Franklin, however, was not spared the presence of a militia force. At the secret 
urging of General Whipple, who advised ·"against backing down" in the face of anti-
Radical opposition, the adjutant general deployed Captain George W. Kirk's newly 
mustered militia company from East Tennessee to Franklin.22 
In contrast to affairs in Franklin, the militia activities of Captain Joseph H. 
Blackbum in DeKalb, a few counties to the north, drew very few headlines. In 
accomplishing his mission, Captain Blackburn preferred a less confrontational approach 
than Rickman. For several weeks after mustering in his Company A (1 April), Blackburn 
methodically helped solidify Radical control over DeKalb County. In this task, he was 
greatly assisted by his first lieutenant, William L. Hathaway, who was also sheriff of the 
county. Although DeKalb had a majority for secession in 1861, more than 40 percent of 
the voters rejected it. Many of these Unionists served in the Federal army, and most of 
those who did so embraced the Radical party after the war. In an effort to mobilize this 
significant white Radical strength, Blackburn sponsored efforts to raise two additional 
State Guard companies from DeKalb. He and a fellow militia captain, William S. Stuart 
( Company K) of neighboring Putnam County, even suggested to the adjutant general that 
their separate commands be combined into a super-company under Blackburn. The state 
government disapproved the raising of additional companies from DeKalb, but was 
22 Knoxville Whig. 5 June 1867; Nashville Union and Dispatch, 7, 12 June 1867; Nashville Republican 
Banner, 5, 18, 25 June 1867; H. H. Thomas to Governor Brownlow, 7 June 1867, Brownlow Papers (MS 
1940), Box 1 Folder 10. William Crane, a local sutler for the militia, had done a brisk business with 
Captain Rickman and was sad to see his unit leave. He tried in vain to get Franklin's citizenry to sign a 
petition asking Rickman to stay. Nashville Republican Banner, 21, 25 June 1867. 
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nevertheless grateful-to Blackburn for his contributions in transforming the county into a 
Radical stronghold where racial violence and ex-Confederate agitation were minimal. 23 
Blackburn's command was unique in that it was essentially a cavalry company. 
While many State Guard captains were fortunate to have a full mounted section of 
twenty-five men (as authorized in General Order No. 1), over sixty men in Company A 
were mounted. This advantage in mobility enabled Blackbum to project militia power 
into all counties adjacent to DeKalb-Cannon, Putnam, Smith, Warren, White, and 
, Wilson. Throughout May and June, using the DeKalb towns of Alexandria and then 
Liberty as his headquarters, Blackburn dispatched squad-sized detachments ( ten to twelve 
men) to such towns as Lebanon (Wilson County), Sparta (White County), and 
McMinnville (Warren County). This last county was particularly troublesome to the 
Radicals. In early June, Registrar William Baker discovered that several dozen ex-
Confederates possessed bogus voting certificates. When he initiated a complete re-
registration of the county, anti-Radicals resisted his efforts. Baker beseeched the 
governor: "a detachment of the State Guard is urgently needed ... not only to insure a 
safe and correct reregistration ... but also to protect the persons and lives of loyal 
citizens from conservative and rebel violence ... without military protection there is 
danger of an outbreak, which may result in the killing of some of our best citizens." On 
23 Webb, DeKalb County. 40-42, 119; Fisher, War At Every Door, 189; J. T. Thompson to Governor 
Brownlow, 13 April 1867, GP 21, Reel 1, Box 2, Folder 2; James T. Exum to Governor Brownlow, 13 
April 1867, GP 21, Reel 1, Box 2, Folder l; Captain Blackburn to H. H. Thomas, 4 May 1867, TAGO, Reel 
2, Box 10, Folder 4. 
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21 June, Blackburn sent Second Lieutenant William C. Cravens with fifteen soldiers to 
assist Baker. 24 
Although an implacable foe of the rebellion during the Civil War, Blackburn was 
commended, by Conservatives no less, for his moderation as a militia captain. When 
White County residents protested Captain Stuart's peremptory treatment of local 
troublemakers (he had forcibly arrested two Rebels in April), Blackburn played the 
peacemaker. He first persuaded Stuart to tone down his pugnacity and then assured local 
whites that the militia was not an enemy but merely a law enforcer. Stuart, who had 
served as a non-commissioned officer under Blackburn during the war, appears to have 
deferred to his former commander without resentment. Blackburn's Reconstruction 
diplomacy may have been effective because of his wartime reputation for ruthlessness 
toward Confederate guerrillas. On one occasion during the war, he was alleged to have 
tortured and hanged one White County Rebel for withholding information about enemy 
movements, and on another to have summarily executed two guerrillas after they 
surrendered to his men. Adding to his fearsome persona was a rumor, reported by the 
Republican Banner, that Blackburn's Company A had killed eleven ex-Confederates 
since its muster. For Captain Blackbum, the mere threat of force seems to have been 
effective. 25 
24 Muster Roll for Company A, 1st Regiment, TAGO, Reel 4, Box 22, Folder l; Nashville Republican 
Banner, 12 May, 7, 11 June 1867; William Baker to Governor Brownlow, 6 June 1867, Patton Collection; 
Warren County petition to Governor Brownlow, 8 June 1867, Brownlow Papers (MS 1940), Box 1, Folder 
10; William Baker to Governor Brownlow, 18, 28 June 1867, GP 21, Reel 1, Box 2, Folder l; Special Order 
No. 1, 21 June 1867, TAGO, Reel 9, vol. 33. 
25 Nashville Republican Banner, 12 May, 2, 18 June 1867; Monroe Seals, History of White County, 
Tennessee (Spartanburg, SC, 1974), 74, 77. 
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In addition to neutralizing anti-Radical opposition in DeKalb and the surrounding 
area, Captain Blackburn served as a bodyguard for William B. Stokes, Radical candidate 
for Congress. Stokes apparently feared assassination. As he stumped the third 
congressional district, he called on Blackburn to provide security, a service few other 
Radical candidates enjoyed. Blackburn could hardly refuse his old commander (he had 
served under Stokes in the 5th Cavalry). As a result, a portion of Company A frequently 
accompanied Stokes during his canvass. In one instance, Blackburn's men not only 
protected Stokes's life but also defended his honor. On 22 June, during a joint political 
debate in Lebanon (Wilson County), a Conservative speaker implied that Stokes was 
either a coward or a woman. Incensed by this insult, Lieutenant Hathaway, "who had 
come to protect William B. 's precious person," moved to strike the offender. In self-
defense, the man produced a pistol and fired at Hathaway, missing the militia officer but 
hitting a black onlooker in the leg. A general scuffle ensued, but Captain Blackbum 
barked out some commands and quickly restored order. The shooter was disarmed and 
"pitched headlong" out of the speaking hall, but was not arrested. The Republican 
Banner reported that the affray had left Stokes "pale as death. "26 
Early militia activities in West Tennessee lacked the drama of Rickman's 
experience in Franklin and Blackburn's in Wilson, but they too proved controversial. On 
or about 22 May, Captain Judge K. Clingan, commanding Company D, deployed to 
Haywood County in response to a recent disturbance. Haywood had been a hotbed of 
secession in 1861, with 87 percent of the electorate voting to leave the Union. In 1867, 
26 Webb, DeKalb County. 37-39; Alexander, Political Reconstruction, 152; Mary Jean DeLozier, "The 
Civil War and Its Aftermath in Putnam County," Tennessee Historical Quarterly 38 (1979): 456; Nashville 
Republican Banner, 31 May, 25 June 1867; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 24 June 1867. 
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the white populace was no less opposed to Radical Reconstruction. On 13 May, a group 
of "young white men" broke up a Radical rally in Brownsville, the county seat. 
According to reports, when the several hundred blacks in attendance commenced 
cheering for Governor Brownlow, the youths dispersed the crowd with pistol fire. 
Radicals referred to the perpetrators as "Etheridge's guerrillas" and intimated a 
connection between the incident and the Conservative gubernatorial candidate's 
concurrent stump speech in neighboring Gibson County and his speech in Haywood 
scheduled for 15 May. Whether this was true or not, it was clear that protecting blacks in 
West Tennessee was going to be a difficult task for the Brownlow administration.27 
Company D had no sooner set up camp on the Brownsville fair grounds than it 
became the target of anti-Radical abuse. Ex-Confederates mocked Clingan's men as a 
"lazy, shiftless class who hang around the groggeries of small county towns." Some of 
the citizens tried to get the militiamen to make bets on who would win the election. One 
Conservative newspaper even portrayed the militiamen as Negrophobes who devoted 
most of their time to disrupting black meetings, harassing black men, and making 
"indecent advances to colored women." This source claimed that one of Clingan's 
soldiers had killed a black man in East Tennessee "and would just as lieve as not kill 
another one." The Radical press countered these aspersions, describing Clingan' s troops 
as "quiet, civil men [who] are commended by all good citizens in the county." The 
27 Fisher, War At Every Door, 189; Nashville Union and Dispatch, 17, 21 May 1867; Nashville Daily Press 
and Times, 1 June 1867; Phillips, "Freedmen's Bureau in Tennessee," 299-300; Nashville Republican 
Banner, 12 May 1867. 
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militia officers themselves urged the residents to promptly report any misconduct by their 
soldiers. 28 
Captain Clingan ignored the propaganda battles. Instead, he spent the first few 
days in Brownsville drilling his men and planning security for a second Radical meeting 
scheduled for 28-29 May. These dates appear to have been cursed for the Tennessee 
State Guard, for as Rickman clashed with ex-Confederates in Franklin, Clingan earned 
notoriety of his own in Haywood. The militia's performance during the convention 
started out well enough. When a large body of armed blacks arrived, probably in 
anticipation of another row with local whites, Clingan calmly informed them that his unit 
would keep order "and that their services were not required." The following day (29 
May), Clingan closed all liquor establishments during the convention's closing 
ceremorues. Thanks to Company D, Haywood's second Radical rally passed off 
quietly. 29 
Unfortunately for the Radicals, an incident outside the convention hall tarnished 
the day's success. An elderly ex-Confederate approached some militiamen and promised 
them horses, clothing, money, and sanctuary if they would desert "the d-d militia." One 
enlisted man did accept the offer and absconded. On learning of the matter, Clingan 
arrested the old man, charged him with willful interference, and implemented a bizarre 
punishment. He "ordered the gentleman to be ridden upon a rail through the town of 
Brownsville." In a letter to the Union and Dispatch, Clingan justified his action on the 
28 Nashville Republican Banner, 21, 28 May 1867; Nashville Union and Dispatch, 14 June 1867; Nashville 
Daily Press and Times, 1 June 1867 .. 
·29 Captain Clingan to James P. Brownlow, 25 May 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 5; Nashville 
Union and Dispatch, 31 May 1867; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 1 June 1867. 
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grounds that he had a duty to protect his men, and that he believed the punishment would 
deter other residents from future attempts to induce desertion. He declared that "if any 
other man, Radical, Conservative, or Rebel, is found guilty of the same offence, he may 
expect to receive what we think is just."30 
The incident lacked the explosiveness of the Brown affair in Franklin, but 
Conservatives still tried to exploit it as another example of "Brownlowism." Decrying 
the "absolutism of military power," the Union and Dispatch objected to the fact that the 
old man in question had received no trial, only the summary infliction of"gross 
cruelties." Local people claimed the old man was simply tryingto persuade his sons, 
who had apparently joined the militia, to come back home. Clingan firmly denied this 
last assertion, stating that none of his men were kin to the perpetrator. Conservatives 
demanded an investigation into the "Dare Devil Doings of the Brownlow Melish" in 
Haywood, but the executive branch took no action.31 
In the weeks following the rail-riding incident~ Haywood was quiet and orderly. 
In mid-June, Captain Clingan reported that he and his men had settled into a comfortable 
routine of peacekeeping. While mounted detachments regularly patrolled the 
countryside, Clingan oversaw the formation of a Union League in Brownsville, one 
largely run by blacks. Noting that "the boys are ... very well pleased and enjoying 
themselves," the militia captain reiterated his commitment to drill: "Our discipline is as 
severe as practicable for recruits." For exercise, the men often wrestled and sometimes 
30 Nashville Union and Dispatch, 31 May, 1 June 1867; Muster Roll for Company D, 1st Regiment, TAGO, 
Reel 4, Box 22, Folder 4; Jones, "Reconstruction in Tennessee," 197. 
31 Nashville Union and Dispatch, 31 May, 1 June 1867. 
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challenged the officers to a friendly match. Clingan was manifestly proud of his 
company: "I can say without boasting that the men of this command can not be excelled 
in trying to do what is right and what they think is their duty." They evidently did their 
duty well, for during a visit through the county in early July, Tennessee Secretary of State 
A J. Fletcher found Haywood "a perfect blaze of enthusiasm for Brownlow. "32 
This favorable assessment notwithstanding, some of Clingan's men were unhappy 
with life in the State Guard. Private James Kelley, for instance, penned a petition to the 
governor complaining about the poor supply of food: "we have never had a change in 
diet, which you know is contrary to the laws of hygiene, nature, and Army regulations. 
We draw meal, bacon, sugar, and coffee ... all of which is deficient in quantity and 
inferior in quality." Foraging for chickens and other foodstuffs helped offset some 
shortages, but mess in Company D apparently left much to be desired. Illness or injury 
dampened the enthusiasm of other volunteers. When 15-year-old Corporal Charles Fry 
became sick, he used his mother's influence to gain a discharge. Private Joseph H. 
Bailes, who accidentally shot himself in the hand, and at least four other enlisted men 
were not as lucky as Fry. They spent most of their time in the militia laid-up in makeshift 
field hospitals. 33 
On 16 June, a squad of regular army troops marched into Brownsville, evidently 
at the behest some of Haywood's citizens. These petitioners claimed that the officers of 
32 McBride, "Black and the Race Issue," 214-15; Captain Clingan to Samuel Hunt, 14 June 1867, TAGO, 
Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 5; Pulaski Citizen, 31 May 1867; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 18 July 1867. 
33 J. L. Kelley to Governor Brownlow, 12 June 1867, GP 21, Reel 1, Box 2, Folder l; Mrs. S. Fry to James 
P. Brownlow, 25 June 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder l; Cleveland Banner, 13 June 1867; Captain 
Clingan to A. E. Boone, 25 June 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 3. 
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Company D had threatened to "lynch those who offend them." According to Clingan, 
"the rebels rejoiced exceedingly when the U. S. troops arrived." After their arrival, he 
added, the Rebels became "considerably bolder." Clingan considered his further 
presence in Haywood superfluous now that Federal troops had appeared. General 
Cooper, having recently assumed command of the State Guard, agreed and ordered 
Company D to neighboring Madison County, a decision that not only projected power 
into that troublesome region but also avoided potential clashes over authority in 
Haywood. As his men prepared to march out of Brownsville on 19 June, Clingan noted 
with amusement how several ex-Confederates heckled his men from afar, boasting that 
any one of them "could whip any three ofBrownlow's malitia." The ex-Confederates 
had had a month to put that claim to the test, but the militia departed with injuries to none 
(except the "old man").34 
Madison whites would come to resent Clingan's command as much as those of 
Haywood, but militia captain John T. Robeson welcomed the presence of his compatriot 
from East Tennessee. Prior to Clingan's arrival, Robeson's Company E had constituted 
the only Radical force in the entire western section of the state (save the Memphis 
Metropolitan Police). Robeson's principal area of operations was the northwest comer of 
Tennessee (Dyer, Gibson, Obion, and Weakley counties). With the exception of 
Weakley, which boasted six chapters of the Union League, this region was 
overwhelmingly ex-Confederate. Toward the end of May, Captain Robeson moved his 
company into Obion County and set-up camp in Troy, the site of Senator Almon Case's 
34 Nashville Republican Banner 16 June 1867; Captain Clingan to James P. Brownlow, 17 June 1867, 
TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 5; Special Order No.-, 19 June 1867, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 33. 
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assassination. On 15 June, he relocated to Union City, in part to counter the political 
effects ofEtheridge's inaugural campaign speech, but more importantly to take advantage 
of the town's railroad nexus.35 
Robeson was dismayed to find that the Radical party was virtually non-existent in 
Obion and Dyer. His arrival did encourage local Radicals, but loyal whites were scarce 
and the freedmen were politically inactive. Robeson did have a valuable ally in James 
W. Tarkington, the sheriff of Dyer County and "a strong Radical," but the county 
registrars appear to have done little to enroll blacks as voters. The militia captain further 
discovered that there had been no Freedmen's Bureau agent in Obion or Dyer for some 
time. Under the circumstances, Robeson realized that he was going to have to assume 
political leadership. In mid-June, he organized a chapter of the Union League in Obion 
County and "initiated quite a number of men both white and black." Presumably, he also 
took steps to get them registered to vote. Proud of his initiatives, Robeson assured the 
adjutant general that Obion blacks would all vote the Radical ticket, and he predicted 
Brownlow would take the county by a three-to-one margin. His confidence in the 
freedmen notwithstanding, Robeson closed one of his reports with an ominous forecast: 
"I look for trouble on the day of the election. "36 
Robeson had good reason to be worried about election difficulties. Obion's ex-
Confederates harassed his men daily. "The Rebs are very bitter," Robeson observed the 
35 Fisher, War At Evecy Door, 189-90; Mingo Scott, The Negro in Tennessee Politics and Governmental 
Affairs, 1865-1965 (Nashville, 1964), 18; Nashville Union and Dispatch, 4 June 1867; Captain Robeson to 
Samuel Hunt, 16 June 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 3. 
36 Captain Robeson to Samuel Hunt, 16, 18, and 22 June, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 3; Graf, Papers of 
Andrew Johnson, 12: 373; Captain Robeson to Governor Brownlow, 22 June 1867, GP 21, Reel 1, Box 2, 
Folder 2; Captain Robeson to Frank Hyberger, 23 June 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 3. 
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day after his arrival in Union City. When they were not trying to induce the militiamen 
to desert, the "Rebs" tried unsuccessfully to incite conflict between Company E and a 
small detachment of Federal troops stationed in Obion. On one occasion, while Robeson 
was scouting the area around Obionville (along the Mississippi River), four militiamen, 
including a corporal, did desert the Union City encampment. They had been told falsely 
by some ex-Confederates that the army was going to arrest all members of the State 
Guard. Robeson reprimanded First Lieutenant Charles B. Simpson for being inattentive 
in his absence. Two of the deserters eventually returned, and thereafter desertion in 
Company E was infrequent. Robeson informed State Guard headquarters that all was 
"write" with his command and that discipline was "Good. "37 
Toward the end of June, Captain Robeson became concerned about a rumor of a 
planned insurrection in West Tennessee. A Rebel named Day was reportedly organizing 
and arming a band of 500 men with which to combat the militia. Day vowed that if he 
and his men were prevented from voting on election day, they would seize control "By 
the Bayonet." Robeson refused "to be alarmed by the threats of Johnnie Reb," but he 
requested more men and horses so that he could better patrol the open country and 
thereby "Ceep the Rebs and the bad men quiete." Until the end of June, when General 
Cooper deployed reinforcements to northwest Tennessee, Robeson defended the Radical 
banner alone in that part of the state. Nevertheless, he was optimistic: "I intend to take a 
37 Captain Robeson to Samuel Hunt, 16, 22 June 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 3; Captain Robeson 
to Governor Brownlow, 22 June 1867, GP 21, Reel 1, Box 2, Folder 2; Morning Report for Company E, 1st 
Regiment, 21 June 1867, TAGO, Reel 4, Box 23, Folder I. 
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Straightforward course. My men shall respect every citizen and I expect the same in 
retum."38 
As the militia companies stationed in Middle and West Tennessee subdued the 
opposition with varying degrees of success, two companies in East Tennessee earned 
their own peculiar notoriety. Following the festivities of his unit's muster in Jonesboro 
(1 May), Captain George E. Grisham transported his oversized Company B (115 men) to 
Sullivan County. Tucked away in the remote northeast comer of the state, along the 
Virginia border, Sullivan was one of the few East Tennessee counties to vote for 
secession in 1861 (by over 70 percent). These isolated ex-Confederates banded together 
tightly. Conservatives were perplexed by the Governor's decision to station militia in 
Sullivan, but according to local Radicals, "most of the rebel desperadoes of this section 
have taken refuge in [the Sullivan vicinity], and occasionally make raids on our farmers, 
and take their fine horses." Prior to his deployment, Grisham appears to have sent 
"spies" into Sullivan. From these individuals, he discovered that the white populace was 
ready to "rise up against him to a man" ifhe overstepped his authority. This intelligence 
notwithstanding, Grisham, who reportedly described Sullivan as "the worst Rebel hole in 
the State," established a firm presence there during the first weeks of May 1867. He and 
part of his command camped in Bristol, while First Lieutenant Nelson McLaughlin led a 
detachment to Kingsport. 39 
38 Captain Robeson to Samuel Hunt, 16, 22 June 1867, IAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 3; Captain Robeson 
to Governor Brownlow, 22 June 1867, IAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 3. 
39 Nashville Daily Press and Times, 19 April 1867; Nashville Union and Dispatch, 16 April, 3 July 1867; 
Fisher, War At Every Door, 188; Hamer, Tennessee, 2: 626. 
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About half of the men in Company B were black and this unit's deployment to 
Sullivan County marked the first use of"Negro militia" in the Reconstruction South. The 
significance of the occasion was not missed by the anti-Radical press, which scowled at 
this experiment in racial equality. The Republican Banner circulated a story about the 
"boisterous" behavior of Grisham's black recruits during the unit's movement by rail. At 
some point on the journey, four black militiamen supposedly forced their way into a 
passenger car, "made themselves very obnoxious to the lady passengers," and bullied the 
white conductor with a bayonet, all the while shouting "Brownlow!"40 
Sullivan whites vilified Grisham's men as "the meanest negroes in the country 
and the meanest of the poor white trash of East Tennessee," but the unit's performance in 
Sullivan proved more humorous than repressive. After informing Registrar A. C. Shipley 
of his arrival, Grisham began his "perfect reign of terror" on 27 May. Inexplicably, 
Grisham involved himself in a domestic dispute. Evidently, a recently divorced local 
woman came to his encampment with a complaint that her former husband had seized 
their seven-month-old daughter and forbade her any contact with the child. Grisham 
decided to hold a hearing in his camp and ordered three Bristol magistrates to attend and 
help him arbitrate the case. Conservatives sarcastically commended "the valiant" 
Grisham for calling on local authorities for assistance, but proclaimed that his "uncivil" 
action was "without precedent in legal or military history."41 
40 Nashville Republican Banner, 22 May 1867. 
41 Nashville Union and Dispatch, 5 June, 3 July, 1867; Pulaski Citizen, 14 June 1867; Clarksville 
Chronicle, 14 June 1867; Jones, "Reconstruction in Tennessee," 197. 
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The ruling in the child custody hearing is unknown, but one of the magistrates, J. 
S. Shangle, was infuriated by the whole affair. In a letter to President Johnson, he 
denounced the State Guard as a "rag-tag-&-bob-tail-malitia" and accused Captain 
Grisham of suppressing free discussion of politics in the county. Anti-Radical 
newspapers tried to corroborate Shangle's statement, but presented nothing more than 
vague references to various "depredations." A visiting northern correspondent refuted 
the libel and insisted that Company B behaved with "perfect decency, propriety and 
order." Although this observer admitted that Grisham "did make rather a fool of himself' 
by getting involved in a domestic dispute, he considered the militia captain a "peaceable, 
good-natured, sensible fellow. ,,42 
Company B performed its mission without further controversy until the beginning 
of July, when Captain Grisham got involved in another dispute. On 1 July, county 
Radicals and Conservatives held a joint political discussion in Blountville. Grisham 
provided security and everything went smoothly. According to the Union and Dispatch, 
however, in the course of the day, two black militiamen accosted a local black named 
Billy Murray and reprimanded him for addressing a local white as "Massa." Dragging 
him before Grisham, who seemed to enjoy his self-appointed role as provost marshal, the 
black militiamen further dressed down the defendant: "You are a pretty d-n fool to be 
calling a white rascal master~ don't you know that's treason?" Grisham reportedly fined 
the hapless Murray ten dollars. Grisham'sjudicial misadventures aside, he apparently 
did a good job of neutralizing local ex-Confederate vigilantism. Later in July, Governor 
42 Graf, Papers of Andrew Johnson, 12: 314; Pulaski Citizen, 14 June 1867; Knoxville Whig, 3 July 1867. 
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Brownlow felt comfortable in permitting Company B's redeployment to Middle 
Tennessee. Sullivan whites expressed elation when the "Brownlow-Grisham Melish" 
departed after two months of occupation. 43 
The State Guard was active elsewhere in East Tennessee as well. In the first week 
of June 1867, Captain James R. Evans of Company I was planning for an imminent 
assignment in Claiborne County, one similar to Grisham's in Sullivan. Although 
Claiborne cast a majority vote against secession in 1861, the county had recently become 
a haven for ex-Confederate guerrillas. At the end of May, Evans had been forced by 
local animus to leave Claiborne before mustering in his men, but he was looking forward 
to a second crack at the county's "bushwhackers." His opening shot of the campaign, 
however, was not aimed at bushwhackers, but at Governor Brownlow's arch-rival, 
Emerson Etheridge. Mustered into service at Morristown (Grainger County) on 3 June, 
Evans's company barely had time to draw equipment and get some rudimentary training 
before the Etheridge cavalcade arrived on 8 June. Morristown was the sixth of eight 
campaign stops in East Tennessee for the Conservative gubernatorial candidate (who was 
on the first of two swings through the heart of Tennessee Radicalism). Having heard that 
some anti-Radicals had caused a disturbance during Etheridge's stop in Greeneville on 3 
June, Evans decided he would forestall any similar outbreaks by posting Company I 
conspicuously near the Morristown festivities. 44 
43 Nashville Union and Dispatch, 9, 31 July 1867. 
44 Fisher, War At Evei:y Door, 188; Knoxville Whig, 12 June 1867; A. W. Howard to Governor Brownlow, 
4 June 1867, Brownlow Papers (MS 1940), Box I, Folder 10. 
120 
The Conservative rally at Morristown was held in a church, but there was nothing 
reverent about Etheridge's speech there. Radicals, led by Judge L. C. Houk, showed up at 
the church and requested a division of time with Etheridge, but the Conservative 
candidate refused. Houk and his followers then moved to a nearby grove, "yelling and 
howling" all the way, and held an outdoor meeting. The proximity of the antagonists led 
to some heckling and a few cases of fisticuffs. Into this volatile atmosphere marched 
Company I, in full military array. According to the Conservatives, Captain Evans 
deployed his company into a line of battle just outside the church and ordered his men to 
"fix bayonets." Not surprisingly, "this caused a panic among the people inside, who 
feared they were going to be shot into and the meeting broken up." All the while, 
Etheridge coolly continued his excoriation of"Radicalism." Company I did not attack 
and the day passed without incident.45 
Conservatives added Evans's conduct at Morristown to a growing list of 
complaints against the State Guard. A petition to Andrew Johnson claimed that the 
episode proved that the militia was "engaged in overawing, insulting, and oppressing the 
people." Characterizing all militia companies, not just Company I, as "lawless bands of 
armed men," the petitioners further declared that the State Guard made a free canvass of 
the state impossible. One Conservative described the situation as desperate and implored 
the President for help: "If this Militia is not disbanded, or sent out there will be actual war 
45 Knoxville Whig, 12 June 1867; Graf, Papers of Andrew Johnson, 12: 309-12; Report of the Secretary of 
War (1867), 230-31. 
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in East Tennessee .... We cannot much longer submit to Brownlowism .... For Gods 
sake come to our relief, & spare an effusion ofblood.',46 
This outcry prompted another Federal investigation into militia affairs, this one 
headed by Colonel Alfred L. Hough. When questioned, Captain Evans denied having 
threatened the Conservatives in the church in any way. He stressed that he stationed his 
men visibly in the area of both party rallies, and he further insisted that "the presence of 
the militia had prevented a riot." Conservatives reiterated the material cited in their 
petition, but admitted to Colonel Hough that Captain Evans exercised firm control over 
his men at all times. On further inquiry, Hough determined that many of the complaints 
about militia "outrages" in East Tennessee were unfounded. In addition to absolving 
Evans of any serious misconduct, Hough dismissed Captain Grisham's improprieties in 
Sullivan as "small grievances." He further discovered that most Conservatives had "only 
praise and compliments" for the conduct of Captain Robert L. Hall's recently mustered 
Company C, which was stationed in Knoxville (probably as a bodyguard for Governor 
Brownlow). 47 
The day after his Morristown demonstration, Captain Evans marched his 
command to Claiborne County. Evidently, while he was monitoring the Conservatives in 
Grainger County, a band of mounted ex-Confederates had "made a rush into Tazewell," 
where they threatened local Radicals and warned blacks not to register. For the rest of 
46 Graf, Papers of Andrew Johnson, 12: 309-12. 
47 Report of the Secretaxy of War (1867), 231-32; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 31 July 1867. 
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June and into July, the "vigorous, active and efficient men" of Company I endeavored to 
keep the peace in yet another county Governor Brownlow had labeled "rebellious. ,,4s 
While stationed in Claiborne, Company I discovered the limitations of supplying 
itself through the voucher system. Charged with procuring victuals, Lieutenant John Ellis 
could find only one general store willing to do business with his company. Anti-Radical 
merchants either refused to sell goods to him or demanded cash payments, often at 
inflated prices. The one friendly merchant proved unable to meet Company I's daily 
food requirements. Fortunately, as the summer wore on, Nashville grocers began 
delivering commissary goods in sufficient quantities to satisfy most company 
commanders. W.W. Totten and Brothers ultimately became the State Guard's largest 
food distributor, providing about one-third of the militia's subsistence before the 
deployment ended. Totten not only shipped a variety of foodstuffs, but also regularly 
furnished such basic items as tobacco, candles, and soap. In the process, the dealer 
grossed over $18,000 from its business with the State Guard.49 
Many scholars of Reconstruction in Tennessee readily accept the Conservative 
claim that the State Guard repeatedly disrupted Emerson Etheridge's canvass of the state. 
In actuality, the only direct encounter between Etheridge and the State Guard occurred at 
Morristown on 8 June. Militia recruitment was well underway when Conservatives 
established their gubernatorial candidate's campaign itinerary. Inevitably, many of 
48 Knoxville Whig. 12, 26 June 1867. 
49 David M. Nelson to Lieutenant Ellis, 3 June 1867 and Lieutenant Ellis to H. H. Thomas, IO, 27 July 
1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box IO, Folder 3; Quartermaster Expenditures, April 1867-February 1868, TAGO, 
Reel 4, Box 22, Folder 5; House Journal, 35th General Assembly, Extra Session, 26. Numerous ration 
invoices from Totten and other grocers to most of the militia companies can be found in TAGO, Reel 2, 
Box 10, Folder 3. 
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Etheridge's campaign stops, especially in East Tennessee, were also State Guard muster 
points. Militiamen, armed or otherwise, were undoubtedly in the vicinity of several of 
his speeches, but with the exception of Captain Evans' s men, they generally gave 
Etheridge a wide berth. When he spoke in Greeneville (3 June), over 150 militia recruits 
were gathering to form two companies of State Guard ( those of the two Kirks), but they 
in no way interfered with the Conservative rally. Far from wanting to suppress a free 
canvass, Radical leaders welcomed all opportunities to spar with the combative 
Etheridge. When the Knoxville Whig claimed that Horace Maynard "literally 
demolished" Etheridge in a rare face-to-face debate at Greeneville, it meant through the 
power of oratory, not through the discharge of militia gunfire. 50 
By mid-June, Radicals throughout the state were fed up with the criticism of their 
"loyal militia." When the ex-Confederate Republican Banner speculated about whether 
the newly appointed General Joseph A Cooper intended to start burning homes and 
shutting down the press, the Radicals replied vehemently. Andrew J. Fletcher, 
Tennessee's secretary of state, went on the stump to justify the call for a State Guard. "It 
is a matter of profound regret," he explained, "that a necessity should exist for the active 
organization of the militia ... but the responsibility rests ... upon the turbulent leaders of 
the rebel party in this State." Similarly, the Daily Press and Times placed the blame for a 
standing army squarely on the Conservatives: "If a thousand quiet rebel sympathizers in 
50 Jones, "Reconstruction in Tennessee," 196; Patton, Unionism and Reconstruction, 177-78; Hamer, 
'.fennessee, 2: 626; Alexander, Political Reconstruction, 151-52; Maness, "Henry Emerson Etheridge," 47-
48; A. W. Howard to Governor Brownlow, 4 June 1867, Brownlow Papers (MS 1940), Box 1, Folder 10; 
Knoxville Whig. 12 June 1867. Captain Grisham took a brief leave of absence from his command in 
Sullivan to participate in a Radical counter-rally during Etheridge's stop in Jonesboro on 5 June. Nashville 
Daily Press and Times, 12 June 1867. 
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any county choose to let fifty violent rebels commit outrages, they must not be surprised 
to see a company of militia sent to bring the ruffians into subjection." Finally, the 
Knoxville Whig defended the record of the militia captains: "No soldiers were ever in 
Tennessee, Union or rebel, who were kept under as strict discipline as the State Guard." 
To this newspaper, the only legitimate charge that the anti-Radicals could bring against 
the militia was the killing of "the notorious guerrilla, Brown. "51 
For all of the anti-Radical criticism, the Brownlow administration had imposed its 
authority over the state with a relatively small militia force. Although fifteen units were 
officially in the field by 1 July, from the beginning of May to the end of June, the Radical 
army of Tennessee basically consisted of six companies. As they awaited the deployment 
of their brethren officers, captains Rickman, Blackbum, Clingan, Robeson, Grisham, and 
Evans interpreted and executed the mission of the State Guard in a variety of ways. A 
common denominator in the experiences of the six men was boldness. Timidity in the 
face of the numerically superior anti-Radicals, who were going to howl in protest over 
any use of force, might actually have invited trouble. From Rickman's punitive 
operations in Franklin County to Evans's martial display in Morristown, these six 
commanders proclaimed to those ex-Confederates who dared test its resolve that the 
militia was a force to be reckoned with. In the process, through such accomplishments 
as Blackburn's establishment of Radical hegemony around DeKalb and Robeson's 
development of a party apparatus in Obion, the State Guard helped get the campaign off 
to a strong start for the Brownlow administration. 
"Nashville Republican Banner, 9 June 1867; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 10, 22 June 1867; 
Knoxville Whig. 19 June, 3 July 1867. 
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Unfortunately for the Radicals, there were instances when the State Guard crossed 
the boundary between reasonable and unwarranted force. However gratifying his 
domineering presence in Franklin must have been for the Radicals, Captain Rickman was 
arguably too aggressive; Franklin whites were not pacified by his tactics, they only 
became more enraged. To a lesser extent, captains Clingan and Grisham also exceeded 
their authority. Clingan hardly followed due process in riding a Haywood resident on a 
rail. And Grisham certainly had no business extending his jurisdiction into domestic 
affairs. Moreover, Evans's drill-and-ceremony during the Morristown rally was certainly 
designed to "over-awe" the Conservatives (although in the end it proved ineffectual). To 
its credit, the Brownlow administration tried to rein in the worst abuses, acceding to two 
Federal investigations, but missteps were made and controversy was unavoidable. 
The State Guard's somewhat inconsistent application of force early in the 
campaign may be attributable, in part, to an inchoate chain of command. Although the 
militia captains usually maintained regular communications with headquarters, the 
executive branch could often offer them only perfunctory instructions. Governor 
Brownlow was virtually bed-ridden in Knoxville, while Adjutant General James P. 
Brownlow was distracted by the ongoing militia mobilization. In addition to directing the 
efforts of those units already deployed (in all three sections of the state, no less), the 
adjutant general was supervising the organization of almost a dozen new companies, and 
overseeing the procurement of arms and supplies for them all. To be sure, Governor 
Brownlow ameliorated these command difficulties when he appointed General Cooper to 
manage the State Guard on 7 June, but Cooper would not appreciably affect militia 
operations until the latter half of the month. In the meantime, the militia captains 
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operated largely on their own initiative. With the exception of Rickman, who must bear 
the ultimate responsibility for his company's temporary breakdown in discipline, the 
captains applied force responsibly as well as effectively. 
Such were the opening shots of the campaign of 1867, which historian Philip M. 
Hamer describes as "probably the most bitterly contested one in the history of 
Tennessee." For the Radicals, it was certainly an auspicious start, and one that boded ill 
for the Conservatives. By July, with General Cooper coordinating the efforts of three 
times the number of State Guard companies that had operated in May and June, the 
Radicals were ready for the final stage of the campaign and confident of victory. 52 
52 Hamer, Tennessee, 2: 620. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The State Guard in "Full Blast" 
If the political campaign of 1867 resembled a military skirmish in May and June, 
it took on the character of an all-out war in July. With over one thousand militiamen in 
the field at the beginning of the month and several hundred more mustering into service, 
the Tennessee State Guard was rapidly taking on formidable size. Earlier in June, the 
Republican Banner expressed the attitude of many anti-Radicals when it wailed, "we 
have now a standing army in full blast." Brigadier General Joseph A Cooper deployed 
this "standing army" with great alacrity, concentrating his forces in Middle and West 
Tennessee. Throughout the final month of the campaign, he steadily reinforced 
companies already in those sections with most of the units raised in East Tennessee and 
with the newly mustered and highly controversial all-black companies of Middle 
Tennessee. After a Radical meeting in Nashville toward the end of June, at which 
Cooper reportedly exclaimed, "I am the organ of the Radical party," Conservatives 
accused him of taking on the mien of a modem-day Caesar. Conservatives further 
claimed that the "Generalissimo" had threatened to shut down what he termed the "rebel 
sheets"--the anti-Radical press. A disgruntled Conservative, Daniel A. Carpenter of East 
Tennessee, told Andrew Johnson that he was not going to submit to the Radicals' military 
tyranny. He ominously informed the President: "There is plenty of Enfield rifles 
scattered through this country .... If you cant help us we will help our selves."1 
1 Special Orders Nos. 1-44, 21 June to 31 July 1867, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 33; Nashville Republican Banner, 
9, 27, 28 June 1867; Graf, Papers of Andrew Johnson, 12: 343. Joining "Generalissimo" Cooper was 
Samuel Hunt, who replaced his cousin James P. Brownlow as adjutant general in July. Brownlow resigned 
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Many Tennesseans shared Carpenter's rage. In response to the growing militia 
power, and in an effort to infuse additional vigor into its canvass, the Conservative Party 
launched a bold political counter-attack. During the last week of June, party chairman 
John C. Gaut issued a provocative circular, one that exploited an apparent loophole in the 
Franchise Act. Gaut contended that while Brownlow's commissioners controlled voter 
registration in the counties, they did not have exclusive control over the appointment of 
election judges. Accordingly, Gaut urged county authorities (most of whom in Middle 
and West Tennessee were Conservatives) to take speedy action: "Do not fail to appoint 
Judges in all the precincts." In doing so, the Conservatives clearly hoped to have some 
influence over how votes were cast. 2 
On 1 July, an enraged Governor Brownlow moved to crush what he considered a 
blatant attempt to circumvent the Franchise Act. He condemned Gaut and his "audacious 
authors" for their "false and rebellious construction" of the franchise clause pertaining to 
election officials, an interpretation the governor insisted demonstrated a "wicked and 
revolutionary purpose." Proclaiming that his registrars had absolute control over all 
aspects of the election, he warned the county officials to ignore the Gaut circular or find 
"themselves liable to be punished." He closed his proclamation with another threat 
"Order must be maintained, and the law executed, if it require that I shall call into the 
field the whole available force at my command to do so. "3 
to accept a commission in the U. S. army and a duty assignment in California. Tennessee Blue Book, 1999-
2000 (Nashville, 2000), 488; Coulter, Brownlow, 267, 324. 
2 White, Messages, 5: 568; American Annual Cyclopedia (1867), 707. 
3 White, Messages. 5: 568-70. 
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Conservatives were indignant at this gubernatorial fulmination and pressed ahead 
in their defiance of "Brownlowism." Chairman Gaut publicly defended his circular and 
criticized Brownlow' s "extraordinary" proclamation as one designed "to incite his militia 
and partisans to acts of lawless violence and bloodshed." In this he was echoing 
President Johnson, who had stated, in a recent interview with the Cincinnati Commercial, 
that "BROWNLOW'S militia would provoke riot and bloodshed." On 4 July, the 
Conservative Executive Committee of Middle Tennessee issued aggressive marching 
orders. The committee compared the current political "crisis" to that of 1861, but 
encouraged its followers to show no fear in the face of "a mercenary•militia of outlaws." 
Though ordering the people to obey the laws and refrain from violence, the Committee 
unveiled a compelling, and lawful, campaign strategy. While all Conservatives who 
could take the franchise oath were instructed to vote, even the disfranchised were enlisted 
into the service of the party. Ex-Confederates were asked to attend party rallies and be 
present on election day as a show of white, anti-Radical solidarity. Additionally, the 
Committee promoted social ostracism of Radical voters, and urged its followers to 
"induce those [blacks] within your influence to withdraw from the treasonable [Union] 
leagues." Conservative leaders assured the white majority that "Brownlow and his 
militia ... dare not confront a determined people. ,,4 
On 5 July, Governor Brownlow again demanded that the Conservatives desist in 
their efforts to subvert the Franchise Act. He ordered "all officers commanding the State 
Guards ... to arrest the said John C. Gaut, or any of his committee or agents wherever 
4 American Annual Cyclopedia (1867), 708; Nashville Republican Banner, 6 July 1867; Graf, Papers of 
Andrew Johnson, 12: 369; Nashville Union and Dispatch, 4 July 1867. In his interview, Johnson also 
described the Radical government in Tennessee as "the worst despotism he had ever heard of" 
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found, if they shall persist in their effort to defeat the execution of the laws." The 
Radical press reflected the governor's exasperation with the Conservatives. The Daily 
Press and Times marveled at Gaut's "sophistry," while the Whig castigated the 
Conservatives for their "blind" alignment with the ex-Confederates. Brownlow's tactics 
gained a significant victory for his administration. Chairman Gaut instructed his party to 
concede the franchise question and devote its energies to other campaign matters. For his 
part, Gaut made the cost of the State Guard his new political issue. At a Conservative 
rally later in July, he warned his listeners that the force then mustered would cost as least 
$1,000,000 "with chickens, roasting ears and ~atermelons, to boot."5 
In addition to combating the Conservatives' legal challenge, the Brownlow 
administration warily monitored the developing ex-Confederate paramilitary movement. 
Throughout the summer of 1867, former Confederate general Albert Pike of Memphis 
called on Tennessee whites to "arm and organize" against the Radicals and the State 
Guard. "Are a few ragamuffins and a mob of miscreants," he asked, "to overawe and 
ride over a whole state?" He urged the formation of so-called Civic Guard companies of 
"sixty or eighty men." In doing so, he probably had the Ku Klux Klan in mind as a ready 
source of manpower. Though largely confined to Giles County for most of 1866, the 
Klan began expanding its operations in the spring of 1867. Distinguishing the Klan from 
the many other bands of Rebel vigilantes is often difficult, but most scholars agree that at 
about the time the Conservative Party convention met in April, delegates from the Giles 
Klan and neighboring affiliates held a clandestine meeting in Nashville. There, the Klan 
5 American Annual Cyclopedia (1867), 708; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 8 July 1867; Knoxville 
Whig. 3 July 1867; Nashville Republican Banner, 21 July 1867. 
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formally organized as a counter-force to the State Guard and the Union Leagues. 
Sometime in May, the Klan elected Nathan B. Forrest its Imperial Wizard. Never more 
than a titular leader, Forrest always maintained that the Klan was a defensive 
organization. Its only overt act of defiance during the campaign of 1867 took place in 
Pulaski (Giles) on 5 June, when seventy-five members held a parade in full costume. 
Nevertheless, Governor Brownlow regarded the Klan as a "secret guerrilla army," and 
dens did exist in several counties occupied by militia: Bedford, Davidson, Franklin, 
Giles, Maury, and Williamson in Middle Tennessee, and Dyer, Hardin, Haywood, and 
McNairy in the west. 6 
In the midst of all this political and militaristic posturing, a violent clash between 
white anti-Radicals and black Union Leaguers occurred in Franklin, Williamson County. 
The Union League of Franklin was one of the more active chapters in the state and was 
largely run by black Civil War veterans. Local Conservatives denounced its public 
activities, especially its daily parades through the town during the week of 4 July. On 6 
July, Joseph Williams, the black Conservative stump speaker, arrived and tried to address 
a Radical party rally. The Union Leaguers, however, disrupted much of his impromptu 
speech with catcalls. In response, an ex-Confederate officer appeared at the head of a 
group of armed whites and began insulting the black Leaguers. Sensing the hostility of a 
gathering crowd of white Conservatives, Radical leaders persuaded their black friends to 
leave the area, but the Leaguers, also well armed, staged a defiant exit. Moments later, 
several whites attacked the departing black procession and shooting soon erupted from 
6 Memphis Daily Appeal, 12 June 1867; Arnell, "Southern Unionist," 314-15; Knoxville Whig. 3 July 
1867; Trelease, White Terror, 14-23; Alexander, Political Reconstruction, 179-181. 
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both sides. By the time the riot was over, twenty-seven black Leaguers and fourteen 
whites had been wounded; one of the whites later died. 7 
Recriminations followed. The Daily Press and Times declared that the Franklin 
"outrage" had instilled the Radical party with "fresh zeal" in its fight against the 
"treachery and malignity of the Conservative faction." William Mills and Horace H. 
Thomas, Tennessee delegates to a July meeting in New York City of the Union League of 
America, exploited the occasion to gamer financial support for their party's campaign. 
Emphasizing the seemingly incessant anti-Radical violence in their state, Mills and 
Thomas defended the mobilization of the Guard: "Were it not for the militia there could 
be no election. The 50,000 black men who have been enfranchised would be shot down 
by rebels if they dared to vote." To the Brownlow administration, the riot, combined 
with the Gaut circular, the Conservatives' strategy for Middle Tennessee, and Pike's 
exhortations from the west ( dubbed a "bastard rebellion" by the Radicals), was proof that 
a counter-revolution of some sort was underway. Consequently, for the rest of July, the 
anti-Radicals would feel the "full blast" of the Tennessee State Guard. 8 
General Cooper identified Middle Tennessee as the principal battleground. 
Thirteen companies of the State Guard would eventually be deployed there before the 
August election. Two of them-Captain Joseph H. Blackburn's Company A and Captain 
William S. Stuart's Company K-were already actively engaged. The Conservative 
party's aggressive stance in early July threatened the Radical control these two units had 
7 Hamer, Tennessee, 2: 627-28; McBride, "Blacks and Race Issue," 215-16; Phillips, "Freedmen's Bureau 
in Tennessee," 300-301. 
8 Nashville Daily Press and Times, 24 June, 10 July 1867; Owens, "Union League of America," 66-68. 
New York Leaguers reportedly made a "munificent contribution" to the Radical party of Tennessee. 
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helped establish in June. Warren County continued to prove especially troublesome. 
There, W. J. Clift, a former colonel in the Union army and a Conservative candidate for 
the General Assembly, spearheaded a strong effort to defeat Radicalism. For weeks, Clift 
had been lambasting the Brownlow administration, urging local Conservatives to permit 
ex-Confederates access to the ballot. When McMinnville's Conservative civil 
authorities, emboldened by the Gaut circular, attempted to halt Registrar William Baker's 
activities, Clift eagerly joined the battle. Accusing Baker of various improprieties, Clift 
obtained an injunction against the registrar, which effectively halted voter registration 
while Baker defended himself in court. Lieutenant William Cravens, who had arrived 
with a squad of militia at the end of June, warned Clift and his fellow Conservatives that 
they had no authority to interfere with registration. At Clift's prompting, the chairman of 
the county court replied that "the restraint of the military would not be regarded." With 
the county sheriff providing armed support, the Conservative court fined Baker $150 and 
dared Cravens to intervene. 9 
Captain Blackburn was quick to aid his lieutenant. With orders to "watch Cliffe," 
Blackbum arrived at McMinnville on 12 July with twenty men (bringing the State Guard 
forces in that town to thirty-five soldiers) and took command. The adjutant general 
certainly wanted to quell the political defiance in Warren, but he cautioned Blackburn to 
handle Clift with care in order to avoid charges of military despotism: "Have him arrested 
by civil process under the Sedition law not by the military." Blackburn's presence 
appears to have broken the Conservatives' resolve: Clift backed down without being 
9 Memphis Daily Appeal, 14 June 1867; McMinnville Enterprise, 29 June, 6 July 1867; Lewis L. Faulkner 
to General Cooper, 6 July 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder l; William Baker to General Cooper, IO 
July 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 4. 
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arrested, registration resumed, and Warren County remained relatively quiet for the 
duration of the campaign. This outcome prompted the Radical McMinnville Enterprise 
to exclaim that the militia was "the best prescription for disloyalty ever yet discovered."10 
As Blackburn neutralized Conservative opposition in Warren County, Captain 
William S. Stuart encountered renewed troubles in White. On 1 July, an ex-Confederate 
approached the perimeter of Stuart's command at "Camp Stokes" (named after the 
Radical Congressman, William B. Stokes) near Yankeytown. From a distance, the Rebel 
unleashed a fusillade of profanity, calling the men of Company K "d-d horse thieves" 
and swearing that the "white men was going to bust up the d-d militia and ... whip out 
the D-d negro." Pickets apprehended the man and Stuart confined him under guard 
until the following day. As this incident transpired, three ex-Confederates attacked the 
farm of a white Radical named Rigsby. The assailants fired their pistols at Rigsby's 
house, insulted the females inside with language so shocking that one reportedly 
"fainted," and, before riding off, threatened to kill Rigsby himself Stuart sent a 
detachment in pursuit, but he doubted whether the civil authorities would prosecute the 
perpetrators if he caught them. Exasperated by ex-Confederate harassment, Stuart 
exploded to General Cooper: "If we have to take such abuse as they have been giving us 
we are going to quit & git to killing them catch us if they can for I had rather die and go 
to hell as to be run over by a set ofrebels."11 
10 James P. Brownlow to General Cooper, 28 June 1867, IAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 4; Special Order 
No. 16, 12 July 1867, I AGO, Reel 9, Vol. 33; McMinnville Enterprise, 6, 20 July 1867; William Baker to 
. General Cooper, IO July 1867, I AGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 4. 
11 Captain Stuart to General Cooper, 3 July 1867 (two letters), IAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 3. Stuart's 
rage may have been further exacerbated by "a very severe spell of Cramp Colic," a stomach ailment which 
135 
A short time after submitting this fiery report, Captain Stuart carried out his 
threatened violence in an unexpected way. On the night of 15 July, an intoxicated Private 
W. B. Davis surprised his comrades by cursing the State Guard as "the d-d militia." 
Davis then entered Stuart's tent and provoked a fight with the captain. Stuart, however, 
twice knocked his assailant to the ground before placing him under arrest. As the 
company soon learned, Davis had been a bounty jumper during the Civil War, deserting 
from several regiments, Confederate and Union. In Stuart's view, Davis was a Rebel 
who "swore a lie" when he took the oath to join the State Guard. In any event, Davis 
escaped from the stockade later that night, but was shot through the bowels by pursuing 
sentries. According to the Union and Dispatch, Stuart then staked his wounded captive to 
the ground leaving him to bleed to death. Stuart's report, however, indicates that Davis 
received medical attention, despite his protests and incessant cursing, but died the 
following day. Anti-Radicals branded Davis's death "a Fiendish Murder," but Stuart 
placed the blame and outcome squarely on the disloyalty of the deceased militia private. 12 
In addition to combating these various anti.Radical challenges, both internal as 
well as external, captains Blackbum and Stuart continued to provide security for William 
B. Stokes's congressional campaign. Blackburn's men typically served as escort in the 
southern half of the third Congressional District, Stuart's men in the northern half. 
General Cooper never forbade this overtly partisan duty provided it did not interfere with 
the primary mission of protecting voter registration. When ex-Confederates killed the 
evidently made moving around quite painful for the militia captain. Captain Stuart to H. H. Thomas, 15 
June 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 3. 
12 Captain Stuart to General Cooper, 16, 18 July 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 3; Nashville Union 
and Dispatch, 23, 28 July 1867. 
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brother of Fentress registrar Perry 0. Dowdy on 15 June, Cooper ordered Stuart to 
investigate. Evidently, the situation required the deployment of militia. On 9 July, a 
forty-man detachment from Company K set up camp in neighboring Overton County and 
remained there for the duration of the campaign. 13 
Traveling with Stokes produced additional controversies for the State Guard. 
Running against Stokes was Eli G. Fleming, a former captain in Stokes's Civil War 
regiment (W. J. Clift served as Fleming's unofficial campaign manager). Bad blood 
existed between the two opponents. Stokes had been instrumental in getting Fleming 
dishonorably discharged for disobedience and incompetence at the battle of 
Murfreesboro. During the campaign of 1867, Stokes accused Fleming of trying to 
assassinate him at a Van Buren County rally, and attributed his survival to the presence of 
Blackburn's militia. Fleming, in tum, accused the militia of trying to kill him on at least 
two occasions. On 5 July, "five ruffians" waylaid the Conservative candidate's buggy. 
Furious at not finding Fleming, but rather his black servant, they vandalized the buggy 
and chased the driver into the woods. Fleming claimed that Lieutenant William L. 
Hathaway, who had described Fleming as a "liar, scoundrel and coward," commanded 
the assailants. On 15 July, Conservatives in McMinnville persuaded Fleming not to 
make a speech there as Captain Blackbum had supposedly declared that he would not 
13 Nashville Daily Press and Times, 26 June 1867; Special Order No. 15, 9 July 1867, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 
33; Marsha Young Darrah, "Political Career of Col. William B. Stokes of Tennessee," (M.A. thesis, 
Tennessee Technological University, 1968), 148-49. The militia detachment in Overton may have 
accompanied Stokes during his stump of the region. Darrah states that when Stokes arrived in the county 
"he was met by a contingent of former Union soldiers on horseback." 
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tolerate Fleming's presence. To counter Stokes's militia escort, Fleming petitioned the 
Federal garrison for a bodyguard ofU. S. troops, but his request was denied. 14 
The Republican Banner sympathized with Fleming. In the final weeks of July, it 
described a scene of almost daily militia atrocities in the state's third district. Without 
identifying specific State Guard officers or companies ( which this newspaper usually 
did), the Banner charged that the militia "rob, burn, threaten and even kill their enemies 
with impunity. . .. They spare no one." This newspaper alleged that the militia 
plundered the home of a "poor widow" in Van Buren County. It reported that the militia 
whipped several ex-Confederates in White County and prevented them from tending to 
their crops. Finally, it claimed that the militia vowed to "kill every man who put his pen" 
to a Warren County petition calling for relief from "Brownlow's terrible carniverous 
militia." How General Cooper managed to "terrorize" an eighteen-county district with a 
total force of 180 men, the Banner did not explain. 15 
As captains Blackbum and Stuart worked to preserve Radical control in their 
respective areas of operation, Captain William 0. Rickman brought his maligned brand 
of law enforcement to Marshall County. He and his Company H arrived in Lewisburg 
(Marshall) on 22 June, after a forty-two-mile march from Franklin, and set up camp on 
the county fair grounds. Two days later, he dispatched Lieutenant J. J. Mankin and 
twenty-five men to neighboring Giles County to facilitate registration there. Marshall's 
Radicals welcomed Company H "with glad hearts." Registrar Robert Wiley, in 
14 Nashville Daily Press and Times, 22, 26 July 1867; Sheafe v. Tillman, 188-89; Nashville Union and 
Dispatch, 12 July 1867; McMinnville Enterprise, 20 July 1867; Pulaski Citizen, 26 July 1867; Nashville 
Republican Banner, 18 July 1867. 
15 Nashville Republican Banner, 18, 20, 24 July 1867; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 18 July 1867. 
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particular, was thankful for the militia's presence, for according to Rickman, "the colored 
men were afraid to register until we came to this place." Perhaps cognizant of Rickman' s 
treatment of Franklin's white populace, Marshall whites accorded the militia captain 
noticeable respect. In a county that had voted for secession by more than 90 percent, 
Rickman reported that even "the Rebels meet us friendly," and he predicted that he would 
"get a long smoothely."16 
All did go well for Captain Rickman throughout the final month of the campaign. 
Although Conservatives protested the "partisan" registration of voters, they commended 
Rickman' s unexpected professionalism. After watching the militiamen for a few days, a 
correspondent for the Union and Dispatch noted, "the troops are very quiet and orderly, 
and injustice of Capt. R., he has so far, disavowed any intention of interfering in the 
election." Rather than prowling the countryside for Rebel renegades, as he did in 
Franklin, Rickman devoted his energies to providing security for the political canvass. In 
one instance, a squad of twelve men stood silent watch over a joint debate between 
Radical James Mullins and Conservative Edmund Cooper at Cornersville. The only 
notable incident involving Rickman's command occurred during a Fourth of July 
celebration in neighboring Lincoln County. General Cooper had ordered Company H to 
oversee Radical rallies in four counties-Marshall, Lincoln, Giles, and Lawrence. At 
Rickman's request, a black Radical named Dr. Wood addressed large black audiences in 
16 Captain Rickman to Samuel Hunt, 25 June 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 2; Morning Report of 
Company H, 1st Tennessee State Guards, 30 June 1867, TAGO, Reel 5, Box 23, Folder 4; Nashville Union 
and Dispatch, 28 June 1867; Fisher, War At Every Door, 189. On 12 June, Governor Brownlow 
invalidated Giles's registration of voters due to "frauds and irregularities." Pulaski Citizen, 14 June 1867. 
While seeking a commission in the State Guard, Registrar Wiley assembled a number of militia recruits 
from Marshall County. Until Rickman arrived in Lewisburg, Wiley's volunteers appear to have served in 
an extra-legal capacity. Robert Wiley to H. H. Thomas, 1 June 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 3. 
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Lewisburg and Fayetteville (Lincoln). During the Fayetteville rally, an ex-Confederate 
broke through the crowd and threatened "the nigger speaker" with a pistol. Rickman's 
militiamen quickly "seized the ruffian and quieted him in a very summary manner." The 
celebrations in Giles and Lawrence, for which Lieutenant Mankin was responsible, 
passed off without any disturbances. In contrast to its reprehensible conduct in Franklin 
County, Company H was a model of restraint in Marshall and Giles, and the Radical 
party prospered in those counties as a result. Captain Rickman later gloated to 
headquarters, "I won the confidence of all Loyal men and the Rebels say that we have 
Conducted our selfs well. "17 
Replacing Rickman in Franklin County was Captain George W. Kirk, whose 
Company A, 2nd Regiment, arrived toward the end of June. Franklin whites greeted their 
new militia commander with scorn. Kirk was told that "he had better watch out." Some 
of the locals even threatened to poison any well used by the State Guard. Adding to the 
hostile reception was the murder of two Franklin blacks during Company A's first two 
weeks in the county. Undaunted, Kirk carried out his mission with aplomb, picking up a 
few local whites as recruits in the process. He established his headquarters at Tullahoma 
with his company in bivouac on the grounds of the town's private academy. When white 
residents insisted that he move his camp elsewhere, Kirk refused, whereupon the school 
17 Nashville Union and Dispatch, 28 June 1867; Special Order No. 11, 3 July 1867, TAGO Reel 9, Vol. 33; 
Captain Rickman to Samuel Hunt, 25 June 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Boxl 1, Folder 2; Nashville Daily Press 
and Times, 6 July, 5 August 1867; Captain Rickman to Lieutenant L.B. Gamble, 2 August 1867, TAGO, 
Reel 1, Box 8, Folder 6. 
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closed in protest. On 21 June, Kirk moved half of his men to Winchester under 
Lieutenant Francis Kirk. 18 
Captain Kirk devoted much of his time to revitalizing the county's Radical party. 
On 1 July, acting on the governor's condemnation of the Gaut circular, Kirk ordered 
Conservative leaders in Winchester to halt their efforts to appoint election judges. The 
Conservatives reluctantly complied, and Registrar D. E. Davenport completed his duties 
without further interference. On 4 July, a detachment of militia provided security for a 
Radical rally in Winchester attended by some 800 blacks. At the request of the black 
leaders, Captain Kirk personally hoisted an American flag with appropriate pomp and 
ceremony. After castigating some ex-Confederate hecklers, Kirk headed a parade of 
"loyal colored men," under a militia escort, through the streets and out of the town 
toward Decherd. En route, several hundred more supporters joined the throngs, including 
some black women who carried a large portrait of President Lincoln. The procession, 
now more than 1,300, halted at intervals to listen to impromptu speeches by Radical 
office seekers. A rain shower eventually dispersed the crowd, but Jacob W. Brown, a 
Radical candidate for the General Assembly, was so delighted by the event, and by Kirk's 
performance, that he boasted to the governor that troublesome Franklin had become "the 
Banner County of the State."19 
18 Nashville Republican Banner, 25 June 1867; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 6 July 1867; Muster Roll 
for Company A, 2nd Tennessee State Guard (1867), TAGO, Reel 5, Box 24, Folder 3; Special Order No. 2, 
21 June 1867, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 33. 
19 Jacob W. Brown to Governor Brownlow, 2 July 1867, Patton Collection; Nashville Daily Press and 
Times, 8 July 1867; Memphis Daily Appeal, I August 1867. 
141 
The killing of one of Kirk's men only a couple of days later abruptly shattered the 
Radicals' newfound mood of confidence. On 6 July Private Martin Jones and a comrade 
entered the Tullahoma general store of ex-Confederate DeWitt Bennett in search of 
tobacco. When Bennett handed them a package, the two men, who apparently had no 
money, pretended to make off with the tobacco "in a sort of playful manner." Bennett 
was not amused, and after grabbing the package from the two pranksters, he ushered 
them out of his store and locked the door. For some reason, Private Jones, accompanied 
by Sergeant John Hughes, returned. An apprehensive Bennett then fired a pistol at the 
men, hitting Jones in the head and killing him instantly. According to Conservative 
accounts, the two militiamen were "tipsy" and tried to batter their way into the store. 
According to the Radicals, Bennett was a vindictive, splenetic man who opened fire after 
the militiamen merely "knocked" on his door. A coroner's jury ruled that the death of the 
24-year-old Jones was the result of a "malicious shooting. "20 
In the furor that followed, Captain Kirk remained calm, and he restrained his 
outraged men from exacting revenge. The Conservative press depicted Jones's death as 
the consequence of a policy that permitted the State Guard to "plunder 'rebels' at will." 
The Radical press intimated that the killing of Jones was retribution for the death of the 
ex-Confederate Brown a month before. Kirk, however, avoided making accusations and 
concentrated on defusing the situation. Militia efforts to arrest Bennett failed, he having 
apparently found refuge with local ex-Confederates. He later notified the public via the 
Republican Banner that he would surrender himself only to civilian authorities. Kirk 
20 Nashville Union and Dispatch, 7, 10 July 1867; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 9, 10 July 1867; 
Pulaski Citizen, 12 July 1867; Muster Roll for Company A, 2nd Tennessee State Guard (1867), TAGO, Reel 
5, Box 24, Folder 3. 
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suspected that the Banner's correspondent knew of Bennett's whereabouts and 
demanded, in vain, that that organ's editors cooperate with his efforts to uphold the law. 
As late as November 1867, Bennett was still at large, while his lawyer negotiated terms 
for surrender. Significantly, Kirk arrested Sergeant Hughes for his role in the tragedy and 
remanded him to the state penitentiary. A court martial later found Hughes guilty of 
intoxication while on duty and of illegal entrance into Bennett's store. Hughes was 
reduced in rank with forfeiture of two months' wages. 21 
Kirk's impartiality appears to have mitigated Franklin's anti-Radical antipathy. 
In mid-July, Kirk reported that "all is going smooth here," a painful, personal bout with 
diarrhea notwithstanding. However, Edmund Cooper, Conservative candidate for 
Congress, frowned on Kirk's public advocacy of the Radicals and his increasing 
proclivity to attend joint debates with his men standing near the speakers. At a joint 
debate in Salem, for instance, anti-Radicals claimed that Kirk surrounded the platform 
with 100 militiamen. Fearful that General Cooper had plans to reassign Kirk's command, 
the formerly optimistic Jacob Brown begged the general to keep the entire company in 
Franklin to ensure "the fair expression of the Public Voice." Company A remained, and 
the county was relatively quiet in the final weeks of the campaign. 22 
21 Nashville Union and Dispatch 7, 10 July 1867; Knoxville Whig 10 July 1867; Nashville Republican 
Banner, 9, 14, 24 July 1867; Taz. W. Newman to General Cooper, 25 November 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 
11, Folder 2; Special Order No. 14, 9 July 1867, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol 33; General Order No. 15, 28 August 
1867, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 27. 
22 Captain G. Kirk to H. H. Thomas and A. E. Boone, 17, 21 July 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 3; 
Captain Grisham to General Cooper, 21 July 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder l; Sheafe v. Tillman, 
101; A. M. Shook to A. S. Colyar, 21 November 1905, Arthur S. Colyar Papers, Southern Historical 
Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill; Jacob W. Brown to General Cooper, 12 July 1867, 
TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 4. 
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Following Kirk to Middle Tennessee was Captain James R. Evans and his 
Company I, fresh from its encounter with Etheridge in Morristown. Leaving a 
detachment of forty men under Lieutenant John N. Ellis in Claiborne County, Evans 
reached Humphreys County on 28 June. Humphreys's whites had voted unanimously for 
secession in 1861 and Registrar William Welch wanted to ensure that these "persons" did 
not go to the polls in 1867. To aid Welch, Evans stationed twenty-nine men under 
Lieutenant James A England at Johnsonville, while he commanded thirty men at the 
county seat of Waverly. On 13 July, Evans concentrated his company at Johnsonville, 
where Registrar Welch was completing his duties. With the militia at his disposal, Welch 
brushed aside a timid Conservative effort to execute the Gaut circular, registered over 
300 blacks and whites, and a fortnight before the election confidently informed the 
governor that Humphreys, "Rebel as it is," would vote the Radical ticket.23 
Only one incident disturbed Company I's occupation of Humphreys. The day 
after his arrival in Johnsonville, Lieutenant England provided security for a Radical rally, 
one that featured General Cooper as a guest speaker. In the crowd was a "fool drunk" ex-
Confederate named Thomas J. Warren. Bored by the "Radical harangue," Warren 
staggered off toward a dry goods store babbling that he wanted to kill a "d-d Yankee." 
When storekeeper Dan Rice tried to calm Warren down, the inebriated Rebel brandished 
a pistol and shot Rice through the chest. England and his men rushed to the scene and 
arrested Warren. Newspapers roundly condemned the shooting-even the Republican 
23 Special Orders Nos. 5 and 6 (28 June), 17 (13 July) 1867, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 33; Captain Evans to 
General Cooper, 1, 16 July 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder S; Fisher, War At Every Door, 189; 
William Welch to Governor Brownlow, 14 July 1867, Brownlow Papers (MS 1940), Box I, Folder 10. 
Lieutenant Ellis remained in Claiborne County throughout the campaign. 
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Banner, which had only that morning denounced the militia's presence in Humphreys, 
presciently quipping that "a few murders of unoffending 'Rebels"' are needed to fire the 
Radical party." The Radicals were fired up, but not by murder, rather by Lieutenant 
England's swift law enforcement.24 
Due to logistical problems, Company F, 1st Regiment, under Captain Shadrick T. 
Harris marked time in Jefferson County for a nearly a month after its muster. Not until 3 
July did the unit finally get into the action. General Cooper decided to split the oversized 
company (113 men) into three detachments in order to cover more territory. Harris 
proceeded to West Tennessee with over fifty men, while his first lieutenant, Edwin R. 
Hall, went to Cheatham County with thirty men and his second lieutenant, John W. 
Roberts, went to Stewart County with about twenty. Stewart was heavily ex-
Confederate, but with the exception of an episode back in April, involving the 
desecration of some Union graves, nothing controversial had occurred there, and after 
Roberts's arrival the county remained "tolerby quiete," as he reported. Roberts 
developed a good working relationship with Registrar R. A Salisbury and the registration 
of voters proceeded speedily. 25 
In contrast to Roberts' s experience, Lieutenant Hall's assignment in Cheatham 
was marked by tension. The county had cast its lot with the Confederacy by over 90 
percent in 1861. In 1867, Cheatham's whites were no less united in their opposition to 
24 Nashville Daily Press and Times, l July 1867; Nashville Union and Dispatch, 2 July 1867; Nashville 
Republican Banner, 29 June, 2 July 1867. 
25 Special Order Nos. 9-10, 3 July 1867, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 33; Report of the Secretaiy of War (1867), 
197-98; Lieutenant Roberts to General Cooper, 4 July 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 3. Originally, 
Roberts was assigned to go to Cheatham and Hall to Stewart, but Cooper reversed their destinations at the 
last minute. 
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Radical rule. Earlier in June, local Radicals beseeched the governor for protection 
following the rancorous disruption of a party meeting in Ashland City. According to 
their petition, a group of ex-Confederates rejected an offer to divide time "politely" and 
instead cursed "the Brownlow cligue and nigger Leagues" of the county. Registrar E. B. 
Harris, in particular, endured scathing verbal abuse. Later that night, these Rebels 
"prominaded the streets, hurrahing for Davis and the Confederacy and ... discharging 
their pieces." These aggressive displays succeeded in cowing Cheatham's freedmen, 
who, although organized into a Union League of 150 members, made it clear that they 
would rather "yield and remain neutral ... than ... be murdered and bushwhacked by 
rebels for supporting a party that [was] either unable or unwilling to afford them the 
promised protection. "26 
Two days before Lieutenant Hall arrived with the "promised protection," 
Registrar Harris took matters into his own hands with tragic consequences. According to 
the Daily Press and Times, after rebuking county Conservatives for trying to appoint 
election officials in violation of the Franchise Act, Harris encountered an armed and 
angry Hardy Brinkley, one of the "ruffians" involved in the Ashland City fracas. "In 
self-defense," Harris drew his own pistol and shot Brinkley dead. According to the 
Conservatives, however, Brinkley's death was the culmination of a daylong rampage by 
Harris and his friend, Stephen Martin, a white member of the Union League. After 
26 Fisher, War At Every Door, 188; Cheatham County Petition to Governor Brownlow, 3 June 1867, GP 21, 
Reel 2, Box 4, Folder 7. 
146 
supposedly disrupting a Conservative meeting, the two men ambushed Brinkley with 
shotgun fire. 27 
Harris and Martin were arrested and arraigned in Ashland City on 6 July before a 
bipartisan court. Lieutenant Hall spent the next couple of weeks providing security for 
the trial, worrying all the while that he might have to combat a Rebel lynch mob. 
Whether in jail, in court, or traveling in between, the two defendants received round-the-
clock protection from a squad of militia. Radicals publicly lamented Brinkley's death, 
while Conservatives exploited it. Dubbing the killing "another Brownlow murder," the 
Republican Banner tried to implicate the militia, claiming that Stephen Martin was a 
commissioned officer in the State Guard. (Martin was not in the militia, and no record 
exists of any application by him for a commission.) Other Conservative newspapers 
argued that Brinkley's death was part of a growing pattern of Radical vigilantism, one 
emboldened by the activation of a partisan militia under a "fiend-like Governor." 
Predicting more atrocities, the Union and Dispatch bellowed, "How long will the God of 
Heaven look down upon such crimes and withhold His terrible vengeance?" In mid-July, 
the Harris-Martin trial was moved, for reasons of safety, to Nashville, where both 
defendants were released on 2 August, the judge ruling that the men had acted in the 
"heat of passion." For the rest of the campaign, Lieutenant Hall avoided further 
publicity, provoking Conservative ire on only one occasion. On 27 July his men caused a 
'"disturbance" when they marched past a Conservative rally en route to their camp.28 
27 Nashville Daily Press and Times, 3 July 1867; Nashville Union and Dispatch, 4 July 1867; Nashville 
Republican Banner, 5 July 1867. 
28 Nashville Republican Banner, S, 8, 12, 28 July, 3 August 1867; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 11 July 
1867; Clarksville Weekly Chronicle, 12 July 1867; Nashville Union and Dispatch, 4 July 1867. 
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In the weeks prior to the election, four all-black companies and two racially 
mixed companies also made their presence felt in Middle Tennessee. Their deployment 
was undoubtedly the most "radical" feature of the Radical campaign. If white militiamen 
elicited bitter complaints from the anti-Radicals, then black militiamen were sure to send 
them into paroxysms of protest. Nevertheless, General Cooper made full use of the 
militia forces at his disposal, regardless of their race. After all, he could point to the solid 
performance of Captain George E. Grisham's mixed company in Sullivan County, the 
Republican Banner's racial caricatures notwithstanding, as an indication of how 
uniformed blacks behaved. 
Captain Thompson McKinley's Company B, 2nd Regiment, operated throughout 
the campaign in Sumner County, where it had mustered. From the perspective of the 
county's whites, this "colored militia" wasted no time before making a nuisance of itself 
According to the anti-Radical press (from which most of the information on this 
company's activities comes), one of McKinley's "very first acts of lawlessness" was his 
selection of an abandoned lot near Gallatin's Female Academy to set up camp. Given 
contemporary phobias about black men and white women, the site was a poor choice. 
There is, however, no record of any contact between the black militiamen and the 
students. There was contact between black militiamen and the white male residents of 
Gallatin. According to Conservative accounts, on 14 June a militia private "insolently 
pushed" a Dr. Tompkins off a sidewalk. Tompkins, in turn, "knocked the black rascal 
down." The doctor fled the scene when more militiamen arrived, but black rage had 
apparently been aroused. The militiamen reportedly gathered at a black saloon, where 
"liquor began to circulate freely and the fear of a riot became general.,, Conservative 
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newspapers claimed that only the timely intervention of Federal troops averted a disaster, 
but not before some of "Brownlow' s pets" exchanged blows with the regulars. Army 
captain Edwin H. Leib vehemently denied that his men brawled with the militia and 
expressed no knowledge of any threatened riot. In a remarkable instance of editorial 
contrition, a chastened Republican Banner apologized to Leib and admitted that "our 
details were imperfect ... our informant had got them second hand. "29 
By the end of June, Company B was ready for active duty. Captain McKinley, 
Sumner's Radical candidate for the state legislature and its voting registrar, made good 
use of his militia command to canvass the county. On one occasion, his men went about 
the countryside posting campaign signs and promoting the Radical party. On another, the 
men of Company B stood by in formation during their captain's address to a black crowd 
in Sandersville. Whites objected not only to McKinley's abuse of power, but also to his 
troops' behavior. Those in Gallatin complained that black troopers "have a practice of 
firing their guns near the turnpike ... to the great terror of passersby.''30 
On 1 July, General Cooper ordered the unit to Hartsville, a town along the 
Sumner-Smith county line. The ex-Confederate guerrilla leader Ellis Harper was 
reportedly in the vicinity and Cooper wanted McKinley's militia to stand watch. (Cooper 
may also have wanted to remove Company B from Gallatin prior to Emerson Etheridge' s 
scheduled 2 July speech in that town.) McKinley did not accompany his unit to 
29 Nashville Republican Banner, 15, 16, 18 June 1867; Memphis Daily Appeal, 19 June 1867. 
30 Durham, Rebellion Revisited, 302; Nashville Union and Dispatch, 30 June 1867. 
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Hartsville "being busily engaged in filling out certificates for colored voters." Instead, 
Lieutenant I. N. Phillips commanded the company on its first genuine mission.31 
Described by Conservatives as "a little upstart," Phillips displayed zealous 
leadership. On completing a sixteen-mile road march, Phillips rested the company on the 
outskirts of Hartsville. He then reminded his men that they were in "the enemies' 
country" and ordered them to keep a sharp lookout for Harper and his "blood-thirsty 
gang." After ostensibly avoiding the Etheridge cavalcade as it passed through Hartsville 
on 3 July, Phillips scouted the surrounding area. He made several attempts to question 
the locals, presumably about Harper's whereabouts, but received mostly cold silence. 
The Republican Banner later claimed that Phillips was really going around looking for 
room and board so that he would not have to share outdoor quarters with his "dusky 
warriors." Fearful of a clash with Harper's ex-Confederates, Phillips ordered his 
sentinels to shoot without hesitation if they suspected intruders. Unfortunately, these 
instructions contributed to the killing of 17-year-old Private John Apples. On the night of 
6 July, Apples, who was absent without leave at the time, tried to "force the guard" and 
was shot dead. The Republican Banner smugly noted that the incident had resulted in "a 
dead negro--one less of the Brownlow's State Guard." Shortly after this tragedy, 
Company B returned to Gallatin ( and to Captain McKinley), where the men constructed a 
makeshift "fort" on a hill near the town's railroad station and then awaited election-day. 32 
31Special Order No. 7, 1 July 1867, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 33; Nashville Republican Banner, 14 July 1867. 
32 Nashville Republican Banner, 30 June, 14, 18 July 1867; Muster Roll for Company B, 2nd Tennessee 
State Guard (1867), Reel 5, Box 24, Folder 4; George B. Guild, "Reconstruction Times in Sumner 
County," The American Historical Magazine 8 (1903), 363. 
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Arguably the most controversial militia unit deployed during the campaign of 
1867, and the one most detested by the anti-Radicals, was Company G, 2nd Regiment. 
This company was all black, including its captain, James H. Sumner. In the first week of 
July, General Cooper planned to send Sumner to Williamson County in response to 
Registrar D. M. Cliffe's request for protection against alleged ex-Confederate 
"proscription" of local Radicals. Before Company G was ready to depart, however, the 
Franklin race riot erupted and Adjutant General Samuel Hunt called on the Federal 
garrison to restore order "for the time being." General Thomas Duncan, post commander 
in Nashville, complied, and on 7 July a company of Federal troops arrived in Franklin 
and began an investigation into the violence. Duncan, however, apparently failed to 
understand that Hunt's request was for temporary assistance only, and he was unaware 
that militia was en route. Despite the potential for a conflict over authority, General 
Cooper dispatched Company Gas scheduled. Captain Sumner's orders reflected 
awareness of the racial hostility his unit was likely to encounter. He was to "preserve 
strict order and military discipline among his men and see that they offer insults to no 
one."33 
For the next several weeks, the anti-Radical press maintained a steady barrage of 
vituperation against Captain Sumner. The Republican Banner professed incredulity over 
General Cooper's decision to send "an infuriate negro," commanding a company of 
"irresponsible and excited negroes," to the site of a "negro riot." Prior to his unit's 
departure by rail, Sumner had marched his newly outfitted command through the streets 
33 Nashville Daily Press and Times, 10, 12 July 1867; Samuel Hunt to General Thomas Duncan, 7 July 
1867, GP 21, Reel 2, Box 3, Folder l; Lieutenant Merritt Barber to Samuel Hunt, 9 July 1867, TAGO, Reel 
2; Box 10, Folder4; Special Order No. 13, 8 July 1867, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 33. 
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of Nashville, pausing outside of a saloon (possibly his own) to address his men. Radical 
observers noted the captain's gratitude for the chance to serve his state and commended 
his exhortation to his men to "never dishonor the flag." Conservative witnesses, 
however, claimed that the speech was inflammatory, and that the militiamen were 
thoroughly drunk. Sumner supposedly reminded his men of the Fort Pillow massacre, 
and declared that if the Rebels of Franklin defied his authority, "he would order his 
company to shoot them down like dogs." Nashville Mayor Matt Brown proclaimed 
Sumner's conduct "coarse, violent, seditious and menacing." The Daily Press and Times, 
however, refuted the mayor's charge, stating that the militiamen's only "crime is that 
they march under the Stars and Stripes. "34 
Company G arrived at Franklin on the evening of 8 July, like "a conquering 
army," according to local whites. Etheridge was scheduled to speak in the town on 10 
July and many Conservatives feared that "the sable" Sumner would exploit the occasion 
to "clean out the secesh." Although Captain Sumner marched his company through the 
streets of Franklin on 9 July as a demonstration of State Guard power, he kept his men in 
camp on the outskirts of town during the Conservative rally the following day. Federal 
troops under Captain Dan M. Burke provide security for the event. The Etheridge visit 
34 Nashville Republican Banner, 9, 17 July 1867; Nashville Daily Press and Banner, 12, 15 July 1867; 
Nashville Union and Dispatch, IO July 1867. On 12 April 1864, Confederate cavalry raiders under Nathan 
B. Forrest captured Fort Pillow (Lauderdale County, Tennessee) and reportedly massacred black soldiers 
who attempted to surrender. See James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (New 
York, 1988), 748, 795. 
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passed off without incident and Radicals applauded Sumner's leadership: "There has 
been no intoxication, no insubordination, no outrages, nothing of the sort. "35 
The dual command structure in Franklin afforded the Conservatives an 
opportunity to depict discord between the State Guard and the army. According to them, 
both Captain Burke and General Duncan were unhappy with Sumner's presence in 
Franklin. The Union and Dispatch claimed that Duncan wanted the black militiamen 
arrested for their "mischiefs." One such instance apparently occurred on 14 July when 
Company G marched double-time through the streets in response to a call from Registrar 
Cliffe. Army sergeant M. V. B. Hazen intercepted the militia column and ordered the 
men back to their camp. The militiamen, again described as drunk, complied only after 
learning that the whole commotion was a false alarm. Incidents like this supposedly 
undermined the army's respect for the black militia. White enlisted regulars refused to 
salute Captain Sumner and his lieutenants. The Republican Banner printed a crude, and 
likely apocryphal, anecdote that illustrated the army's contempt for the "bold Othello." 
One day, so the story began, Sumner approached an army sergeant on the streets of 
Franklin and declared, "I out rank you." "Yes," replied the sergeant, "in smell."36 
To the Daily Press and Times, stories depicting rancor between Company G and 
the Federal garrison were part of a Conservative effort to divert attention from the real 
35 Nashville Union and Dispatch, 10, 11 July 1867; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 11 July 1867. In an 
apparent misread of the sources, James W. Patton incorrectly contends that Company G "stood 
threateningly by" during Etheridge's speech. Captain Sumner was probably under General Cooper's direct 
command on the day of the Conservative rally. The general had come down from Nashville that morning 
to coordinate the activities of the militia and the Federal troops. Patton, Unionism and Reconstruction, 177; 
Nashville Republican Banner, 11 July 1867. 
36 Nashville Union and Dispatch, 10, 11, 16, 18, 28 July 1867; Nashville Republican Banner 17, 23 July 
1867. 
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problem-the anti-Radical animus that provoked the Franklin riot. This newspaper 
countered its rivals' allegations with articles that described a harmonious relationship 
between generals Cooper and Duncan. It quoted a black militiaman, who insisted that a 
"perfect good feeling" existed between the regulars and the militia. Nevertheless, 
General Cooper disapproved of the redundant assignment of forces in Franklin. On more 
than one occasion, he was compelled to go in person to Franklin to sort out jurisdictional 
confusion. Toward the end of the month, he employed detachments from Company Gin 
more useful tasks. On 22 July, one of Sumner's lieutenants embarked with fifty men on a 
three-day patrol through the countryside around Triune (Williamson County). It was 
hoped that this show of force would encourage the area's eligible blacks to register and 
vote. Similarly, on 29 July, First Lieutenant George Sumner headed with half of 
Company G to Columbia (Maury County) in response to various registration difficulties 
and to provide security on election day. All the while, Captain Sumner remained in 
Franklin, as much for the sake of Radical pride at that point as to enforce the laws. To 
the dismay of local whites, he and his half-strength company participated in a Union 
League parade on 29 July, and later forced a white employer to compensate a black 
worker who took time off to attend the political festivities. Such actions prompted the 
Daily Press and Times to declare that "the spirit of riot ... has.been most effectually 
quenched in Franklin." Cooper, however, ultimately conceded full authority to the army; 
he placed Sumner (and elements of the recently mustered black Company K, 2nd 
Regiment) under Captain Burke's command for the day of the election. The Republican 
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Banner rejoiced at this final development: "so the black man will be taught subordination 
for the future. "37 
If racial slurs and professional humiliation were not enough, Captain Sumner also 
endured some aggravating complications with logistical support. Only a few days before 
the election, many of his men still lacked a complete set of uniforms, among other basic 
issue items. "One third of the men are preatty in need," he informed the quartermaster, 
"they are hard laying over the ground at night in the dew,-I want Blankets Coats Tents 
Drawers and Shirts." Perhaps Sumner found solace in the fact that at least it was 
summertime. 38 
While his all-black companies pressed on under an implacable propaganda 
assault, General Cooper deployed the rest of the State Guard. Over the final two weeks 
of the campaign, he stationed three additional companies in Middle Tennessee. As far as 
the Brownlow administration was concerned, there were plenty of "rebellious" counties 
in need of State Guard pacification. Moreover, Cooper decided that captains Blackbum 
and Rickman were over-extended-both being responsible for four or more counties-
and in need of some relief. Enter the racially mixed units of George E. Grisham 
37 Nashville Daily Press and Times, 11, 17 July, l August 1867; Special Orders Nos. 25, 34, 36 (22, 29, 30 
July) 1867, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 33; W. T. Allmond to General Thomas Duncan, 29 July 1867, TAGO, 
Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 5; Nashville Union and Dispatch, 11, 31 July 1867; Nashville Republican Banner, 
11, 31, July, l August 1867; Captain D. M. Burke to Adjutant General of Tennessee, 30 July 1867, TAGO, 
Reel 10, Vol. 46. Maury County authorities originally requested military assistance from the Federal 
garrison, but General Duncan referred the matter to General Cooper, who dispatched Lieutenant Sumner. 
38 Captain Sumner to A. E. Boone, 29 July 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 3. 
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(Company B, 1st Regiment) and John L. Kirk (Company C, 2nd Regiment), and the all-
white command of Robert L. Hall (Company C, 1st Regiment), all from East Tennessee.39 
Grisham and Hall arrived together in Nashville on 18-19 July. City Radicals were 
jubilant at the presence of over 200 loyal militiamen. They described Grisham as 
mentally "whole-souled" and physically in "fine trim," affectionately referred to Hall as 
"Friend Bob," and praised the enlisted men on their disciplined military bearing. 
Conservatives were less impressed. The Union and Dtspatch conceded that Hall's all-
white company, decked out in distinctive Burnside hats, "made a better show" than any 
other militia unit it had thus far observed, but declared that Grisham's mixed command 
was "as ragged and dirty a set of green looking bumpkins as ever went barefoot." 
Company B's flag, inscribed with "Tennessee Vol's," was ridiculed as "bogus." 
Unfortunately for the Radicals, at some point during these companies' stay, three or four 
militiamen wandered into a saloon, got drunk, and started a row. After knocking down 
the barkeep, they stumbled onto the street and fired a gunshot into a neighboring 
building. A passing constable sounded the alarm, but the militiamen fled the scene. 
Civilian witnesses magnified the incident into a street riot, but no arrests were made and 
the militia companies soon headed for their final destinations, leaving in their wake yet 
another "outrage" for the anti-Radical press to exploit.40 
39 Governor Brownlow to General Cooper, 11 July 1867, GP 21, Reel 1, Box 1, Folder 1; Nashville Daily 
Press and Times, 15, 24 July 1867. 
40 Nashville Daily Press and Times, 20 July 1867; Knoxville Whig. 24 July 1867; Captain Hall to H. H. 
Thomas, 13 June 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 3; Nashville Union and Dispatch, 20 July 1867; 
Nashville Republican Banner, 20 July 1867. 
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Captain Hall moved his men to nearby Buena Vista Springs, where they would act 
as a State Guard reserve. Captain Grisham's company, however, was split into two 
forces. First Lieutenant Nelson McLaughlin commanded one of them, a forty-man 
detachment, which he marched to Lebanon (Wilson County) on 20 July to protect the 
Radical minority there. Previously, Wilson had been part of Captain Blackburn's rather 
large militia bailiwick. In early July, however, new priorities compelled Blackbum to 
withdraw his squad from Lebanon. As a result, Wilson Conservatives renewed their 
challenge to Registrar W. H. Goodwin's control over the election. Simultaneously, ex-
Confederate landlords threatened their black field hands that they would "be turned out of 
employment if they vote the Brownlow ticket." After setting up camp, McLaughlin 
publicly warned the Conservatives that he would not permit them to interfere with 
Goodwin's duties. He tempered his address, however, by assuring them that his men 
would remain quietly in camp "unless a conflict is forced." The Conservatives did not 
challenge McLaughlin. 41 
Captain Grisham took the rest of his Company B to Fayetteville (Lincoln 
County). Captain Rickman had temporarily occupied that town during the 4 July 
celebration. Registrar John Carey, however, desired a full-time militia force. "I have 
been cursed and threatened," he complained to Governor Brownlow, adding that ex-
Confederate harassment inhibited Radical efforts to organize blacks into a Union League. 
A militant speech by Emerson Etheridge on 8 July exacerbated Carey's plight. Along 
with his typical denunciations of the governor, Etheridge declared the militia a violation 
41 W. L. Waters to General Cooper, 2 July 1867, IAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 3; Nashville Republican 
Banner, 28 July 1867. 
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of the Bill of Rights and insinuated that the "Caries" of Tennessee were thieves deserving 
to be overthrown. Grisham was sent to the rescue. Before he departed Nashville, 
however, Grisham paid a surprise visit to the office of the anti-Radical Republican 
Banner, where he told the staff that he felt "no spirit of hostility to the people" of Lincoln 
County. Grisham, an editor himself, believed that this face-to-face meeting might change 
the Banner's opinion of the State Guard. The editors did, indeed, acknowledge 
Grisham' s sincerity and deemed the unusual dialogue "a cheering indication" that some 
of the militia units could actually be respectable. From that point on, the Banner spared 
Company B negative press coverage.42 
From Grisham's perspective, his deployment to Lincoln was a resounding 
success. After arriving in Tullahoma by rail on 22 July and drawing additional 
equipment, Grisham commenced a march to Fayetteville on the evening of25 July. As a 
hot summer sun rose on the morning of26 July, Grisham beheld a beautiful rolling 
countryside laced in fields of cotton and com. Throughout the trek, Grisham rode up and 
down his column conversing with the men and dispelling rumors that 3,000 armed Rebels 
awaited them to give battle. When the company entered Fayetteville, Mayor Robert 
Farquharson, a former Confederate colonel, commended its orderly deportment. Grisham 
thereupon proclaimed, "our whole mission among you is peace, quiet and the 
enforcement of the laws." After paying a friendly visit on the local newspaper editor, 
Grisham helped his men establish a "good & healthy camp." Conservatives were 
42 John Carey to Governor Brownlow, 8 July 1867, GP 21, Reel 1, Box 2, Folder 1; Fayetteville Observer, 
11 July 1867; Nashville Republican Banner, 21 July 1867. 
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generally impressed by Grisham, whose militiamen were described as "delightful 
electioneering wheelhorses. ,,43 
Although Grisham apparently enjoyed his Guard duty in Fayetteville, there was 
cause for concern in the last few days before the election. The Lincoln County sheriff 
was an ex-Confederate. Moreover, he was dubious of Grisham's goodwill, and pointedly 
warned the militia captain that if the Radicals tried to attend the polls in procession, he 
would call out some 500 armed "police" to disperse them. Grisham informed General 
Cooper that he would not hesitate to meet force with force: "I will fight them with ball 
cartridges and bayonets until ammunition and men are exhausted." Determined to protect 
the polls and the county's 500 registered black voters, Grisham ordered all saloons closed 
on election day. Furthermore, on the advice of the registrar, he stationed ten men under 
Lieutenant Joseph February at one of the county's more remote polling sites.44 
The final addition to the State Guard presence in Middle Tennessee came on 24 
July when Captain John L. Kirk and his racially mixed command arrived in Nashville en 
route for Montgomery and Robertson, counties with strong Confederate sympathies. 
Montgomery whites had recently petitioned the Federal garrison for some soldiers to 
maintain order on the day of the election. The request may have been a compromise 
between local Radicals who wanted militia and local Conservatives who wanted no 
troops at all. General Duncan, however, referred the matter to General Cooper, who 
ordered Kirk to fulfill the task. On 25 July, Kirk entered the county seat of Clarksville 
43 Captain Grisham to General Cooper, 26 July 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder l; Jonesboro Union 
Flag. 16 August 1867; Fayetteville Observer, 1 August 1867. 
44 Jonesboro Union Flag. 16 August 1867; Captain Grisham to General Cooper, 31 July 1867, TAGO, Reel 
2, box 11, Folder 1. 
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with forty men, whom the Republican Banner characterized as "colored warriors ... 
panting for military glory." Their presence was like a surge of electricity through the 
ranks of the Radicals. According to Registrar John L. Roberts, "the Negroes are jubilant 
[and] the Reh citizens are more fearful." Many county blacks volunteered to join Kirk's 
company and over the next several days he mustered in over sixty additional recruits, 
bringing his force in Clarksville to about 100 militiamen. 45 · 
While Kirk headed for Clarksville, his first lieutenant, David E. Burchfield, took a 
thirty-man detachment to Springfield (Robertson County). Given that Kirk's force was 
predominately black, most ofBurchfield's men were probably white. The distinction was 
significant, for Robertson County was a hotbed of ex-Confederate outlawry. Registrar H. 
D. Featherston was undoubtedly relieved when Burchfield's contingent arrived, but his 
prediction that all would thenceforth be "peaceable and quiet" proved wrong. On the 
night of 30 July, unidentified raiders fired rifle shots into the militia camp. Burchfield 
reacted decisively: "My men raleyed and gave a furius voley in the same direction." For 
the next ten minutes the militiamen anxiously stared into the darkness. Then, another 
shot rang out from the woods, followed by a shotgun blast. None of the troops was hit, 
however, and Burchfield was content merely to return fire until the attackers withdrew. 
The Union and Dispatch dismissed the State Guard's official report of the incident. 
According to this newspaper, one ofBurchfield's few "colored" militiamen accidentally 
45 Special Order No. 27, 24 July 1867, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 33; Fisher, War At Every Door, 189; Nashville 
Daily Press and Times, 19, 24 July 1867; Nashville Republican Banner, 25 July 1867; John L. Roberts to 
General Cooper, 27 July 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 3; Muster Roll for Company C, 2nd 
Tennessee State Guard (1867), TAGO, Reel 5, Box 24, Folder 5. Kirk's new recruits may not have been 
full-fledged militiamen. General Cooper referred to them as a "Citizen Company." Special Order No. 138, 
26 July 1867, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 33. 
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fired his weapon, "creating a temporary stampede, and setting the musketry to popping in 
all directions. ,,46 
Although General Cooper distributed most of his units in Middle Tennessee, the 
west was not neglected. Five militia companies plus one detachment would see action in 
West Tennessee. One of Cooper's main priorities was reinforcing Captain John T. 
Robeson's hard-pressed forces in the northwest corner. For over a month, Robeson had 
been trying single-handedly to regulate political affairs in Obion, Weakley, Dyer, and 
Gibson counties. During a tour through several western counties in early July, Secretary 
of State Andrew J. Fletcher observed that in spite of potential militia reprisals, "the rebels 
are brow-beating and threatening the negroes with all manner of punishment." He 
concluded that "the strong arm of military power is needed to keep them in check." 
Accordingly, on 21 June, Cooper ordered Company G, 1st Regiment, under Captain Silas 
L. Chambers, into the region. When the unit passed through Nashville, the anti-Radical 
press mocked it with typical venom: "the 'volunteers' [were] ... armed to the teeth with 
rusty old shooting irons of uncouth finish and ancient make ... some of them barefooted, 
and all of them notoriously ugly." The Daily Press and Times contradicted its rivals, 
describing the militiamen as "entirely worthy of the uniform" and promising that 
Chambers would "neither oppress or insult any man. "47 
46 Special Order No. 28, 24 July 1867, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 33; H. D. Featherston to General Cooper, 26 
July 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder I; Lieutenant Burchfield to General Cooper, 30 July 1867, 
TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 4; Nashville Daily Press and Times, I August 1867; Nashville Union and 
Dispatch, 2 August 1867. 
47 Nashville Daily Press and Times, 27 June, 18 July 1867; Special Order No. 3, 21 June 1867, TAGO, 
Reel 9, Vol. 33; Nashville Republican Banner, 26 June 1867; Fayetteville Observer, 11 July 1867. 
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The anti-Radicals were closer to the mark in their assessment; Company G's 
performance proved embarrassingly "ugly." While Lieutenant James W. Newport went 
to Dresden (Weakley County) with forty men, Captain Chambers headed for Trenton 
(Gibson County) with forty-five. Chambers arrived on 28 June and found everything "all 
rite." But the leadership and morale problems that marred his company's muster soon 
reemerged. Sometime during the first week of July, Chambers took one too many shots 
of whiskey and proceeded to make a jackass of himself before the citizens of Trenton. 
According to witnesses, the intoxicated Chambers "made some very Severe Threats to 
Burn the Town." All the while, the militia captain "flourished his pistol, Threatened to 
Shoot any one who interfered with him and used very obscene language." First 
Lieutenant Larken B. Gamble, the state's investigating officer and a member of the 
Knoxville Sons of Temperance, corroborated the charges. On Larken's recommendation, 
General Cooper, himself a teetotaler, punished the "disgraceful" company commander. 
Chambers was arrested and dishonorably discharged. Calling on the governor for 
clemency, Chambers meekly confessed, "it is true that I drink a little whiskey." He 
begged in vain for a second chance. The Republican Banner snickered at the episode: 
"He must be a wretch indeed who is not deemed worthy to hold a commission in 
Brownlow' s militia. ,,4s 
48 Special Order No. 4, 25 June and No. 12, 8 July 1867, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 33; Captain Chambers to 
General Cooper, 28 June 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 5; Lieutenant L.B. Gamble to General 
Cooper, 14 July 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 1; Knoxville Whig. 12 December 1866; Nashville 
Daily Press and Times, 15 July 1867; General Order No. 3, 17 July 1867, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 27; Captain 
Chambers to Governor Brownlow, 16 July 1867, GP 21, Reel 1, Box 2, Folder 1; Nashville Republican 
Banner, 10 July 1867. Through the intercession of numerous friends, Chambers eventually received an 
honorable discharge. John M. Cordell to General Cooper, 11 November 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, 
Folder 5; Scott County Petition to General Cooper, 15 November 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 2; 
General Order No. 35, 14 January 1868, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 27. 
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Captain Chambers's dismissal did not prevent the decline of Company G as a 
reliable militia unit. General Cooper placed Lieutenant Newport in command, but this 
officer evidently lacked what the general was looking for. Some time in the middle of 
July, Cooper promoted Pryor Adkins, one of the company's non-commissioned officers, 
to the captaincy. Adkins was a 25-year-old Scott County farmer and a Civil War veteran. 
Under his direction, Company G provided protection for Gibson County registrar Robert 
E. Bogle, who added 350 blacks to his voting roster. At the end of July, however, 
Company G suffered another humiliation. For several days, local whites had been 
spreading rumors that a large Rebel force was massing for an attack. When some boys 
fired off skyrockets on 28 July, a jumpy Captain Adkins telegraphed for help, while his 
men "set to work with desperate energy to dig a ditch." The Republican Banner 
exaggerated many of the facts surrounding this "terrible scare," but Adkins's overreaction 
earned him the sobriquet "Captain Shirttail." Adkins appears to have lost the respect of 
some of his men as well, for he was forced to reduce three corporals to the rank of private 
for "mutinous conduct." An exasperated General Cooper authorized Adkins to use any 
means necessary to instill better discipline. 49 
Company G failed to provide Captain Robeson much relief. Fortunately for the 
Radicals, Robeson was one of the most able officers in the State Guard. In the first half 
of July, he led patrols through Obion, Dyer, and Weakley counties in his ongoing effort 
to establish Radical control. He was pleased "to find the Freedmen all for Brownlow," 
49 Special Order Nos. 12, 39 (8, 31 July) 1867, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 33; CSR Index, Reel l; Census of 
Tennessee, Schedules of Population (Scott County), 255; Memphis Daily Appeal 16 July 1867; Nashville 
Republican Banner, 1 August 1867; Nashville Union and Dispatch, 31 July 1867; Captain Adkins to 
General Cooper, 31 July 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 4. 
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but he also reported that "the Rebels are verry bitter." Wherever he went, ex-
Confederates vowed their intention to "vote or die." While scouting in Weakley County 
(where Lieutenant Newport was ostensibly in charge) on 13 July, Robeson captured 
Martin Vowell, "a verry bad man." Vowell was part of an ex-Confederate band that 
boasted that it could "Whip the State Troops." The prospect of clashing with Rebel 
vigilantes evidently excited Robeson. "I think I will have some fun," he confided to the 
adjutant general.50 
The difficulty of bringing law and order to four large counties eventually 
discouraged even the doughty Robeson. Try as his did, he could not be everywhere all of 
the time. Leaving his foot soldiers in Obion County, Robeson kept his mounted section 
in motion. Beginning on 19 July, he embarked on an ambitious eight-day patrol through 
Dyer, Gibson, and Lauderdale counties, the last one an extension of his already vast area 
of operations. Ex-Confederates in Dyer County took advantage of his absence to try to 
roll back Radicalism. On 24 July, they disrupted a Union League meeting in Dyersburg 
with brickbats and pistol shots. As a result, many blacks opted not to register. Only 
twenty-eight blacks received voting certificates from Registar James McCoy during 
Robeson's excursion. On his return to Dyersburg, Robeson arrested several whites 
accused of perpetrating the attack. Nevertheless, he realized that he did not have enough 
men to garrison Dyer effectively. Moreover, he determined from his patrol that 
Lauderdale County needed militia and that Trenton, though occupied by a detachment 
from Company G, was essentially "controlled by the Rebels." General Cooper did 
5° Captain Robeson to Horace H. Thomas, 12 July 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 3; Captain 
Robeson to Samuel Hunt, 12, 15 July 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 3. 
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augment Robeson's forces by attaching Captain William C. Holt's thirty volunteers to 
Company E, but given the political challenges elsewhere in West and Middle Tennessee, 
no substantial reinforcements were available.51 
As Robeson orchestrated State Guard activities in four counties, Captain Judge K. 
Clingan had his hands full in one-Madison. Having ostensibly secured Haywood 
County for the Radicals, Clingan arrived at the town of Jackson (Madison) in the last 
week of June. Over 99 percent of Madison's white electorate had voted for secession in 
1861. In 1867, the county's whites were in no mood for the presence of a company of 
"Melish." Two years after the Civil War, Jackson still showed the effects of wartime 
devastation; entire blocks were little more than charred ruins. Local whites complained 
that business was poor and that many freedmen seemed to hang around doing nothing. 
Into this dismal setting came Company D, 1st Regiment, "without the slightest 
provocation," according to Conservatives. 52 
Clingan found the anti-Radicals of Madison far more truculent than those of 
Haywood. Shortly after his arrival, he earned the locals' ire when he forbade the carrying 
of firearms in public. Whether all complied or merely concealed their weapons is 
unclear, but the white townspeople did not hide their contempt for the militia. "They ... 
scorn us as we pass," Clingan noted, and appear to have closed their shops to his men 
compelling the militia captain to rely exclusively on the quartermaster for supplies. On 
51 Captain Robeson to Samuel Hunt, 27 July 1867, IAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder I. The anti-Radical 
sentiment in Lauderdale was likely intensified by a mid-July address by Nathan B. Forrest during a 
Conservative rally at Fort Pillow, site of the Civil War massacre. Knoxville Whig. 17 July 1867. 
52 Special Order No.-, 19 June 1867, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 33; Fisher, War At Every Door, 190; Emma 
Inman Williams, Historic Madison: The Story of Jackson and Madison County Tennessee. From the 
Prehistoric Moundbuilders to 1917 (Jackson, 1946), 190-93; Memphis Daily Appeal, 11 July 1867. 
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one occasion, a group of ex-Confederates confronted Clingan personally, cursing the 
captain and his "god damned Yankey and Brownlow militia." Toward the middle of 
July, Clingan reported that "there is something misteriouse going on in this place." For 
weeks, Madison whites had been creating a climate of fear, "doing all in their power to 
demoralize" Clingan's men. During the night, sporadic gunfire kept militia sentries on 
edge, while false alarms of murder had militia details chasing phantoms. During the day, 
Jackson residents tempted the militiamen to leave their posts with offers of clean clothes 
and home-cooked meals. Company D's morale suffered: sixteen men deserted during 
one ten-day period. While riding a man on a rail had quelled the harassment of his men 
in Haywood, Clingan proved reluctant to employ similar tactics in Madison. Instead, he 
appears to have holed up with his entire command in an· encampment on the outskirts of 
town, leaving the countryside to the Rebels, except for an occasional mounted patrol. 53 
Clingan's defensiveness was a wise precaution. His scouts discovered the 
existence of several caches of regular army rifles ( some stored in one of Jackson's 
banks). Additionally, they reported that a group of some 500 ex-Confederates, whose 
"looks shows vengeance," had standing orders to assemble quickly should conflict with 
the militia arise. Clingan told General Cooper that "if it was not fear of more soldiers, 
the citizens would not allow us to remain here." Further complicating Clingan's task was 
a political circular distributed by county Conservatives urging ex-Confederates to 
participate in the election and chastising them for not trying to register. Evidently, the 
53 Williams, Historic Madison, 193-94; Captain Clingan to General Cooper, 11, 15 July 1867, TAGO, Reel 
2, Box 10, Folder 5; Captain Clingan to General Cooper, 24 June, and A. E. Boone 25 June 1867, TAGO, 
Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 3; Wing E. Ramsey to Adjutant General of Tennessee, 18 July 1867, TAGO, Reel 
10, Vol. 46; Muster Roll for Company D, 1st Tennessee State Guard (1867), TAGO, Reel 4, Box 22, Folder 
4. 
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Conservatives hoped that a swarm of illegal certificate-seekers would overwhelm 
Registrar Robert Medlin and inhibit his registration of blacks. One of Clingan's 
lieutenants overheard a Rebel exclaim that if whites were not allowed to vote then "no 
d-d nigger should vote." Clingan concluded that Madison was "the worst place without 
any doubt in West Tennessee."54 
As unnerving as all of this anti-Radical opposition must have been, Captain 
Clingan persevered in his duty. He requested permission from General Cooper to 
confiscate all weapons until after the election. He also maintained order, albeit with 
difficulty, during a mid-July Radical rally, one attended by several Rebels who 
mercilessly insulted the speakers. Finally, he remonstrated against the racial "hatered" of 
Madison's whites, particularly their maltreatment of a mentally and physically 
handicapped black man. Apparently, this former slave had recently become a ward of the 
county, costing the residents about $25.00 for three months of care. Sometime in the first 
week of July, city officials cast the man into the streets outside the courthouse, where he 
lay virtually naked for over an hour. When Clingan demanded an explanation for this 
appalling act, one Conservative retorted that since "Brownlows malitia was the friend of 
the negro ... let them take care of him." Clingan helped some locals blacks get the man 
into shelter, giving them $5.00 out of his own pocket for food and clothes. Unfortunately, 
the man later died. Clingan was disgusted by Madison's attitude toward the freedmen: 
"This is the feeling of the flower of the lost cause. "55 
54 Captain Clingan to General Cooper, 11 July 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 5; Nashville Daily 
Press and Times, 11 July 1867. 
55 Captain Clingan to General Cooper, 11, 15 July 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 5. 
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Captain Shadrack T. Harris of Company F, 1st Regiment, joined his militia 
compatriots in the west on 4 July. Half of the company was on detached service in 
Middle Tennessee, but General Cooper assigned Harris and his remaining fifty men to 
Henry County. The unit's trip by rail was uncomfortable from start to finish. Through a 
scheduling miscommunication with the Edgefield & Kentucky, the company left 
Nashville in boxcars instead of passenger cars. An apologetic superintendent later 
installed some couches for the militiamen, but Captain Harris arrived at his destination in 
an irascible mood. Henry County had supported secession by nearly 85 percent in 1861, 
and its "rebellious" mindset had not diminished much by 1867. Registrar James B. 
Guthrie, whom local whites branded "an unfeeling brute, a faithless cur," had so far 
failed to register any blacks. Harris's arrival in the county seat of Paris on American 
independence day elicited a grim comment from the county newspaper: "Despotism 
fastened one of its armed heels on this quiet community .... We are overawed by the 
surveillance of an irresponsible body of armed men." Conservatives feared the worst 
from Harris, the man who had languished in a Confederate prison for over two years. 
White residents scrutinized every move by his men for signs of "drunken, indecent and 
lawless conduct." The Republican Banner even claimed that Harris had given his men 
orders to "burn the town and kill every rebel in it" if the election went against the 
Radicals. Harris hardly deserved the abuse. His occupation proved relatively uneventful 
and, in some respects, ineffective. Perhaps unable to act more forcefully because of his 
crippled condition, Harris submitted his letter of resignation one day before the election, 
citing "private business." Leaving the company first sergeant in charge in Cheatham, 
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Lieutenant E. R. Hall rushed to Paris to take over, only to discover that Guthrie had 
managed to register just a few dozen voters. 56 
In contrast to Harris's, Captain George Hamilton's experience in McNairy County 
was nerve-wracking. After mustering in his racially mixed Company E, 2nd Regiment, in 
mid-June, Hamilton established his base at Purdy, the county seat, and remained there for 
the duration of the campaign, the men possibly enjoying the comforts of wooden barracks 
constructed from lumber purchased by the quartermaster. For about a month, all was 
calm in the county, which had voted for secession by just under 70 percent. Hamilton 
and Registrar Levi Hurst appear to have quietly prepared the loyal voters for the 
upcoming election. In July, however, ex-Confederates mounted a serious challenge to 
Radical authority. On the night of the fifteenth, a small group of "bushwhackers" fired 
several gunshots into the militia encampment and then galloped off before the militiamen 
could return the fire. Having few horsemen, Captain Hamilton could undertake no 
pursuit. The Daily Press and Times condemned the sneak attack, proclaiming that "the 
Purdy guerrillas ... richly deserve to dangle on the gallows. "57 
Less than two weeks later, a much larger group of ex-Confederates attacked. On 
the night of 26 July, some fifteen to twenty men, heavily armed and with blackened faces, 
commenced firing on the militia encampment. This time, the assailants did not flee, but 
instead made sporadic attacks throughout the night. The militiamen fired back as best 
56 Special Order Nos. 8, 48 (3 July, 2 August) 1867, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 33; Boyd Cheatham (Edgefield & 
Kentucky) to General Cooper, 3 July 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 5; Fisher, War At Every Door, 
189; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 3, 9 July 1867; Memphis Daily Appeal, 23 July 1867; Paris 
Intelligencer, 6 July 1867; Nashville Republican Banner, 9 July 1867. 
57 Captain Hamilton to H. H. Thomas, 2 July 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 3; Fisher, War At Every 
Door, 189; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 20 July 1867; Memphis Daily Appeal, 25 July 1867. 
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they could from their position. With the light of dawn, however, Captain Hamilton went 
on the offensive. Placing his company in assault formation, he "charged the guerrillas 
and drove them pell-mell through the town to the woods." Three Rebels were reportedly 
wounded, while Company E miraculously suffered no casualties. Conservatives 
downplayed the incident as a "desultory skirmish. "58 
The following day, black Union Leaguers held a flag-raising rally in Purdy with 
Company E providing security. Several speeches were made, some apparently in honor 
of the militia's nighttime heroics, before three "pestiferous rebels" interrupted the 
proceedings with loud insults. When militia Sergeant James Hardin attempted to silence 
the men, he was shot through the shoulder. More shots were fired and more injuries were 
sustained before the militia restored order. Ex-Confederate Samuel Lewis was among the 
wounded. When he died two days later, McNairy's Conservative authorities tried to 
indict Captain Hamilton's black militiamen for murder. It is not clear what became of 
this legal action nor whether Sergeant Hardin recovered from his own wound. What is 
clear is that Hamilton faced a determined enemy in McNairy County. Few other militia 
companies expended as much ammunition as Company E appears to have discharged. 
Still, Hamilton held the field, and the anti-Radicals knew that he would not give up 
without a hard fight. 59 
Hamilton's lack of cavalry horses was a common deficiency in the State Guard. 
The Militia Act permitted a twenty-five man mounted section for each company, but 
58 Nashville Daily Press and Times, 31 July 1867; Nashville Republican Banner, 31 July 1867. 
59 Nashville Daily Press and Times, 31 July 1867; Nashville Republican Banner, 31 July 1867; Muster-Roll 
for Company E, 2nd Tennessee State Guard (1867), TAGO, Reel 5, Box 24, Folder 7; Report of the 
Secretaiy of War (1867), 189. 
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militiamen apparently had to provide their own steeds. With good quality horses often 
costing over $100, few volunteers owned one. As a result, many companies failed to 
field a complete complement of horsemen. This loss in mobility hindered the 
performance of some units, such as Hamiliton's. Some companies appear to have pooled 
their horses for joint use. Captains Grisham and G. W. Kirk, for example, occasionally 
borrowed extra mounts from Rickman' s unit during the last half of July. (Much later in 
the deployment, General Cooper would implement an equitable redistribution of horses.) 
For those militiamen who did join with their own horse, the state compensated them 40-
cents per day for feed and grooming, but it is unclear if it reimbursed soldiers for horses 
that died in the line of duty. There is no indication, for instance, that the quartermaster 
ever settled a claim entered by Private Joseph Law (Company I, 1st Regiment), who lost 
his mount, valued at $100, while on patrol. For better or worse, the Brownlow 
administration avoided most of the costs that horses added to nineteenth-century military 
operations. 60 
The last State Guard unit to deploy to West Tennessee was Company F, 2nd 
Regiment, First Lieutenant Joseph M. Alexander commanding. In the second week of 
July, while waiting for orders, Alexander imposed quasi-martial law on the town of 
Loudon (Roane County). Claiming that the town was controlled by a "rebel dynasty" 
(although the county had voted against secession by over 70 percent), Alexander issued 
some strict decrees, such as nighttime curfews, restrictions on the sale of liquor, and a 
60 Muster Rolls for Company A, H, I, 1st Regiment, B, 2nd Regiment, Tennessee State Guard (1867), 
TAGO, Reel 4, Box 22, Folder I, Reel 5, Box 23, Folders 4, 5, Box 24, Folder 4; Captain Grisham to 
General Cooper, 21 July 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder I; General Order No. 34, 7 December 1867, 
TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 27. 
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requirement that certain individuals (i.e., ex-Confederates) carry travel passes while in 
town. The anti-Radical populace vehemently protested these infringements on their civil 
liberties. Referring to Alexander as "the great Mogul," residents called for his dismissal. 
The militia lieutenant ignored all remonstrance.61 
Infuriated by Alexander's "officious" conduct, ex-Confederate S. "Bob" Viars 
tried to stir up trouble. Denouncing the militiamen as "low-flung," he called for 
volunteers to help him "run the State Guards out of Loudon." On 15 July, he stormed 
alone into the militia encampment, hurled insults at Alexander, and threatened to tear 
down the American flag. The men of Company F pounced on him. Alexander later 
commented that "it was with much difficulty [that] I could restrain the men from putting 
him through." Alexander then held a drum-head court where the battered Viars was 
charged with insurrection and treason, and reportedly "sentenced to eat grass or go 
hungry." Though coerced with bayonets, Viars "refused to nibble." After a few more 
indignities, the "malignant scoundrel" was released.62 
Civil authorities brought a lawsuit against Alexander and his men, but it never 
reached court, for Company F headed for West Tennessee on 22 July. Probably 
influenced by Captain Robeson's report on conditions in Lauderdale County, General 
Cooper ordered Lieutenant Alexander to set up camp in the county seat of Ripley. The 
unit's cross-state journey was quite eventful. Its passage through Nashville was 
something like a Roman triumph. "With colors flying, a clanging snare drum sounding, 
61 Nashville Daily Press and Times, 26 July 1867; Fisher, War At Every Door, 188; Nashville Union and 
Dispatch, 23 July 1867. 
62 Nashville Daily Press and Times, 26 July 1867; Knoxville Whig. 24 July 1867; Nashville Union and 
Dispatch, 23 July 1867. 
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and the bayonet of every musket fixed," Company F proceeded toward its rail 
connection. The Union and Dispatch described the march through the city as one of 
"glistening intimidation. ,,6J 
On 25 July, Company F briefly halted at Humboldt (Gibson County). From the 
Radicals' standpoint, Gibson was in political disarray, the presence of a detachment from 
Company G, I st Regiment, notwithstanding. While Lieutenant Alexander went to 
Trenton, presumably to consult with Captain Adkins, Second Lieutenant E. R. Brown 
remained in Humboldt with the main body. Brown observed firsthand the ex-
Confederates' domination of the county. According to the lieutenant, the "Rebs" 
brazenly congregated near his bivouac and taunted his men. One ex-Confederate sneered 
that the Radicals "had better send more men ... if they expect the d-d nigger to Vote." 
Another ridiculed the militiamen as dupes of"Brownlow's Bogus State Govt." and 
vowed to send the "Ignorant niggers" back to slavery regardless of the outcome of the 
election. Brown ordered his men to ignore the catcalls. Several freedmen braved the 
gauntlet of ex-Confederate loiterers and informed the lieutenant that barely half of the 
eligible black voters had been registered. Moreover, they intimated that the militia 
detachment in Trenton had done very little to suppress ex-Confederate lawlessness. 
Some Gibson blacks had actually formed their own vigilante groups, inflicting three 
casualties on a band of Rebels in one clash. Brown requested permission from General 
Cooper to stay and register the freedmen personally, but a couple of days later Alexander 
returned from Trenton and Company F proceeded to Ripley. Arriving on 31 July, 
63 Athens Republican, 26 July 1867; Special Order No. 26, 23 July 1867, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 33; Nashville 
Union and Dispatch, 25 July 1867. 
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Alexander reported that the blacks in that region turned out in large numbers to welcome 
his command. 64 
Alexander's relatively rapid movement from Loudon to Ripley (a distance of 
about 350 miles) highlights the importance of rail transportation to the militia 
deployment. Given that most lawless counties were located in Middle and West 
Tennessee and that most of the militia units came from East Tennessee, trains were 
indispensable to the politics of force. Shortly after mobilization, the major railroad 
companies agreed to a "special arrangement" with the Tennessee quartermaster, whereby 
militia personnel and freight could travel at a 40 percent discount. Moreover, H. H. 
Thomas persuaded some of these companies to conduct business on credit, assuring them 
that the state was good for all fees. In return, the State Guard received timely transport 
and courteous treatment from many superintendents. J. L. Williams of the Mobile & 
Ohio, for example, intervened in behalf of the quartermaster when one of his conductors 
refused to accommodate an unscheduled shipment of munitions. Williams ordered the 
conductor to readjust his plans or face discharge. Captain Harris's bumpy ride to Henry 
County was an aberration in an otherwise efficient mode of travel. The railroad 
companies also presumably turned a profit, grossing $27,347 over the course of their 
business with the State Guard. 65 
64 Lieutenant Brown to General Cooper, 25 July 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 4; McBride, "Blacks 
and the Race Issue," 215; Lieutenant Alexander to General Cooper, 31 July 1867, T AGO, Reel 2, Box 10, 
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65 Boyd M. Cheatham to H. H. Thomas, 18 June 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 3; H. H. Thomas to 
Joseph Hoxie, 8 August 1867, GP 21, Reel 2, Box 3, Folder 1; H. H. Thomas to President of Mobile & 
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General Cooper might well have deployed the balance of his State Guard-three 
companies from East Tennessee-to other trouble spots in the middle and western 
sections had it not been for some unexpected anti-Radical challenges in the mountain 
counties. On 23 July, a political riot broke out in Rogersville (Hawkins County). The 
Radicals and the Conservatives had staged competing rallies in close proximity, the 
latter's featuring one of Emerson Etheridge's stump speeches. At some point, shots rang 
out and a melee ensued, leaving one black Union Leaguer dead and two wounded and 
one white Conservative dead and another wounded. Radicals blamed the Conservatives 
for opening fire, while Conservatives accused the Radicals of trying to assassinate 
Etheridge. The day after this incident, an ex-Confederate shot a black Radical in the face 
during a Knoxville party rally. This violent tum of events in East Tennessee compelled 
Governor Brownlow to retain the remaining militia companies in that section. He 
stationed Captain Kemp Murphy's Company D, 2nd Regiment, in Knoxville (probably as 
a personal bodyguard as much as a law enforcer). Captain A. M. Clapp's Company H, 
2nd Regiment, went to Hawkins County to restore order there. Clapp may have detached 
some men to neighboring Sullivan, for Conservatives in that county claimed that his 
"rabble" made a habit of marching "up and down the country, threatening and terrifying 
all they meet." Finally, First Lieutenant William N. Purdy' s newly mustered Company I, 
2nd Regiment, was ordered to Monroe and Polk, counties that had voted for secession. 66 
Journal, 35th General Assembly, Extra Session, 26. For a map of the principal rail lines in Tennessee 
during this period, see Bergeron, Tennesseans, 115. 
66 Governor Brownlow to General Cooper, 25 July 1867, GP 21, Reel 1, Box 1, Folder 1; Knoxville Whig. 
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Unable to get more men from East Tennessee, General Cooper committed his 
reserve unit-Captain Hall's Company C-to Rutherford County on 30 July. Radicals 
there had long insisted that they could handle voter registration and the election itself 
without militia troops. The Etheridge camp, however, had heated up the political climate 
and frightened many registered freedmen in the process. Toward the end of July, county 
Radicals requested militia, and Hall encamped his men in the county seat of 
Murfreesboro. Cooper replaced Hall's company as a reserve by hastily mustering in the 
all-black Company A, 3rd Regiment, a mere two days before the election. The 
Republican Banner, always on the look out for military despotism, found the general's 
abrupt "augmentation of the Brownlow army ... rather mysterious." As far as Cooper 
was concerned, however, even the capital county of Davidson needed some State Guard. 
One day before the election he ordered the white Captain Michael J. Houston to deploy 
his black militiamen throughout the county. 67 
Except for a few last-minute adjustments, the twenty-one companies of the State 
Guard were all in place by 31 July. In looking back at this political campaign, 
Conservative candidate for Congress Edmund Cooper grumbled, "My district [the fourth] 
was, just before the election. flooded with troops-Tennessee militia." In some respects, 
"flooded" was not an exaggeration. Six of the eight counties in Cooper's Middle 
Tennessee district were occupied by three full companies of militia and detachments from 
three others. Some 1,210 militiamen (including most of the black volunteers) from 
thirteen companies had either patrolled or physically occupied at least twenty-four of 
67 Special Order Nos. 37, 40-42 (30, 31 July) 1867, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 33; W. Y. Elliott to Governor 
Brownlow, 15 July 1867, Patton Collection; W. Bosson and W. Y. Elliott to General Cooper, 26 July 1867, 
TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 4; Nashville Republican Banner, 1 August 1867. 
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Middle Tennessee's thirty-six counties. In West Tennessee, approximately 460 
militiamen from six companies occupied at one time or another at least nine of the 
section's eighteen counties. And in East Tennessee, some 205 militiamen from four 
companies exercised authority over five or more of that section's thirty counties (see 
Appendix B). The "full blast" of the Tennessee State Guard was indeed a dramatic 
display of Radical power. 68 
The conduct of this Radical army was a major issue throughout the campaign. 
John P. Holtsinger spoke for many Conservatives when he complained to President 
Johnson that "the presence ofBrownlow's militia tends more to disorder, than 
otherwise." In actuality, however, most of the "disorder" during the campaign was a 
product of anti-Radical agitation, especially in West Tennessee. Most company 
commanders simply tried to execute their orders and keep the peace. When 
confrontations occurred, they usually responded with appropriate and reasonable force. 
Much of the credit for this manifest professionalism rests with General Cooper. His 
leadership gave the State Guard a more centralized chain-of-command than had existed 
prior to his appointment, and his numerous special orders not only directed militia 
movements but also reiterated the rules of engagement. To be sure, some officers 
overstepped their authority. Lieutenant Alexander's brief"martial law" in Roane County 
was certainly an abuse of power. Other officers, however, such as Captain Grisham, 
exhibited an unexpected human touch in pacifying the opposition. The scope of the State 
68 Sheafe v. Tillman, 101; Lieutenant L.B. Gamble to General Cooper, 6 September 1867, TAGO, Reel 1, 
Box 8, Folder 6; Lieutenant Cravens to General Cooper, 7 September 1867, TAGO, Reel 1, Box 8, Folder 
6; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 27 July, 9 August 1867; Knoxville Whig. 7 August 1867; Special 
Orders Book, 1867, TAGO, Reel 9. Vol. 33. 
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Guard's activities was extensive, but a military despotism it was not. There were no 
atrocities, at least none for which the militia was responsible. Some ex-Confederates 
were captured or arrested, but instead of being summarily executed they were usually 
released after a short incarceration. There was no suppression of the anti-Radical press, 
which lambasted the militia on virtually every page. There was no interference with the 
Conservative canvass of the state, in which Etheridge denounced the Brownlow 
administration at every stop. And there was no official martial law. There were 
restrictions placed on some activities, such as the sale of liquor, but in most occupied 
counties life went on as if there were no militia at all. What the State Guard did do was 
provide protection for Radicals who wanted to meet safely in public and freedmen who 
wanted to register to vote. 69 
Anti-Radical criticism of the State Guard never abated, but there were several 
instances where the rhetoric of tyranny lapsed into comic lightheartedness. In May, the 
Fayetteville Observer penned a piece of doggerel entitled, "Commander-in-Chief, Etc." 
which mocked Brownlow' s employment of force: "He steers the proud old ship of state/ 
And if she sinks, he'll let her-ah/ But he will never share her fate,/ "Commander-in-
Chief, Etcetera." In June, the Republican Banner printed a humorous story that portrayed 
the militiamen as sniveling cowards. As Captain Evans's Company I was moving by rail, 
the train suffered an accident. According to the Banner, as the train screeched to a halt 
"Brownlow's Bummers" thought they were under attack by Rebels and "screamed like a 
pack of frightened children or a flock of scared sheep." One private shrieked, "O, my 
69 Graf, Papers of Andrew Johnson, 12: 434. 
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God!" while another begged, "Don't shoot!" As the panic subsided, one demoralized 
militiamen sobbed, "I thought the rebs'd got me shure!" In July, several Conservative 
newspapers parodied Colonel David M. Nelson's investigation of the Rogersville riot. 
As the colonel interrogated the "rebel" perpetrators, he discovered that they were actually 
all officers of the "melish," at which point he promptly bellowed, "Guards! Release these 
men at once." A final example of State Guard lampooning involved the black militia. 
The Union and Dispatch related the observations of a Nashville "colored man" who 
shook his head with disapproval at Captain J. L. Kirk's black troopers: "Dese nigger 
melishy goin to fool round here tell they gits us all in trouble. They better go back to the 
com field whar they belong and then we'll have peace."70 
Comic stories notwithstanding, the contending sides did despise one another. As 
General Cooper completed his deployment, the anti-Radicals continued to issue 
challenges to Radical authority. In the closing weeks of the campaign, the Union and 
Dispatch ran its own version of the Gaut circular that urged "three freeholders,, in any 
county "to qualify themselves ... and proceed to hold the election and certify the returns 
to the sheriff" The Republican Banner called on "the moral power of the people" to 
safeguard the ballot box from "Brownlow bullies." To this end it declared that every 
white man "should consider himself a special policeman authorized to keep the peace." 
The State Guard now had one final task: to protect the polls and ensure that only "loyal" 
men cast a ballot. All Tennesseans anxiously awaited the dawn of 1 August.71 
70 Fayetteville Observer, 9 May 1867; Nashville Republican Banner, 30 June, 1 August 1867; Nashville 
Union and Dispatch., 25 July, 1 August 1867. 
71 Nashville Union and Dispatch, July 1867; Nashville Republican Banner, 20 July 1867. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
The Radical Army Wins the Election 
Most Tennesseans anticipated civil disturbances on the day of the election. 
Radicals were certain that one or more of the many bands of Rebel vigilantes would 
attack the polling sites, while Conservatives fully expected at least one of the militia 
companies to fire on the citizenry. No one was more concerned about potential violence 
than General Joseph A Cooper. As the commander of nearly 1,900 militiamen 
distributed in more than thirty counties, Cooper bore direct responsibility for ensuring 
public safety and preserving electoral integrity. He did not shrink from this important 
duty. In the final week of the campaign, besides completing the deployment of the State 
Guard, Cooper issued specific election-day instructions to all of his company 
commanders. He ordered them to work closely with "their Union friends," to position 
their men in "the best possible advantage to protect the loyal voters," and to "use Every 
means to preserve the peace."1 
General Cooper was also worried about the well being of the militiamen 
themselves, in light of the death of Private Jones and the night attacks against the State 
Guard in McNairy and Robertson, among other confrontations. In a general order issued 
the day before the election, Cooper denounced the "armed mobs and outlaws, who ... 
persist in keeping the country in a reign of terror by their outrageous conduct." He 
warned that anyone caught interfering with the State Guard would be "punished to the 
full extent of the law," and he informed the "disloyal citizens" of those counties occupied 
1 Circular No. 2, 25 July 1867, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 27. 
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by militia that he would hold them "strictly responsible for any violation of this order." 
Conservatives found the general's last statement particularly offensive. The Union and 
Dispatch derided the general order as a piece of"graceless impudence" and warned that if 
Cooper ever acted on his threats against "the innocent," then the people of Tennessee 
would rise up and sweep the militia "out of existence. "2 
Nashville Mayor Matt Brown was unimpressed by General Cooper's edicts. 
Throughout the campaign, Mayor Brown had opposed the Radicals in every way he 
could, from endorsing the Gaut circular to co-authoring the Conservatives' campaign 
strategy for Middle Tennessee. He had had run-ins with General Cooper on several 
occasions, including a sharp exchange on 2 July, when the militia general complained to 
Brown that the Nashville police were culpable in the disruption of Radical meetings in 
the city. According to Cooper, when someone extinguished the lights during one Radical 
speech, the police stood by and "winked at the outrage." Brown denied the accusation, 
just as he denied the authority of Cooper to enforce the law in Nashville. In mid-July, the 
mayor called on President Johnson to strengthen the Federal garrison in Tennessee, 
seeing that military body as a potential counter-force to the State Guard. In the final 
week of the campaign, Brown went a step further and created a "special police" of 300 
men. He then issued a proclamation that mandated how voters were to conduct 
themselves. This decree stated that the "special police," in conjunction with the Federal 
garrison, was the only legitimate law enforcement body in the city. Alarmed by the 
mayor's machinations, Governor Brownlow informed General George Thomas that the 
2 General Order No. 4, 31 July 1867, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 27; Nashville Union and Dispatch, 2 August 
1867. 
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"special police" was made up mostly of ex-Confederates~ he urged Thomas to consult 
with General Cooper, not the city officials, on matters of peacekeeping. 3 
Brown and Brownlow's competition for the Federal garrison serves as a reminder 
that the State Guard was not the only instrument of military coercion in Tennessee in 
1867. About 1,000 U. S. soldiers were stationed in the state at the time of the election 
and their relationship to the State Guard was often problematic. Reconstruction politics 
placed these Federal troops in an awkward position. Their commander, General George 
H. Thomas, privately supported the Radicals and was reluctant to overrule the Brownlow 
administration in civil matters. The political campaign of 1867, however, clearly 
demonstrated that all was not stable in the state. Thomas had an obligation to prevent 
open warfare, but because Tennessee was readmitted to the Union in 1866, he lacked the 
sweeping powers of the Reconstruction Acts, which applied only to the other ten ex-
Confederate states. Wherever possible, Thomas preferred to let the Tennessee State 
Guard control the situation, and he advised his officers that this organization was "among 
the regularly constituted authorities of the State." Nevertheless, Thomas could not ignore 
the many requests made to his department, by Conservatives and Radicals alike, for 
military assistance in preserving the peace. From Memphis, a city outside the realm of 
the State Guard, Thomas received numerous reports that violence was likely on election 
day. Fearful of a repetition of the previous year's horrible race riot in that city, General 
Ulysses S. Grant ordered Thomas not to "wait for a riot to take place but use the military 
3 Nashville Union and Dispatch, 3, 31 July 1867; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 26 July, 1 August 1867; 
Graf, Papers of Andrew Johnson, 12: 410; Report of the Secretary of War (1867), 235-37; Governor 
Brownlow to George H. Thomas, 20 July 1867, GP 21, Reel 2, Box 3, Folder 1. The Metropolitan Police 
was only partially organized in the summer of 1867, and the Radicals were still fighting the legal injunction 
against it. 
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vigorously to prevent one commencing." Accordingly, in the last week of July, Thomas 
took personal command in Memphis and delegated riot control in "Nashville and the 
other larger towns" to his subordinate in the state capital, General Thomas Duncan.4 
General Duncan's assignment was a thankless task. He had to monitor the 
election in Nashville, yet avoid any hint of "political skullduggery." Furthermore, he had 
to accommodate both the State Guard and Mayor Brown's "special police," while 
preventing any armed clashes between these two partisan forces. Adding to Duncan's 
difficulties were his troop commitments in Sumner, Williamson, and Maury counties, 
areas simultaneously occupied by some of the controversial black militia units. In most 
cases, Duncan deferred to General Cooper and the State Guard, but the Franklin riot and 
the racial tension produced by the black militia compelled Duncan to keep a watchful eye 
on these three counties. Hoping to improve the awkward command arrangement, General 
Cooper suggested that Duncan temporarily attach a company of regulars to the State 
Guard. Duncan, however, thought the reverse would be more appropriate, and two days 
before the election Cooper agreed to subordinate his lone militia unit in Nashville-
Company A, 3rd Regiment (black)-to General Duncan, much as he had done with his 
all-black militia forces in Williamson County. To Cooper, a peaceful Radical victory at 
the polls was more important than a jurisdictional victory over the army. Nashville 
4 Sefton. United States Army and Reconstruction, 261; American Annual Cyclopedia (1867), 708; 
Nashville Daily Press and Times, 26 July 1867; Report of the Secretazy of War (1867), 184, 232-35; John 
Y. Simon, ed., The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant, 24 vols. to date (Carbondale, 1967-), 17: 236-238. Thomas 
was under no illusions about the anti-Radicals' attitude toward the army. He knew that they disliked him 
and regarded the Federal garrison as merely a lesser evil than the militia. Prior to the State Guard's 
mobilization. his regulars endured frequent criticism in the press, and on one occasion his men were 
involved in a ridiculous rock-throwing incident with white Nashvillians. Thomas's public 
acknowledgement of the lawfulness of the State Guard prompted the Union and Dispatch to insult the 
general as a man who was "not as sharp as we [took] him to be" (see Nashville Daily Press and Times, 18 
March 1867; Pulaski Citizen, 12 April 1867; Nashville Union and Dispatch, 2 January, 30, 31 May 1867). 
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Conservatives were thankful that the Federal troops had not been "prostituted to the 
service of the Brownlow despotism. "5 
On the eve of the election, General Duncan issued his own orders, which 
explained election security procedures for Nashville. He instructed the officers of his 
eclectic command, which evidently came to include the "special police," to station their 
men at various points throughout the capital and keep them "well in hand." He forbade 
the troops to go anywhere near the polls unless called on by civil authorities to suppress a 
confirmed disorder. Finally, he authorized them to arrest any civilian caught carrying a 
concealed weapon. The Union and Dispatch commended Duncan's leadership, but 
criticized his superior, General Thomas, for being a stooge of the Radicals and leaving 
most of the state "at the mercy of the militia." This newspaper further declared that a fair 
election was impossible, even though Federal troops had been ordered to stay away from 
the polls, because "the militia, of course, will be at the voting places. ,,6 
Every State Guard officer knew that election-day order and Radical success at the 
polls depended ultimately on their performance, the Federal garrison notwithstanding. 
For the sake of the democratic process, most militia units actually tried to remain 
inconspicuous during the hours of voting (9:00 AM to 4:00 PM), but all were prepared 
for an emergency. Secretary of State A. J. Fletcher calculated that about 115,000 
Tennesseans were registered to vote for the 1 August election. Fewer than 21,000 of 
'Sefton, United States Army and Reconstruction, 184; Report of the Secretary of War (1867), 182-84; 
General Cooper to Post Commander, Nashville, 29 July 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 5; Nashville 
Daily Press and Times, 26, 30 July 1867; Nashville Union and Dispatch, 20 July 1867. A detachment of 
Federal troops had been at Spring Hill (Maury) since the beginning of July and General Duncan notified the 
residents that it would remain there "until after the election." Nashville Republican Banner, 10 July 1867. 
6 Nashville Daily Press and Times, 31 July 1867; Nashville Union and Dispatch, 2 August 1867. 
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them resided in counties containing Federal troops. If the militia could not instill 
confidence among the remainder, especially blacks, and prevent ex-Confederate 
vigilantes from disrupting the election in Middle and West Tennessee, then it would 
make no difference if voting in Nashville and Memphis was peaceable, for the Radicals 
would lose the state. Conscious of the State Guard's critical role, General Cooper 
reiterated his orders and added that his company commanders were to submit detailed 
reports on the election in their counties. Having issued this final word, the militia 
general, "serene and jovial" on the outside, anxiously awaited the election outcome at his 
Nashville headquarters.7 
The concentration of over 1,000 militiamen in Middle Tennessee proved a 
profitable investment on election day, Brownlow and the Radicals won in virtually every 
county of that region. The election in the third congressional district, where Radical 
William B. Stokes and Conservative Eli G. Fleming had fought a nasty campaign, was 
surprisingly uneventful. The vigilance of captains Blackburn and Stuart during the 
campaign accounts for much of the quiet in that section of the state. Having distributed 
his command through more than ten counties from May to July, Captain Blackburn 
concentrated in three for the election. He and thirty-six men covered various precincts in 
DeKalb County, while Lieutenant W. C. Cravens commanded a thirty-man detachment in 
Warren and First Sergeant John T. Askew protected Cannon (part of the fourth district) 
with twenty-five men. The company's official report stated that the "conduct of soldiers 
and civilians [was] very good." Captain Stuart's Company K, split evenly between 
7 Nashville Daily Press and Times, 25 July, 2 August 1867; Circular No. -, 31 July 1867, T AGO, Reel 9, 
Vol. 27. 
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Overton and White counties, enjoyed a similarly quiet election day. In the end, the 
Radicals swept most of the third-district county races, while Stokes trounced Fleming, 
8,000 votes to 1,600. In the governor's race, Brownlow polled 7,900 votes in the third 
district against Etheridge's 1,700. Stokes later informed the governor that the Union 
Leaguers in DeKalb all marched to the polls unmolested and that every black in the 
district voted the Radical ticket. Fleming claimed bitterly that he lost the election solely 
because Stokes used the militia as a personal army. 8 
In nearby Rutherford County, Captain Robert L. Hall enjoyed an equally quiet 
and successful election day. Arriving in the county only two days before the election, 
Hall did little to help the Radicals prepare, but he did deploy his men at three important 
precincts-Murfreesboro, Lavergne, and Sand Spring. In consultation with Registrar F. 
Sherbrooke and Murfreesboro's Conservative Mayor Charles Ready, who had deputized 
fifty men to help keep the peace, Hall agreed to remain in camp and stay away from the 
polls as long as everything proceeded smoothly. A grateful Mayor Ready courteously 
provided Captain Hall with election updates throughout the day. County Radicals were 
evidently satisfied with the arrangement and there is no indication that the militiamen 
ever left their encampments. In the end, the Radicals won the county, with Brownlow 
crushing Etheridge, 2,939 votes to 359. Mayor Ready later complimented "the 
gentlemanly bearing and orderly behavior" of Captain Hall and his Company C. Hall 
8 Lieutenant W. C. Cravens to Headquarters, Tennessee State Guard, 7 September 1867, IAGO, Reel 1, 
Box 8, Folder 6; Darrah, "Political Career ofW. B. Stokes," 149, 282; McBride, "Blacks and the Race 
Issue," 219; W. B. Stokes to Governor Brownlow, 12 August 1867, Patton Collection. 
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soon returned to Buena Vista (Davidson) to resume his duty as State Guard reserve with 
Company A, 3rd Regiment as an attachment.9 
Company I in Humphreys also presided over a generally quiet election. Captain 
James R. Evans's decision to close all saloons undoubtedly contributed to the calm. The 
only disturbance was a rock-throwing incident in Waverly between some black voters 
and white onlookers. Lieutenant James A England arrested the troublemakers on both 
sides and detained them in his camp until the polls closed. The Radicals triumphed, with 
Brownlow winning 267 votes to Etheridge's 131. Incidentally, the militiamen of this unit 
participated in the election themselves, in accordance with Section 7 of the third 
Franchise Act, which authorized company commanders to implement a policy similar to 
absentee voting. Prior to guarding the polls, thirty-nine militiamen cast ballots for the 
Radical Horace Maynard, whose second congressional district included Claiborne 
County, home of Company I. Evidently, some of the men had forgotten their voting 
certificates, but Captain Evans permitted them to vote anyway. 10 
For Company F, 1st Regiment, the election went well, although it was marked by 
some disappointments. Reporting from Henry County in West Tennessee, brevet Captain 
E. R. Hall stated that everything "passed off quietly" in the three counties occupied by his 
company-Cheatham, Stewart, and Henry. In Cheatham, the detachment under First 
9 Report of Company C, 1st Regiment, 5 September 1867, TAGO, Reel 1, Box 8, Folder 6; Sheafe v. 
Tillman., 113-15, 193,199,203; Anne H. Hopkins and William Lyons, Tennessee Votes: 1799-1976 
(Knoxville, 1978), 48; General Order No. 6, 3 August 1867, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 27. 
10 Report of Company I, 1st Regiment, 5 September 1867, TAGO, Reel 1, Box 8, Folder 6; Lieutenant 
England to General Cooper, 4 August 1867, TAGO Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 5; Hopkins, Tennessee Votes, 
48; Acts of Tennessee, 34th General Assembly, 2nd Adjourned Session, Chapter 26, Sec. 7; Nashville Daily 
Press and Times, 3 August 1867; Captain Evans to Headquarters, Tennessee State Guard, 22 July 1867, 
TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 5. 
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Sergeant William C. McClanahan never left its camp. Brownlow won that county with 
207 votes to Etheridge's 58. In Stewart, Lieutenant John Roberts posted his men near the 
Stuart's Station polling site at the request of the registrar. Although no trouble was 
reported, Brownlow garnered only 252 votes against Etheridge' s 631. How the State 
Guard failed to secure Stewart remains a mystery, especially considering the easy 
registration of voters and the incident-free occupation during the campaign. As for Henry 
County, the election there was simply a bust. Due to Registrar J.B. Guthrie's apparent 
incompetence and former Captain Harris' s personal difficulties, no valid registration was 
ever completed. Governor Brownlow ruled the county's registration null and void, and 
no official election took place. Inexplicably, nineteen votes for Etheridge were recorded 
in the final tally. 11 
Captain John L. Kirk experienced similarly mixed success in Montgomery and 
Robertson counties. In Clarksville, Kirk and his mostly black detachment worked closely 
with a "special police" force to ensure a smooth election. When it was over and the 
Radicals had won, an exultant Kirk declared that he had "Never Seen A Civeler day go 
off in his Life." Brownlow polled 1,527 votes, Etheridge 588. In Springfield, Lieutenant 
David E. Burchfield, whose detachment had come under attack a few days before, 
stationed his men "a short distance" from the courthouse and afterward reported that 
"evry thing went off Peaseably more So than I expected." It was not completely 
peaceable, however: after the polls closed, mounted men rode past his encampment and 
fired some gunshots. Burchfield claimed his men hit one of the attackers with return fire. 
11 Report of Company F, 1st Regiment, 5 September 1867, TAGO, Reel 1, Box 8, Folder 6; Captain E. R. 
Hall to Lieutenant L.B. Gamble, 17 August 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder l; Hopkins, Tennessee 
Votes, 48. 
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Unfortunately for the Radicals, although Brownlow garnered more votes at the 
Springfield precinct, Etheridge claimed a narrow victory in Robertson-493 votes to the 
incumbent's 348. Registrar H. D. Featherston commended Burchfield's performance, but 
regretted having tied down a militia detachment on what proved to be a fruitless task. 
The registrar realized too late that it was impossible for the Radicals to win the county; 
there were too many legal Conservative voters. 12 
Unlike many of his counterparts in other counties, Captain George W. Kirk made 
a deliberate point of posting guards visibly at the precincts in Franklin. As the polls 
opened in Winchester, a detachment of militia under Kirk marched through the public 
square to the courthouse, carrying a large ammunition box. Some militiamen took 
positions on the second floor of the building, while the remainder stood outside the door 
to the polls with fixed bayonets. M. C. Whipple, a Radical election clerk, noted that the 
Conservatives were put "much out of humor" by this martial display. Several ex-
Confederates offered a passive challenge by congregating close to the courthouse, but no 
trouble occurred. Evidently satisfied with the proceedings, the militia departed the scene 
shortly before noon. Local Conservatives claimed that while he was there, Captain Kirk 
screened several freedmen as they approached the ballot box to make sure that they 
deposited Brownlow tickets. One Conservative later stated that "three legal voters" were 
12 Report of Company C, 2nd Regiment, 5 September 1867, IAGO, Reel 1, Box 8, Folder 6; Lieutenant 
Burchfield to General Cooper, 2 August 1867, IAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 4; Nashville Union and 
Dispatch, 3 August 1867; Hopkins, Tennessee Votes, 48; H. D. Featherston to General Cooper, 2 August 
1867, IAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder I. 
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turned away by militia sentries. Whipple, however, denied that Kirk's men interfered in 
any way. Etheridge received 313 votes, but Brownlow took the county with 702. 13 
Much to the surprise of many observers, Captain William 0. Rickman maintained 
a low profile in Marshall County throughout the first of August. With the exception of a 
fifteen-man patrol sent through the countryside, Rickman and his men remained in camp 
on the fair grounds outside Lewisburg, despite some rumors about a threatened riot in the 
town. Like Captain Hall in Rutherford County, Rickman assigned polling place security 
to a "special police" force. It consisted of fifteen men under William B. Holden, a 
Conservative but also a former colonel in the Federal army. The only incident of note 
occurred at the Coney Spring precinct, where some black voters came armed. They 
agreed to stack their weapons before voting, however, and then departed quietly. Unable 
to cite any militia transgressions, county Conservatives protested the conduct of the 
Lewisburg Union League. According to Abner A. Steele, a virulent opponent of 
"Brownlowism" in the General Assembly, white Radicals herded the black Leaguers to 
the polls like a "drove of sheep." After receiving ballot ticket~olored "red" for 
Radical-the blacks "voted in a body, like soldiers deliver their fire under orders." 
Overall, Marshall cast 831 votes for Brownlow and 449 for Etheridge. 14 
Steele was evidently disappointed that the militia kept its distance during the 
election. Captain Rickman reported that at various times during the day, Steele came out 
13 Sheafe v. Tillman, 83-85, 138-39; Hopkins, Tennessee Votes, 48. 
14 Report of Company H, 1st Regiment, 5 September 1867, TAGO, Reel 1, Box 8, Folder 6; Captain 
Rickman to Lieutenant L.B. Gamble, 2 August 1867, TAGO, Reel 1, Box 8, Folder 6; Captain Rickman to 
Lieutenant L.B. Gamble, 7 August 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 2; Sheafe v. Tillman, 38, 46-48, 
50, 61, 65-66, 69; Hopkins, Tennessee Votes, 48. 
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to the encampment of Company H and "tried to get up a conflict." He and some ex-
Confederates, who accompanied him, denounced the Radical party and insulted the 
militiamen as "Horse Thieves and Robbers." Rickman forbade his men to retaliate, but 
later explained that Steele was precisely the sort of rabble-rouser who made the State 
Guard necessary. 15 
Rickman's detachment in neighboring Giles County under Lieutenant J. J. 
Mankin reported more Radical success at the polls, although a resort to force proved 
necessary. Mankin commanded forty-five men at Pulaski (including twenty black 
militiamen received from Company K, 2nd Regiment, on 31 July). At least four Klan 
dens existed in Giles at that time, but they were passive during the election, just as they 
had been throughout Mankin's deployment in the county. For most of the morning on 1 
August, Mankin remained in camp, coming out just once to reprimand an ex-Confederate 
who had been heckling the militia from afar. Sometime that afternoon, Mankin learned 
that the sheriff of Giles was disputing Registrar B. J. Sheridan's authority. Because 
Sheridan was inspecting each ballot, accepting some and throwing out others, the sheriff 
intervened and halted the voting while he investigated the registrar's actions. Duty-
bound to prevent such obstructions, Mankin formed his men and headed for the 
courthouse, arriving just in time to prevent a rush on the ballot box by several hundred 
disgruntled voters. Behind a militia cordon, the voting resumed in an orderly manner, but 
the hour was late and some 200 freedmen had still not voted when the polls closed. 
15 Report of Company H, 1st Regiment, 5 September 1867, TAGO, Reel l, Box 8, Folder 6; Captain 
Rickman to Lieutenant L.B. Gamble, 2 August 1867, Reel 1, Box 8, Folder 6; Captain Rickman to 
Lieutenant L.B. Gamble, 7 August 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 2. Rickman offered this 
additional comment on Steele: "He will soon Kill him Self and So I would reckamen that He go to his 
Grave un noticed." 
191 
Nonetheless, about 950 blacks cast ballots at the Pulaski precinct and Brownlow took the 
county as a whole with 1,880 votes against Etheridge's 150. A disappointed Edmund 
Cooper, Conservative candidate for Congress, complained that Sheridan and his fellow 
registrars permitted many underage blacks to vote. Cooper did, however, compliment 
Lieutenant Mankin on his firm leadership and "courteous" behavior.16 
Also in Giles County on 1 August were two squads of black militiamen (besides 
the detachment under Mankin). Having just subordinated his black militiamen in 
Davidson and Williamson counties to General Duncan's authority, General Cooper, on 
31 July, deftly deployed most of these men to areas outside of the army's control. 
Second Lieutenant John S. Durham, commanding eighteen black militiamen from 
Company A, 3rd Regiment, moved by rail to Giles and arrived in Lynnville (north Giles) 
thirty minutes after the polls opened. A correspondent for the Republican Banner 
reported that the German Durham was "very fearful" of the white populace, muttering 
"Mein Gott" to himself as he "carefully marched in the rear" of his column en route to 
the polls. The militia lieutenant's report, however, conveys no such trepidation. Durham 
stated that after posting his men approximately 100 yards from the polling place, he 
quietly watched the election. At one point, a drunk staggered up to the line of voters and 
tried to make a black man cast his ballot for Etheridge, but the troublemaker was led 
away by the town constable without the militia having to intervene. When the polls 
closed at 4:00 PM, the Lynnville election officials reported that Brownlow had received 
16 Special Order No. 44, 31 July 1867, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 33; Trelease, White Terror, 23-24; Report of 
Company H., 1st Regiment, 5 September 1867, TAGO, Reel 1, Box 8, Folder 6; Captain Rickman to 
Lieutenant Gamble, 7 August 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 2; Sheafe v. Tillman, 90-91, 101-102, 
264-66; Pulaski Citizen, 2 August 1867; Hopkins, Tennessee Votes, 48. 
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219 votes to Etheridge' s 17. That evening, as Durham's men awaited rail transportation 
back to Nashville, they were "entertained in a hospitable manner" by some jubilant 
Radicals. Lynnville had been easy duty for this black detachment, but Durham closed his 
report with a statement that may well explain this outcome: "the conduct of the men ... 
was highly commendable. Not one of them spoke to a white man."17 
Similarly, in Prospect (south Giles), a sergeant and ten men from Company G, 2nd 
Regiment, arrived just as the election commenced. General Cooper placed this squad at 
the disposal of Thomas P. Harrison, the election official, but as the militiamen 
approached the precinct they were "ordered out of town" by Prospect's constable. The 
militiamen complied and apparently sat idle on the outskirts of town. Later in the day, a 
procession of armed blacks marched to Prospect, but were forced by civil authorities to 
tum over their weapons before voting. Many of these blacks asked the militiamen if 
Captain James Sumner was with them. Local whites insisted that these blacks were 
looking for an excuse to cause trouble and if Sumner-who had won infamy among 
Conservatives for his actions in Williamson County-had been present, "riot and 
bloodshed" would certainly have ensued. 18 
Two black militia detachments from the 2nd Regiment were present in Maury 
County for the election. Lieutenant George Sumner was stationed in the county seat of 
Columbia with about fifty men from Company G, while First Sergeant Howard Freeman 
17 Nashville Republican Banner, 3 August 1867; Lieutenant Durham to Captain Houston, 2 August 1867, 
TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 5; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 5 August 1867; Report of Company A, 
3rc1 Regiment, 5 September 1867, TAGO, Reel 1, Box 8, Folder 6. 
18 Special Order No. 38, 31 July 1867, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 33; Pulaski Citizen, 2 August 1867; Nashville 
Republican Banner, 3 August 1867. 
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commanded a twenty-man squad from Company Kat Spring Hill. Nimrod Porter, an 
anti-Radical farmer, claimed that there were in actuality some 250 "malisha (blacks) ... 
here in the County to intimidate the voters." Porter believed that the presence of this 
force only excited Maury's blacks and made a riot all the more likely. Although there are 
no extant reports of the militia detachments' activities, the election in Maury was a great 
success for the Radicals. As the polls opened in Columbia, white Radicals organized 
approximately 1,000 black voters into a queue and instructed them not to leave the line 
for any reason. They then moved up and down the line verifying that the blacks had "the 
ticket they wanted to vote" and making sure that Conservatives did not persuade any to 
switch their tickets. For three hours the blacks voted while white bystanders "jeered and 
insulted" them and, in a few instances, tried to break the line. In Spring Hill, the Radicals 
were similarly successful, though it should be noted that a small contingent of Federal 
troops was on hand in addition to the militia. Overall, Brownlow crushed Etheridge, 
2,817 votes to 238. Samuel Arnell, the victorious Radical candidate for Congress in that 
district, proclaimed the election a "civil revolution ... the chattel had become a human 
creature. " 19 
In Williamson County, Federal troops under Captain Burke provided security at 
the polls. Captain James H. Sumner and Lieutenant Philip Fleming, each with only a 
fraction of their militia commands on hand, sat in camp outside Franklin, presumably 
keeping each other company as the election unfolded. Sumner, whose authority had been 
19 Special Orders Nos. 34, 43 (29, 31 July) 1867, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 33; Diary ofNimrod Porter, 30 July, 
1 August 1867, Nimrod Porter Papers (MSS 1094), Southern Historical Collection, University of North 
Carolina, Chapel Hill; Arnell, "Southern Unionist," 316-19; Nashville Republican Banner, 3 August 1867; 
Hopkins, Tennessee Votes, 48. 
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truncated by General Cooper, opted to make no election report. Fleming merely stated 
that "everything was quiet." Like some other militia officers, Fleming appears to have 
conducted an election among his men. Brownlow won the county 1,704 to 574.20 
Leaving Nashville to the Federal garrison, General Cooper distributed most of the 
black militiamen of Company A, 3rd Regiment to three other precincts in Davidson 
County during the morning of I August. Captain Michael J. Houston guarded the polls in 
Antioch with twenty men. Aside from an idle threat by some Rebels who told Houston 
that they were going to get drunk and "raise a disturbance," all was quiet at that location. 
First Lieutenant Alexander Gleaves took a squad of twenty men to Goodlettsville. The 
Republican Banner insisted that Gleaves's presence was "contrary to the wishes of the 
people," although less than a week before, a white Radical named William Scruggs had 
been murdered there after holding a party meeting in his saloon, attended by blacks. 
Lastly, Sergeant James M. Pitman proceeded with twenty men to Buena Vista. Prior to 
his arrival, ex-Confederates had occupied the building designated as a polling place and 
they now refused to vacate it. The black militia sergeant thereupon announced that he 
would personally conduct the election under a nearby locust tree. As black voters handed 
Pitman their ballots, a group of ex-Confederates surrounded the make-shift polling place, 
waved pistols and shotguns, and shouted that a hundred more Rebels were on the way. 
Pitman courageously stared down the mob: "I told them I was there to preserve the Peace, 
and for the protection of the Polls, and I was going to do so." Pitman further warned the 
whites that he too could get reinforcements. Their threats having no effect, the whites 
20 Report of Company K, 2nd Regiment, 5 September 1867, IAGO, Reel 1, Box 8, Folder 6; Governor 
Brownlow to Lieutenant Fleming, 21 July 1867, GP 21, Reel 1, Box 2, Folder 11; Hopkins, Tennessee 
Votes, 48. 
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dispersed and Pitman returned to Nashville later that afternoon, turning his ballots over to 
the adjutant general. Brownlow easily won a majority in Davidson: 5,454 votes to 1,001 
for Etheridge.21 
As the various detachments of Company A arrived back in Nashville, some of the 
black militiamen began celebrating what they believed would be a decisive Radical 
victory. One squad roamed the streets "shouting vociferously for Brownlow." Another 
marched to the home of Conservative T. D. Harris, who had allegedly fired one of his 
black employees for going to the polls. The angry militiamen "demanded an 
explanation" for this action, but received only a curt order to get off Harris's property. 
Refusing to leave, the militiamen loitered nearby "cursing, hooting and threatening 
throughout the night." The Union and Dispatch denounced these incidents as "Negro 
Brownlowism. "22 
The only all-black company not broken into detachments was Captain Thompson 
McKinley's Company B, 2nd Regiment. The situation in Sumner County demanded the 
presence of his entire command. In the closing days of July, bands of ex-Confederates, 
presumably under the leadership of "King" Ellis Harper, intensified their intimidation of 
blacks. According to Radical witnesses, these "bushwhackers and guerrillas threatened 
that they would waylay and shoot every colored man who should attempt to vote." 
Moreover, white employers threatened to fire any black employee who went to the polls. 
21 Special Order Nos. 40-42, 31 July 1867, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 33; Report of Company A. 3n1 Regiment, 5 
September 1867, TAGO, Reel 1, Box 8, Folder 6; Nashville Republican Banner, 2 August 1867; Knoxville 
Whig. 30 July 1867; Sergeant J.M. Pitman to Captain Houston, 3 August 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, 
Folder 2; Hopkins, Tennessee Votes, 48. 
22 Nashville Republican Banner, 2 August 1867; Nashville Union and Dispatch, 3 August 1867. 
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The election officials outside of Gallatin also endured "ferocious" harassment. McKinley 
sent squads through the countryside to "inspire" the freedmen and reassure the Radical 
leaders, but to no avail. By I August every precinct judge and clerk had tendered his 
resignation rather than risk his life holding an election in which Rebel violence seemed 
certain.23 
Only in Gallatin, where McKinley served as voting registrar and political 
candidate as well as militia captain, did the polls open. But even here, the election 
encountered difficulties. Conservative Mayor William Wright informed McKinley that 
the State Guard was forbidden to enter the town limits on the day of the election. When 
McKinley announced his intention to garrison the courthouse with his company and 
permit his men to vote, Mayor Wright turned to his chief of police, an ex-Confederate 
named Colonel J. J. Turner. Turner armed and deputized virtually every white man he 
could find, and then reputedly vowed to "wipe from the face of the earth the Brownlow 
militia." Sources differ greatly as to what transpired next. According to McKinley, on I 
August his men established an effective perimeter around the courthouse despite several 
instances of "very provoking" behavior by local whites. A fanciful anti-Radical post-
Reconstruction account, however, describes a near-battle between Turner's men and the 
black militia. According to this source, as McKinley marched his company toward town 
in the early morning hours of 1 August, Colonel Turner managed to encircle the militia 
23 Nashville Daily Press and Times, 2, 3 August 1867; Report of Company B, 2nd Regiment, 5 September 
1867, TAGO, Reel 1, Box 8, Folder 6. 
column. Rather than face certain annihilation, McKinley surrendered and his men 
returned to their camp under guard, while the Conservatives ran the election. 24 
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Regardless of whether Turner's feat of arms is a fabrication, McKinley did not 
maintain peace alone. Before any real battles broke out, Captain Edwin H. Leib arrived 
with a company ofU. S. cavalry. Simultaneously, hundreds of blacks from other parts of 
the county arrived to vote, as per an arrangement between the Brownlow administration 
and the army. Secretary of State A. J. Fletcher instructed McKinley to keep the polls 
open until every black who so desired had voted. When the day ended, the Radicals had 
prevailed at the polls, Brownlow garnering 891 votes to Etheridge's 224. McKinley also 
won his race for the General Assembly, 882 to his opponent's 235. About 400 registered 
blacks, however, never appeared to vote, having been "disfranchised by the pistol and 
bowie knife," in the words of the Daily Press and Times. Those blacks who did brave the 
threatened reprisals of the ex-Confederates refused to go home for several days until the 
tension died down. Although the Radicals were victorious in Sumner, much of the credit 
for this outcome must go to the U. S. army. 25 
In Lincoln County, Captain George E. Grisham had a particularly difficult 
experience. Initially, he had planned merely to close the saloons, forbid the carrying of 
weapons, and post his men at discreet distances from the polls. The Conservatives, 
however, made a last-minute bid to control the election. On 31 July, a committee of 
citizens from Fayetteville approached Grisham and requested that he not allow the blacks 
24 Report of Company B, 2nd Regiment, 5 September 1867, TAGO, Reel 1, Box 8, Folder 6; Guild, 
"Reconstruction Times in Sumner County," 362-64. 
25 Nashville Daily Press and Times, 2, 3 August 1867; Hopkins, Tennessee Votes, 48. 
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to march to the polls in procession. The militia captain replied that there was no law 
against it, and if legal voters chose to vote en masse, that was their business. That night, 
the city council passed an ordinance outlawing election-day processions, and the next 
morning a committee delivered a copy of the statute to Grisham. Unwilling to get into a 
legal dispute, Grisham agreed to comply with the new law, but stated that he would 
permit blacks to carry arms to the polls. He had received reports that a band of 500 to 
1,000 Rebels was gathering to raid certain precincts and he thought that the blacks should 
have some means of defense. The Fayetteville committee dismissed the rumored raid and 
objected to Grisham's decision to let black voters carry arms. In yet another counter-
move, it suggested that Grisham's Company B share security duty with a "special police" 
force of twenty-five townsmen. Remarkably unperturbed, Grisham again agreed, but 
insisted that James Kirkpatrick, a local Radical leader, command the police force. At this 
point, the negotiations ended and the election commenced. 26 
During the morning parley, some three or four hundred blacks congregated 
around the militia encampment, no doubt wondering at the delay. Many were armed, but 
Grisham persuaded them to surrender their weapons until the end of the day. After 
collecting ballots from his own men, thirty-three of whom voted for Radical candidates 
back in Washington County, Grisham marched his command to Fayetteville, the throng 
of blacks following. At the courthouse, Company B fixed bayonets, formed a line in 
front of the building, and checked the voters, black and white, for weapons. Disgusted by 
what he considered the illegal presence of militia at the polls, the editor of the Lincoln 
26 Report of Company B, 1st Regiment, 5 September 1867, TAGO, Reel I, Box 8, Folder 6; Captain 
Grisham to General Cooper, 5 August 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 1; Knoxville Whig, 7 August 
1867. 
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County News unfurled a large flag stenciled "ETHERIDGE." Mayor Robert 
Farquharson, however, cautioned everyone to cooperate with the militia in the interest of 
peace. The mayor spent most of the day at his office window, from which he observed a 
scene of"considerable excitement" and occasional "disorder."27 
It was well that Grisham took precautions, for ex-Confederates did try to disrupt 
the voting at a number of precincts. On the advice of Registrar John Carey, Grisham 
stationed a squad under Corporal Isaac Love at the polling place in Commoner's District. 
Some time around noon, an armed group of Rebel horsemen led by Burnell Mateer, "a 
noted Bushwhacker," arrived, dismounted, and began blocking access to the ballot box. 
Corporal Love, who apparently had kept his men out of sight, marched rapidly toward the 
ex-Confederates, who thereupon fled the scene. Similar attempts were thwarted at other 
locations. Lieutenant Joseph February received particularly high marks for his work in 
protecting the voters, although the company's official report offers no details of his 
actions. Even in Fayetteville, Grisham sensed danger and warned the county sheriff, who 
had previously threatened the militia captain, that he would defend the courthouse like a 
fort and make use of the confiscated weapons as a reserve arsenal. In the end, the militia 
captain reported that everything went well, though he stressed that "bloodshed and riot 
would have marked the day ... had not the State troops been present to prevent it." 
Brownlow received 780 votes in Lincoln against 267 for Etheridge. While Conservatives 
admitted that Grisham never obstructed any legal voter who sought to deposit a ballot, 
they insisted that the militia dissuaded many white men from going to the polls at all. 
27 Report of Company B, 181 Regiment, 5 September 1867, TAGO, Reel 1, Box 8, Folder 6; Knoxville 
Whig. 7 August 1867; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 5 August 1867; Sheafe v. Tillman, 26, 34; 
Alexander, Political Reconstruction, 154-55. 
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Nevertheless, the Conservatives conceded defeat and the "ETHERIDGE" banner was 
taken down. Captain Grisham applauded the courage of the freedmen and Lincoln's 
small contingent of white Radicals: "A million cheers for the brave little band of 
patriots!"28 
Lieutenant Nelson McLaughlin, on detached service from Company B in Wilson 
County, enjoyed comparable success. Though privately worrying over news of illness in 
his family back in Washington County, McLaughlin resolutely fulfilled his election 
duties. He stationed his men around the courthouse in Lebanon, "ready to put down a 
row," but fortunately did not have to resort to force. The election concluded without a 
single reported instance of harassment or interference. During his deployment, 
McLaughlin appears to have won the respect of the anti-Radical populace, who described 
the militia officer as a "most perfect gentlemen." The vote was relatively close: 
Brownlow got 1,249, Etheridge 788. After the election, McLaughlin thanked the people 
of Wilson for their civil behavior and expressed his hope for a time "when men shall 
wear swords no longer in Tennessee."29 
West Tennessee's election-day experience was considerably more turbulent that 
Middle Tennessee's. Although the militia performed well, ex-Confederates shut down 
several precincts and in some instances nearly overwhelmed the State Guard. Given his 
28 Report of Company B, 1st Regiment, 5 September 1867, TAGO, Reel 1, Box 8, Folder 6; Captain 
Grisham to General Cooper, 5 August 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder l; Hopkins, Tennessee Votes, 
48; Sheafe v. Tillman, 27, 174; Alexander, Political Reconstruction, 155; Captain Grisham to Samuel Hunt, 
2 August 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder I. 
29 Jonesboro Union Flag. 16 August, 6 September 1867; Memphis Daily Appeal, I August 1867; Hopkins, 
Tennessee Votes, 48. McLaughlin resigned his commission a week after the election in order to go home 
and care for his family. Captain Grisham lamented the loss of this "valuable and honest officer." Special 
Order No. 65, 9 August 1867, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 33; Captain Grisham to General Cooper, 6 August 1867, 
TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 1. 
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struggles during the campaign, Captain John T. Robeson was generally pleased by the 
election results in his area of operations. While he remained in Union City (Obion), 
Robeson ordered Lieutenant Charles B. Simpson to patrol the countryside from Troy 
(Obion) south into Dyer County throughout the day of the election. The voting went 
smoothly in these two counties, Brownlow winning Obion 272 to 67 and Dyer 316 to 46. 
In Weakley County, however, Robeson experienced failure. Registrar AH. Walker, 
doubtful that the detachment under Lieutenant James W. Newport of Company G would 
leave the safety of its encampment outside Dresden, asked Robeson to protect the rural 
precincts. Robeson complied, sending a squad under Lieutenant W. G. Fuller. But Fuller 
arrived too late to prevent Rebel vigilantes from running off over 100 black voters at one 
location. Walker claimed that more than 200 Radical votes were lost altogether due to 
ex-Confederate intimidation. Nevertheless, Brownlow won Weakley, 769 to 282. 
Lieutenant Newport reported that all was quiet in Dresden.30 
Captain Pryor Adkins's experience in Gibson County was the opposite of his 
lieutenant's in Dresden. The election in Gibson was the closest the State Guard and the 
ex-Confederates came to pitched battle. Local Radicals reported that about 600 ex-
Confederates had assembled to "drive every Union man out of the county" if the vote 
went against Etheridge. These Rebels were unafraid of Adkins. His Company G, having 
"betrayed signs of timidity" to the white community, was ill prepared for any 
confrontations. Less than a month before, the unit's former captain was relieved for 
3° Captain Robeson to General Cooper, 13 August 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 2; Report of 
Company E, 1st Regiment, 5 September 1867, TAGO, Reel I, Box 8, Folder 6; A.H. Walker to Governor 
Brownlow, 2 August 1867, GP 21, Reel 1, Box 2, Folder 2; Hopkins, Tennessee Votes, 48; Report of 
Company G, 1st Regiment, 5 September 1867, TAGO, Reel 1, Box 8, Folder 6. 
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drunkenness. Less than a week before, the company was humiliated by its overreaction 
to some firecrackers. And less than a day before, Adkins had defused a potential mutiny. 
Furthermore, with at least nine of his soldiers incapacitated by illness or injury, including 
one volunteer who had somehow lost an eye, the new militia captain had no more than 
thirty-five men fit for action. As a result, Adkins probably just wanted to remain in camp 
and leave election security to the civil authorities in Trenton. Circumstances prevented 
him from doing so.31 
On the morning of 1 August, a militia detachment under Captain William C. Holt 
of Robeson's command arrived unannounced to assist Adkins. Holt's entrance into 
Trenton, however, may have inflamed passions as much as it sought to subdue them. 
Carrying a large banner with "W. G. Brownlow" sewn on it, Holt's men marched around 
the public square before taking a position next to the courthouse. For most of the 
morning, the election proceeded quietly, but by noon a number of whites began 
quarreling with Holt. They accused him of instructing black voters, whom they called 
"poor deluded dupes," to vote only the Radical ticket. Holt drew his navy revolver and 
ushered them away from the courthouse. A few minutes later, they returned with guns 
and reinforcements. 32 
31 Nashville Daiiy Press and Times, 9 August 1867; Nashville Union and Dispatch, 11 August 1867; 
Captain Adkins to General Cooper, 2 August 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 3. See Chapter Four for 
details on this militia unit's internal difficulties. Also adding to Adkins's worries was the Conservative 
gubernatorial canvass, which concluded its tour of the state with a grand rally in Humboldt (Gibson) on 31 
July. There, Emerson Etheridge urged his followers to ostracize socially all the Radicals in the county, 
including their children. Owens, "Union League of America," 71. 
32 Report of Company G, 1st Regiment, 5 September 1867, TAGO, Reel 1, Box 8, Folder 6; Captain Adkins 
to General Cooper, August 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 4; Nashville Union and Dispatch, 6, 11 
August 1867. General Cooper certainly doubted Adkins's ability to keep the peace in Gibson, but it is not 
clear whether he, or Captain Robeson, authorized Holt to go to Trenton on I August. Holt may have acted 
on his own. 
203 
As these ominous events transpired, Captain Adkins received an urgent plea from 
S. Hatchett, the Radical election official, to bring his men immediately to the courthouse. 
Threats and obscenities filled the air as Adkins and his men approached the public 
square. The courthouse had become a fortress, bristling with the rifles of Holt's besieged 
men. On the public square, a large crowd of anti-Radicals surged about, armed "to the 
teeth." Adkins tried to disperse the crowd, but failed. As his militiamen hastily took 
refuge in the courthouse, a Rebel named Bill Canby began organizing an assault. Adkins 
anxiously watched as "Balls of Thread Was Rolled up to anoint With Turpintine to 
Charge the court house ... and set it on fire." Canby also allegedly ordered some of his 
men to head for Adkins's undefended camp and "destroy it." Both militia captains 
agreed to "pour hell" into the attackers and torch the courthouse themselves if forced to 
retreat.33 
At this point, the mayor and other city officials rushed between the antagonists 
and brokered "an armistice." Holt's "Skullboneans" agreed to leave the town (they 
eventually went to Weakley County). Adkins remained at the courthouse until the polls 
closed, although it is not known how many more black voters dared cast their ballot. In 
the evening, some "reckless youths" fired a few gunshots at Adkins encampment, but no 
one was hurt. Initial election returns indicated that Etheridge won Gibson County, but 
33 Report of Company G, 1st Regiment, 5 September 1867, TAGO, Reel l, Box 8, Folder 6; Captain Adkins 
to General Cooper, August 1867, IAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 4; Nashville Union and Dispatch, 6, 11 
August 1867. 
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the final, official tally gave Brownlow a solid victory, 687 to 277. Company G had 
demonstrated that it had some mettle after all. 34 
The election in neighboring Madison County was no less desperate for the State 
Guard. Captain Judge K. Clingan occupied the Jackson courthouse on 31 July and his 
Company D "remained under arms" throughout the following day, expecting "a difficulty 
at any moment." Madison's blacks also feared trouble. At the alleged urging of Clingan, 
a group of about twenty-five blacks stockpiled guns in a cabin outside Jackson, evidently 
intending to go to the polls armed. Ex-Confederates caught wind of this "murderous 
design" and raided the cabin the night before the election, capturing twelve black 
"insurrectionists" and confiscating their weapons. At dawn bands of ex-Confederates 
fanned out across the county, apparently as part of a preconceived plan of intimidation. 
Threatened with loss of employment, loss of life, or both, hundreds of black voters stayed 
home. Many of those who did go to the polls had their Radical tickets tom from their 
hands by Rebel "ruffians." Registrar Robert Medlin evidently lost his nerve and left the 
county before the polls opened. The Union and Dispatch claimed that Medlin was 
traveling by rail spreading an alarm that "colored men were being murdered in Jackson 
by the wholesale. "35 
Captain Clingan did his best to enforce the laws and protect the voters, but the ex-
Confederate challenge was too great. In Jackson, where Clingan personally supervised 
the election, an estimated 350 to 400 voters, black and white, deposited their ballots 
34 Nashville Union and Dispatch, 11 August 1867; Captain Adkins to General Cooper, August 1867, 
TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 4; Hopkins, Tennessee Votes, 48. 
35 Report of Company D, 1st Regiment, 5 September 1867, TAGO, Reel 1, Box 8, Folder 6; Nashville 
Union and Dispatch, 6 August 1867; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 9 August 1867. 
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without incident. Elsewhere, however, the militia was hard-pressed to protect the polls. 
At one precinct, a procession of black voters came under fire from "unknown parties." 
Clingan sent fifteen men under Lieutenant Robert Armstrong to restore order. The 
troublemakers fled at the arrival of the militia, but most of the blacks had already fled as 
well. No sooner had Armstrong departed than Clingan received information of another 
disturbance. In this instance, however, the report was a ruse; the men Clingan dispatched 
were "decoyed." Later in the day, another report of an outrage reached Clingan. He 
rallied out, but was fortuitously warned by some white Radicals that he and his men were 
heading for an ambush. Clingan later discovered that some Jackson Rebels had even 
prepared "fireballs, soaked in turpentine" to bum his men out of the courthouse. Tricked 
and nearly "bushwhacked," Company D failed to provide protection outside Jackson and 
the Radicals lost the election in Madison. Brownlow garnered 343 votes to Etheridge's 
503.36 
In the aftermath of this defeat for the Radicals, Captain Clingan offered some 
interesting insights into the state of Reconstruction in West Tennessee. What struck him 
was the "tyranny ... of the Conservative Party." Madison's few white Radicals, he said, 
"feared to be seen in my presents privately." One episode that stood out in his mind was 
a conversation about politics that he had with a local Radical. As the two talked, a party 
of ex-Confederates passed by, at which point Clingan's interlocutor abruptly changed his 
tune and acted "indignant" toward Governor Brownlow. When the Rebels were gone, the 
Radical apologized, stating that he acted as he did "in order to preserve the future 
36 Report of Company D, 1st Regiment, 5 September 1867, TAGO, Reel 1, Box 8, Folder 6; Nashville Daily 
Press and Times, 9, 12 August 1867; Hopkins, Tennessee Votes, 48. 
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harmony." The county's blacks were even more afraid of white retribution. According 
to Clingan, a group of Jackson's "strongest colored radicals," asked by some Rebels 
which gubernatorial candidate they intended to vote for, declared for Etheridge. When 
Clingan interrupted the discussion and encouraged these blacks to state the truth, they 
still refused to endorse Brownlow. "The colored race in this section," Clingan decided, 
"realize their freedom only to a very limited extent." He was convinced that ex-
Confederate terrorism kept hundreds of blacks from the polls. In his view, it would take 
something more than a single company of State Guard to ensure liberty and justice in 
Madison County. 37 
McNairy and Lauderdale counties were the only completely peaceful spots in the 
west. Captain George Hamilton, whose men had engaged in several skirmishes with 
Rebel vigilantes in the latter half of July, reported that his men stayed in camp outside 
Purdy on 1 August, ready to aid the registrar if necessary. The election "passed off 
quietly," however, and Brownlow easily won McNairy 608 to 127. Lieutenant Joseph M. 
Alexander also reported a generally quiet election, although he mentioned a few exciting 
moments. Registrar William McCornice did not oversee the ballot box at the Ripley 
courthouse, but did so instead at an outlying precinct, with the assistance of six 
militiamen. Alexander conducted the election in Ripley. Positioning his men around the 
courthouse, the militia lieutenant took a seat behind the ballot box and screened the 
voters as they approached. At one point, he noticed that many freedmen had ballots 
marked "Etheridge." When he asked them if they knew who they were voting for, they 
37 Report of Company D, 1st Regiment, 5 September 1867, TAGO, Reel 1, Box 8, Folder 6. 
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replied, "Brownlow." Alexander thereupon took the "Rebel Tickets" from the hands of 
the illiterate blacks and "gave them the right kind." On another occasion, seventeen 
freedmen arrived without their voting certificates, but after learning that they were army 
veterans, Alexander permitted them to deposit their ballots: "they all voted the Radical 
ticket." White onlookers objected to Alexander's procedures, some claiming that the 
lieutenant was tearing up Conservative ballots. Irritated by their scrutiny, Alexander 
snapped at them, warning that he would "wreck the town" and "arrest or kill" anyone 
who interfered. After this outburst, "things Cooled down." It was well for the Radicals 
that the vigilant Alexander was on duty in Lauderdale, for Brownlow gained a relatively 
narrow victory over Etheridge, 296 to 162. For unknown reasons, four of the county's 
ten precincts did not open on 1 August, making the Ripley precinct all the more 
important. 38 
For the companies of State Guard in East Tennessee, the election was rather dull. 
Captain Kemp Murphy covered Knox County. Although he had been warned of "an 
anticipated riot," there was no disturbance of any kind. Brownlow claimed his home 
county with 2,880 votes to Etheridge's 1,102. Lieutenant William N. Purdy's unit was 
split evenly between Monroe and Polk counties. Leaving a sergeant in command at 
Sweetwater (Monroe), Purdy marched into Benton (Polk) on the morning of I August, 
"taking the inhabitants completely by surprise." With the exception of the ranting and 
profanity of a local Conservative, the election was quiet. Brownlow claimed victories in 
38 Captain Hamilton to Lieutenant L.B. Gamble, 6 August 1867; Reports of Companies E and F, 2nd 
Regiment, 5 September 1867, TAGO, Reel 1, Box 8, Folder 6; Hopkins, Tennessee Votes, 48; Lieutenant 
Alexander to General Cooper, 3, 11 August 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 4; Nashville Daily Press 




both counties: in Monroe, 978 to 160; in Polk, 211 to 48. Lieutenant Ellis, on detached 
assignment from Company I, 1st Regiment, made no report from Claiborne. Brownlow 
captured that county easily, 795 to 159. Captain A. M. Clapp protected the polls in 
Hawkins County, with most of his men stationed at the Rogersville precinct, site of the 
July riot. All went well there on election day, Brownlow winning 1,107 to 186, but 
Clapp noted that some "irksome" Conservative citizens vowed to take revenge when the 
State Guard left. The militia captain only laughed: "they are so whipped at the ballot box 
that it will dishearten them . . . they will not carry out their threats. "39 
Clapp's prophecy proved inaccurate, but for the moment, the Radicals in 
Tennessee could celebrate a great political triumph. Brownlow polled over 74,000 votes 
in the state, while Etheridge got about 22,500. In addition, Radicals won all eight 
congressional races, and the Radical party took control of all but three seats in the 
General Assembly. Scholars have rightly noted that black votes contributed substantially 
to this sizeable margin of victory (between 35,000 and 40,000 blacks voted). Black 
voters made the difference for many Radical candidates in Middle and West Tennessee, 
where the white votes generally went Conservative. What scholars have overlooked is 
the critical role of the State Guard in this decisive victory. From the registration process, 
through the canvass, to the day of the election, thousands of Radical supporters, black 
and white, enjoyed the protection of the militia. The Radical Daily Press and Times 
declared that "the grand instrumentalities by which we triumphed were, not only colored 
suffrage ... but also rebel disfranchisement ... and the loyal militia," the last making the 
39 Reports of Companies D, H, and I, 2nd Regiment, 5 September 1867, TAGO, Reel 1, Box 8, Folder 6; 
Hopkins, Tennessee Votes, 48; Captain Clapp to General Cooper, 6 August 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, 
Folder 5. 
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other two possible. Historian William G. McBride and others have noted that Brownlow 
would have won re-election without black voters. But would he, and his Radical cohorts 
for that matter, have won without the State Guard?40 
Using the vote totals for Brownlow as representative of the Radical vote as a 
whole, an examination of the election returns indicates that about 33,600 Radical voters 
(45 percent of the total) came from the thirty-three counties occupied by the State Guard 
on 1 August (see Appendix C). This figure increases to nearly 39,000 (52 percent) if 
counties significantly affected by the militia at some point during the campaign are t' 
included. These counties include Haywood in the west and Sullivan in the east, both of 
which witnessed month-long militia occupation, and Bedford, Lawrence, Putnam, Van 
Buren, and probably others in Middle Tennessee, where the militia briefly patrolled or 
provided security for a specific political event. Although the outcome was disappointing 
for the Radicals in a few counties, the Brownlow administration was satisfied with the 
State Guard's overall performance. In the words of the Knoxville Whig, it established 
"the most perfect order" on 1 August. In many locations, the militia presided over a quiet 
election, the Conservative leadership having conceded defeat during the campaign. In 
others, the militia swiftly intervened when Rebels offered resistance. While Captain G. 
W. Kirk in Franklin and Lieutenant Alexander in Lauderdale exhibited excessive 
arrogance in carrying out their mission, Captains Adkins, Holt, and Clingan deserve high 
marks for withholding their fire in Gibson and Madison counties. Although it looked for 
examples of military despotism, the anti-Radical press voiced little substantial criticism 
40 Bergeron, Tennesseans, 166; Alexander, Political Reconstruction, 156-160; McBride, "Blacks and the 
Race Issue," 218-23; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 10 August 1867. Precise election figures vary 
slightly from source to source; this study relies mostly on Hopkins, Tennessee Votes. 
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of the militia's performance on 1 August. It should also be noted that over 9,800 
Conservative votes were cast in the thirty-three "militia" counties.41 
In fairness, it must be noted that Federal troops also contributed to Radical 
victory. They certainly helped preserve peace in Memphis and Shelby County, where 
over 4,000 Radical votes were cast. Moreover, of the 33,600 Radical voters receiving 
direct militia protection, those in Davidson, Maury, Sumner, and Williamson (10,000 in 
all) also enjoyed the presence of Federal troops. Thus, the State Guard can take full 
credit for protecting only 23,600 Radical voters on the day of the election. But the army, 
as an apolitical body, was under strict rules of engagement and was therefore oflimited 
value to the Radical party. Unlike the militia, the army had no authority to enforce voter 
registration, nor to provide security for the Radical canvass. And it could only respond to 
crises, not prevent them as many militia captains tried to do through their patrols. To be 
sure, Captain Edwin Leib shielded rural blacks from attack as they made their way to the 
Gallatin precinct, but this was at the specific request of the Brownlow administration. 
For the most part, the Federal detachments stayed in their quarters on 1 August. In 
Davidson, for example, the troops were confined to the city limits of Nashville under 
General Duncan, while black militia squads actively defended the polls elsewhere in the 
county. It is hard to imagine a Federal soldier conducting an election on his own 
initiative as militia sergeant Pitman did at the Buena Vista precinct. In Maury, the army 
detachment never left Spring Hill, whereas most of the county's blacks voted at the 
Columbia precinct, where Lieutenant George Sumner stood watch with fifty black 
41 Knoxville Whig, 21 August 1867; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 5 August 1867. 
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militiamen. The army played an important role, but Radical voters relied far more on the 
State Guard for protection during the campaign and election of 1867 than on the Federal 
gamson. 
Without the militia as a deterrent, the state's numerous Rebel vigilante bands 
would undoubtedly have been even more aggressive toward Radical voters. Moreover, 
the Ku Klux Klan might have emerged as a major instrument of terror a year earlier than 
it actually did, and Albert Pike's dream of an ex-Confederate "civic guard" might well 
have become a reality. Would the 33,600 Radical voters located in "militia" counties 
have cast ballots against such opposition? Would they, and the thousands of others in 
counties visited by the militia, have even been able to register, let alone vote? As it was, 
ex-Confederates in the west disrupted voting at several polling sites and spoiled Radical 
success in Madison, a county occupied by a full company of State Guard. In Tipton and 
Hardeman, where no militia was stationed, Rebels denied an estimated 2,000 blacks 
access to the polls and the Conservatives won. Similarly, Conservatives prevailed in 
Coffee and Grundy, counties that at most received an occasional militia patrol. 
According to Radical sources, between 8,000 and 15,000 black voters were kept away 
from the polls in West and Middle Tennessee.42 
Besides protecting the freedmen, the State Guard also enforced the Franchise Act. 
Conservatives tried to circumvent this law via the Gaut circular, and only the vigilance of 
the State Guard defeated this tactic. In the absence of the militia, Conservatives might 
have gained control of many precincts and in all likelihood they would have permitted 
42 Hopkins, Tennessee Votes, 48; Alexander, Political Reconstruction, 161-62; Nashville Daily Press and 
Times, 3, 5 August 1867; Hamer, Tennessee, 2: 629. 
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thousands of disfranchised whites to vote. These fraudulent white votes, cast most 
certainly for Etheridge, coupled with the loss of thousands of black votes for Brownlow 
would have substantially reduced, if not eradicated, the Radical majority. 
A statewide election in 1867 without the State Guard could have resulted in a 
disaster for the Radicals and the failure of self-Reconstruction in Tennessee. The 
Conservatives would have made substantial gains in the General Assembly, would have 
acquired as many as four Congressional seats, and might have won the gubernatorial 
race. Even had Brownlow managed to defeat Etheridge, his administration would have 
ruled with a weaker mandate, and the experiment with black suffrage would have been 
tarnished. To be sure, Governor Brownlow could have used alternative means to prevent 
this outcome. He could have arbitrarily tossed out thousands of votes, as he did in 1865, 
or he could have ruled the entire election null and void. He could also have called on 
additional Federal troops to quell a Rebel opposition that his administration was unable to 
handle on its own. Any of these actions, however, would have called into question the 
legitimacy of the Radical government barely a year after the state's readmission to the 
Union. Congress, which had just put the rest of the former Confederacy under military 
rule, might well have felt compelled to do likewise to Tennessee. Fortunately for the 
governor and his party, a homegrown Radical army existed to champion their cause and 
defend their political hegemony. 
In using the State Guard to help win the election of 1867, the Brownlow 
administration learned two valuable lessons. The first was that black militia units were at 
least as much a liability as an asset. As commander-in-chief of a newly created "loyal 
militia," it was perfectly logical for Governor Brownlow to view the enfranchised 
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freedmen as potential recruits. But it was perilous to enlist blacks as sentinels over a 
profoundly racist white population. White units of Radical militia were bad enough, in 
the anti-Radicals' eyes-black units were an insufferable outrage, and any clash between 
black militiamen and white citizens could well trigger a bloody race war. Although 
General Cooper exercised great care in his deployment of black units, and those units 
generally acquitted themselves well, Governor Brownlow concluded that the risk of 
employing them outweighed the benefit. Within a matter of weeks after the election, all 
companies containing blacks were disbanded, and blacks never again served in the 
Tennessee State Guard during Reconstruction. 
The second lesson that the Brownlow administration learned was that 
Reconstruction in parts of the state, especially in West Tennessee, was going to require 
the continued use of military force. Many ex-Confederates had proved alarmingly 
defiant, and in many locations they were barely subdued. Part of the problem was faulty 
troop dispositions. While General Cooper did a good job overall in this regard, he could 
have more efficiently distributed his men to ameliorate the situation in the west. Captain 
Robert Hall's company of 110 men was wasted in Rutherford County; a detachment 
would have sufficed there. Similarly, Lieutenant Burchfield's unit in Robertson could 
have been better used elsewhere. Furthermore, it is doubtful that three militia companies 
and a detachment from a fourth were needed to secure East Tennessee. In Cooper's 
defense, it should be noted that the governor and the adjutant general had a say in 
deployment. Brownlow, for instance, insisted that Captain Kemp Murphy remain in 
Knoxville. Moreover, Cooper took command of the State Guard while it was still in the 
process of mobilization. He could sometimes do little more than dispatch companies 
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piecemeal throughout the state as they organized. In any event, an extended period of 
militia occupation was needed in several counties if the Radical party hoped to establish 
itself at the local level and if the freedmen there were going to feel safe in exercising their 
rights as citizens. 
Governor Brownlow had hoped to disband the State Guard immediately after the 
gubernatorial election, but the intransigence of the anti-Radicals compelled him to 
proceed with caution. As the administration demobilized its Radical anny, General 
Cooper retained some of the best units for continued operations against the Rebels. In 
August, he shifted the weight of his forces from Middle to West Tennessee. Moreover, 
he concentrated his companies in the state's principal trouble spots, most notably 
Madison and Gibson counties. In the weeks ahead, the Tennessee State Guard, albeit 





Radical victory at the polls gave Reconstruction in Tennessee a new lease on life, 
but it did not end ex-Confederate lawlessness and the corresponding need for the State 
Guard. Nevertheless, Governor Brownlow directed General Cooper, soon after the 
election, to disband all but a few companies of State Guard, beginning with the black 
units (see Appendix D). Evidently, the governor believed that quiet would return once 
the election was over. But Tennessee remained a land of turmoil. Unhappy with the 
results of the election, Rebel vigilantes flouted Radical authority and exacted revenge on 
black voters in Middle and West Tennessee, and Conservative leaders publicly 
encouraged the dismissal of black workers who supported the governor. From August to 
November, the State Guard was engaged in trying to suppress this persistent anti-Radical 
challenge. Additionally, it was called on in late September to secure once again a 
Radical political victory during the tense mayoral election in Nashville. All the while, 
the Brownlow administration demobilized its Radical army. 1 
For General Cooper, maintaining order with an ever-decreasing military force 
proved a difficult task. Anticipating trouble, he ordered all of his officers to remain at 
their posts and began regrouping the companies for new assignments. Cooper did not 
have to wait long for an eruption of renewed anti-Radical hostility. He had no sooner 
recalled Captain Robert Hall's Company C from Rutherford on 2 August than trouble 
broke out in the county seat of Murfreesboro. It began when Henry McLaughlin, a 
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Conservative newspaperman, got into a fierce argument with Registrar F. Sherbrooke 
over the election returns. In the course of their altercation, McLaughlin assaulted 
Sherbrooke and "gave him a sound thrashing." Some blacks came to the registrar's 
rescue, but a crowd of whites gathered around to protect McLaughlin. Town police soon 
arrived and prevented a riot, but Radical leaders nonetheless telegraphed Nashville for 
help. Before the end of the day, twenty-five militiamen arrived, followed by twenty-five 
more two days later, all under Lieutenant Robert G. Miner. Conservatives protested the 
return of the militia and blamed the "detested" Sherbrooke for the commotion. Radical 
State Senator W. Y. Elliott, however, insisted that the situation warranted the presence of 
an entire company of State Guard. The Republican Banner dismissed the senator's 
concerns: "there will be no further trouble unless the militia cause it." Trusting Mayor 
Charles Ready' s promise to keep the peace, General Cooper withdrew Lieutenant 
Miner's detachment to Nashville after about a week's occupation.2 
As disturbing as the Murfreesboro incident was to General Cooper, the virtual 
anarchy in the West Tennessee counties of Madison and Gibson was a greater concern. 
When Colonel W. T. Cate of Cooper's staff visited Madison in the first week of August 
to investigate charges of ex-Confederate interference with the election, he was greeted by 
"drunken rebels" who hurled curses at him while firing their pistols into the air. 
Reestablishing law and order in that region became the general's top priority in the 
1 White, Messages, 5: 586; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 13, 16 August 1867; Owens, "Union League 
of America," 171-72: Fayetteville Observer, 15 August 1867. 
2 Nashville Daily Press and Times, 3 August 1867; Nashville Republican Banner, 3 August 1867; Nashville 
Union and Dispatch, 3 August 1867; Special Order Nos. 46, 50, 75 (2, 4, 10 August 1867), TAGO, Reel 9, 
Vol. 33; W. Y. Elliott to General Cooper, 5 August 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 5. 
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immediate aftermath of the election. The first order of business was to replace the 
ineffectual commands of captains J. K. Clingan in Madison and Pryor Adkins in Gibson 
with more reliable militia units. Perhaps sensing headquarters' disfavor with his 
leadership, Adkins promised Cooper that if he could have some more horses he would 
track down the instigators of the Trenton riot and make "several arrests." Without 
responding, Cooper withdrew Adkins's Company G and Clingan' s Company D to 
Nashville on 9 August and ordered them to disband. Private Julin Reed of Company G 
beseeched Governor Brownlow for a commission to raise a fresh company from Scott 
County, presumably so he could redeem the disgrace of his unit's performance in Gibson. 
His request was denied. 3 
Rather than beg for a second chance, Captain Clingan dutifully withdrew his 
company, but his departure from West Tennessee was marred by controversy. Stopping 
briefly in Trenton en route for Nashville, Clingan allegedly allowed his men to forage 
without restriction. Apple orchards and cornfields reportedly fell prey to roaming squads 
of soldiers. A local farmer complained that one group of militiamen dirtied his well, 
while another claimed that Captain Clingan himself led a party that chased down one of 
his hogs and killed it. The apparent seriousness of the outrages notwithstanding, General 
Cooper took no action against Clingan, whose men left Trenton almost as soon as they 
had arrived.4 
3 Nashville Daily Press and Times, 9 August 1867; Special Order Nos. 70-71, 9 August 1867, TAGO, Reel 
9, Vol. 33; Captain Adkins to General Cooper, 9 August 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 4; Julin 
Reed to Governor Brownlow, 10 August 1867, GP 21, Reel I, Box 2, Folder 2. 
4 N. Richeson and N. N. Northrup to General Cooper, 10 August 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 2. 
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During the middle weeks of August, the citizens of Gibson and Madison 
witnessed the arrival of four new companies of State Guard, two for each county. 
General Cooper placed Captain John T. Robeson and his company at Trenton (Gibson) 
with Captain John L. Kirk's mixed company attached. In Jackson (Madison), Captain 
George W. Kirk took charge and was soon followed by a large contingent of Captain 
Joseph H. Blackburn's company from DeKalb. As Blackburn transported his command 
west, he boasted through the newspapers that "the marauders who infest [Madison 
County] must be on the alert if they expect to elude the vigilance of the loyal State 
Guard." Where two mediocre companies had failed, Cooper hoped that four of his best 
units would succeed. 5 
Cooper briefly considered sending Captain James H. Sumner's all-black company 
to Madison County as well. Many Radicals thought a large force of black militia was just 
what counties like Madison needed and deserved. In denouncing ex-Confederate 
terrorism in the western section of the state, the Daily Press and Times half-jokingly 
suggested that the Brownlow administration organize into several regiments those 
"colored men who have been driven off to starve by their rebel employers" and deploy 
them throughout West Tennessee. "A few days of martial law rigidly enforced," the 
editor remarked, "would cause a great change." The anti-Radical press replied fiercely to 
the Press and Times editorial. The Union and Dispatch regarded the idea of arming 
thousands of blacks as a frightening indication of"how near we are to the war of races of 
which so much has been said." Similarly, the Pulaski Citizen retorted, "If you really 
5 Special Order Nos. 54-56 (6 August), 67 (9 August), 89, 15 August 1867, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 33; 
Nashville Daily Press and Times, 12, 16 August 1867. 
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want war in Tennessee, this is the policy that will surely bring it about." Perhaps swayed 
by such protests, Cooper decided against sending Sumner's unit west and instead 
disbanded the black captain's company. By the end of August, the only black militiamen 
on active duty were those in John Kirk's mixed command, stationed in Gibson.6 
As Captain G. W. Kirk set up camp in Jackson, local Radicals deluged him with 
accounts of Rebel intimidation. "Desperadoes, cut throats and outlaws," reportedly 
numbering about 1,000, roamed the countryside whipping freedmen, seizing their 
weapons, and warning white Radicals to leave the county. In one instance, some ex-
Confederates allegedly bound and murdered three blacks, and then tossed their corpses 
into a thicket. Another freedman barely escaped a lynching at the hands of "a pack of 
demons in the shape of men." Dozens of blacks, many "covered with blood," took refuge 
near Kirk's encampment, but even there they were harassed by ex-Confederates, who 
fired their weapons "all night long." With some understatement, Kirk informed General 
Cooper that ''the rebels in this county are behaving very badly." While one Radical 
believed that "at least five or six hundred men" were needed to suppress the Rebel bands, 
Kirk was confident that his company's firepower would suffice. In requesting 3,000 
additional rounds of ammunition from the state quartermaster, Kirk promised to "take 
good care of it and if necessary make good use of the same."7 
When Captain Blackburn arrived in Jackson on 20 August, bringing the State 
Guard's strength in the town to about 150 men, the ex-Confederates temporarily halted 
6 Special Order Nos. 57, 68 (6, 9 August 1867), TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 33; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 
7 August 1867; Nashville Union and Dispatch, 8 August 1867; Pulaski Citizen, 9 August 1867. 
7 Nashville Daily Press and Times, 20, 27 August 1867. 
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their activities. Several white residents approached Blackburn and tried to convince him 
that there had been "no depredations committed" by anyone. As for the three murdered 
blacks, these residents insisted that the victims had killed each other in a dispute over a 
card game. Blackburn replied that he intended to conduct a complete investigation of the 
incident. He then wrote General Cooper that he would have "every thing in perfect peace 
and harmony" by the end of the month. 8 
In Gibson County, captains Robeson and J. L. Kirk encountered more instances of 
white terrorism. Like blacks in Madison, those in Gibson congregated around the militia 
encampments and related how they had been beaten and driven from their homes because 
they had voted for Brownlow. Robeson, who exercised overall command in the county, 
appears to have stationed Kirk's company in Trenton as a garrison while his unit 
patrolled the countryside of Gibson and neighboring Dyer County. Vowing to crush 
Rebel vigilantism even ifhe had to "brake some ones neck," Robeson made a number of 
arrests, turning his prisoners over to Dyer's Radical sheriff Tarkington. Moreover, 
Robeson warned Trenton's whites that he would not leave "Union Men to the mercies of 
the Rebel mob" (as he believed Captain Adkins and Holt had done) but would instead 
"Burn their Graett and Beautyfull city." Toward the end of August, Robeson reported 
that Trenton was "rather more quiette than on the day of Election." With characteristic 
confidence, he added, "unless they could assinate me You may rest assured that I will 
ceep all Quiette in Gibson County. "9 
8 Captain Blackburn to General Cooper, 21 August 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 4. 
9 Captain Robeson to General Cooper, 26 August 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 3; Captain Robeson 
to Lieutenant L.B. Gamble, 27, 30 August 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 3. 
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General Cooper decided to retain the State Guard in just one other West 
Tennessee County-Henry. There, Edwin R. Hall, the new captain of Company F, 1st 
Regiment, reported only a few instances of trouble: a man named Trezevant had been 
distributing anti-Radical literature and local ex-Confederates habitually insulted the 
militiamen, calling them "Chicken Stealers." With the return of this unit's detachments 
from Middle Tennessee in mid-August, Hall felt he could keep the peace without 
incident. By September, the militia captain was more concerned with uniform shortages 
than Rebel troublemakers. "My men are greatly in need of something to wear," he 
anxiously reported to the quartermaster, "some of my men are entirely naked." Perhaps 
the onset of cold weather accounts for this exaggeration, but new clothes did soon arrive. 
By the middle of September, local Conservatives ceased their criticism and even 
commented that the militiamen "behaved themselves surprisingly well." Satisfied with 
his redistribution of forces in the west, General Cooper proceeded to disband Lieutenant 
Joseph M. Alexander's command in Lauderdale County and Captain George Hamilton's 
in McNairy. 10 
While Cooper focused his attention on West Tennessee, a new wave of 
lawlessness engulfed Middle Tennessee. On 5 August, Captain George E. Grisham 
reported that the ex-Confederate guerrilla Burnell Maleer accosted S. H. Taylor, a 
Lincoln County election official, and demanded at gunpoint the names of "every damned 
Radical" who had cast a ballot. Taylor talked his way out of the predicament and then 
fled to the militia encampment, but he pleaded with Grisham not to arrest Maleer for fear 
1° Captain E. R. Hall to Lieutenant L. B. Gamble, 17 August 1867, T AGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder l; 
Captain E. R. Hall to A. E. Boone, 2, 6 September 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 3; Nashville Daily 
Press and Times, 17 September 1867; Special Order Nos. 63, 72, 9 August 1867, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 33. 
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of Rebel retribution against his home and family. The plight of Lincoln's Radicals only 
worsened when Grisham's company returned to East Tennessee at the end of August. 
With the militia gone, Maleer joined forces with ex-Confederate Joe Rodgers of 
neighboring Franklin County and began what local Radicals dubbed a "reign ofterror."11 
In two lengthy letters to the governor and General Cooper, Simeon Bloom, a 
white Radical merchant from Lincoln, vividly described the mayhem in his county, which 
he attributed to the "total depravity of ... the leading characters of the ex-Confederacy 
and ... their deluded followers." According to Bloom, on the night of 5 September, a 
band of Rebels robbed and vandalized the stores of all the "staunch unconditional union 
men" in Fayetteville. They also hurled rocks and bricks through the bedroom windows 
of the new registrar, A. T. Nicks. The following morning, as Bloom and his brother 
inspected the damage to their store, they discovered that human excrement had been 
"deposited on the front door step." A few days later, an intoxicated ex-Confederate 
named Fulgham stormed into Bloom's store and accused the proprietors of using political 
influence to run him out of business. When Bloom denied the charge, Fulgham drew a 
knife and then lifted a twenty-pound weight over his head in a threatening manner. 
Bloom forced the man out with a pistol, but from that point on he and his brother felt 
compelled to stand guard over their store twenty-four hours a day. Registrar Nicks, 
reportedly traumatized by his brush with violence, decided to tender his resignation and 
leave the county. Other county Radicals supposedly feared assassination as well. When 
Bloom reported these events to the civil authorities, he found them "either powerless or 
11 Captain Grisham to General Cooper, 5 August 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder l; Special Order No. 
108, 28 August 1867, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 33; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 30 August 1867. 
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indisposed" to help. Reminding the governor of the risks he and others took in behalf of 
the Radical party during the campaign, Bloom stated that it would be "shameful" if 
nothing were done to protect the loyal constituency in Lincoln. "After the avalanche has 
full head-way," Bloom subsequently warned General Cooper, "it is then too late to stay it 
in its devastating course." Without explicitly saying so, Bloom was urging the return of 
the militia. 12 
Lincoln Conservatives tried to downplay the extent of lawlessness in their 
community. While condemning the spate of vandalism against Radical shopkeepers, they 
insisted that there were no ex-Confederate vigilante bands in the county. Furthermore, 
they ridiculed Taylor's story as a "malicious falsehood" circulated by the county's Union 
League and dismissed most of Bloom's account as "equally destitute of truth." 
According to the Fayetteville Observer, the only "outrage" of note occurred on a certain 
Friday afternoon when a Union Leaguer was thrown by a '"rebellious mule." This 
newspaper further asserted that Registrar Nicks was still in town, and had in fact told 
militia Lieutenant J. J. Mankin, who evidently investigated the alleged Rebel 
depredations, that the civil authorities had law enforcement well in hand. 13 
The terror in Lincoln soon spread to Giles County, where the militia barely kept 
in check a growing Ku Klux Klan threat. Passive during the campaign, the Klan came 
out in full force in the months that followed. During the final week of August, Klansmen 
began harassing Radical shopkeepers and one den, led by deputy sheriff Alonzo Peden, 
12 Simeon Bloom to Governor Brownlow, 6 September 1867, and Bloom to General Cooper, 11 September 
1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 4. 
13 Fayetteville Observer, 29 August, 26 September, 3 October 1867. 
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targeted the county's Union League for destruction. In response, General Cooper 
deployed Captain William 0. Rick.man's entire company to Pulaski. The night riding 
continued, however. On 29 August, the Daily Press and Times reported that a "gang of 
ruffians" fired a volley of buckshot into the militia encampment outside Pulaski. When 
Lieutenant J. J. Mankin formed a detachment to halt the disturbance, the "ruffians" 
dispersed, but yelled that they "intended to shoot into the camp, or over it, as much as 
they d--d please." The Pulaski Citizen contradicted the Radical version of this incident, 
claiming that the shooters were "respectable young men" who frequently used "bull-bats" 
for target practice on the outskirts of town. According to this newspaper, a stray shot, not 
a deliberate volley, landed in the militia camp. While admitting that the men were 
probably Klansmen, the Citizen stressed that Giles' s Klan had "never been known to 
molest or even speak to any one while out on their mysterious pilgrimages. " 14 
Captain Rickman was not convinced of the Klan's reputed harmlessness. On 8 
September, believing that the Klan intended to attack a black church outside of Pulaski, 
the militia captain stationed a squad of men around the building. That evening, as the 
service was ending, the militia squad came under attack and exchanged shots with 
unidentified assailants. Lieutenant Mankin soon arrived with more men and apparently 
marched the combined force into the public square, where the militiamen cursed the 
Rebels and threatened "to bum the town up and demolish the Ku Klux Klan." Two days 
after this incident, Pulaski mayor William Ballentine demanded that General Thomas 
Duncan deploy Federal troops to Giles to keep an eye on the militia. Duncan did conduct 
14 Nashville Daily Press and Times, 30 August, 4 September 1867; Trelease, White Terror, 25; Special 
Order No. 101, 21 August 1867, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 33; Pulaski Citizen., 6 September 1867. 
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an investigation into the militia's alleged misconduct, but he found both sides to blame 
for the county's restlessness. Referring the matter to General Cooper, Duncan declined 
to send troops. For all practical purposes, Rickman's ninety men were the Brownlow 
administration's only dependable law enforcers in the southern section of Middle 
Tennessee. 15 
Elsewhere in Middle Tennessee, Radicals implored General Cooper for continued 
militia protection. Hickman County Radicals cried that "we are threatened every day, 
and menaced in every conceivable manner." They requested a squad of militiamen to 
combat the "rebel element." In Stewart, a county that the Conservatives won, Registrar 
R. A. Salisbury complained that since the removal of Lieutenant John Robert's 
detachment "every man that voted for Brownlow has been threatened." Furthermore, ex-
Confederates openly bullied black Union Leaguers and socially ostracized white 
Radicals. Salisbury vowed to resign if the militia did not return: "I have ten enemies now 
where I had one before. The men that are making the threats ought to have been hung 
long ago." Thomas Grundy, a Radical from Williamson County, was similarly 
displeased by Cooper's removal of militia from his community. Federal troops were 
present, but Grundy believed that only militia could maintain order. After Grundy's 
request to raise a new company of State Guard was denied, his fears of trouble were 
evidently realized. Toward the end of August, the Daily Press and Times reported that "a 
15 Pulaski Citizen, 13, 20, 27 September 1867; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 12, 13 September 1867. 
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ranting crowd of Conservatives" was fomenting unrest in the town of Franklin, site of the 
July race riot, and that the Federal troops were apparently doing nothing to suppress it. 16 
Sumner County, also garrisoned by Federal troops, became the scene of racial 
conflict in the latter half of August. There, ex-Confederates targeted the recently 
disbanded black militiamen of Company B, 2nd Regiment. Two privates were driven 
from their homes in Hartsville by armed whites, one by a local physician who bluntly 
explained that he had "no use for Brownlow's militia," and the other by a group of 
Rebels who shouted, ''there goes a Brownlow negro vote~ by God! He can't stay in this 
town." A third militiaman was fired by his white employer and warned to leave Gallatin 
or be treated "God d--d rough." In addition to harassing former militiamen, ex-
Confederates tried to break-up an election in Gallatin for school directors. These 
incidents were cited in a petition from a group of Sumner countians calling on General 
Cooper to reorganize the militia there. 17 
In DeKalb County, the State Guard itself was the target of an ex-Confederate 
attack. On 8 August, white assailants ambushed First Sergeant John Askew of Company 
A, 1st Regiment, as he left the home of Congressman William B. Stokes. According to 
the Daily Press and Times, Askew's "assassins rushed up and fired several bullets into 
his body." Initially reported as dead, the militia sergeant eventually recovered from his 
wounds. The Fayetteville Observer joked that Askew had actually been wounded by 
"squirrel shot" as he attempted to steal watermelons from a local Conservative's farm. 
16 Nashville Daily Press and Times, 27 August, 13 September 1867; R. A. Salisbury to General Cooper, 13 
August 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 3; Thomas Grundy to General Cooper, 4 August 1867, 
TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 1. 
17 Nashville Daily Press and Times 29 August 1867. 
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Radicals, however, cited "political hatred" for the crime and were shocked by the 
incident; DeKalb had come to be regarded as a party stronghold. Lieutenant William L. 
Hathaway conducted a lengthy, and ultimately futile, manhunt for the perpetrators. 
Meanwhile Blackburn published a defense of his company's performance in upholding 
the law during the political campaign. "In no section of the State," he declared, "has 
there been better order preserved and less personal violence and bloodshed than that 
which I have had the honor to control, as military commander." When General Cooper 
transferred Company A to Madison County a week after the shooting, DeKalb Radicals 
worried that the Rebels might cause more trouble. Blackburn, however, dismissed the 
attack on Askew as an aberration and believed that Lieutenant Hathaway, as county 
sheriff, could keep the peace alone. Nevertheless, Cooper stationed Captain William S. 
Stuart's Company Kin neighboring Warren County. 18 
Blackburn badly underestimated the resolve of DeKalb's ex-Confederates. Anti-
Radical terrorism was on the rise, as General Cooper learned through a series of petitions 
from DeKalb citizens. "No sooner were the militia gone," one petition began, "than a 
factious spirit began to show itself" This "spirit" was the newly formed Knights of the 
Golden Circle, one of the more colorfully named dens of the Klan. This organization 
initiated its activities at the end of August with a parade through the streets of Statesville, 
a town just across the county line in Wilson. Carrying a Confederate battle flag, the 
Knights proclaimed their liberation from military rule. Besides treating all Radicals with 
"insolence," this den reportedly disrupted a biracial church service and a black meeting in 
18 Nashville Daily Press and Times, 13, 16, 30 August 1867; Fayetteville Observer, 29 August 1867; 
Special Order No. 62, 9 August 1867, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 33. 
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Alexandria, both with gunfire, and murdered "an aged Union man." Insisting that 
"nothing but force" could quell the Klan in DeKalb and the surrounding counties, the 
petitioners implored General Cooper to return Captain Blackburn's command, or at least 
"give us arms, and our brave boys, white and black, will bear and use them." Although 
Conservative newspapers denounced the petitions as partisan fiction, Blackbum did 
return with a portion of his command in early September. 19 
Even in East Tennessee, a disturbance dashed the hope for post-election quiet. 
Captain A. M. Clapp, who had scoffed at Rebel threats during the election, reported an 
attack against his unit at Rogersville (Hawkins). According to the militia captain, on the 
night of 23 August "a lawless band" surprised some of his men as they slept in the 
courthouse and drove them out of the building under a hail of rocks. About the same 
time, a group of ex-Confederates stopped Clapp's servant on the streets and insulted him. 
Unable to catch any of the culprits, Clapp turned out his entire company and marched it 
through the streets, "Cheering the Gov." all the way. 20 
As incidents of lawlessness and defiance multiplied, General Cooper acted 
forcefully. On 26 August, he issued a bellicose proclamation. Citing "reliable 
information," he recounted the unrest in Middle and West Tennessee and declared that 
"forbearance in such cases is no longer a virtue." He would now halt the mustering out 
of the State Guard, he said, and would continue to occupy "the rebellious localities, until 
19 DeKalb County petition to General Cooper, 8 September 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 4; 
Nashville Daily Press and Times, 30 August, 10, 16 September 1867; Nashville Republican Banner, 17 
September 1867; Nashville Union and Dispatch, 17 September 1867; Special Order No. 115, 31 August 
1867, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 33. 
20 Captain Clapp to General Cooper, 24 August 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 5. 
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the disloyal citizens, or outlaws, are dealt with for their rebellious and seditious conduct." 
Moreover, Cooper expanded the jurisdiction of his militia officers, authorizing them to 
control jail security to ensure that captured offenders would "not be turned out or allowed 
to escape" by those in sympathy with them. Furthermore, he encouraged all victims of 
ex-Confederate terrorism to press charges against their attackers. Cooper assured those 
concerned about rising military expenses that the "disloyal true-payers will help to bear 
the burden. "21 
General Cooper's proclamation elicited a fierce anti-Radical rebuttal. The Union 
and Dispatch unleashed an especially vicious editorial barrage of criticism and character 
assassination. Cooper's circular was "a wordy, bombastic order," this newspaper 
declared, which smacked of "the imperious command of the tyrant." Ridiculing the 
general's so-called "reliable information," the Dispatch accused him of"greedily" 
accepting as true the Radical Press and Times's "fancy sketches" of Rebel violence 
against white Unionists and freedmen. According to the Dispatch, there was no 
significant ex-Confederate intimidation anywhere in the state. The trouble in Madison 
County, in particular, was dismissed as a vengeful rumor manufactured by Registrar 
Robert Medlin, whose seat in the General Assembly was being contested by the 
21 Tennessee State Guard Circular, 26 August 1867, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 27. The Freedmen's Bureau 
corroborated many of General Cooper's findings. In addition to numerous instances of economic 
proscription, it reported over 150 cases of violence by whites against blacks in Middle and West Tennessee 
between 1 June and 1 October. Report of the Secretai:y of War (1867), 688. Captain Clingan, whose 
Company D had been slated for disbandment, marched his command into the town of Franklin as Cooper's 
circular went to press. Special Order No. 106, 24 August 1867, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 33. 
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Conservatives. The Dispatch suggested that Cooper verify his information before issuing 
Mexican-style "pronunciamentos. "22 
Other prominent Conservative voices were also raised in protest. Franklin Mayor 
J. B. McEwen addressed a letter to General Cooper denying the recent allegations of 
misconduct by his constituents. Conceding that a few "idlers" caused some trouble on 
occasion, the mayor insisted that he could uphold the law without a company of militia. 
Sumner County whites similarly declared Cooper's allegations oflawlessness "false." 
Fearing the reactivation of the black militia, the county sent a delegation to Nashville to 
dissuade the general from deploying any state troops in their county. Cooper, however, 
made no promises to the delegation. 23 
In some respects, Cooper's circular was a grand bluff. Despite his stated intention 
to retain most of the State Guard, Cooper disbanded seven companies within a fortnight 
of his proclamation (see Appendix D). By 10 September, over 1,000 militiamen had 
been mustered out. Before disbanding, Company I, 1st Regiment, performed a final 
service for its state. The unit had recently returned to Tazewell (Claiborne County), and 
Lieutenant John Ellis had assumed command following the resignation of Captain James 
Evans. On 30 August, Sheriff C. D. Willis asked Ellis to assist him in apprehending "a 
desperate man" named George Campbell. Willis had apparently tried to arrest Campbell, 
but was chased away at gunpoint. Ellis agreed to help and reinforced the sheriff with a 
corporal and six men. Willis then returned to the home of Campbell and demanded an 
immediate surrender. When Campbell foolishly brandished a double-barreled shotgun, 
22 Nashville Union and Dispatch, 27, 28, 29, 31 August, 7 September 1867. 
23 Nashville Republican Banner, 31 August 1867; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 5, 6 September 1867. 
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the militia squad fired, "killing him instantly." The lack of newspaper coverage suggests 
that Campbell was a plain felon (though his crime was never stated) and not a political 
enemy of the Brownlow administration. 24 
With the discharge of most militiamen in August and September, the Radicals 
incurred their greatest single financial expense in the politics of force-payroll. The 
paymaster was Major E. J. Brooks, a wealthy 31-year-old lawyer and manufacturer from 
Washington County. In the course of his duties, he disbursed $166,861 in wages to the 
State Guard, many of the men receiving pay for the first time as they were mustered out. 
Pay scales were in accordance with U. S. army regulations: the monthly wages for 
enlisted men ranged from $16.00 for privates to $20.00 for sergeants. The comparable 
monthly wage for a farm laborer in the late 1860s was between $16.00 and $18.00. 
Unlike a farm worker, however, militiamen also received a one-time subsistence 
allowance of$12.00 and were usually reimbursed for legitimate clothing purchases 
beyond the issue of their basic uniform. After "stoppages" (i.e., fines for losing or 
damaging equipment, or for a disciplinary infraction), a volunteer stood to make a fair 
sum of money. The men of Company H, 1st Regiment, for instance, earned an average of 
nearly $200.00 each during about eight months of duty. Officers, of course, enjoyed 
more generous wages. Company commanders earned $70.00 per month, while their first 
and second lieutenants earned $50.00 and $45.00 respectively. General Cooper appears 
to have made $300.00 per month. All officers received a daily subsistence allowance of 
24 Special Order No. 100, 21 August 1867, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 33; Lieutenant Ellis to General Cooper, 30 
August 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 5; C. D. Willis to General Cooper, 2 September 1867, TAGO, 
Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 3; James R. Evans to General Cooper, 2 September 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, 
Folder 5. Evans resigned in order to attend to his duties as chancery court clerk of Claiborne County. 
Captain Evans to State Guard Headquarters, 22 July 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 5. 
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$1.20 and many had personal servants paid for by the state at the grade of private. Wiley 
Williams, for instance, a 30-year-old black shoemaker from Davidson County, tended to 
Lieutenant J. J. Mankin, an officer in the all-white Company H, 1st Regiment. By the end 
of their service, some line officers had garnered nearly $1,000.25 
For many militiamen, payday afforded an opportunity to celebrate, and there was 
no better place to have fun than Nashville. "The militia recently mustered out are 
spending money about town quite freely," the Daily Press and Times noted with 
satisfaction, "business under this new impetus is looking up." Anti-Radical newspapers 
downplayed this supposed economic boon and instead highlighted the rowdy conduct of 
"Cooper's bummers." According to them, saloons and brothels were the principal 
beneficiaries of spendthrift militiamen, while the citizenry had to endure the drunken 
revelry that ensued. Militiamen reportedly roamed the streets shouting at people, picking 
fights, or "stealing peaches." In one incident, a squad of Captain Blackburn's men rode 
through the streets, waving revolvers and "inspiring fully as much terror as could be 
expected." In another, some of Captain Clingan's men snatched the hat off a black 
minister and ran off laughing. In a third, three men from Company C, 1st Regiment, 
barged into a private residence where they harassed two female occupants with lewd 
flirtations and insults. The timely arrival of the ladies' husbands scared the intruders 
25 Census of Tennessee, 1870, Schedule of Population (Washington County), 230, (Davidson County), 
3/262; E. J. Brooks to Samuel Hunt, 24 July 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 4; Special Order No. 
162, 4 October 1867, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 33; House Journal, 35th General Assembly, Extra Session, 26; 
General Order No. I, 6 March 1867, TAGO, Reel 8, Vol. 26; Payroll vouchers for 1867-68, TAGO, Reel 4, 
Box 22, Folder 8; Alrutheus A. Taylor, The Negro in Tennessee. 1865-1880 (Washington, 1941), 124; 
Payroll for Company H, 1st Regiment, TAGO, Reel 5, Box 23, Folder 5. Wiley Williams is listed on 
Mankin's Payroll Voucher No. 20. 
233 
away. In the wake of such tomfoolery, the Paris Intelligencer declared that the capital 
was "polluted by the filth and obscenities of the dirty melish. "26 
General Cooper was displeased by these incidents. In an effort to dissuade his 
men from visiting houses of prostitution, most notably those located in a section of the 
city known as "Smokey Row," he ordered that any soldier contracting "syphilus or 
Gonorrhea" would have to pay for medical treatment out of his own wages. As for those 
who got drunk and disturbed the peace, Cooper assisted the city magistrates in bringing 
them to justice. With the general's approval, Lieutenant Robert Miner handed over for 
civil trial the men involved in molesting the two women. These men were jailed on 
$1,000 bail. An indeterminate number of other volunteers spent time in the state 
penitentiary while they waited for their day in court. Most militiamen, however, faced 
military tribunals. In one court martial, Lieutenant E. R. Brown was drummed out of the 
service for "habitual drunkenness and utter worthlessness." In another, seven black 
soldiers, including their lieutenant, H. H. Mitchell (Company G, 2nd Regiment) received 
dishonorable discharges for destroying private property. Evidently, on the night of 14 
August, these men pillaged the farmhouse of Newell Watson, making off with a large 
number of watermelons. For his part in the crime, Mitchell was publicly reprimanded, 
dishonorably discharged, and fined $25.00.27 
26 Nashville Daily Press and Times, 21 August, 7 September 1867; Nashville Republican Banner, 9, 17, 18, 
20, 23 August, 6 September 1867; Nashville Union and Dispatch, 17 August, 7 September 1867; Paris 
Intelligencer, 31 August 1867. 
27 General Order Nos. 7, 12, 13 (9, 21, 24 August 1867), TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 27; Lieutenant Grace to 
James S. Hull, 27 August, 7, 30 September, I October 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder l; Nashville 
Union and Dispatch, 7, 8 September 1867; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 7 September 1867. Smokey 
Row's notoriety first emerged during the Civil War when the city was under Federal occupation. To the 
chagrin of many commanding officers, thousands of soldiers visited the place and, more often than not, 
contracted venereal disease as a consequence. See Maslowski, Treason Must Be Made Odious, 129-131. 
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For Private Samuel F. Scott, disbandment brought neither pay nor pleasure, only 
an unexpected form of punishment: a false accusation of desertion. Described by an 
associate as "invariably unconditionally loyal," Scott had enthusiastically enlisted in 
Company G, 1st Regiment and was apparently one of that troubled unit's better soldiers. 
While stationed at Trenton, he received word that his wife was sick and near death. 
Rather than relate his story to Captain Pryor Adkins, who may have disliked the private, 
Scott asked Second Lieutenant Alvin Parker for help. Though sympathetic, Parker was 
unsure of his authority to grant leave. However, First Lieutenant J.M. Alexander, 
commander of Company F, 2nd Regiment, happened to be in Trenton at the time and, 
similarly moved by Scott's plight, told Parker to grant a hardship leave. Evidently, no 
one informed Adkins ofthis decision. On 28 July, only a few days before the election, 
Scott left for his home in Morgan County on twenty days' leave. Unfortunately, during 
his absence Company G was disbanded and, when the unit drew its pay, Scott was 
incorrectly listed as a deserter, a mistake which the private's benefactor, state senator 
George W. Keith, claimed was a deliberate "infamy" on the part of Adkins. Ignorant of 
this "infamy," Scott went to Knoxville and officially mustered out with Captain Kemp 
Murphy's company. His application for pay, however, was rejected by Major Brooks, 
who knew the man only as a deserter. What followed was a legal battle for back-pay that 
lasted nine months. Scott wrote several letters to the paymaster and submitted affidavits 
from lieutenants Parker and Alexander, as well as Senator Keith. Eventually, Governor 
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Brownlow became involved in behalf of Scott. On 26 May 1868, the State Guard finally 
paid the private his overdue wages-$69.86.28 
Although the State Guard continued to disband, General Cooper was still 
determined to suppress ex-Confederate vigilantism. On 3 September, he created a 
"special command," composed of the eight remaining militia companies, and placed it 
under the leadership of newly promoted Major John T. Robeson (see Appendix D). 
Officially designated 1st Battalion, the streamlined "special command" soon found itself 
heavily engaged, fighting ex-Confederate bands in some of the most "rebellious" portions 
of Middle and West Tennessee.29 
Major Robeson accepted his promotion gratefully, but he made no substantial 
changes to the Guard's mode of operations. Trusting his captains to fulfill their duties, 
Robeson continued to hunt down ex-Confederate outlaws in the state's northwest comer, 
his activities taking him once again into Dyer and Obion counties. Evidently, during the 
first week of September some Rebels began skulking around the home of the late state 
senator Almon Case, frightening his widow. When a doctor and a man named Neely, 
who had been looking after Mrs. Case, came to visit her, a party of Rebels fired on the 
men with shotguns, badly wounding Neely. Robeson sent a large mounted force under 
Lieutenant William Fuller in pursuit, but none of the perpetrators was ever caught. The 
major was disgusted by the region's pronounced Confederate sympathies. "There is 
28 Furlough for Private Samuel F. Scott, 28 July 1867, Lieutenant Alexander to Samuel Scott, 9 December 
1867, George W. Keith to Governor Brownlow, 6 April 1868, Governor Brownlow to Albert E. Boone, 8 
April 1868, Samuel Scott to A E. Boone, 8, 30 April 1868, A E. Boone to Samuel Scott, 26 May 1868, 
T AGO, Reel 4, Folder 8, Box 22; Lieutenant Parker to General Cooper, 7 November 1867, T AGO, Reel 2, 
Box 11, Folder 2. 
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verry few people who wants the civil law enforced if any in these Counties," he wrote, 
"We will have to hurt Some one before they will behave in West Tenn."30 
The militia in Madison County fulfilled Robeson's prophecy with bloody results. 
In the first half of September, Captain G. W. Kirk was away on sick leave and Captain 
Blackburn was on emergency duty back in DeKalb. Commanding the militia in Madison 
were lieutenants William C. Cravens and Francis M. Kirk, the latter only 18 years old. 
Madison's ex-Confederates exploited this apparent absence of seasoned militia leadership 
to spread their terror. Cravens, who had performed well in independent commands 
during the recent political campaign, believed that these Rebels were plotting an uprising 
against the militia. Accordingly, he implemented drastic countermeasures, ordering his 
men to disarm every ex-Confederate citizen in the county. What followed was a scene 
reminiscent of Captain Rickman's operations in Franklin County the previous May. 
Beginning on 5 September, militia squads began searching homes and halting people on 
the streets, confiscating weapons as they were found. In the process, several militiamen 
abused their authority. In one instance, some privates senselessly killed two mules only 
to discover that the animals belonged to a local Radical. In another, a squad severely beat 
a man named Noah Sellers after he allegedly called the militiamen brigands. Outraged 
whites warned Cravens that if his men persisted in their activities "they would shoot their 
d-n welt's out." Unperturbed, the militia lieutenant informed Adjutant General Samuel 
29 General Order No. 16, 3 September 1867, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 27; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 4 
September 1867. 
30 Major Robeson to Samuel Hunt and General Cooper, 6 September 1867 (two letters), TAGO, Reel 2, 
Box 11, Folder 3; Major Robeson to Captain A. E. Boone, 5 September 1978, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, 
Folder 3; Major Robeson to Lieutenant L.B. Gamble, 9 September 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 3; 
Nashville Daily Press and Times, 13 September 1867. 
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Hunt that if the Rebels offered armed resistance he would "rally his company and whip 
out this county." If worst came to worst, he vowed he would "bum every house and kill 
every man. "31 
Before State Guard headquarters could respond to Cravens's message, the 
lieutenant's men shot a prominent ex-Confederate, Major Thomas H. Hartmus. It seems 
that on the night of 10 September, three militiamen-Corporal James Evans, Corporal 
Isaac Sandlin, and Private Samuel Phelps-confronted Hartmus and demanded his pistol. 
Hartmus reluctantly complied, muttering something about "usurpation." Evidently 
incensed by the remark, one of the corporals shot Hartmus in the chest. Conservative 
sources claimed that the militiamen were drunk and, rather than asking Hartmus for his 
weapon, they ambushed him and shot him in the stomach. A Radical witness insisted 
that Hartmus actually instigated the trouble, firing three shots at the militiamen before 
Corporal Evans gunned him down. Whatever the truth, great excitement ensued. Former 
Rebel leader J. T. McCutchen hastily organized a posse and went after the militiamen, 
who after exchanging a few shots with their pursuers ran back to camp, stole some 
horses, and galloped into the countryside. As a large, armed, and angry white mob 
approached the militia encampment, Lieutenant Francis Kirk formed a defensive line and 
telegraphed Major Robeson that a riot was imminent. 32 
31 Special Order No. 107, 28 August 1867, TAGO, Reel 9, vol. 33; Major Robeson to General Cooper, 12 
September 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 3; Lieutenant Cravens to Samuel Hunt, 7 September 1867, 
TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder I; Nashville Republican Banner, 14., 17 1867; Williams, Historic Madison, 
194. On 28 August, Captain Kirk became ill with fever and jaundice and was placed on indefinite bed rest. 
Dr. W.W. Drake to General Cooper, 3 September 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box IO, Folder 4. 
32 Major Robeson to General Cooper, 12 September 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 3; Nashville 
Republican Banner, 14, 17 September 1867; Nashville Union and Dispatch, 17 September 1867; Captain 
Blackburn to Samuel Hunt, 19 September 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 4; Williams, Historic 
Madison, 194; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 18 September 1867. 
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No clash of arms occurred, but the Hartmus controversy had only begun. The 
following morning, Major Robeson arrived and brought Captain J. L. Kirk's racially 
mixed command with him. "Defiantly parading the streets," in the words of one 
observer, Robeson dispersed the crowd, which had grown to some 800 men. After 
questioning lieutenants Kirk and Cravens, he sent a detachment after the three fleeing 
militiamen, who had reportedly left the county by train. In the meantime, Jackson's 
whites gathered in the public square and cheered as Mayor William Alexander publicly 
condemned "the lawless acts of the militia." Over the next three days, an eleven-man 
committee compiled a formal list of protests against the "bloodhounds of Brownlow." 
Proclaiming that Madison County had been "entirely peaceable and quiet" until the 
militia arrived, the committee resolved to ask the Federal garrison for a temporary 
contingent of troops. Furthermore, it demanded the immediate relocation of the militia 
encampment, which was then on the grounds of West Tennessee College. Finally, the 
committee appointed a three-man delegation to meet with the governor and negotiate the 
permanent removal of all militia forces from the county. 33 
The Jackson delegation achieved a significant victory over the State Guard. The 
three members embodied a wide range of political views. W. J. Hurt was one of the few 
Conservatives to win a seat in the incoming 35th General Assembly. Hervey Brown was 
a moderate Republican who had voted against the militia act the previous February. 
Thomas C. Muse was a strong Radical who had voted for the militia act but had come to 
believe that the State Guard had outlasted its usefulness. Meeting with Governor 
33 Major Robeson to General Cooper, 12 September 1867, IAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 3; Nashville 
Union and Dispatch, 17, 18 September 1867; Nashville Republican Banner, 17 September 1867; Williams, 
Historic Madison, 194, 279, 530; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 18 September 1867. 
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Brownlow and General Cooper in Knoxville on or about 16 September, the delegates 
argued that the continued presence of the militia in Madison only inflamed passions. 
Pleading with the executive to remove the militia, the delegates promised that the civil 
authorities would make a better effort to protect the county's Radicals regardless of race. 
Brownlow agreed to withdraw the militia as "a fair test of the good intentions" of the 
people of Madison. General Cooper objected, believing that the militia's removal was a 
risky "experiment," but he dutifully complied. Over the next several days, Cooper not 
only withdrew Captain J. L. Kirk's racially mixed company but officially disbanded it; 
thus the last of the black militiamen were gone. The other companies soon left for new 
assignments. At the end of the month, W. P. Bond, a Radical circuit court judge in West 
Tennessee, reported that justice was being served in Madison County and that he had 
sentenced several ex-Confederate criminals without fear of reprisal. The Press and 
Times, however, observed these developments with disapproval. Commenting on 
Hartmus' s speedy recovery from his wound, this newspaper ruefully noted that "Poor 
Senator Case and our other murdered loyalists do not recover so quickly. "34 
As the Brownlow administration resolved the problem of law enforcement in 
Madison, a new, more serious, crisis erupted in Nashville. The city's municipal election, 
scheduled for 28 September, became the occasion for an exciting political showdown. 
The previous month, Radicals had bickered over whom to run for mayor. One faction 
nominated Augustus E. Alden while another selected Abram Myers. Alden had ably 
34 Nashville Republican Banner, 17 September 1867; McBride, Biographical Directory. 1: 85, 2: 446-47, 
653; House Journal, 34th General Assembly, 2nd Adjourned Session, 301; Senate Journal, 327; Nashville 
Daily Press and Times, 19, 26 September 1867; Knoxville Whig. 25 September 1867; Nashville Union and 
Dispatch, 19 September 1867; Special Order No. 128, 17 September 1867, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 33; W. P. 
Bond to Governor Brownlow, 1 October 1867, GP 21, Reel 1, Box 2, Folder I. 
240 
served the party as registrar for Davidson County, but he was a carpetbagger from 
Minnesota, disliked by many native Radicals. Myers enjoyed black support, but he 
lacked the governor's endorsement. Delighted by the Radical rift, Conservatives backed 
H. S. Scovel, a respectable though uninspiring Republican moderate who also had the 
support of a third Radical faction, one sponsored by the Daily Press and Times. Myers's 
accidental death on 7 September simplified the choices, but polarized the electorate. As 
most Radicals united behind Alden, Conservatives abruptly declared their intention to 
conduct the election in accordance with the city charter, which stipulated that only white 
males could vote and that the civil authorities, not registrars appointed by the governor, 
controlled the election machinery. In effect, the Conservatives were arguing that their 
city government operated like a state-chartered bank or railroad, and that therefore the 
state Franchise Act, with its much despised provision for black suffrage, did not apply to 
a municipal election. City Radicals were quick to call on the governor for help. 35 
Brownlow took decisive measures to defeat this Conservative challenge. First, he 
appointed B. J. Sheridan, a party stalwart, as the new county registrar. Then, on 18 
September, he proclaimed that "the franchise law is a part and parcel of the constitution, 
has been sustained by the supreme court of Tennessee, and all elections held in violation 
of said law are null and void, and ofno effect whatever." When incumbent mayor W. 
Matt Brown threw his powerful support to the Conservative position, and then announced 
his candidacy for reelection, Brownlow prepared for civil war. On 22 September, he 
Js Patton. Unionism and Reconstruction, 229-30; Robert M. McBride, "Northern, Military, Corrupt, and 
Transitory: Augustus E. Alden. Nashville's Carpetbagger Mayor," Tennessee Historical Quarterly 37 
(1978): 63-65; McBride, "Blacks and the Race Issue," 262-65; Gary L. Komell, "Reconstruction in 
Nashville, 1867-1869," Tennessee Historical Quarterly 30 (1971): 278; Nashville Petition to Governor 
Brownlow, 14 September 1866, Patton Collection. 
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ordered General Cooper to concentrate "immediately all the troops, Infantry and 
Cavalry," in the Nashville precincts. Anticipating such a command, Cooper had already 
set his militia companies in motion. In less than six days, the entire 1st Battalion, 
Tennessee State Guard, was in Nashville. As this force arrived, the militia general 
admonished the Conservatives "to desist from any attempt to hold any election in 
violation of the Franchise Law. "36 
Rightly believing that General Cooper intended to enforce Brownlow's decree "at 
the point of the bayonet," Conservatives denounced the "high-swelling and blood-
portending" actions of the administration. Mayor Brown was especially vehement. On 
24 September, he proclaimed that the election would take place as required by the city 
charter, adding that "we shall hardly be deterred from the performance of that duty by 
any force of mere militia with which our good and quiet citizens are threatened." He 
furthermore augmented the city police force by 300 men. Hoping for peace, however, 
Brown encouraged the Radicals to hold their own election under the Franchise Act. 
Thus, the mayor was recommending that the city hold a dual election and then "let the 
courts, the only proper arbiters, decide in the end." Seeking Federal support, Brown 
wrote President Andrew Johnson, explained his position, and urged the president to use 
Federal troops against Brownlow's "standing army" should the latter attempt "the seizure 
36 Patton, Unionism and Reconstruction, 230; Report of the Secretaty of War (1867), 186; McBride, 
"Blacks and the Race Issue," 264; Nashville Union and Dispatch, 21 September 1867; Governor Brownlow 
to General Cooper, 22 September 1867, GP 21, Reel 1, Box 1, Folder l; Special Order Nos. 133 (21 
September), 136, 25 September 1867, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 33; State Guard Proclamation, 23 September 
1867, GP 21, Reel 1, Box 1, Folder l; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 20, 25 September 1867. 
Brownlow's position was supported by the Radical state supreme court, which, in its decision in Ridley v. 
Sherbrook (21 March 1867), upheld the constitutionality of the Franchise Act. See Patton, Unionism and 
Reconstruction, 120-23. 
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by armed force of our City." Though sympathetic to the Conservative position, Johnson 
left the matter to the appropriate military leaders. 37 
The Federal garrison in Nashville watched these developments closely. As the 
tension mounted, the army officers debated their proper course of action. General 
Thomas Duncan believed that Mayor Brown's position was "the correct one" and 
suggested that Federal troops provide security for both elections. "For those who hold 
their election illegally," he stated, "it will only be an innocent amusement." General 
George Thomas disagreed with his subordinate. For him, two competing elections 
guaranteed violence. Accepting Brownlow's "construction of the law," Thomas 
instructed Duncan to recognize only the governor's authority and to aid the State Guard 
in enforcing the Franchise Act. As a result of Mayor Brown's communication with 
President Johnson, however, General Ulysses S. Grant overruled Thomas and imposed 
new constraints on the Federal troops in Nashville. Grant stated that "the military cannot 
set up to be judge as to which set of election judges have the right to control, but must 
confine their action to putting down hostile mobs." These instructions seemed to 
vindicate the position of Mayor Brown, who was "exceedingly pleased," for it appeared 
that two elections would be held after all. 38 
The Brownlow administration was indifferent to Grant's decision. Determined to 
thwart the mayor's political maneuvers, branded a "Little Rebellion" by the Whig and 
37 Nashville Republican Banner, 24 September 1867; Nashville Union and Dispatch, 25, 27 September 
1867; Kornell, "Reconstruction in Nashville," 281; Report of the Secretruy of War (1867), 186; Graf, 
Papers of Andrew Johnson, 13: 99-101. 
38 Report of the Secretary of War (1867), 184-85, 187-88; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 28 September 
1867; Simons, Papers ofU. S. Grant, 17: 362. 
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outright treason by General Cooper, the administration steadily strengthened its military 
power in the city. On 25 September, the State Guard took possession of the city armory 
to prevent its "seizure by Rebels." On 26 September, General Cooper ordered three 
recently discharged militia officers-McKinley, Houston, and Fleming-to reorganize 
their black companies for use as a reserve force. Finally, on 27 September, Governor 
Brownlow proclaimed that "an insurrection exists in the City of Nashville." He then 
called on the Federal garrison to render assistance in suppressing it. While the governor 
awaited a reply from General Thomas, Major John T. Robeson sent militia detachments 
into the city's ten voting districts, instructing his officers to bivouac at the polling places 
and to permit only those election officials appointed by Registrar Sheridan to operate the 
polls. Flaunting the power of the State Guard, Captain Rickman paraded his company 
through the streets with "his Band playing and Colors flying. "39 
This militant posturing convinced General Thomas that the army could not remain 
neutral during the election. Warning that "a collision is inevitable," he asked General 
Grant for clarification of the rules of engagement. Thomas claimed that if the militia and 
city police came to blows, the army would have to choose sides or prevent both elections 
altogether. But to enforce a dual election, he added, would "be a practical decision 
against State authority and against the franchise law." Clearly, Thomas favored the 
Radicals, but Grant repeatedly ordered him not to take sides, stating that his duty was 
simply to "prevent conflict" and "preserve peace." After exchanging telegrams with his 
39 Knoxville Whig. 25 September 1867; Nashville Union and Dispatch, 27, 29 September 1867; Governor 
Brownlow to General Cooper, 25 September 1867, GP 21, Reel 1, Box 1, Folder l; Special Order Nos. 139, 
144-46 (26 September), 147, 149, 27 September 1867, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 33; Governor's Proclamation, 
27 September 1867, GP 21, Reel 1, Box 2, Folder 11. The black militia companies were never actually 
reactivated, the crisis having passed before their officers could reassemble the volunteers. 
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superior for three days, however, Thomas received orders that resolved his dilemma. At 
9:00 PM on 26 September, Grant significantly modified his instructions to Thomas: "the 
military cannot be made use of to defeat the executive of a State. . .. You are not to 
prevent the legal State force from the execution of its orders." Thomas could now in 
good conscience uphold actions taken by the Tennessee State Guard. The next morning, 
as Brownlow was declaring a state of insurrection, the general visited Mayor Matt Brown 
and bluntly informed him that the army would "sustain the governor in case of 
collision. ,,4o 
Mayor Brown and the city council were crestfallen at the sudden tum of events. 
Brown denounced Thomas's decision as a "signal and deplorable mistake," but under 
pressure from several councilmen he agreed to concede the contest to Brownlow. 
Alderman John Coltart alone urged the council to continue its resistance and hold an 
election under the city charter "at all hazards, no matter what may be the consequences." 
No one seconded his motion, however. General Thomas had reinforced the garrison with 
over 1,000 men, bringing Federal troop strength in Nashville to 1,400. This force, 
combined with the 600 militiamen of the State Guard, left the city police heavily 
outnumbered. On the afternoon of 27 September, Brown notified the public of the 
council's decision and then withdrew from the race. Blaming Thomas for "forcibly 
preventing a peaceable election," the mayor insisted that enforcing the Franchise Act in 
40 Report of the Secretary of War (1867), 189-91; Sefton, United States Army and Reconstruction, 229-30; 
Nashville Daily Press and Times, 28 September 1867. 
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Nashville was "clearly illegal." In a bitter letter to President Johnson, Brown cried that 
the city was in "a state of organized anarchy never parallelled.'41 
In accordance with an agreement between generals Cooper and Thomas, the State 
Guard relinquished control of the polls to the Federal garrison shortly after the election 
began. The militiamen returned to their bivouacs and the army presided over a generally 
quiet election. Registrar Sheridan reportedly combed the streets ensuring that every 
black man in the city voted the Radical ticket, while Captain Blackbum allegedly scoured 
the "cellars and attics" in search of surreptitious charter voting. "Martial law reigned as 
completely as it did during the battle of Nashville," observed the Republican Banner. To 
this newspaper, the election was little more than "military dictation" from the 
"unmilitary" Thomas. To other anti-Radicals, the election was a "disgusting farce" 
enacted by "Satan's twin brother"-Govemor Brownlow. Desperate to prevent the 
impending Radical triumph, Mayor Brown made a final plea to General Thomas on the 
afternoon of 28 September, asking permission to hold an election under the charter, "late 
as it is," or to hold one at a subsequent date. "If you, general, desire to see equal justice," 
the mayor chided, "you will see that we are permitted to hold such an election without the 
interference from the State militia." Thomas politely refused the mayor's request, 
reiterating that a peaceful election under the charter was impossible. In the end, A. E. 
Alden became mayor in a landslide over Scovel, 2,423 votes to 258, and Radicals took 
control of the city council. Governor Brownlow telegraphed State Guard headquarters to 
express his "entire approval" of Cooper's leadership and the militia's performance during 
41 Report of the Secretary of War (1867), 191-92; Nashville Republican Banner, 28 September 1867; 
Nashville Union and Dispatch, 28 September 1867; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 28 September 1867; 
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the crisis. The politics of force had prevailed once again, but, in the words of General 
Thomas, "how narrowly [Tennessee] escaped from a condition ofWar.',42 
The drama of the Nashville election did not end with the closing of the polls. 
With Federal troops departing as quickly as they had arrived, the lame-duck Mayor 
Brown endeavored to secure an injunction against Registrar Sheridan's certification of 
the election returns. On the morning of 2 October, after Radical chancellor Horace 
Harrison dismissed the injunction, the mayor's friends on the city council warned him 
that the State Guard planned to "make a 'clean shuckling' of the old administration" if he 
remained defiant. Brown remained defiant. When Mayor-elect Alden arrived at city hall 
to assume his duties, Brown barred his entrance. "I believe you to be illegally elected," 
he declared, "and therefore cannot surrender you the office." Alden immediately 
reported this to Governor Brownlow, who instructed General Cooper to use "whatever 
force is necessary ... to overcome any illegal resistance." Accordingly, Cooper ordered 
Captain Blackbum to effect the transfer of municipal power. 43 
Blackburn's mission was a success, although the anti-Radical press depicted his 
confrontation with Brown as a piece of burlesque. At 5:00 PM on 2 October, Blackbum 
and Lieutenant Hathaway arrived outside city hall with about forty mounted men. At the 
approach of a large crowd of black and white onlookers, the militia formed a line of 
42 Report of the Secretary of War (1867), 193-97; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 28 September 1867; 
Special Order No. 152, 28 September 1867, T AGO, Reel 9, Vol. 33; Komell, "Reconstruction in 
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battle, the "ignorant young tow-heads" presenting.a "horrid front." Blackburn, 
accompanied by Hathaway and five enlisted men, then entered the building and, after 
supposedly getting lost on the third floor, found the mayor in conversation with several 
other Conservative politicians. According to one Conservative witness, the militiamen 
"sported shockingly bad hats." As Brown feigned surprise at the arrival of this inelegant 
armed party, Blackbum ordered him to turn over the mayoral books and keys. When 
Brown asked the militia captain if he intended to use force, Blackburn, who reportedly 
"trembled with excitement," replied that he had orders to "take possession" of the office. 
Brown then demanded to see written authorization, which Blackburn produced after some 
hesitation. As the mayor slowly read the orders, his fellow Conservatives growled 
protests at the militiamen, who "manifested considerable uneasiness." Evidently satisfied 
with the authenticity of Blackburn's orders, Brown departed the building and addressed 
the multitudes in pompous style: "I have surrendered my office, but I want you to 
understand that I yield only to the bayonet." The whites in the crowd cheered wildly at 
their mayor's audacious exit, while the "shabby" detachment of militiamen countered 
with a "hideous 'yi, yi. '" Leaving a squad behind to protect Mayor Alden, who 
apparently had been waiting outside, Blackbum and his "critter company" sauntered off 
toward the courthouse, where they spent the night. "Thus ended the Brownlow-Alden 
coup d' etat.',44 
44 Nashville Republican Banner, 3 October 1867; Nashville Union and Dispatch, 3 October 1867; 
Knoxville Whig. 9 October 1867; Komell, "Reconstruction in Nashville," 279-81. With Brown's final 
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The Nashville election is an instructive example ofBrownlow's force politics in 
action. The Banner howled that the whole episode was a case of"might overruling 
right." Radical "might" was unmistakable, but Conservative "right" was a matter of 
debate. Radicals denied that the use of militia constituted military usurpation. Rather, 
the governor had employed justifiable force against a "pestiferous rebel Mayor," who, 
incidentally, had never taken any oath of allegiance. Moreover, Radicals insisted that the 
Brownlow administration was not motivated by partisan politics, citing Adjutant General 
Samuel Hunt's vote for Scovel as compelling proof Brownlow could not have permitted 
such an unprecedented event as a dual election, however reasonable the idea may have 
seemed to people like Mayor Brown, without subverting the Franchise Act and losing 
credibility. When Brown and his allies pressed the issue, the State Guard stymied their 
efforts. To be sure, the Federal garrison played a critical role, but its involvement mostly 
prevented a street battle, one in which the more numerous and better led, trained, and 
equipped militia would have surely routed the city police and arrested the "charter party" 
officials. Arguably, the aggressive use of militia risked civil violence, but without its 
presence, the Conservative scheme would likely have been carried to fruition. The army 
certainly would not have stopped it, for without a potential clash between militia and city 
police to give it a pretext for stepping in, the U. S. soldiers would have stayed in their 
barracks on 28 September. Consequently, a dual election would have taken place in spite 
ofBrownlow's decrees. Whether the Conservatives retained control of the city, or 
249 
merely held the Radicals at bay temporarily while the courts sorted out the confusion, 
anti-Radicalism would have gained immeasurable political capital.45 
All things considered, the State Guard performed commendably in the Nashville 
controversy, as it had during the state election. · General Cooper and his officers 
appreciated the gravity of the situation and exercised tight discipline over their enlisted 
men throughout the crisis. There were no serious disturbances, violent or otherwise. 
Captain Blackbum' s conduct during the Brown standoff is a good example of the State 
Guard's professionalism. The militia captain had authority to physically oust the mayor, 
yet he responded to Brown's obstinacy with politeness and restraint. 
While acknowledging the State Guard's able performance, the officers of the 
Federal garrison were not overly impressed by its military bearing. In the aftermath of 
the election, Company C, 1st Regiment was camped outside the army base in Nashville-
the Ash Barracks-the men sharing a water hole with the U. S. soldiers. The army 
officers soon came to detest what they considered a "laxity of discipline" on the part of 
this unit. "I noticed the Privates," Lieutenant Robert P. Wilson complained on one 
occasion, "attending to the call of nature in full view of the houses and public highways." 
Lieutenant Scott Payne reported another disgraceful encounter. Returning to camp one 
night, he discovered a militiaman lying on the side of the road "in a beastly state of 
intoxication." He regarded the inebriate "a disgusting object to behold." Other officers 
considered the militia an outright danger. According to Lieutenant F. W. Foote, a group 
45 Nashville Republican Banner, 2 October 1867; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 30 September, 4 
October 1867. James Sefton points out that the Nashville election was the U. S. army's "baptism of fire in 
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of militiamen accosted one his men near the water hole in an attempt to steal his 
"pantaloons." When the soldier resisted, his attackers splashed water in his face, 
splattered his uniform with mud, and broke his water pitcher. Other Federal soldiers 
received similar treatment, one almost having his hat stolen. A final indignity proved 
nearly fatal. Riding past the militia encampment one evening, a cavalry sergeant was 
fired on by a party of militiamen, the shot passing "within less than four feet of his 
head.',46 
After placing a guard around the water hole, General Duncan demanded that 
General Cooper exercise greater control over his men. Never one to take misconduct 
lightly, Cooper ordered Captain Robert L. Hall to head an investigation of the army's 
charges and ensure "that Such Cases do not Occur again." Hall asked Duncan for 
affidavits, but he refused to speak directly with any of the general's lieutenants, perhaps 
resenting their aspersions against his leadership. In some respects, the antics of his men 
were typical of the sort of pranks played amongst rival services. In the end, Hall merely 
confined a few suspects to the workhouse and declared the matter closed. In the 
meantime, Nashville authorities appear to have put an end to Company C's practice of 
relieving itself in public. On 7 October, the city police arrested four militiamen for 
"indecent exposure. ,,47 
46 Lieutenant Robert P. Wilson to General Duncan, 2 October 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 3; 
Lieutenant Scott Payne to General Duncan, 2 October 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 2; Lieutenant 
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Culminating the State Guard's string of shameful incidents was one that could be 
termed the Mollie Brown affair. On the night of 6 October, Lieutenant William G. Fuller 
received a pass and, with a large sum of cash in pocket, went into town for "a little fun in 
the jungles." More precisely, the lieutenantmade a visit to Smokey Row. While there, 
he drank heavily and enjoyed the affections of pretty Mollie Brown, an orphan girl turned 
prostitute. At some point during the night, he produced a roll of bills worth $220, but 
gave his companion a mere fifty cents with which he expected her to go and buy him a 
beer. Brown, however, apparently waited for the lieutenant to pass out and then took the 
whole purse. After sobering up, an enraged Fuller tracked Brown down and demanded at 
gun-point the return of his money. When she brashly refused, he dragged the girl into 
court on the charge of theft. Before the lieutenant could make his case, however, General 
Cooper ordered Fuller dishonorably discharged for drunkenness and conduct unbecoming 
an officer. Anti-Radical newspapers had a good laugh over the whole affair. Fuller later 
apologized profusely for his misdeeds and, on Major Robeson's recommendation (Fuller 
had been a capable officer in the field), the sentence was eventually commuted to 
honorable discharge. Nevertheless, Fuller's fate, like that of Captain Chambers and 
lieutenants Brown and Mitchell before him, demonstrates that wayward officers received 
little mercy in the State Guard. 48 
In his addresses to the incoming 35th General Assembly on 9 and 10 October, 
Governor Brownlow made no reference to the Nashville election nor to his militia's 
48 Nashville Republican Banner, 8 October 1867; Nashville Union and Dispatch, 8 October 1867; Nashville 
Daily Press and Times, 8 October 1867; General Order Nos. 31, 35 (8 October 1867, 14 January 1868), 
TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 27; Lieutenant Fuller to General Cooper, 11 November 1867, and Company E, 1st 
Regiment Petition to General Cooper, 11 November 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder I. 
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misadventures afterward. Rather, he exulted that the Radicals' now seemingly 
uncontested political control would enable the party to transform Tennessee into "the 
Harbinger of the New South." Among his many proposals, Brownlow urged the 
Assembly to allocate funds for public education and internal improvements, 
recommended an extension of civil liberties to the freedmen, and unveiled a plan to 
attract white immigrants to the state. In order to pay for these new programs and enhance 
the state's image abroad, however, the standing army would have to go. Brownlow 
acknowledged the State Guard's crucial contribution to Radical victory, but he was 
"anxious to rid the State of this item of expense." Listening with pride and satisfaction to 
their executive's words were three former militia captains-Representative Thompson 
McKinley, Principal Clerk of the House George E. Grisham, and Doorkeeper James H. 
Sumner. McKinley played an important role in this "New South" agenda, sponsoring the 
"Common Carriers" bill, which granted blacks equal access to public transportation, and 
supporting the "Omnibus" bill, which initiated extravagant railroad construction.49 
Confident that the anti-Radical threat was now pretty much contained, Brownlow 
proceeded to reduce the size and scope of militia activities. On 11 October, General 
Cooper turned operational command over to Major Robeson, while most of the militia 
staff officers resigned their commissions. At about the same time, Adjutant General Sam 
Hunt resigned and was replaced by Daniel T. Boynton. By 15 October, the State Guard 
comprised only four companies. Major Robeson decided to deploy these units to the 
49 White, Messages, 5: 571-91; Fayetteville Observer, 17 October 1867; Lovett, African-American Histoty 
ofNashville, 209; McBride, "Blacks and the Race Issue," 245 
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state's familiar trouble spots. Captain Rickman returned to Pulaski, while the remaining 
three companies headed to West Tennessee.50 
Rickman did not stay in Pulaski for long. In mid-October, he inaugurated an 
ambitious plan to "make the Rebels strate" throughout southern Middle Tennessee. 
While Lieutenant J. J. Mankin occupied Lewisburg (Marshall) with twenty-three men, 
Rickman marched the main body sixty-one miles to Tullahoma (Franklin), where his 
career as a militia officer had begun six months before. Once there, he sent his mounted 
section on an extensive fifteen-day sweep through Franklin, Lincoln, and Giles counties. 
In the end, the mission proved more a cat-and-mouse game than a decisive blow at ex-
Confederate vigilantism. The Klan eluded his grasp, and his men grew weary of the 
seemingly interminable patrols. When Rebels torched a portion of his unit's winter 
quarters, Rickman fumed that Franklin remained "one of the most Rebellious places in 
Middle Tenn." Nevertheless, his mere presence appears to have kept much of the 
region's chronic lawlessness in check. Rickman eventually lost his passion for the State 
Guard, however. At the end of October, he wrote that he needed to move his family to 
East Tennessee "where thay can see Loyal People." He then departed on what turned out 
to be permanent leave. In one of his last communications with headquarters, the veteran 
50 General Order No. 32, 11 October 1867, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 27; Lieutenant L.B. Gamble to General 
Cooper, 11 October 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder l; Tennessee Blue Book, 488; Nashville Daily 
Press and Times, 8, 10 October 1867; Nashville Union and Dispatch, 9 October 1867; Special Orders Nos. 
166-68, 171, 175-76, 8-10 October 1867, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 33. Shortly after stepping aside, Cooper 
accepted a nomination for the U. S. Senate, but when the General Assembly voted on 22 October, only six 
Radicals endorsed him. His name was withdrawn after the first ballot. Governor Brownlow won the office 
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militia captain proudly declared, "I am a soldier." Lieutenant Mankin assumed command 
of Company B some time in November. 51 
Militia law enforcement in West Tennessee was as frustrating as in Middle. After 
establishing his headquarters at Trenton with one company under Captain William Holt, 
Major Robeson stationed Captain Robert Hall in Union City and Captain E. R. Hall in 
Jackson-the ex-Confederates in Madison County having apparently failed their "fair 
test" agreement of the previous month. A company of Federal troops, also stationed at 
Union City, helped keep Obion County relatively quiet, but Robeson declared that the 
social and political climate in the rest of the section was "worse than in 61." On 14 
October, an estimated 100 mounted Rebels welcomed his return to Gibson County with a 
wild dash through the streets of Trenton aimed at raiding the militia commissariat. 
Robeson's exact countermeasures are unknown, but he appears to have withdrawn his 
company from Union City and used it to reinforce his positions in Jackson and Trenton. 
In any event, he informed the governor that the county's Rebels "are only kept down by 
Fear." Besides trying to suppress ex-Confederate vigilantes, Robeson sought to rectify 
the dismal Radical voting record in Henry County, which failed to hold a valid election in 
August. To this end, the major went to Paris in November and supervised Registrar 
James Guthrie's registration of the county's loyal voters. 52 
51 Captain Rickman to General Cooper, 24 October 1867 (two letters), and to Daniel T. Boynton, 28 
October 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 2; Morning Report for Company B, 1st Battalion, Tennessee 
State Guard, 31 October 1867, TAGO, Reel 4, Box 22, Folder 2. In addition to the Klan, supply shortages 
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52 Major Robeson to Daniel T. Boynton, 15 October 1867, T AGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 3; Major 
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Left behind in Trenton during Robeson's many excursions was Captain William 
C. Holt. For much of the deployment, he had served under Robeson as the "junior" 
captain of Company E, 1st Regiment, but with Robeson's promotion to major at the 
beginning of September, Holt assumed full command in his own right. Unfortunately, 
most of the men in the company were Robeson volunteers and they (including Lieutenant 
Fuller prior to his discharge) disliked Holt, thinking him incompetent. Further 
complicating the growing disharmony within the unit was the appointment of Lieutenant 
Moses Kinman, a Holt supporter, to replace the popular Fuller. Divided loyalties 
inevitably undermined unit cohesion and, throughout the autumn, men deserted Company 
E in a slow but steady stream. Those who remained got into trouble. Sometime in 
October, a group of militiamen reportedly killed the livestock of a local farmer, 
producing a needless, albeit minor, controversy for the Brownlow administration.53 
Major Robeson was appalled by these developments and by the decline of his old 
company, formerly one of the best in the State Guard. On 14 October, with General 
Cooper's blessing, he relieved Holt of command. Holt, however, had political friends 
who used their influence to get him reinstated two weeks later. Resigned to having to 
work with Holt, Robeson ordered the company into winter quarters, while he attended to 
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matters elsewhere in West Tennessee. With the exception of an occasional desertion, the 
men of Company E appear to have sat quietly in camp for the duration of their service. 54 
Company E's experience reveals that, like every military organization, the 
Tennessee State Guard suffered its share of desertion. Nearly forty men deserted 
Company E, mostly during Holt's tenure, although that total was not indicative of the 
militia at large. Over the course of the entire deployment, about 155 militiamen deserted, 
· barely 8 percent of the mobilized force. Moreover, with the exception of Holt and 
Captain Clingan (who lost twenty-six men to desertion while stationed in Madison 
County), desertion never prevented State Guard officers from carrying out their mission. 
Eighty-eight militiamen deserted while on duty in the west, a ratio of nearly one man in 
five. The Republican Banner attributed this to delinquent payroll, but the hostile Rebel 
climate unquestionably contributed. The desertion rate in Middle Tennessee was 
substantially lower: sixty-four men altogether (about one in twenty). In East Tennessee 
the rates were negligible: only three men deserted in that part of the state. Significantly, 
very few black militiamen deserted. The four all-black units experienced just one 
desertion among them. The mixed companies reported seventeen, but there is no 
indication of these men's race. Regardless of whether they were white or black, Captain 
Grisham probably spoke for all militia commanders when he referred to the ten men who 
deserted from his unit as "worthless individuals." Some officers spent a great deal of 
energy hunting down such men. Captain Clingan, for example, pursued Private Francis 
54 Special Order Nos. 180, 192 (14, 30 October 1867), TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 33; Isaac J. Roach and John 
Norman to General Cooper, 23 October 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 3; Major Robeson to General 
Cooper, 26 November 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 3. 
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M. Jack all the way to Bradley County, his unit's muster point. While being transported 
back to Nashville by rail, however, Jack leaped from the train and disappeared.55 
Rounding out the State Guard's activities for the year, Captain E. R. Hall 
maintained an uneasy peace in Madison County. The white citizens there were 
displeased by what they considered the unethical practices of their new registrar, Galen 
E. Green. Apparently, as a purveyor of beef to the State Guard, Green had been 
exaggerating ex-Confederate lawlessness so as to retain the presence of the militia, his 
principal customer, while using his profits to buy black political support. Ignoring this 
alleged profiteering, Captain Hall agreed with Green that vigilantes dominated the 
countryside. Throughout November, he searched in vain for a "gang of highwaymen" 
who had reportedly robbed a number of black homes. He had hoped for help from the 
civil authorities, but he found the white leadership uncooperative and the citizenry 
hostile. In Jackson, the militiamen endured daily verbal abuse-"Damned Cowardly 
Brownlow Sons ofb-s" was a frequent insult-and occasionally found their lives in 
danger. In one instance, three Rebels ambushed a lone militia sentry and tried to steal his 
rifle before being scared off by the timely arrival of the relief guard. In another, the 
company supply wagon was intercepted and delayed by a group of Rebels toting double-
barreled shotguns. Hall ordered his men to shoot anyone who willfully interfered with 
55 General Order No. 14, 27 August 1867, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 27; Muster Rolls for the Tennessee State 
Guard, TAGO, Reels 4-5, Boxes 22-25; Nashville Republican Banner, 17 September 1867; Captain 
Grisham to James P. Brownlow, 12 July 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 1; Captain Clingan to 
Samuel Hunt, 28 August 1867 and Clingan to General Cooper, 11 September 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, 
Folder 5; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 29 August 1867. 
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their duties, but Sheriff George C. Perkins persuaded the militia captain to retract this 
command lest the county experience a repetition of the Hartmus shooting. 56 
Unfortunately, Jackson once again became the scene of a near-riot. It happened 
on the night of23 November. Evidently, one of Hall's men was courting a local girl, and 
during one of their meetings, the town constable arrested the militiaman for allegedly 
disturbing the peace. A black witness inexplicably cheered the arrest and cursed the 
soldier for being "one ofBrownlow's melish." After his release later that evening, the 
humiliated soldier headed back to town, "swearing that he would kill the negro" who had 
mocked him. Some of his companions grabbed their rifles and followed him. When the 
militiamen entered the public square, several surprised and apprehensive townspeople 
opened fire, some of the shots ironically coming from the law office of Hervey Brown, 
one the delegates who had earlier negotiated the removal of the militia from Madison 
County. After discharging a volley of their own, the militiamen fell back to camp, where 
Captain Hall now had the entire company on full alert. Leaming that a large group of 
whites were assembling "for the purpose of charging my Camp." Hall personally 
conducted a two-hour patrol through the streets to head off trouble. The following day, 
Hall courageously attended a town meeting where angry whites protested the presence of 
his militia company. One citizen reportedly recommended that the mayor bar the militia 
from the town limits and that the police shoot violators on sight. Hall insisted that Rebel 
agitators were to blame for the shooting affray and for the general "ill feeling" toward his 
men. Reiterating his commitment to law enforcement, he demanded that the townspeople 
56 Alvin Allen to Governor Brownlow, 6 November 1867, MS 1940, Box 1, Folder 10; Nashville Union 
and Dispatch, 26 November 1867; Captain E. R. Hall to General Cooper, 24 November 1867, TAGO, Reel 
2, Box 11, Folder 1. 
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assist him in this task. He doubted, however, that a change of heart would be 
forthcoming. In closing a lengthy report to General Cooper, he stated that "if Rebels in 
this county want a fight with me or the Militia they can have it. "57 
The ex-Confederates may have displayed such fighting spirit in Madison and 
elsewhere because they knew that Captain Hall and the rest of the militia would soon be 
mustered out. Following the governor's address in October, the General Assembly 
produced legislation that would eventually prompt the governor to complete his 
demobilization of the State Guard. On 15 October, Stephen J. Matthews of Blount 
County introduced Senate Bill No. 16, "to Reduce Military Expenses," which called for 
extensive cuts in the militia's budget. On 22 November, the Matthews's bill passed the 
Senate with little opposition, 17-2. In the House, several Radicals from Middle and West 
Tennessee resisted the bill's passage, but ultimately lost their fight 48-18. All but one of 
the "No" votes in the House came from legislators whose counties had received militia 
protection at some point during the year. On 13 December, Brownlow signed into law 
"An Act to Reduce the Military Expenses of the State." This new iaw in no way repealed 
the Militia Act, but through its elimination of important staff positions, its restrictions on 
officer pay, and its strict limits on quartermaster purchases, it would clearly reduce the 
State Guard's effectiveness. In keeping with the law's spirit, the adjutant general 
disbanded two more militia companies, including Captain E. R. Hall's.58 
57 Captain E. R. Hall to General Cooper, 24 November 1867, IAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 1. 
' 8 McBride, Biographical DirectOQ'. 2: 61 I; Senate Journal, 35th General Assembly, 1st Session, 47, 147-48; 
Senate Journal, 35th General Assembly, 1st Session, Appendix, Comptroller's Report, 100-102; House 
Journal, 337-38; Acts of Tennessee, Chapter 21; Special Order No. 200, 7 December 1867, IAGO, Reel 9, 
Vol. 33. For unknown reasons, Thompson McKinley abstained from voting on Senate Bill No. 16. 
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Legislative concerns over cost were well founded. As of 1 October, the Radical 
army had cost the taxpayers $194,595, an expense that ranked second only to payment on 
the state debt, and one that amounted to 11 percent of all treasury disbursals for the fiscal 
year. Before it was over, the price tag for the deployment of 1867 would reach $329,127, 
split almost evenly between pay and supplies. Given the large sums involved, rumors of 
malfeasance invariably touched the quartermaster and paymaster departments. 
Throughout the autumn of 1867, H. H. Thomas steadily fell behind in his payments to 
various militia contractors. Furthermore, Paymaster Brooks was accused of having 
"absconded from the State" with $7,000. It took Brooks months to clear his name, but in 
the meantime, the General Assembly ordered an audit of all the adjutant general's 
financial records. An investigative committee discovered that much of the paperwork in 
the quartermaster and paymaster offices was in disarray and asked Thomas for a "detailed 
statement" of all militia expenses and shortfalls. Unwilling or unable to explain his 
department's disorganization, Thomas resigned before the year was out. Rather than sort 
through the morass of vouchers, receipts, invoices, bills of lading, payrolls, and account 
books, the committee recommended that a specialist take charge. Accordingly, the 
General Assembly passed the so-called Boone Act (3 February 1868), whereby Thomas's 
assistant Albert E. Boone assumed control of both the quartermaster and paymaster 
departments at the rank of colonel. His mission was to "examine and perfect" the ledger 
of the State Guard "so as to render said accounts with the State, complete and 
intelligible. "59 
59 Senate Journal, 35th General Assembly, 1st Session, Appendix, Comptroller's Report, 100; Senate 
Journal, 36th General Assembly, 1st Session, Appendix, Comptroller's Report, 73; Snapp Thomas to H. H. 
Thomas, 22 July 1867, Thornburgh and Hoskins to G. W. Blackburn, 24 August 1867, M. J. Childress to H. 
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It took Boone several months, but by the summer of 1868 he had accounted for 
every penny spent on the militia. In doing so, he removed all claims against the state by 
unpaid militiamen by either paying them off or dismissing their case. Additionally, he 
settled all accounts with the railroad companies and various suppliers. In keeping with a 
legislative resolution calling on the Federal government to pay for the State Guard, 
Boone then sent a bill for over $300,000 to the Tennessee delegation in Congress. 
Having provided the State Guard with its munitions free of charge, however, not to 
mention hundreds of U.S. troops to uphold the laws, Congress ignored this presumptuous 
request. Although the Tennessee government had to pay for its standing army in the end, 
the General Assembly was pleased both by the thoroughness of Boone's accounting and 
by "his integrity, his morals, and especially his business qualifications." In an era that 
became known, in part, for its financial corruption, Boone's responsible bookkeeping 
stands as a refreshing example of fiscal probity. 60 
Rectitude in the adjutant general's office notwithstanding, many Radicals watched 
the dismantling of their partisan army with growing concern. Major Robeson was 
particularly disturbed. To him, disbanding the militia in the face of an armed and 
dangerous foe only invited more lawlessness. Governor Brownlow sympathized with his 
field commander, but could only hope that "the factious elements would quiet down" 
once the State Guard was gone. State Supreme Court Justice Sam Milligan doubted 
H. Thomas, 9 September, Thornburgh and Hoskins to D. G. Thornburgh, 11 September, TAGO, Reel 2, 
Box 10, Folder 3; Knoxville Whig, 19 February, 4, 11 March 1868; Acts of Tennessee, 35th General 
Assembly, 1st Session, Resolution Nos. 18, 73, 97, 102, Chapter 39. 
60 House Journal, 35th General Assembly, Extra Session, 25-27; Acts of Tennessee, 35th General Assembly, 
1st Session, Resolution No. 78; A. E. Boone to all ten Congressional Representatives and Senators from 
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whether the anti-Radicals could be so easily placated. In a letter to President Johnson, 
Milligan predicted that the Rebels' intractable political bitterness and racial hostility 
would lead to a "collision of arms, unless prevented by a standing army."61 
Unfortunately for men like Robeson and Milligan, Tennessee's Radical army was 
virtually non-existent as 1867 came to an end. On 13 January 1868, Adjutant General 
Daniel Boynton suspended all militia operations and placed the remaining two companies 
on indefinite furlough. Just a week before, Klansmen in Giles County had attacked a 
black store in Pulaski, killing one freedman and wounding several others. Whether this 
would have occurred had militia been present can never be known, but what is known is 
that after the militia left, the Klan in Giles County greatly increased its acts of terrorism. 
By the time the Militia Act was officially repealed on 1 February, the Klan throughout 
Tennessee had inaugurated an unprecedented campaign of violent counter-
Reconstruction. Where 1867 had been a year of success and optimism for the Radical 
party, 1868 would be a year of doubt and fear. 62 
Tennessee, 6 June 1868, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 9, Folder 5; General Assembly to Governor Brownlow, 3 
September 1868, Patton Collection. 
61 Major Robeson to General Cooper, I December 1867, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 3; Arnell, 
"Southern Unionist," 329; Graf, Papers of Andrew Johnson, 13: 321,446. 
62 Special Order No. 201, 13 January 1868, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 33; Trelease, White Terror, 32-33; Acts of 
Tennessee, 35th General Assembly, 1st Session, Chapter 33, Section 10. On 11 February, Boynton mustered 
out the last two militia companies. 
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The Brownlow administration and the General Assembly soon regretted 
disbanding the State Guard. Although this organization had not eliminated the ex-
Confederate threat to Reconstruction, it had at least kept the numerous vigilante groups at 
bay and thereby given black and white Radicals in Middle and West Tennessee a fighting 
chance. With the demobilization of the militia in February 1868, however, Rebel 
paramilitarism intensified, with the infamous Ku Klux Klan taking the lead. Within a 
matter of days after the last company of State Guard mustered out, Radical leaders began 
calling for its re-activation. The democratic process, however, does not always respond 
to a crisis with celerity. Months would pass before the General Assembly empowered the 
governor with new laws and a new militia force with which to combat the Klan. 
Throughout the proceedings, legislators argued over the nature of force politics and the 
necessity of a standing army. All the while, Ku Kluxism ran amok. 
The Ku Klux Klan emerged as a major challenge to Reconstruction throughout 
the South in 1868. Historian Allen Trelease has pointed out that the Klan was a 
decentralized organization, one whose activities varied from state to state and county to 
county. "Klan" was really a generic term used to identify a legion of ex-Confederate 
vigilante bands. Tennessee alone endured the lawlessness of such Klan-like outfits as the 
Pale Faces (Maury), Red Caps (Humphreys), and the Knights of the Golden Circle 
(DeKalb), in addition to the original Ku Klux Klan of Giles County. Whatever their 
name, these seemingly ubiquitous dens shared a common goal-the reassertion of white 
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supremacy and the defeat of Reconstruction. In Tennessee, if the outright overthrow of 
the Brownlow administration was impractical, the destruction of Radicalism at the grass-
roots level was not. Using the national election on 3 November 1868 as a rallying point, 
the Klan in Middle and West Tennessee unleashed a campaign of racial and political 
terrorism. Historian Thomas Alexander has described this campaign as a "psychological 
war," one in which the Klan relied more on fear than on violence to achieve its ends. In 
fact, however, the organization perpetrated a great deal of violence. Many Klansmen not 
only wanted to frighten blacks and Radicals, they wanted to kill them. 1 
In February, Samuel Amell, one of Tennessee's Radical Congressmen, notified 
Governor Brownlow that "letter after letter is pouring in upon me ... in regard to the Ku 
Klux Klans." Amell was not exaggerating. The story of the Klan's terrorism in 
Tennessee in 1868 is well documented. Voluminous investigative reports by state 
authorities and by U. S. authorities, including the Freedmen's Bureau, reveal a 
widespread and deadly Klan menace. Between January and August 1868, the Klan 
committed literally hundreds of acts of violence in at least thirty Middle and West 
Tennessee counties. The particulars become mind-numbing in their repetitiveness. The 
Klan whipped, beat, threatened, shot, and lynched black and white Radicals. The Klan 
burned schools, robbed homes, and disrupted church services. And the Klan attacked the 
Radical party, crippling it in many counties. 2 
1 Trelease, White Terror, xv-xlvii; Alexander, Political Reconstruction, 177. 
2 Samuel Amell to Governor Brownlow, Patton Collection, 4 February 1868; Joint Military Committee 
Report on the Ku Klux Klan, Senate Journal, 35th General Assembly, Extra Session, 131-168 (also printed 
in the House Journal, 185-223); Sheafe v. Tillman, 1-315; 40th Congress, 3rd Session, House Executive 
Documents, Report of the Secretary of War (1868), 143-187; see also the reports of Freedmen's Bureau 
agents in Middle and West Tennessee for 1868 under the headings "Records Relating to Outrages" (Reel 
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This political damage was the Klan's most significant contribution to counter-
Reconstruction. Where Rebel vigilantes had failed in 1867, the Klan vowed to succeed. 
Commissioners of Registration continued to be principal targets. "I am in danger," 
exclaimed Registrar Robert Wiley from Marshall before resigning out of fear, "the Ku 
Klux are all through the county." Registrar James F. Koger of Overton was not as 
fortunate as Wiley. In June, he was murdered by the Klan. Rather than suffer a similar 
fate, the registrar in Fayette County succumbed to Klan threats and added known Rebels 
to his voting roster. Union Leagues also felt the wrath of the Klan. By May, night riding 
in Giles, Maury, and Williamson had effectively eradicated the leagues in those counties. 
Klansmen later tortured and killed S. A Bierfield, a white Radical, and one of his black 
friends when the two men tried to revitalize their party in Williamson. Other political 
leaders also fell victim to Klan assaults. In a near-reprise of Senator Almon Case's 
assassination the previous year, Klansmen dragged the geriatric state senator William 
Wyatt from his home in Lincoln in early April and beat him into unconsciousness. Wyatt 
had recently voted to reactivate the State Guard. One Freedmen's Bureau agent asserted 
that a fair and peaceful election in November was unlikely in much of Middle Tennessee 
as long as the Klan rode unpunished. 3 
Klan strength is difficult to determine. Sometime leader Nathan B. Forrest 
claimed that there were 40,000 Klansmen in Tennessee (and 550,000 throughout the 
34) and "Narrative Reports of Operations and Conditions" (Reels 16, 18) in Records of the Assistant 
Commissioner for the State of Tennessee, Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Land (1865-
1869), RG 105, National Archives; McBride, "Blacks and the Race Issue," 391. 
3 Robert Wiley to Governor Brownlow, 14 February 1868, MS 1940, Box 1, Folder 1 l; Fayette County 
Petition to Governor Brownlow, 24 February 1868, MS 1940, Box 1, Folder 11; Phillips, "Freedmen's 
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South). These figures are probably inflated, even if they include organizations other than 
the official Ku Klux Klan, but the Klan's size was nevertheless impressive. An estimated 
300 Klansmen operated in Murfreesboro (with 1,000 in Rutherford County at large), 400 
in Pulaski (Giles), 500 in Columbia (Maury). In Obion County, sixty Klansmen stalked 
the countryside under the leadership of Martin Vowell, an ex-Confederate whom militia 
major John Robeson had briefly incarcerated in 1867. On 4 July, Klan dens staged 
militant parades in several Middle Tennessee counties. One in Shelbyville (Bedford) 
reached a climax when some fifty Klansmen accosted two local Radicals and whipped 
them through the streets. Watching helplessly was John J. Mankin, a former officer in 
the State Guard. Less than five months before, he had commanded a full company of the 
now disbanded militia. 4 
As Klan terrorism spread, the General Assembly scrambled to counter it. Hoping 
to avoid the financial and political burden that recreating the State Guard would entail, 
Radical legislators first tried to strengthen county law enforcement by increasing the 
power of the sheriffs. On 1 February, "An Act to Amend an Act for the Protections of 
Sheriffs" passed into law. The original law had authorized sheriffs to create County 
Guards to combat lawlessness. Taking into account the ex-Confederate animus in many 
counties, the new law permitted (presumably loyal) sheriffs to recruit as posse members 
any citizen of the state. Moreover, it allowed them to pursue criminals to any part of the 
Bureau in Tennessee," 302-303, 318; Report of the Secretary of War (1868), 172, 178-82; Arnell, 
"Southern Unionist," 338; Senate Journal, 35th General Assembly, Extra Session, 140-41. 
4 Trelease, White Terror, 34, 45; Phillips, "Freedmen's Bureau in Tennessee," 305,312; Report ofthe 
Secretary of War (1868), 166; Sheafe v. Tillman, 264-67. 
267 
state. Furthermore, if civil authorities in counties wracked by lawlessness failed to create 
County Guards, the governor was authorized to intervene and appoint a new sheriff. 5 
The legislation was motivated in part by Sheriff James W. Tarkington's 
tribulations in Dyer County. Tarkington had worked closely with Major John Robeson in 
1867 and was probably the only Radical law enforcer in West Tennessee at the beginning 
of 1868. In early January, he and his deputized son clashed with Rebel guerrilla leader 
William Duncan on the streets of Dyersburg. Tarkington wounded Duncan and another 
Rebel in apprehending him, but was himself wounded, while his son was killed. Several 
days later, twenty "desperadoes" broke Duncan out of jail, and the outlaw took refuge in 
Madison County. Tarkington asked Governor Brownlow for 100 militiamen to help him 
enforce the law, warning that the county would fall to the anti-Radicals in the November 
election without them. No militia was forthcoming, although former State Guard 
lieutenant William Fuller joined Tarkington's County Guards. The General Assembly 
did award the sheriff a portion of Duncan's bounty-$333.33. The sum was poor 
compensation for a dead son. 6 
In practice, the amended Sheriffs Act was no more effective than the old law. 
Fear of Klan retribution made effective law enforcement impossible in many counties. 
Klansmen in Rutherford cowed the Radical sheriff with a midnight whipping. In 
Marshall, the Brownlow administration could find no sheriff willing to arrest any 
member of the Klan. Even the efforts of a few aggressive sheriffs proved unsatisfactory. 
5 Acts of Tennessee, 35th General Assembly, 1st Session, Chapter 33. 
6 J. W. Tarkington to Governor Brownlow, 8 January 1868, GP 21, Reel 1, Box 2, Folder 3; Nashville 
Daily Press and Times, 31 January, 11 March 1868; Acts of Tennessee, 35th General Assembly, 1st Session, 
Resolution Nos. 103, 107. 
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When the sheriff of Fentress openly joined a Rebel gang, the governor appointed 
Claiborne Beaty, a veteran of wartime Union guerrilla operations, to uphold the law, but 
Beaty became bogged down in a fruitless year-long struggle with a number of Rebel 
vigilante groups. In Sumner, former State Guard lieutenant I. N. Phillips took charge and 
recruited eighty discharged black militiamen for his posse-"Phillips Militia." This force 
helped the Radical party prevail in the March county elections, but when Conservative 
authorities arrested Phillips for an alleged murder, army Captain Edwin Leib had to step 
in to restore order. In Wayne County, SheriffE. F. Thurman successfully employed his 
County Guards in protecting black ironworkers from a Klan attack in August, but it took 
the arbitration of a Freedmen's Bureau agent to broker an uneasy, and temporary, peace. 
James Tarkington eventually stepped down as Dyer's sheriff, claiming that he could 
never suppress the ex-Confederates without military force. 7 
Many Radical leaders soon came to believe that the Sheriffs Act was insufficient 
and that the State Guard was needed again. On 27 February, a majority in the House, led 
by Jesse E. McNair of Gibson County, voted to repeal the Act to Reduce the Military 
Expenses, the law that had precipitated the final disbandment of the militia. The repeal 
effort never made it to the Senate floor, but the two houses did present Governor 
Brownlow with a resolution calling on the executive to dispatch militia to the state's 
troubled regions in order to provide security for the county elections in March. 
Brownlow must have been nonplussed by the Assembly's request. At the time, there 
7 Trelease, White Terror, 35; Amell, "Southern Unionist," 335-36; Rufus Dowdy to Governor Brownlow, 9 
July 1868 (two letters), GP 21, Reel 1, Box 2, Folder 3; Durham, Rebellion Revisited, 312-15; Report of 
the Secretazy of War (1868), 182-85; Alexander, Political Reconstruction, 185-86; Nashville Daily Press 
and Times, 18 March 1868. 
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were no active militia units in the state and, with the essential repeal of the 1867 Militia 
Act, the governor could not reactivate the State Guard without a new law. Instead of 
deploying militia, Brownlow urged the loyal citizens of Middle and West Tennessee to 
keep lists of Klan perpetrators for future prosecution and defend themselves as best they 
could within the limits of the law. 8 
Militia advocates regrouped and in the first week of March introduced a bill to 
reorganize the State Guard. On 16 March, the Assembly enacted a second Militia Act by 
solid majorities in both houses. The new law was notable both for its swift passage and 
for its fatal limitations. The first sections were a facsimile of the previous law. Most of 
the other sections, however, imposed parsimonious spending constraints. Although he 
signed the bill, Brownlow was dissatisfied with it. The Militia Act of 1867 was designed 
to protect an election and preempt any anti-Radical challenges. In order to overcome the 
full-blown Klan conspiracy of 1868, Brownlow believed he needed something more 
potent. The new law granted him no special powers, such as the authority to declare 
martial law, and its financial constraints and limitations on staff personnel made 
equipping and supplying the militia volunteers difficult. While anti-Radical newspapers 
ignored the new Militia Act, the Knoxville Whig derisively called it "an abortion." 
Brownlow never took action under its provisions. 9 
For every Radical who desired a reactivated militia, there seemed to be one who 
insisted on alternatives. Besides passing new Sheriff and Militia acts, legislators at the 
8 House Journal, 35th General Assembly, 1st Session, 654-55; Acts of Tennessee, 35th General Assembly, 1st 
Session, Resolution No. 189; Phillips, "Freedmen's Bureau in Tennessee," 316; Nashville Daily Press and 
Times, 5 March 1868. 
9 Acts of Tennessee, 35th General Assembly, 1st Session, Chapter 70; Knoxville Whig. 11 March 1868. 
270 
end of February urged the governor to call on the Federal garrison for help. Specifically, 
they wanted U. S. troops to occupy selected counties during local elections on 7 March. 
Evidently, General Thomas provided a few squads of soldiers for election duty and 
Radicals won most of the county offices (only in Marshall did the Klan appreciably 
interfere with voting), but the troops were withdrawn immediately afterwards. Klan 
reprisals followed this latest Radical political success and Governor Brownlow found 
himself calling on the army again. On 10 April, he requested General Thomas to station 
fifty men in Maury County, the scene of a recent spate of vicious Klan lynchings. 
"Matters have been growing worse than ever since the State militia were disbanded," 
Brownlow told the general. Thomas again agreed to provide troops for the occasion, but 
he balked when Brownlow asked for six more county deployments in May and June. The 
general wanted to help crush the Klan, but he refused to let his men be used as 
troubleshooters to be rushed from one part of the state to the next. Reminding Brownlow 
that Tennessee was in full exercise of its civil functions, he encouraged the governor to 
use the recent sheriff and militia legislation "vigorously." He personally thought a 
reactivated State Guard would be especially suitable to the task of fighting the Klan. 10 
As Klan atrocities multiplied in the spring and summer, Brownlow chafed at his 
inability to fight back. Even some anti-Radicals began to protest Klan terrorism. Ex-
Confederates in Carroll County joined their Radical neighbors in publicly condemning 
the Klan. Nimrod Porter of Maury also fumed when Klansmen began harassing his black 
10 House Journal, 35th General Assembly, 1st Session, 593-94; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 10-12 
March 1868; Report of the Secretary of War (1868), 13-14; White, Messages, 5: 611-12. General Thomas 
may also have felt ill equipped to fight the Klan effectively. With the exception of Captain Edwin Leib's 
company in Sumner County, the Federal garrison had no cavalry. General Duncan facetiously described 
his force in Nashville as the "wooden-leg corps." Graf, Papers of Andrew Johnson, 14: 403-404. 
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servant. "Things must be stopt some way," he declared. But he worried about the 
governor's reaction to the terrorism: "I greatly dread the consequences I fear the result." 
After Samuel Arnell reported his narrow escape from a Klan lynch mob on 14 June, 
Brownlow took the drastic action Porter dreaded. On 6 July, he ordered a special session 
of the legislature to meet later in the month. 11 
Governor Brownlow's address on 28 July to the reconvened legislature was one 
of the most forceful and provocative of his gubernatorial career. Chastising the members 
for repealing the Militia Act (he ignored that body's re-enactment in March), he 
proclaimed that the state was in the death grip of the Ku Klux Klan. According to him, 
the Klan's objectives were manifold: ''the overthrow of the existing State Government, 
the abolition of colored suffrage, the immediate enfranchisement ... of every rebel who 
fought to destroy the Government, and a wiping from the statute books of all the 
[Radicals'] wholesome and patriotic laws." After explaining the deficiencies of local law 
enforcement and the reluctance of the Federal garrison to take decisive action, Brownlow 
requested a militia law that would enable him to suppress the Klan, regardless of the cost. 
Moreover, he "emphatically" recommended that Klansmen be "declared outlaws by 
special legislation, and punished with death wherever found." Lastly, he admonished the 
legislators that if they equivocated in this matter, the executive branch would hold them 
responsible for every citizen "butchered in cold blood. "12 
11 Graf, Papers of Andrew Johnson, 14: 369-70; Porter Diary, 23 April, 3 May, 1 June 1868; Kathleen R. 
Zebley, "Samuel Mayes Arnell and Reconstruction in Tennessee," Tennessee Historical Quarterly 53 
(1994): 254; White, Messages, 5: 608-609. 
12 White, Messages, 5: 609-14. 
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Anticipating the governor's hard-line tactics, anti-Radicals voiced strong protest 
against the "extraordinary" legislative session. The Republican Banner printed excerpts 
from numerous county newspapers denouncing the "miserable radical oligarchy." These 
newspapers spoke of "Brownlow's hell" and the administration's "negro and penitentiary 
militia." They claimed that the Union Leagues were arming and drilling for battle and 
warned that anti-Radical men "would think no more of killing ... niggers than they 
would of killing snakes." Fearing that Brownlow's conduct was leading to civil war, 
Conservatives bombarded President Andrew Johnson with pleas to intervene with the 
army. A. 0. P. Nicholson of Maury County was particularly concerned. He regarded the 
governor's actions as "a declaration of war" that would result in a "bloody collision." In 
his diary, Nimrod Porter may have best summed up the anti-Radical attitude: "Brownlow 
is mad."13 
As the General Assembly digested the governor's message, individuals from all 
political camps promoted universal suffrage as a solution to the impending showdown. 
Conservative John C. Gaut urged the General Assembly to consider a statewide 
referendum on the franchise question. The Assembly took no action on this suggestion. 
John M. Lea, a moderate Radical, implored Governor Brownlow to lift the franchise 
restrictions for the sake of republican liberty and the "Anglo-Saxon" race. "Ku Klux 
organizations would be compelled to disband," he reasoned, for with a restored right to 
vote "the excuse for vindictiveness would have ceased." Stating that Reconstruction and 
its inherent divisiveness had to end sooner or later, Lea challenged Brownlow to exhibit 
13 Nashville Republican Banner, 19 July 1868; Graf, Papers of Andrew Johnson, 14: 419-20, 461-62, 484, 
487; Porter Diary, 29 July 1868. 
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magnanimity. Playing on these overtures, thirteen former Confederate generals, all 
alleged leaders in the Klan, including N. B. Forrest, also petitioned the state government 
to remove all political disabilities from the white majority as a means of ending the crisis. 
Without explicitly mentioning the Klan, they insisted that its actions were a justifiable 
response to continued Radical proscription. Finally, the generals intimated that 
suppression of the Klan ultimately lay in their hands. "As inducement and reason to your 
honorable body not to organize [the State Guard], we pledge ourselves to maintain the 
order and peace of the State with whatever influence we possess." Brownlow respected 
Lea for his sincerity, but considered him narve. The governor regarded the generals' 
petition as a veiled threat by "unreconstructed Ku Klux rebels" and spumed their 
proposal. 14 
The "extraordinary" session of the 35th General Assembly was an important event 
in Tennessee's Reconstruction. As the extra session got underway, the Senate assumed 
responsibility for drawing up the legislation that made Ku Kluxism a crime. The House 
formulated the appropriate militia enforcement act, one that authorized the governor to 
mobilize a State Guard and declare martial law. In the meantime, a joint committee 
commenced an extensive investigation into Klan outrages. Although all but three of the 
approximately ninety attending members were Radicals, it soon became apparent that the 
legislature was not in agreement over precisely how to suppress the Klan. The debates 
and votes reveal a surprising amount of dissension, particularly over the use of force. In 
14 House Journal, 35th General Assembly, Extra Session, 19-20; John M. Lea to Governor Brownlow, 26 
July 1868, GP 21, Reel l, Box 2, Folder 8; White, Messages, 5: 617-19. 
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many respects, the eventual enactment of Brownlow' s requested counter-measures in 
1868 was more difficult than the passage of the Militia Act in 1867. 15 
A number of House legislators exhibited reservations about recreating the State 
Guard. On 7 August, William Bosson of Rutherford pushed through a resolution calling 
on the military committee to scrap the militia bill in favor of a renewed effort to gain the 
services of the Federal garrison. On 10 August, William F. Prosser of Davidson endorsed 
Judge Lea's idea and urged the Assembly to consider lifting the franchise restrictions as a 
means of pacifying the ex-Confederate opposition. Prosser stressed that disfranchisement 
"was never intended to be permanent" and that indefinite proscription only fueled anti-
Radical propaganda. All the while, opponents of the militia bill read petitions from their 
home counties protesting the re-activation of the State Guard. 16 
As the session went on, Tennessee's Congressional Radicals and other party 
spokesmen demanded that the General Assembly act. Horace Maynard, speaking at a 
Republican convention held in Nashville on 12-13 August, called the legislature a "sham 
government" and rebuked the members for their apparent indecisiveness. Samuel Arnell 
questioned the members' "manhood." Roderick R. Butler was less accusatory, but in a 
letter to the governor he too urged strong action. The Nashville convention formally 
recommended the passage of "an efficient military bill" with as little delay as possible. 
ror legislators worried about the cost of re-mobilizing the militia, the convention 
15 Senate Journal, 35th General Assembly, Extra Session, 65, 90-91, 116-123; House Journal, 17, 28, 68-72, 
148. The three Conservatives members, all in the House, were William H. Johnson (Hardeman), Isaac J. 
Roach (Carroll, Gibson, Henry, and Madison), and W. P. H. Turner (Lawrence). McBride, Biographical 
Directory. 1: 620-21, 2: 468-69, 928-29. 
16 House Journal, 35th General Assembly, Extra Session, 68-71; Acts of Tennessee, Resolution Nos. 21, 23. 
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resolved that counties dominated by the Klan should pay it. Impressed by the 
convention's sense of urgency, state legislator D. G. Thornburgh of Jefferson called for 
the incorporation of the convention's recommendations into the existing militia bill, 
followed by its immediate passage. 17 
Despite the party's exhortations, legislators spent the last weeks of August 
wrangling over not only the wording but also the necessity of the force bills. In the 
House, on 25 August, Martin T. Ryder of Shelby and Newton Hacker of Washington 
entered into an especially mean-spirited debate over the militia bill. Ryder objected to 
any new militia legislation, insisting that the March law "was equal in every respect to 
the emergency, if properly enforced." When Hacker denounced these remarks as anti-
Radical subterfuge, an offended Ryder retorted that he had "only presented to the House 
its own child." Hacker rejoined that "the signs of the times were not as black and 
portentous then as they are now." The next day, fifty-one Radicals passed the militia bill 
over the strenuous protests of seventeen members. In addition to reiterating Ryder's 
arguments, the opponents claimed that a State Guard capable of defeating the Klan would 
cost more than one million dollars and, therefore, would be "suicidal to the credit of the 
State." Moreover, they believed that foisting such an exorbitant expenditure on the 
counties was a terrible injustice. Finally, they objected to the bill's provision for martial 
law. Elihu S. Williams of Smith feared that invoking martial law would make the 
17 Hamer, Tennessee, 2: 641; American Annual Cyclopedia (1868), 722-23; Yerton M. Queener, "A 
Decade of East Tennessee Republicanism, 1867-1876," East Tennessee Historical Society Publications 14 
(1942): 63; Arnell, "Southern Unionist," 341; R.R. Butler to Governor Brownlow, 11 August 1868, Patton 
Collection; House Journal, 35th General Assembly, Extra Session, 135. 
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Conservatives' charges of despotism a reality. Duly noting their colleagues' protest, the 
majority applauded the militia bill's transmission to the Senate. 18 
While the Senate examined the militia bill, anti-Radical observers raised their 
voices in renewed outcry against it. President Johnson received more letters begging him 
to intercede. One writer wailed that once the militia bill was passed "all the viscious and 
evil Disposed Negroes in Tenn ... will be mustered in, with a sprinkle of white men." At 
a public rally in Nashville, such familiar Conservative leaders as A. S. Colyar, Matt 
Brown, and John Gaut hurled condemnations at the Radical legislators. Although they 
had exhausted their worst insults the year before, the speakers still decried the militia bill 
as a "monstrous" and "infamous" measure that would make Brownlow a king. The 
Republican Banner compared the extra session of the General Assembly to "the horrors 
of the Holy Inquisition." More disturbing to the state government than the 
Conservatives' predictable denunciations, however, were Nathan B. Forrest's 
increasingly bellicose comments. After the governor snubbed the ex-Confederate 
generals' petition, Forrest went on the stump calling on disfranchised whites to resist 
"Brownlowism" to the utmost. In a widely reprinted newspaper interview on 28 August, 
he defended the Klan as "a protective political military organization," one he would 
gladly "co-operate with," although he claimed he was not a member. When asked his 
opinion of the pending militia bill, Forrest replied that "if the militia are called out, we 
cannot but look upon it as a declaration of war." Claiming that the Klan comprised 
40,000 law abiding Tennesseans, he was confident it could withstand any attacks from 
18 House Journal, 35th General Assembly, Extra Session, 145-48, 153-60; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 
26 August 1868; Nashville Republican Banner, 28-29 August 1868. 
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the State Guard. "We will resist to the last," he warned, "not a radical will be left 
alive."19 
Forrest's statements alarmed many Radical leaders. The usually intrepid Daily 
Press and Times expressed doubts about a re-activated State Guard's chances of 
suppressing the numerically superior Klan. Similarly affected, A. V. S. Lindsley of 
Davidson and several other Radicals in the Senate delayed passage of the militia bill, and 
proposed that a special delegation entreat President Johnson to bring the full force of the 
U. S. army down on the Klan. This latest alternative to an "efficient military bill" 
provoked another round of heated debates in both houses. Senate hard-liners such as 
William J. Smith of Hardeman, who had lobbied for a permanent militia force since 
1865, refused to be intimidated by anti-Radical rhetoric and insisted on mobilizing the 
State Guard. Berry Lyle of Montgomery spoke for the moderates when he argued that re-
mobilizing the militia "would be arming one neighbor against another," necessitating 
Federal intervention in the end. In the House, Newton Hacker spearheaded a strong 
effort to derail the proposed conference with the president. "This Legislature presents a 
most humiliating spectacle to the world," he declared, "when it at this late day turns aside 
from the real objects for which it was assembled, and commences to fritter away our 
precious time and the peoples' money in a worse than fruitless appeal to Andrew 
Johnson .... He is an enemy to our State government." A majority in both houses, 
however, supported the idea of seeking Federal aid in addition to passing a militia bill. 
19 Graf, Papers of Andrew Johnson, 14: 553-55; Nashville Republican Banner, 28-29 August 1868; 
Nashville Daily Press and Times, 17 August 1868; Arnell, "Southern Unionist," 339-40; Stanley F. Hom, 
Invisible Empire, The Story of the Ku Klux Klan 1866-1871 (Boston, 1969), 411-13. Forrest later recanted 
some of his more extreme statements. 
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On 1 September, a formal resolution creating the proposed special delegation passed both 
chambers. 20 
As the special delegation headed to Washington D. C., Samuel Arnell expressed 
his displeasure over the Assembly's failure to enact a militia law. "Have our friends in 
that body," he privately asked Governor Brownlow, "not even the courage of self-defense 
& only the blindness of bats?" Arnell had no sooner posed the question than a turning 
point occurred in the legislature. On 2 September, the joint committee on Klan activities 
submitted its report. Presenting over eighty affidavits as evidence, the committee 
declared that the Ku Klux Klan was a real organization which, "by a system of anti-lawry 
and terrorism," had subjugated the Radical party and the freedmen in many parts of 
Middle and West Tennessee and jeopardized Radical success at the polls in November. 
The committee further asserted that Klansmen had committed an average of one murder a 
day over the preceding six months. Accordingly, it recommended the speedy creation of 
a militia force to be used at the governor's discretion. 21 
Shocked by the magnitude of Klan terror, the General Assembly accelerated both 
the anti-Klan bill and the militia bill. On 7 September, after weeks of revising the anti-
Klan bill, the Senate passed it, 15-7. Three days later the House approved the bill with 
minimal discussion, 46-21. Officially entitled "An Act to Preserve the Public Peace," the 
new law defined a Klansman as a person who associated with "any secret organization .. 
. that shall prowl through the country or towns of this State, by day or by night, disguised 
20 Nashville Daily Press and Times, 29, 31 August, 1, 3 September 1868; Senate Journal, 35th General 
Assembly, Extra Session, 116; House Journal, 172-175; Acts of Tennessee, Resolution No. 23. 
21 Samuel M. Arnell to Governor Brownlow, 1 September 1868, Patton Collection; Senate Journal, 35th 
General Assembly, Extra Session, 131-68; House Journal, 185-223. 
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or otherwise, for the purpose of disturbing the peace." The minimum punishment upon 
conviction was a fine of $500 and five years in the state penitentiary. Significantly, the 
death penalty was not attached as Governor Brownlow had hoped, although anyone 
found guilty would be "rendered infamous," (i.e., permanently deprived of such political 
liberties as the right to vote and hold public office). The law further stipulated that 
anyone willfully interfering with an election or intimidating voters would suffer the same 
fate as a convicted Klansman. 22 
The militia bill underwent a crucial last-minute change before it too was passed. 
A number of senators insisted that the governor's power to declare martial law be 
constrained. They amended the bill so that imposing martial law in a county required the 
consent of the district's circuit judge and attorney general, the county's senator and 
representatives, and at least ten "unconditional" Union men from the county in question. 
On 9 September, the Senate passed the amended militia bill, 14-7. The House initially 
balked at the change, arguing that it emasculated the threat of martial law. After a joint 
meeting on the evening of IO September, however, the House consented and the bill 
finally passed. Officially entitled "An Act to Enforce the Laws of the State," the new 
militia law (the third during Reconstruction) authorized the governor to reorganize the 
Tennessee State Guard along the same lines as the 1867 act. It granted the executive 
certain discretionary funds to carry out his mission and empowered him to declare martial 
law under specific conditions. And it required that those counties occupied by the militia 
pay for any deployment of troops. The Republican Banner denigrated the new laws as "a 
22 Senate Journal, 35th General Assembly, Extra Session, 184-87; House Journal, 252-55; Acts of 
Tennessee, Chapter 2. A legal definition of"infamy" is provided in Tennessee Code Annotated 
(Charlottesville, 1997), 7 A: 300-304. 
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most cumbrous mass of legal absurdities," but they theoretically granted Brownlow 
everything he needed to wipe out the Klan. 23 
Although strong majorities ultimately supported both the anti-Klan and militia 
bills, and both passed in a relatively short period of time (forty-five days), the 
proceedings clearly demonstrated a profound concern over the politics of force. An 
analysis of voting reveals some significant patterns. Legislators from Middle and West 
Tennessee, knowing that counties in their sections would bear the physical and financial 
brunt of martial law and a re-activated State Guard, were particularly disturbed by the 
militia bill. The three Conservative members of the House predictably voted against it, 
but so did twelve Radicals from Middle Tennessee and two from West. Notable among 
the Radical dissenters were Jacob Brown of Franklin, William Bosson of Rutherford, and 
Jesse McNair of Gibson, men who had benefited politically from militia occupation in 
1867. In the all-Radical Senate, the opposition was more pronounced. Five of the 
chamber's twenty-two members in attendance, all from Middle and West Tennessee, 
steadfastly resisted both bills. Samuel Amell referred to these men as "timid servants," 
but they did persuade the General Assembly to renew its efforts to gain U. S. army 
assistance, and they were influential in placing constraints on the governor's power to 
declare martial law. 24 
23 Senate Journal, 35th General Assembly, Extra Session, 195-203; House Journal, 258-59; Acts of 
Tennessee, Chapter 3; Nashville Republican Banner, 11 September 1868. 
24 House Journal, 35th General Assembly, Extra Session, 153-54; Senate Journal, 186-87, 198; Samuel M. 
Arnell to Governor Brownlow, I September 1868, Patton Collection. Thomas Alexander mentions the 
Radical division over the force bills, but he provides no detailed analysis of either the debates or the roll 
call vote. Political Reconstruction, 201. 
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Shortly after the extra session adjourned, Governor Brownlow acted. In a 
proclamation of 16 September, he condemned the Ku Klux Klan and called for the 
organization of loyal militia companies. Ordering the Klan to disband voluntarily and 
submit to the laws before he actually fielded his Radical army, Brownlow warned its 
leaders that he would not hesitate·"to put down armed marauders by force." Cognizant of 
Tennesseans' fears of race war, he stressed that he would "first call into the field only 
white troops, holding the colored companies, when organized, as a reserved corps." 
Acknowledging the misgivings of many legislators about employing a militia, he further 
stated that if the Federal garrison agreed to furnish a sufficient force to maintain order 
during the November election, he would not call the State Guard into service at all. 25 
On this last point, the Brownlow administration soon received favorable news. 
On 11-12 September, as the General Assembly was completing the passage of the force 
bills, the state's special delegation met with President Johnson. Three Radicals made up 
the delegation: state Senator William H. Wisener of Bedford and House members James 
H. Agee of Campbell and Thomas A Hamilton of Shelby. All three had supported the 
militia bill, but each hoped the president would provide Federal troops in lieu of a State 
Guard. After describing the Klan's violent activities and its intent to overthrow the state 
government, the delegates explained their preference for Federal troops. A clash between 
the Klan and the State Guard, they argued, would be bloody (although they believed that 
the Brownlow administration would prevail in such a struggle), whereas Federal troops 
could suppress the Klan and protect the ballot box with minimal bloodshed. Several anti-
25 Nashville Daily Press and Times, 17 September 1868. 
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Radicals from Tennessee warned the president not to believe the special delegation's 
depictions of Klan atrocities. Dreading the partisan law enforcement of the State Guard, 
however, they privately recommended that he provide troops for the time being to keep 
the peace. Whether or not moved by such advice, Johnson was certainly appalled by the 
Klan's alleged depredations. At the end of the meeting he promised to sustain 
Tennessee's civil authorities with Federal troops. As a result, the State Guard would 
remain a force on paper only. 26 
The day after his militia proclamation, Governor Brownlow received word from 
General Thomas that the Federal garrison, including a fresh regiment made available by 
the War Department, was at the state's disposal. Brownlow immediately took advantage 
of this military windfall by asking Thomas to station one company in each of eleven 
Middle and nine West Tennessee counties. He stressed that Giles, Lincoln, Marshall, 
Maury, Fayette, Gibson, and Obion were the most lawless counties of the twenty. In a 
peculiar statement, he added that "the presence of federal troops in each county named 
will quiet things, whereas the presence of State militia would exasperate them." At the 
beginning of September, the army's strength in Tennessee was only 370 soldiers. By 1 
October, it had grown to about 2,000. It was a force equal in size to the State Guard of 
1867 yet concentrated in fewer locations. Three companies occupied Maury County 
alone. Nimrod Porter, one of that county's strongest anti-Radicals, claimed that he could 
26 Graf, Papers of Andrew Johnson, 15: 37-38, 44-51, 69; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 17 September 
1868. 
see army tents wherever he looked. He further grumbled that the "yankeys" foraged 
through his orchards without permission.27 
283 
The presence of Federal troops seemed to guarantee a peaceful election. Klan 
night-riding lessened in October, although many dens, fearing gubernatorial reprisals, had 
already curtailed their violence at the end of August. Tennessee Radicals supported the 
Republican presidential candidate Ulysses S. Grant, whose campaign slogan was "Let Us 
Have Peace." They expected an easy victory. Conservatives, hoping to capture a few 
congressional seats, aligned themselves with the national Democratic party and endorsed 
its presidential candidate, Horatio Seymour. Furthermore, they formed Democratic 
political clubs throughout the state. The Conservatives' attitude towards the Klan had 
always been mixed. On the one hand, they rejoiced over its effectiveness in weakening 
the Radical party apparatus in many counties. On the other, they deprecated its tactics 
when the extra-legal violence prompted Governor Brownlow to call the emergency 
session of the General Assembly. Relieved that the governor had opted to use Federal 
troops instead of militia, Conservatives were nevertheless disappointed that the state had 
been placed under de facto military rule. Such were the "fruits of the mighty K. K. K.," 
remarked one Conservative sarcastically. 28 
As the election soon demonstrated, the Federal garrison was a poor substitute for 
the State Guard when it came to protecting the polls, not to mention the Radical canvass 
27 Report of the Secretary of War (1868), xxx-xxxi; Sefton, United States Army and Reconstruction, 262; 
Porter Diary, 3, 5, 7, 9 October 1868. 
28 Trelease, White Terror, 45-46, 175; Hamer, Tennessee, 2: 642-43; Owens, "Union League of America," 
201; Porter Diary, 3 October 1868. Following the election in 1867, the General Assembly decided to hold 
Tennessee's congressional races in even-numbered years in conjunction with national elections. Bergeron, 
Tennesseans, 174. 
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and the registration of black voters. Unlike the Radical army of 1867, the U.S. army 
detachments in 1868 generally remained in camp and made no effort to enforce the anti-
Klan law. One army captain in Marshall County, citing his strict rules of engagement, 
ignored a white Radical's plea for help in apprehending Klansmen who had just 
murdered a black tenant farmer. Whereas militia officers were committed to the Radical 
cause, many army officers were indifferent or, in a few cases, even in sympathy with the 
Conservatives. A more serious shortcoming with General Thomas' s occupation in 1868 
was that all of his units were infantry and could not, therefore, effectively pursue Klan 
outlaws had they chosen to. When infantry replaced the vigilant Captain Edwin Leib's 
cavalry command in Sumner in late September, the so-called Harper gang resumed its 
terrorist activities with impunity. Other Klan vigilantes were also quick to realize the 
army's limitations as a law enforcer. Dispensing with their now illegal hoods and robes, 
Klansmen continued to intimidate blacks and voting registrars. On 19 October, 
Brownlow was compelled to void the registration in Lincoln County after his 
commissioner confessed that he had certified Rebels under duress. Eventually, the Klan 
returned to its violent methods as well. Just before the election, Klan raiders in Middle 
and West Tennessee swept through several counties, whipping some blacks and shooting 
others, in a final effort to dissuade Radicals from voting. There is no indication that the 
army did anything to stop these crimes. 29 
29 Sefton, United States Army and Reconstruction, 224; Phillips, "Freedmen's Bureau in Tennessee," 314, 
318; Sheafe v. Tillman, 61, 248; Report of the Secretary of War (1868), 152-55; Alexander, Political 
Reconstruction, 194-95; Coulter, Brownlow, 366; Trelease, White Terror, 175-76; Nashville Daily Press 
and Times, 10-13 November 1868. 
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Grant carried the state of Tennessee on 3 November, but the election returns 
reflect a dramatic drop in the Radical vote. The army ensured that the day of the election 
itself was quiet, but the political damage to the Radical party was already done. Whereas 
Brownlow received 74,437 votes in August 1867, fifteen months later Grant garnered 
only 56,606, a difference of 17,831. As scholars have noted, virtually the entire 
difference is accounted for by counties terrorized by the Klan. Despite the presence of 
some twenty companies of Federal troops, thousands of blacks stayed away from the 
polls out of fear. 30 
A key factor in this reversal of Radical fortunes, one overlooked by scholars, is 
the absence of the Tennessee State Guard. A comparison of the 1867 and 1868 returns 
from the twenty-eight counties in Middle and West Tennessee that received militia 
protection in 1867 illustrates the vital role that the State Guard played in Radical political 
success (see Appendix E). Whereas Conservatives eked out victories in four "militia" 
counties in 1867, they captured thirteen in 1868, including seven that were occupied by 
Federal troops. The outcome in Middle Tennessee is particularly striking. In Lincoln 
County, anti-Radicals seized control of the precincts and conducted an election in 
violation of the Franchise Act. The army officer in charge considered declaring martial 
law, but ultimately opted just to prevent rioting. The vote in that county was Radicals 
four, Conservatives 558. In Franklin, the sheriff persuaded the army company 
commander to send a squad into one of the few functioning precincts, but the detachment 
remained for only fifteen minutes. With Rebels chanting "shoot the damned Radicals," 
30 Hopkins, Tennessee Votes, 48-49; Alexander, Political Reconstruction, 193; Trelease, White Terror, 177. 
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the election there was a sham. In several other counties, especially Giles, the Radicals 
were simply overwhelmed. They nearly lost in Maury, despite the presence of three 
infantry companies, and in Rutherford, where a self-appointed white police force in 
Murfreesboro turned many prospective black voters away. 31 
In West Tennessee, the decline in Radical strength was less pronounced but no 
less discouraging. Here, too, the Federal detachments offered mostly symbolic 
protection. In Dyer and Obion, counties that militia major John T. Robeson had 
painstakingly secured for the Radicals in 1867, black turnout dropped by more than sixty-
five percent. The polls in Gibson County never even opened thanks to pre-election Klan 
terrorism. It does appear, however, that the army helped the Radicals win a narrow 
victory in the restless county of Madison. 32 
Deprived of the State Guard's partisan security, the Radical party lost over 12,500 
votes, mostly from blacks, in the "militia" counties alone. Conversely, the Conservative 
tally in these counties increased by over 4,000. Admittedly, these may have been legally 
cast, but Freedmen's Bureau agent George E. Judd reported that anti-Radicals in 
Rutherford unabashedly stuffed some of the ballot boxes. As they had hoped, 
Conservatives gained nominal majorities in two congressional districts. Governor 
Brownlow, however, refused to recognize the legitimacy of those results and, in a reprise 
31 Sheafe v. Tillman, 145-49, 237-38; Hopkins, Tennessee Votes, 49; Trelease, White Terror, 176; 
Nashville Daily Press and Times, 13 November 1868. 
32 Nashville Daily Press and Times, 7, 10, 12 November 1868; Frederick M. Culp and Mrs. Robert E. Ross, 
Gibson County Past and Present: The First General History of One of West Tennessee's Pivotal Counties 
(Trenton, 1961), 43; Hopkins, Tennessee Votes, 49. 
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of his arbitrary vote-tossing of 1865, he nullified the returns from selected counties 
overrun by the Klan and declared the Radical candidates victorious. 33 
A year without the State Guard had been a painful time for many Tennessee 
Radicals. The General Assembly's initial decree disbanding this standing army and 
Brownlow's later decision to rely solely on Federal troops instead of militia placed 
Reconstruction at the mercy of the Ku Klux Klan for most of 1868. In an address to the 
legislature a week after the election, Brownlow applauded the overall Radical victory. 
Commenting on his use of force, the governor explained that by employing the army "no 
expense to the State has been incurred." Nevertheless, the price in freedmen's blood and 
the disruption of party organization at the local level made the 1868 election a pyrrhic 
victory for the Radicals. Through its campaign of terrorism, the Klan destroyed most of 
the Union Leagues outside of East Tennessee and, ironically, prompted renewed efforts 
to repeal the Franchise Acts, the legal linchpin of Radical power. Even Brownlow began 
suggesting a conditional removal of political disabilities. 34 
Ku Kluxism did not end with the November election, but continued unpunished as 
the Federal troops returned to their barracks and the militia remained merely a force on 
paper. Within a matter of weeks, however, this seemingly incessant Klan defiance turned 
Brownlow'sjoy into wrath. In the spring of 1869, Tennessee's Radical army would stage 
a powerful return. 
33 Sheafe v. Tillman, 193-95; Coulter, Brownlow, 366-67. William B. Stokes, who easily won his third 
district with the aid of the militia in 1867, won again in 1868, but with 2,100 fewer votes. Darrah, 
"Political Career ofW. B. Stokes," 282. 
34 White, Messages, 5: 624-25, 627-28, 633. 
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CHAPTER EIGIIT 
Too Much, Too Late: The Return of the Radical Anny in 1869 
On 10 February 1869, Governor Brownlow tendered his resignation and prepared 
to take his seat in the U. S. Senate, to which the General Assembly had elected him over 
fifteen months before. On 25 February, DeWitt C. Senter, the speaker of the state Senate 
and a dedicated Radical, was sworn in as governor. This transition of power came at a 
critical time during Tennessee's Reconstruction. The Klan had recently resumed its 
violent activities and the state government was determined to destroy this ex-Confederate 
challenge once and for all. Three weeks prior to announcing his resignation, Brownlow 
mobilized the militia, and five days before handing the gubernatorial reins to Senter, he 
declared martial law in nine counties. It was the final action of one of Tennessee's most 
controversial governors. The stage seemed set for an exciting and decisive showdown 
between the Radical State Guard and the Rebel Ku Klux Klan. 1 
Radicals were disappointed by the army's failure to stop Klan terrorism. After the 
presidential election, the Daily Press and Times vented its frustration: "Let the damnable 
Kukluxers be shot down and exterminated if there is no other way of putting an end to the 
outrages of this wicked conclave." By January 1869, Klan violence had again reached 
alarming proportions. Radical newspapers reported increased Ku Kluxism in Coffee, 
Davidson, Fentress, Gibson, Giles, Overton, Maury, Lawrence, and Sumner counties. 
Overton was especially overrun. Some 200 Klansmen openly stalked the streets of 
Livingston, the county seat, disarming the freedmen and defying Radical authority. The 
1 White, Messages, 5: 652-53. 
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U. S. internal revenue collector fled the town after some of these vigilantes raided his 
home. State legislator Rufus Dowdy of neighboring Fentress barely evaded an apparent 
kidnapping attempt as he traveled through the county. The situation in many of these 
counties seemed to warrant martial law and the deployment of militia. But with the 
exception of Overton, no county met the stringent martial law prerequisites of the recent 
Militia Act. The General Assembly's concern over an executive abuse of power had 
paralyzed the state's response to terrorism.2 
Radical Tennesseans found encouragement in Arkansas's concomitant experience 
with the Klan. In November 1868, Republican governor Powell Clayton declared martial 
law in more than a dozen counties, and over the next four months he fought the Klan with 
a biracial militia .force. Moreover, he employed a number of undercover agents, some of 
whom successfully infiltrated the Klan and obtained lists of members and den locations. 
Despite the outcry against his ruthless tactics, Clayton attained satisfactory results. His 
militia killed several Klansmen, captured many more, and essentially broke the 
organization's back. Governor Brownlow was no less vigorous than Clayton, and he had 
already used his own militia effectively in 1867. There seemed to be no reason why he 
could not also defeat the Klan in Tennessee, provided he was given a free hand to do so.3 
In December, legislators in both houses of the General Assembly presented an 
amendment to the Militia Act that would enhance the governor's ability to declare martial 
law. A key supporter in the Senate was the usually moderate William Wisener. He 
2 Nashville Daily Press and Times, 13 November 1868, 10, 12, 14, 15, 18, 19, 27 January 1869; Knoxville 
Whig. 20 January, 3 February 1869; Trelease, White Terror, 177-78; Horn, Invisible Empire, 80. 
3 Trelease, White Terror, 149-74; Richard N. Current, Those Terrible Cametbaggers: A Reinterpretation 
(New York, 1988), 137-42. 
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considered the army's withdrawal in November an egregious breach of President 
Johnson's promise to help suppress Klan outlaws and believed that martial law was the 
only way that the state could "swing up these assassins." In the House, William W. 
Murray of Carroll acknowledged the seriousness of martial law but passionately defended 
its necessity. He tried to overcome his colleagues' fears of a Brownlow dictatorship by 
reminding them that the "sanguinary Kuklux" was the state's main concern. A few 
legislators moved to table the amendment and some even tried to repeal the force acts of 
the previous September, but a majority of Radicals were willing to risk military 
despotism in order to crush the Klan. With the House voting in favor 55-9 and the Senate 
17-5, the "martial law" bill passed into law on 16 January 1869. John Bowles ofKlan-
oppressed Overton County reportedly whooped for joy at the outcome, his cry described 
as a cross between "the bray of an Andalusian jack" and "the howl of a laughing hyena." 
Decrying martial law as "no law," the anti-Radical press branded the new decree the 
"crowning iniquity" ofRadicalism.4 
The Republican Banner rightly predicted that Governor Brownlow would soon 
unleash his "dogs of war" on the Klan. On 20 January, the governor issued a formal call 
for loyal militia volunteers. "Outrages have been long borne," he said, "but the executive 
is not to be cajoled or terrified." He closed his brief proclamation with a promise to make 
Middle and West Tennessee "as orderly and quiet" as East Tennessee. Brownlow 
refrained from declaring martial law for the time being, but he appointed General Joseph 
4 Senate Journal, 35th General Assembly, Adjourned Session, 72, 82, 101, 109, 135, 171; House Journal, 
168, 177, 236-41; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 15, 16 January 1869; Acts of Tennessee, 35th General 
Assembly, Second Session, Chapter 13; Nashville Republican Banner, 17 January 1869; Nashville Union 
and American, 19, 23, 24 January 1869. In 1868, the anti-Radical Union and Dispatch was renamed the 
Union and American. 
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A. Cooper to command once again the re-activated State Guard and ordered all 
companies to assemble in Nashville as soon as they organized. 5 
Contrary to the assertions of some historians, the Brownlow administration had 
little difficulty finding recruits for its second mobilization of the State Guard. James 
Patton and Thomas Alexander erroneously state that the governor's call for volunteers in 
September 1868 "got inadequate response" and that Brownlow was ''forced to rely" on 
the army. In actuality, while he gladly left election-day law enforcement to the Federal 
garrison, Brownlow unofficially assembled a militia force on paper, one that could 
rapidly mobilize if needed. Several days prior to the governor's militia proclamation of 
January 1869, Adjutant General Daniel T. Boynton activated a portion of this force. 
Moreover, he commissioned Sheriff Claiborne Beaty of Fentress a captain in the State 
Guard, authorized him to recruit more men, and renamed his County Guards the "Special 
County Police Force" for Overton, thereby providing immediate relief to that beleaguered 
part of the state. Newer companies also began to form. One future captain, E. E. 
Winters, opened a recruiting office in Nashville the day after the militia proclamation. 
Hanging a large poster printed with the popular wartime cry "Rally 'round the Flag," he 
enrolled about forty whites from Davidson County, some of whom were born in such 
northern states as New York, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts, and such countries as 
Ireland and Canada. His first lieutenant, P.A. Tillet, recruited several more volunteers 
from East Tennessee. On 11 February, the adjutant general mustered in Winters's 
5 Nashville Republican Banner, 17 January 1869; White, Messages, 5: 650. 
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polyglot command of eighty-eight men (average age, 23.6 years), with 18-year-old 
Patrick S. Cromwell of Nashville receiving the second lieutenancy.6 
After accepting his reappointment as commander-in-chief of the State Guard, 
General Cooper assumed complete control over the militia build-up. His first general 
order indicated that he reserved the right to approve or reject commissions. Concerned as 
always with discipline and professionalism, Cooper declared that he would accept only 
loyal men of"good moral character." On 26 January, he formed his general staff, which 
included his 19-year-old son, John Cooper, and Larken B. Gamble, the general's efficient 
aide-de-camp during the 1867 deployment. Major Albert S. Bayless, a 54-year-old 
farmer from Washington County, served as the quartermaster. He had Civil War 
experience as a staff officer in the 9th Tennessee Cavalry. 7 
Besides experience and leadership ability, Cooper brought a strong command 
presence to the capital. Through a series of interviews with Nashville newspapers, he 
thoughtfully kept the public apprised of military issues. To alleviate anti-Radical fears of 
race war, Cooper announced that "no colored soldiers" would be mustered in; the militia 
would comprise only whites, mostly from East Tennessee. He cautioned, however, that if 
the Klan continued to resist, he would not hesitate to form black militia units and place 
them in the field. Regarding the prospect of martial law, Cooper promised that the 
6 Patton, Unionism and Reconstruction, 198-99; Alexander, Political Reconstruction, 188; Knoxville Whig, 
7 October 1868; Daniel T. Boynton to John N. Ellis, J. W. Bowman, Joseph Moore, and D. F. Smith, 18 
January 1869, GP 21, Reel 2, Box 3, Folder 1; Nashville Republican Banner, 22, 28 January, 5 February 
1869; Muster Roll for Company C, 1st Regiment, Tennessee State Guard, Reel 8, Vol. 12; State Guard 
Officer Roster (1869), TAGO, Reel 13, Vol. 85. 
7 General Order No. 1, 25 January 1869, T AGO, Reel 9, Vol. 27; Special Order No. 2, 26 January 1869, 
TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 33; Census of Tennessee, 1870, Schedule of Population (Washington County), 232; 
CSR Index, Reel 1. 
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administration would not make that decision until the State Guard was ready for action. 
Until then, he urged local authorities to demonstrate a willingness to fight the Klan. 
When the editor of the Republican Banner denounced the militia build-up as "stupid" and 
accused the administration of trying to outshine Arkansas's Governor Clayton, Cooper 
politely replied that he would maintain firm control over his men. The general then 
shrewdly invited the Banner to denounce the Klan, but the editor "modestly" responded 
that his newspaper had no real influence among the state's ex-Confederates. For the most 
part, Cooper's statements were in keeping with Brownlow's policies, but in response to a 
question regarding the fate of captured Klansmen, the general declared flatly that the 
guilty "would be hung. "8 
Perhaps discomfited by General Cooper's last comment, the Banner on 23 
January shocked its readers with a false report of martial law. Warning that it was to be 
declared "in a day or two," the newspaper listed what it believed were twenty-five 
targeted counties, eleven in West Tennessee and fourteen in Middle. Furthermore, the 
Banner claimed that some 2,000 militiamen were already equipped, with more on the 
way. Before the Brownlow administration could repudiate these falsehoods, frantic 
petitions from over half of the named counties poured into the executive office. Some 
expressed indignation, insisting that occupation by "Cooper's legions" was unnecessary 
because no Klan existed in their counties, while others included resolutions promising to 
make a stronger effort to suppress the Klan using local resources. 9 
8 Nashville Daily Press and Times, 22, 25 January 1869; Nashville Republican Banner, 20, 21, 22 January 
1869. 
9 Tipton County Petition to Governor Brownlow, 26 January 1869, GP 21, Reel 1, Box 2, Folder 4; 
Nashville Daily Press and Times, 26 January 1869; Nashville Republican Banner, 24, 26, 28, 29, 31 
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Several counties, not content with written protests, sent delegations to Nashville 
to plead their case directly. General Cooper met with many of these delegates, but he 
was unimpressed by their asseverations. He upbraided the Madison delegates when they 
stated that they thought they could keep the peace on their own: "It is remarkably strange 
that you gentlemen have so recently discovered your ability to enforce the laws." 
Speaking in behalf of the Brownlow administration, the general similarly dismissed the 
arguments of other delegates. "We have had enough preambles and resolutions," he told 
the delegation from Rutherford, "We want action." He warned all of his visitors that if 
they did not help the state government "knock the Kuklux in the head," they could expect 
martial law. Dismayed by the delegations' rough treatment, the anti-Radical Memphis 
Appeal howled, "We are in the hands of the Philistines."10 
The martial law scare coupled with Cooper's stem admonitions seems to have had 
a beneficial effect in a few instances. Prominent anti-Radicals such as Arthur S. Colyar 
of Franklin County and Abner A. Steele of Marshall began publicly condemning Ku 
Kluxism. Radicals in Lincoln County reported a bipartisan effort to suppress the Klan. 
There, on 29 January, the constable of Fayetteville arrested a Klansman and confined him 
to jail for a week. At about the same time in Maury County, the commander of a small 
army detachment in Columbia, at the request of the civil authorities, agreed to help guard 
two recently apprehended Klansmen while they awaited trial. The most significant 
reaction to the Brownlow administration's hard-line approach, however, was Nathan B. 
January, 4, 6 February 1869; Nashville Union and American, 30, 31 January, 6 February 1869; Fayetteville 
Observer, 4, 28 February 1869. 
10 Nashville Union and American, 31 January 1869; Nashville Republican Banner, 28 January 1869; 
Nashville Daily Press and Times, 26 January 1869; Memphis Appeal, 25 January 1869. 
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Forrest's so-called disbandment order to the Klan at the end of January. Frustrated by the 
Klan's wanton violence and poor discipline, and fearful of a Clayton-style militia 
campaign against the organization, Forrest secretly ordered every den in Tennessee to 
curtail its activities, destroy its regalia, and go underground temporarily. For probably 
the only time in his life, the fearsome cavalry raider was backing out of a fight. 11 
Although many Klan dens appear to have obeyed their Grand Wizard's orders, the 
State Guard, ignorant of this development, continued to mobilize. The personnel records 
for this mobilization are incomplete and less detailed than those of 1867, but it appears 
that between 28 January and 18 February nineteen companies, totaling approximately 
1,600 white soldiers, mustered into service and encamped on the outskirts of Nashville 
(see Appendix F). What had taken the adjutant general over four months to do in 1867 
took less than one month in 1869. 12 
Many familiar faces returned to organize and lead this resurrected Radical army. 
One of them, William L. Hathaway, quickly raised a company of eighty-six horsemen 
from DeKalb County. He secured the services of John B. Taylor, age 35, as his first 
lieutenant. William C. Cravens returned to serve again as second lieutenant. Hathaway 
further helped raise a second company of seventy-eight men, also from DeKalb. Levi N. 
Woodsides, a 29-year-old miller from Liberty, commanded this unit. His lieutenants 
were McAdoo D. Vanetta, a farmer worth $9,000, and 24-year-old John B. Turner, a 
11 Nashville Republican Banner, 24, 31 January, 4 February 1869; Sheafe v. Tillman, 252-53; Fayetteville 
Observer, 4 February 1869; Susan Lawrence Davis, Authentic History: Ku Klux Klan. 1865-1877 (New 
York, 1924), 125-28; Trelease, White Terror, I 79-80. 
12 General Order No. 2, 12 February 1869, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 27; Nashville Republican Banner, 31 
January 1869. 
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former private in the 1867 Guard. All the militia officers from DeKalb had served in 
Joseph H. Blackburn's Civil War command. 13 
Also returning for duty were Judge K. Clingan and William N. Purdy. Among 
Clingan's ninety-seven volunteers from Bradley County were William L. Hicks, a 28-
year-old farmer, serving as first lieutenant, and Powell H. Low, a 24-year-old laborer and 
former bugler in the 4th Tennessee Cavalry. Significantly, only a few of the recruits from 
Bradley were veterans of the 1867 campaign. Moreover, Clingan's new company was 
rather young; the men averaged 19.7 years of age. His unhappy experience in West 
Tennessee in 1867 perhaps dissuaded many of his original volunteers from joining a 
second time. Purdy's sixty-man company from Monroe probably included many of his 
former soldiers. As in 1867, Purdy appears to have had no lieutenants. 14 
George W. Kirk, another veteran of the 1867 State Guard, supervised the 
formation of two companies from Greene County. His own comprised about eighty men 
including his former second lieutenant, Henry C. Sanders, who now served as first 
lieutenant, and 24-year-old Caswell T. Tipton, a small farmer and wartime first sergeant, 
now as the second lieutenant. Little is known about the second and much smaller 
company from Greene. First Lieutenant Joseph A. Moore and Second Lieutenant 
13 State Guard Officer Roster (1869), TAGO, Reel 13, Vol. 85; Special Order Nos. 3, 6, 28 January, 2 
February 1869, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 33; Nashville Republican Banner, 31 January, 14 February 1869; 
Nashville Union and American, 11 February 1869; CSR Index, Reels 15, 16; Census of Tennessee, 1870, 
Schedule of Population (Meigs County), 395, (DeKalb County), 128. Blackbum himself might also have 
offered his services to the 1869 State Guard, but at the time he appears to have been earning a lucrative 
living as a special bounty hunter for the Brownlow administration. Manson M. Brien to Governor 
Brownlow, 18 October 1868, Patton Collection. 
14 Muster Roll for Company B, 1st Regiment, Tennessee State Guard, TAGO, Reel 8, Vol. 14; State Guard 
Officer Roster (1869), TAGO, Reel 13, Vol. 85; Census of Tennessee, 1870, Schedule of Population 
(Bradley County), 314, 323; CSR Index, Reel 9; Nashville Union and American, 17 February 1869. 
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Jackson Grant commanded its forty-one men. Moore had been an officer in the "paper 
militia" that Adjutant General Boynton activated earlier in January. 15 
One of Kirk's former militia sergeants, 22-year-old Henry M. Cutshaw, served as 
first lieutenant in a large company from neighboring Washington County. Henry C. 
Yates, age 21, commanded this unit's 101 men, some of whom came from George E. 
Grisham's 1867 command. The average age of the men was 20.4 years. Henry A Cox, a 
24-year-old subsistence farmer, was elected to the second lieutenancy. Both lieutenants 
had Civil War experience, but Yates did not. Interestingly, six of the company's enlisted 
men were members of the large Shelton clan across the state line in Madison County, 
North Carolina. Confederate troops had massacred thirteen civilians there in 1863. 
Three of the victims were Sheltons. The family may have seen the Tennessee State 
Guard as a means of revenge. 16 
Michael Roberts, the 26-year-old former first sergeant from Kemp Murphy's 
1867 command, helped organize another company from Washington and served as its 
second lieutenant. Alexander R. P. Toncray, age 26, commanded this company of ninety-
two men, some of whom came from Carter County. Robert A Smith was elected first 
lieutenant. All three officers were Civil War veterans, Toncray having served as a 
captain in the 10th Tennessee Cavalry. 17 
is State Guard Officer Roster (1869), TAGO, Reel 13, Vol. 85; Census of Tennessee, 1870, Schedule of 
Population (Sevier County), 426; SCR Index, Reel 15; Nashville Union and American, 22 April 1869. 
16 Muster Roll for Company F, 2nd Regiment, Tennessee State Guard, IAGO, Reel 8, Vol. 15; State Guard 
Officer Roster (1869), TAGO, Reel 13, Vol. 85; Census of Tennessee, 1870, Schedule of Population 
(Greene County), 336; CSR Index, Reels 3, 4; Phillip Shaw Paludan, Victims: A True Stoiy of the Civil 
War (Knoxville, 1981), 26-27, 84-98. 
17 State Guard Officer Roster (1869), TAGO, Reel, Vol. 85; Morning Report for Company G, 1st Regiment, 
21 April 1869, TAGO, Reel 8, Vol. 17; CSR Index, Reels 13, 14, 15. 
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Robert L. Hall of Knox began reorganizing his old Company C, 1st Regiment, at 
the end of January, but shortly before departing for Nashville he resigned his commission 
for unstated reasons. Two of his old non-commissioned officers, Joseph 0. Manson and 
Noah N. West, stepped in to complete the task, enrolling enough additional men for a 
second company. Manson commanded the larger of the two, a unit of 104 men, and 
gained the services of newly-elected First Lieutenant J. D. Steele and Second Lieutenant 
Morgan C. Hackworth, a former sergeant in the 1st Tennessee Infantry. West became the 
second lieutenant in the other company (seventy-four men) serving under Captain John 
Haynes, a former company commander in the 9th Tennessee Cavalry, and 20-year-old 
First Lieutenant W. C. Chandler, a farm laborer and Civil War veteran. Chandler did not 
last long. On 22 February, he was dishonorably discharged for drunkenness. 18 
From Union County came ninety-five men under George W. Browning, a 27-
year-old farmer. The average age of the enlisted men was 20.5 years. Daniel F. Smith, a 
private in the 1867 Guard, had originally been asked by the adjutant general to command 
this unit, but he opted to serve as second lieutenant instead. The 26-year-old Smith 
brought a strong Unionist background to his position. He was one of the bridge-burners 
of 1861 and had used his home as a secret meeting place for Unionist guerrillas until his 
capture in 1862. He was released after a few months of captivity and returned to the 
fight. After the war, he worked as a farm laborer. The company's first lieutenant was 
18 Knoxville Whig. 10 February 1869; Robert L. Hall to Captain L.B. Gamble, 6 February 1869, TAGO, 
Reel 2, Box 9, Folder 5; State Guard Officer Roster (1869), TAGO, Reel 13, Vol. 85; Morning Report for 
Company I, 1st Regiment, 18 February 1869, TAGO, Reel 8, Vol. 19; Morning Report for Company E, 1st 
Regiment, 21 April 1869, TAGO, Reel 8, Vol. 17; Nashville Republican Banner, 29 January, 16 February 
1869; CSR Index, Reels, 3, 6, 10, 16; Census of Tennessee, 1870, Schedule of Population (Sevier County), 
413; General Order No. 3, 22 February 1869, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 27. 
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41-year-old Jacob Sharp, a middling farmer from Maynardville who had requested a 
commission in 1867 but for unknown reasons did not receive one. All three officers had 
served during the Civil War in the same company of the 1st Tennessee Infantry. 19 
John W. Roberts, the tall second lieutenant of Shadrack Harris's 1867 command, 
moved up to first lieutenant in 1869. He served under 34-year-old Captain Jefferson C. 
French and over 27-year-old Second Lieutenant James R. French in a command 
consisting of seventy men from Jefferson County. The two Frenches were not related. 
Lieutenant French was a farm laborer from Flat Gap who brought some wartime non-
commissioned officer experience to his new post. Captain French was a well-to-do 
cotton factor from Nashville, worth nearly $30,000. Although he apparently did not 
serve in the war, he was a good Radical, serving as Jefferson County's registrar in 1867. 
He further demonstrated his political credentials in a rather peculiar way. In a cryptic 
letter to Andrew Johnson written shortly before he joined the State Guard, French asked 
the president "not to leave the Government without its constitutional provisions." He 
also stated that "the union men of the north and south will enforce this measure. Liberty 
or monarchy." Friends of the president informed him that French was "very drunk" when 
he wrote this letter. 20 
19 Muster Roll for Company D, 1st Regiment, Tennessee State Guard, TAGO, Reel 8, vol. 13; State Guard 
Officer Roster (1869), TAGO, Reel 13, Vol. 85; Census of Tennessee, 1870, Schedule of Population 
(Union County), 241,245,282; D. T. Boynton to Daniel F. Smith, 18 January 1869, GP 21, Reel 2, Box 3, 
Folder 1; War of the Rebellion, Series Two, 1: 863, 870, 881; Jacob Sharp to Governor Brownlow, 27 April 
1867, GP 21, Reel 1, Box 2, Folder 2; CSR Index, Reels 2, 14. 
20 State Guard Officer Roster (1869), TAGO, Reel 13, Vol. 85; Nashville Union and American, 18 
February 1869; CSR Index, Reel 5; Census of Tennessee, 1870, Schedule of Population (Jefferson County), 
303, (Davidson County), 3-293; Knoxville Whig, 24 April 1867; Graf, Papers of Andrew Johnson, 15: 399-
400. 
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Several units had no direct links with the 1867 State Guard. Among these fresh 
Radical warriors was a company of ninety-seven men from Blount County. James P. 
Edmondson commanded. His first lieutenant, Samuel A Cowan, age 26, was a survivor 
of the tragic Sultana explosion. Cowan had applied for a commission in 1867, but like 
Jacob Sharp had not received it. Twenty-year-old Nathan H. Greer, a farm laborer, 
served as the unit's second lieutenant. Edmondson and Cowan were members of the 
Maryville Union League, an organization that dominated politics in Blount County for 
much of the Reconstruction period. Although no muster roll for this company exists, it is 
likely that several of its volunteers were also members of this league.21 
Sevier County contributed as many as eighty-seven men to the militia build-up. 
Samuel M. Hammer, a 21-year-old salesman, commanded these volunteers. His father 
was state legislator Jonathan M. Hammer, a strong supporter of the anti-Klan and militia 
acts. In raising his company, Hammer was reunited with his wartime comrade Lemuel 
Bogart, age 23. As teenagers during the Civil War the two had served in the same 
artillery battery (and probably worked the same gun). Bogart, a farm laborer, was elected 
first lieutenant, while Andrew J. Harris, a wartime cavalry sergeant, became second 
lieutenant.22 
21 Morning Report for Company A, 1st Regiment, 25 June 1869, TAGO, Reel 8 Vol. 17; State Guard 
Officer Roster, TAGO, Reel 13, Vol. 85; Inez Bums, History of Blount County, Tennessee: From War 
Trail to Landing Strip, 1795-1955 (Maryville, 1957), 319; S. A. Cowan to Ben Cunningham, 2 March 
1867, GP 21, Reel 1, Box 2, Folder l; Census of Tennessee, 1870, Schedule of Population (Blount 
County), 127, 161; Benjamin H. Severance, "Loyalty's Political Vanguard: The Union League of 
Maryville, Tennessee, 1867-1869," The Journal ofEast Tennessee History 71 (1999), 25-46. On 27 April 
1865, the steamboat Sultana, carrying liberated Union prisoners of war, exploded on the Mississippi River, 
killing hundreds on board. See McPherson, Battle Cry Of Freedom, 853. 
22 Nashville Daily Press and Times, 16 February 1869; State Guard Officer Roster (1869), TAGO, Reel 13, 
Vol. 85; McBride, Biographical Directory. 2: 375-76; Census of Tennessee, 1870, Schedule of Population 
(Sevier), 353, 378; CSR Index, Reels 2, 6. 
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The largest company mustered into service, a unit of 120 men, came from Carter 
County. Christopher C. Wilcox, a 43-year-old saddler from Elizabethton, commanded 
these mountain boys. Wilcox was one of the most experienced officers in the State 
Guard. He had fought throughout the Civil War in the 13th Tennessee Cavalry, mostly as 
a company commander, and finished the conflict with the rank of major. His most 
exciting action occurred in September 1864, when he led the raiding party that killed the 
famous Confederate cavalry leader John Hunt Morgan in Greeneville, Tennessee, and 
effectively destroyed his forces. Wilcox's two militia lieutenants were Daniel K. Rowe, a 
wartime lieutenant, and 33-year-old Jacob W. Hendrickson, a well-to-do farmer and 
former captain in the 8th Tennessee Cavalry. Hendrickson and Wilcox were two of 
Carter's delegates to the Greeneville Convention in 1861. 23 
A N. Roach organized a company·of eighty-six men from McMinn County. 
Little more is known about this unit besides the names of the two lieutenants: J. Smith 
Riggs and John T. Rider, the latter a Civil War veteran. E. H. Gurney raised a company 
of seventy-nine men from Anderson and Roane counties. This unit's lieutenants, Alfred 
N. Ragle and Thomas T. Wilson, brought with them experience as officers in the 1st 
Tennessee Infantry. Ragle had participated in an extensive anti-guerrilla operation in 
Middle Tennessee during the final months of 1864.24 
23 Nashville Union and Americ1m, 12 February 1869; State Guard Officer Roster, TAGO, Reel 13, Vol. 85; 
Census of Tennessee, 1870, Schedule of Population (Carter County), 60, 73; CSR Index, Reels 7, 13, 16; 
War of the Rebellion, Series One, 39(1): 489-92; Temple, East Tennessee and the Civil War, 572. 
24 Knoxville Whig. 10 February 1869; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 27 January 1869; Nashville Union 
and American, 11 February 1869; Morning Reports for Companies F and K, 1st Regiment, 21 April 1869, 
TAGO, Reel 8, Vol. 17; State Guard Officer Roster (1869), TAGO, Reel 13, Vol. 85; CSR Index, Reels 12, 
13, 16; War of the Rebellion, Series One, 45(1): 428-29. Captain Gurney apparently recruited men from 
McMinn, as well as Roane and Anderson counties, angering the officers of Roach's command. J. S. Riggs 
to General Cooper, 3 February 1869, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 9, Folder 5. 
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The last company to muster came from Carroll County, the only militia unit from 
West Tennessee. First Lieutenant John L. Murray was its sole officer. With the arrival 
ofMurray and his forty volunteers in Nashville on 18 February, the mobilization of the 
Tennessee State Guard was declared complete, although other companies were still trying 
to form. 25 
The 1869 Guard was different in some respects from its 1867 counterpart. Fifteen 
of the nineteen companies came from East Tennessee, compared to twelve out oftwenty-
one in 1867. Moreover, five companies were raised in counties not represented in the 
1867 mobilization. The most significant difference, however, was that the State Guard of 
1869 was all white, whereas about 500 blacks had served in 1867. Many 1867 volunteers 
declined to serve in 1869, but the large number of white troops who did enlist suggests 
that Radicalism was not lacking in strength. Of the fifty-six men serving as company 
officers in 1869, only fifteen were veterans of the 1867 deployment. The military and 
socioeconomic background of the officer corps in 1869 was, however, remarkably similar 
to that of the 1867 Guard. Forty of the 1869 militia officers were Civil War veterans, 
fifteen as officers (the respective figures for 1867 are forty-seven and eighteen). The 
average age in 1869 was 27.5 years, the same as in 1867. Additionally, 1870 census data 
on twenty-five company officers reveals that they, like their 1867 brethren, were mostly 
married farmers with children whose property value averaged about $3,300 ($3,000 in 
1867). Although many of the names were new, there was little measurable difference 
25 Nashville Republican Banner, 20 February 1869; State Guard Officer Roster (1869), TAGO, Reel 13, 
Vol. 85; John(?) Murray to Captain L.B. Gamble, 18 February 1869, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 9, Folder 5. A 
man named McWhiney informed State Guard headquarters that he had organized a full company from 
McMinn County, but General Cooper never granted him a commission. McWhiney to General Cooper, 3 
February 1869, IAGO, Reel 2, Box 9, Folder 5. 
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between the officer corps of the two Guards. The militia leaders of 1869 possessed the 
same vigor, maturity, and professionalism that marked the officers of 1867. 
As the companies began arriving in Nashville in early February, General Cooper 
took steps to get the men into fighting trim. With Captain Edmondson acting as the 
training officer, Cooper ordered all companies to conduct a minimum of four hours of 
drill each day. Evidently, some of the training included techniques in border patrol for, 
as Cooper explained to some journalists, he hoped to prevent Klansmen from neighboring 
states from crossing over and helping the Tennessee Klan. In addition to training, Cooper 
instructed his officers to study and read aloud selections from the U. S. army's Articles of 
War and to maintain strict accountability of their men. When a few militiamen caused 
some disturbances in downtown Nashville, Cooper confined all of his soldiers to their 
camps and forbade the consumption of alcohol, except for a ration of beer. On the 
afternoon of 18 February, Cooper inspected the troops as part of a grand review and 
appears to have judged them ready for action.26 
At this point, General Cooper established a tighter chain of command over the 
State Guard than had existed in 1867. The regimental structure of the first militia 
deployment was more a formality than a working reality; the twenty-one companies 
typically operated as separate, quasi-autonomous units scattered all over the state. Given 
the strength and ubiquity of the Ku Klux Klan in 1869, however, such dispositions risked 
destruction in detail. Thus, Cooper restored the integrity of the traditional regiment, 
26 Special Order Nos. 7, 8, 10, (5, 6, IO February 1869), TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 33; Nashville Union and 
American, 4, 16 February 1869; General Order No. 3, 17 February 1869, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 27. The 
incidents that prompted Cooper to lock down the militia encampment included a militiaman's refusal to pay 
for breakfast at a black-owned restaurant and the killing of a Federal soldier by a militiaman during a 
brawl. Nashville Republican Banner, 7, 11, 12 February 1869. 
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enabling multiple companies to fight in concert under the direction of a field-grade 
officer. Shortly after his grand inspection, he appointed Larken B. Gamble lieutenant 
colonel of the 1st Regiment with Major Judge K. Clingan as the executive. William L. 
Hathaway subsequently became commander of the 2nd Regiment with Major George W. 
Kirk as the executive (see Appendix F). The four handpicked men were all seasoned 
militia officers who understood the nuances of Reconstruction's politics of force. 27 
The regimental structure greatly enhanced logistical efficiency. Each company 
appointed a supply officer who worked directly with a regimental quartermaster who in 
turn reported to Major Bayless. Although the quartermaster records for 1869 are less 
detailed than those of 1867, Bayless appears to have closely monitored the State Guard's 
supply needs~ there were few shortages and fewer complaints during the deployment. 
The quartermaster department also supervised a smooth distribution of firearms. The 
state had apparently retained possession of its army ordnance after the 1867 deployment 
and constructed a proper armory in the interim. As the volunteer companies 
rendezvoused in Nashville, a team of gunsmiths inspected and cleaned over 1,500 rifles 
prior to distribution. Throughout the deployment, Bayless maintained a reserve arsenal 
of 480 rifles and 66,000 rounds of ammunition.28 
As the Radical army completed its organization, many legislators in the General 
Assembly renewed their objections to its existence. Klan activity had declined over the 
27 Special Order Nos. 17, 22, (20, 25 February 1869), IAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 33; Nashville Daily Press and 
Times, 18 February 1869. 
28 General Order Nos. 4, 6, 7 (23 February, 1, 2 March 1869), IAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 27; Major Bayless to 
Lieutenant Colonel Gamble, 15 March 1869, IAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 28; Nashville Republican Banner, 4 
February 1869, Major Bayless to General Cooper, 13 March 1869, IAGO, Reel 2, Box 10, Folder 4. 
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preceding weeks and these legislators saw no reason for continuing the militia 
mobilization. In the Senate, Hiram Patterson of Smith, a consistent opponent of the use 
of force, recommended that no more than four companies of militia be activated. In the 
House, a majority resolved to stop the creation of a standing army altogether. I. A 
Taylor of Carter argued that, due to the "crippled condition" of the state treasury, the 
militia would "greatly add to our indebtedness." On 10 February, a resolution directing 
Governor Brownlow to disband the entire State Guard passed, 35-23. Among the 
majority were fifteen members who barely three weeks earlier had voted for the martial 
law amendment. Although the hawkish William J. Smith buried both the House 
Resolution and Patterson's proposal in his Senate military committee, anti-Radicals 
delighted over what they believed was the General Assembly's waning enthusiasm for 
"Brownlowism." "Strip them of the Militia," one Conservative said of the governor's 
supporters, " & their power is gone. "29 
Far from being stripped of his Radical army, Governor Brownlow at last began 
his war against the Klan. On 20 February, he declared martial law in nine counties: 
Gibson, Haywood, and Madison in West Tennessee and Giles, Jackson, Lawrence, 
Marshall, Maury, and Overton in Middle. He further ordered General Cooper to deploy 
the State Guard "at once, and continue them in service until we have unmistakable 
evidence of the purpose of all parties to keep the peace." At least one scholar has rightly 
questioned the inclusion of Lawrence and Jackson in the martial law edict. These 
counties had no significant history of lawlessness. State legislator W. P. H. Turner of 
29 Senate Journal, 35th General Assembly, Adjourned Session, 226,258; House Journal, 371-72; Nashville 
Union and American, 9, 20 February 1869; Graf, Papers of Andrew Johnson, 15: 421,436. 
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Lawrence, whom the anti-Radical press incorrectly identified as a Radical, was "greatly 
astonished" that his "law abiding" county had been placed under martial law, without his 
consent no less. The omission of such Klan strongholds as Dyer, Franklin, Lincoln, 
Obion, and Rutherford from the governor's decree is equally surprising. Anti-Radicals in 
Lincoln County quietly counted their blessings. The Fayetteville Observer made little 
mention of the militia deployment after its county was spared the governor's wrath. 
Whatever the rationale behind the selections, the Republican Banner denounced the 
martial law proclamation as "a last desperate move" by the much-hated "Brownlow 
regime. "30 
As Brownlow issued his declaration of martial law, the body of a Cincinnati 
detective named Seymour Barmore washed up on the bank of the Duck River in Maury 
County. Several months before, Brownlow had hired Barmore to infiltrate the Klan in 
Giles and essentially do for his administration what Governor Clayton's agents did in 
Arkansas: obtain hard evidence of Ku Kluxism. Evidently, Barmore did acquire some 
useful information, for General Cooper intimated to some of the protesting county 
delegates that he had the names of several Klansmen. In any event, the nightriders of 
Giles and Maury discovered the spy amongst them and, on 11 January, a group of them 
. dragged Barmore from a Nashville-bound train and summarily executed him in a nearby 
forest. The recovery of the detective's body six weeks later helped rally lukewarm 
Radicals against the Klan. State legislator John M. Cordell of Scott, an erstwhile 
opponent of the militia, helped push through a resolution calling on General Cooper "to 
3° Knoxville Whig, 20 February 1869; American Annual Cyclopedia (1869), 662; Trelease, White Terror, 
470; Nashville Union and American, 23 February 1869; Nashville Republican Banner, 21, 23 February 
1869. 
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bring to justice the perpetrators of this most cruel, wicked and atrocious murder." 
Barmore's death added a timely sense of urgency to Browlow's martial law 
proclamation. 31 
On 23 February, five companies of State Guard under Lieutenant Colonel Gamble 
marched into Giles County. Using Pulaski as his headquarters, Gamble established a 
"Military District" consisting of Giles and the adjacent counties of Lawrence, Marshall, 
and Maury (see Appendix G). After closing the civil courts, he urged the citizens to 
assist him in "ferreting out those disturbers of the Public Peace that they may be dealt 
with as they deserve." Simultaneously, Gamble dispatched militia units throughout his 
zone of control with orders to arrest any suspected Klansman, or at least those whose 
names were on a secret list provided by General Cooper. Maury resident Nimrod Porter 
decried this "terrible state of affairs" and feared that the militia would show no quarter. 32 
Gamble's entrance was impressive, but his raids netted few Rebel vigilantes. 
Although the militia apprehended some Klansmen in Giles County, many suspects 
evaded capture by fleeing across the state line into Alabama. Among these fugitives was 
Frank McCord, the editor of the Pulaski Citizen, an anti-Radical newspaper that appears 
to have shutdown temporarily during the militia dragnet. Most Klansmen, however, 
simply went into hiding as per Forrest's instructions. In Maury, a county described by 
one historian as "a loyal province of the Invisible Empire," the militia forces could find 
31 Alexander, Political Reconstruction, 196-97; Trelease, White Terror, 178; Nashville Republican Banner, 
4 February 1869; House Journal, 35th General Assembly, Adjourned Session, 470. Stanley Horn offers a 
lively account ofBarmore's ill-fated exploits in Invisible Empire, 108-12. 
32 General Order No. 4, 23 February 1869, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 27; Post Order Nos. 1-2, 25, 26 February 
1869, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 28; Nashville Republican Banner, 24 February 1869; Porter Diary, 28 February 
1869. 
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no one to arrest and soon returned to their base camp around Pulaski. Far from suffering 
the horrors of martial law, several Maury Conservatives actually embarked on a pleasant 
deer hunt during this period, an excursion that took them into militia-occupied Lawrence 
County as well. 33 
While producing meager results, the flurry of militia activity spawned a number 
of spectacular rumors. The Union and American reported that Gamble had ordered the 
summary execution of four of his captives. This newspaper also claimed that the militia 
was holding "forty prominent citizens" as hostages to ensure Klan quiescence. Whether 
or not he believed these stories, one Freedmen's Bureau agent in Columbia (Maury) 
considered the situation "deplorable." He recommended to his commander that the army 
reopen the Bureau courts in those areas affected by martial law. 34 
Before Lieutenant Colonel Gamble could undertake further anti-Klan operations, 
DeWitt Senter became governor and implemented a significant change in policy. 
Although Senter was less extreme politically than Brownlow (he opposed black suffrage, 
for example), he regarded the Klan with the same contempt as his predecessor. As a state 
senator, he had voted for the expanded gubernatorial power that he now possessed. 
Furthermore, in his inaugural address of25 February, Senter stressed his commitment to 
law and order. Expecting the worst from the new governor, the Union and American 
warned Senter to rescind martial law or face a revolution. This newspaper's fears were 
unfounded, for where Brownlow had been authoritarian, Senter proved to be conciliatory. 
33 Sheafe v. Tillman, 242-43; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 1 April 1869; Trelease, White Terror, 182; 
Horn, Invisible Empire, 81; Nashville Republican Banner, 25 February 1869. 
34 Nashville Union and American 27 February 1869; T. H. Reeves to James Thompson, 28 February 1869, 
Records of the Assistant Commissioner for the State of Tennessee, BRFAL, Record Group 105, Reel 18. 
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On 27 February, Senter modified the martial decree by reopening the civil courts and 
ordering General Cooper and his subordinates to cooperate with local law enforcement 
much as the State Guard had done in 1867. A relieved Republican Banner proclaimed 
the governor's decision "welcome news," although Gamble waited at least three days 
before complying with this abrupt directive. 35 
A number of factors account for Senter' s relaxation of martial law. In the Senate, 
moderate Radicals had reintroduced the House resolution calling for the State Guard to 
disband. On 26 February, the motion narrowly failed 10-8, but the vote reflected the 
legislature's growing opposition to a standing army and martial law. As Senter watched 
this development in the General Assembly, he was deluged by a fresh round of petitions 
protesting the militia deployment. The magistrates and sheriffs of Giles, Lawrence, and 
Marshall insisted that their counties were quiet and that they could suppress the Klan, if it 
ever showed itself again, without the militia. Finally, shortly after his inauguration, 
Senter had an interesting conversation with Judge James 0. Shackleford of the state 
Supreme Court. In the presence of General Cooper, Shackleford informed the governor 
that the judiciary had strong misgivings about martial law in a time of peace and urged 
him to consider restoring civil authority as soon as possible, lest the executive branch 
forfeit its popular support. 36 
35 Hamer, Tennessee, 2: 645-46; White, Messages, 6: 3-5; Nashville Union and American, 23 February, 4 
March 1869; General Order No. 5, 27 February 1869, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 27; Nashville Republican 
Banner, 28 February 1869; Post Order No. 4, 1 March 1869, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 28. Curiously, Senter 
made no specific mention of the militia deployment in his inaugural address. 
36 Senate Journal, 3 5th General Assembly, Adjourned Session, 317; A. Cox to Governor Senter, 25 
February 1869, Governor D. C. Senter Papers, Tennessee State Library and Archives, Box I, Folder 2; 
Giles County Petition to Governor Senter, 26 February 1869, Senter Papers, Box 1, Folder 6; Lawrence 
County Petition to Governor Senter, 26 February 1869, Senter Papers, Box 1, Folder 3; Nashville 
Republican Banner, 6 March 1869; Nashville Union and American, 28 April 1869. William J. Smith, 
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The "modification" to martial law did not end the militia deployment. Radical 
hard-liners worried that a complete suspension of military operations would encourage 
renewed Rebel vigilantism. Dismissing the county petitions as disingenuous indignation, 
Senator Joshua B. Frierson of Maury cautioned that if the militia was disbanded, the anti-
Radicals would "chuckle in their sleeves, and the Ku Klux Klan [ would] rise up again." 
Senter shared his former colleague's concerns and, during the first week of March, he 
clarified his new policy. The State Guard would remain on active duty until the county 
authorities produced "practical evidence" of their intentions to uphold the laws. 
Moreover, wherever sheriffs and constables were remiss in their duties, militia officers 
would be permitted to intervene. In short, like Brownlow before him, Senter wanted to 
see some Klan outlaws arrested, prosecuted, and convicted. 37 
With Senter's approval, General Cooper continued to deploy the State Guard. 
Moving much of his command by steamboat, Lieutenant Colonel Hathaway led seven 
companies into Livingston (Overton) on 5 March and established another military 
district, one that covered Jackson and Overton counties (see Appendix G). Like Gamble, 
however, Hathaway discovered that the Klan's wave of terror had largely subsided. 
Jackson was so quiet that troops were never stationed there. Hathaway did conduct 
mounted patrols through Overton, which captured one Klansman, but these were mostly 
mop-up operations. For six weeks prior to the militia's arrival, Sheriff Claiborne Beaty's 
special county police force had effectively suppressed the Klan. A former Unionist 
chairman of the Senate military committee, appears to have been absent when the resolution to disband the 
militia was reintroduced. 
37 Nashville Republican Banner, 27 February, 6, 9 March 1869; Knoxville Whig, 24 March 1869. 
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guerrilla from that part of the state, Beaty knew the country well and, despite a shortage 
of ammunition, aggressively rooted out a number of Klan dens. Rather than make 
arrests, however, he was content to drive these bands into Kentucky. As a result, the 
rather large militia command, after its arrival, either simply guarded the state border or 
d · 38 staye m camp. 
Lieutenant Colonel Hathaway apparently chafed at the lack of excitement in 
Overton. In the latter part of March, he led an expedition into neighboring Putnam, a 
county beyond the limits of martial law, on the pretext of pursuing fugitive Klansmen. 
This foray, which accomplished little, culminated in a dramatic show of force in the town 
of Cookeville. Witnesses claimed that Hathaway "boastingly and defiantly perambulated 
the streets with drawn pistols, bursting caps at quiet and peaceable citizens, demanding 
perfect obedience to his commands." Evidently, he also made a few arrests in violation 
of the modified martial Jaw decree. When he returned to Overton, he received a direct 
order to begin cooperating with justices of the peace in upholding the law. Hathaway 
also found the citizens in that part of the state eager for his men to leave. 39 
At the end of March, Radical delegates from Overton visited the governor in 
Nashville to negotiate the removal of the militia from their county. Thanking the 
governor for his efforts in fighting the Klan, they contended that the crisis had passed and 
38 General Order No. 7, 1 March 1869, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 27; Special Order Nos. 29-30, 5 March 1869, 
TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 33; Nashville Union and Americim, 7 March 1869; Nashville Republicai:i Banner, 4, 
11 March 1869; Captain French to Captain Yates, 5 March 1869, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 32; C. Beaty to 
Governor Senter, 24 March 1869, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 4; Robert L. and Mary Eldridge, 
Bicentennial Echoes of the History of Overton County. Tennessee (Livingston, 1976), 67; Nashville Dfilly 
Press and Times, 16 March 1869. In addition to hunting down the Klan, militiamen may have also helped 
the U. S. army destroy some illicit distilleries in Overton. See Nashville Press and Times, 31 March 1869. 
39 J. J. Womack to Governor Senter, late March 1869, Senter Papers, Box 1, Folder 6; Special Order No. 
52, 24 March 1869, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 33. 
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that there was nothing further for the militia to do. Not only were the troops eating 
everything in the vicinity of Livingston, the delegates complained, but they were also 
succumbing to a measles epidemic that had recently struck the militia encampment. 
While complimentary of Hathaway's overall performance, the Cookeville incident 
notwithstanding, they recommended that the force of 500 militiamen be reduced to fifty. 
General Cooper thought the full occupation should continue until some examples had 
been made "to terrify evil doers." Governor Senter, however, accepted the sincerity of 
the delegation and promised to withdraw some of the companies, beginning with Sheriff 
Beaty's special police force. 40 
If the State Guard deployment in Middle Tennessee seemed anticlimactic, militia 
activities in West Tennessee produced a few instances of drama. Between 2 and 5 
March, Major Judge K. Clingan and five companies headed for Humboldt (Gibson), 
where they established a military district over Gibson, Haywood, and Madison counties 
(see Appendix G). For Clingan, the deployment was a return to his 1867 area of 
operations. Madison whites protested this latest militia occupation, claiming that the 
Klan had been nothing more than a "will-o-the-wisp" and had long since disappeared. 
West Tennessee Radicals, however, were delighted by the militia's presence, particularly 
Humboldt's school superintendent W. H. Stilwell, who had earlier boasted that "two 
weeks of real working mounted militia would conquer" the Klan. Another Radical, J. C. 
Reaves of nearby Weakley, even requested that the State Guard extend its jurisdiction to 
40 Nashville Daily Press and Times, 24, 25 March, 9 April 1869; Nashville Republican Banner, 25 March 
1869. On 20 March, General Cooper ordered Sheriff Beaty to disband his unit and return to Fentress 
County. Special Order No. 51, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 33. 
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include his county. According to him, the Klan was still active, albeit discreetly, around 
the county seat of Dresden. 41 
Major Clingan soon found that some Klan dens were willing to fight. On 10 
March, in response to reported Klan outrages against the black community in western 
Haywood, he sent a detachment of twenty men under Lieutenant Powell Low to 
investigate. Low spent most of his time patrolling the vicinity of Woodville, but perhaps 
suspecting that Klansmen were using neighboring Lauderdale County as a safe haven, he 
crossed the boundary and began searching farmhouses for Rebel outlaws. When the 
owner of one farm accused the militiamen of trespassing, he was allegedly fired on. This 
incident contributed to a growing resentment among local whites. Returning that evening 
to Woodville, Low bivouacked under arms-wisely so, as it turned out, for at 9:00 PM 
"an organization of outlaws" attacked the militia unit. One anti-Radical newspaper 
contended that about a dozen "bold determined men" carried out the attack, while another 
claimed that the assailants were merely "small boys." Low, however, estimated that the 
force comprised as many as 100 mounted Klansmen. In any event, after standing his 
ground for four hours, the lieutenant commenced a slow retreat to Brownsville, 
exchanging sporadic fire with the Rebels until around 10:00 AM the following day. 
Despite the apparent intensity of the skirmish, Low reported only one casualty among his 
men. Klan casualties are unknown. 42 
41 General Order No. 6, 2 March 1869, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 27; Special Order Nos. 23, 26, 28 February, 2 
March 1869, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 33; Memphis Appeal, 1 March 1869; W. H. Stilwell to John Eaton, 28 
January 1869, John Eaton Papers, Special Collections, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, Box 1, Folder 
9; J.C. Reaves to G. Underwood, 27 February 1869, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 4. 
42 Nashville Daily Press and Times, 19, 20 March 1869; Nashville Union and American, 16 March 1869; 
Nashville Republican Banner, 23 March 1869. 
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With the willing assistance of Haywood sheriff S. S. Sherman, Major Clingan 
soon launched a counter-attack. On 21 March, he led a force of 150 men back to 
Woodville. Ordering Captain William Hicks to seal off the roads with strong pickets, 
Clingan rushed into the town with thirty mounted men hoping to catch any Klansmen by 
surprise. In a house-by-house search, conducted under a cold rain, the militiamen 
apprehended one of the men believed to have been involved in the shoot-out with Low. 
Three other suspects managed to escape with the help of the townspeople. Disappointed 
by the results, Clingan halted all business in Woodville and assembled the town's leading 
citizens for a meeting. Castigating them for their complicity in the region's lawlessness, 
the major demanded that they disclose the Klan's hiding places. This proved fruitless. 
Realizing that his listeners were either in league with the Klan or afraid of reprisals 
should they cooperate with him, Clingan handed his lone prisoner over to Sheriff 
Sherman and returned to Humboldt on 24 March. 43 
Clingan's punitive raid may not have captured many Klansmen, but it did subdue 
Haywood's defiant ex-Confederates. According to the Daily Press and Times, many of 
the county's Klan outlaws fled to Arkansas, where Governor Clayton had recently ended 
his militia campaign. Whereas Captain Hicks had asserted that a "reign of terror" existed 
in Haywood before the Woodville occupation, Lieutenant Smith Riggs described a "quiet 
43 Nashville Daily Press and Times, 23, 26, 30 March 1869; Nashville Republican Banner, 27 March 1869; 
Nashville Union and American. 23 March 1869. The Memphis Avalanche (as reported in the Daily Press 
and Times, 26 March) falsely stated that the townspeople of Woodville killed fifteen militiamen during 
Clingan' s occupation. 
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condition" in its aftermath. Riggs even believed that the improved situation would permit 
the governor to disband many of the militia companies.44 
Having brought order to his military district in March, Major Clingan incited a 
needless controversy in April. In the early part of the month, he posted an order under 
the heading "Department ofForky Deer," referring to the nearby Forked Deer River, 
which runs through southwest Gibson County. When Mr. A. Richardson, a former 
Confederate captain, crossed out the "y" in Forky and penciled in "ed," Clingan had him 
arrested and charged with "mutilation of general orders." A militia tribunal meted out a 
harsh and unusual punishment. Richardson was tied to a telegraph pole by his thumbs, 
where he languished for more than four hours, during which time the occupants of 
several passing trains gawked at the spectacle. 45 
Gibson whites condemned Clingan's extra-legal punishment. Describing the 
militia major as a "wooden-headedjackanapes," the Republican Banner reminded its 
readers that martial law had been modified to prevent such outrages. This newspaper 
joined a chorus of demands calling for an immediate removal of all the militia from West 
Tennessee. After his release, Richardson levied a $100,000 civil lawsuit against Clingan. 
Later in the month, however, he apparently had an altercation with two militiamen and 
received a bullet in his thigh. The Banner described the incident as an assassination 
44 Nashville Daily Press and Times, 29, 30 March, 1 April 1869; Nashville Republican Banner, 27 March 
1869. 
45 Nashville Republican Banner, 7, 13, 15, 30 April 1869; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 14 April 1869; 
Culp and Ross, Gibson County, 43. Culp and Ross incorrectly state that Richardson was executed by 
hanging. 
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attempt. Richardson recovered from his wound, but he also appears to have dropped the 
lawsuit.46 
Richardson's ordeal was only the latest on a growing list of civilian grievances 
against the State Guard during the spring of 1869. With no Klan to fight, some of the 
militiamen in Giles County began preying on the very people they came to protect. On 
the evening of 1 March, a Private Adams raped a 12-year-old black girl on the outskirts 
of Pulaski. Discovering what had happened, the girl's father and some other black men 
chased Adams into the woods and severely beat him. Summoned to investigate the 
incident, Captain E. E. Winters interrogated the blacks and the injured Adams, who was 
recovering in the home of a black widow. Shocked by what he learned, Winters 
reportedly stated that the militiaman should be shot for his heinous crime. Similarly, 
after hearing the story, Lieutenant Colonel Gamble vowed that he would "have no mercy 
on the miscreant." Misinterpreting these officers' indignation as a license to exact 
revenge, a group of freedmen dragged Adams from his bed the next morning and killed 
him. Interestingly, the State Guard took no action against the black community. 47 
The rape precipitated a vociferous round of protests against the militia occupation. 
Giles County blacks asked Governor Senter to remove his soldiers. Although they 
complimented the officers of the State Guard, they professed little faith in the enlisted 
men. Anti-Radicals in the county went further in their remonstrance. Complaining that 
46 Nashville Republican Banner, 27, 30 April, 4 May 1869; Culp and Ross, Gibson County. 43. 
Contending that the criticism of Clingan was overblown, a number of residents from the Humboldt military 
district commended the conduct and behavior of the major and his officers. M. G. Senter to Governor 
Senter, 28 April 1869, Senter Papers, Box 1, Folder 6; Haywood Petition to Governor Senter, 4 May 1869, 
TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 4. 
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militia deserters roamed the countryside causing trouble, nearly 600 whites from virtually 
every district in the county signed petitions denouncing the State Guard and calling for its 
removal. Additionally, county leaders staged a formal protest in Pulaski on 7 March, one 
attended by thousands of citizens of both races. According to the Republican Banner, the 
participants condemned the militia "with one voice as if [they] were praying." Invited to 
speak, General Cooper came down from Nashville and defended the overall conduct of 
his men. He reminded his listeners of the lawlessness of the Klan and drew cheers from 
the freedmen when he reassured them that the militia was still their friend, the isolated 
rape notwithstanding. In contrast to Cooper's measured words, Captain Winters, who 
was providing security for the event, reportedly excoriated a nearby crowd with an 
"inflammatory and incendiary" speech. Disparaging the organizers of the protest as a 
"G-d d-d set of rebels," he warned the blacks that if the militia left Giles "the Ku Klux 
would be as numerous as ever." When the county sheriff asked Winters to calm down, 
the militia captain shouted back that his unit was going to stay in the county until "Hell 
froze over. ,,4s 
Despite his subordinate's harangue, Lieutenant Colonel Gamble took seriously the 
peoples' dissatisfaction with his command. In addition to the single case of rape, which 
was the militia's worst offense, a number of militiamen, often under the influence of 
liquor despite Gamble's standing order against the purchase or consumption of"any 
intoxicating beverage," committed several acts of theft against the civilian population 
47 Nashville Union and American, 2, 3 March 1869; Nashville Republican Banner, 2, 3 March 1869; Porter 
Diary, 3 March 1869. 
48 Nashville Union and American, 4, 9 March 1869; Giles County Petitions to Governor Senter, 6, 7, 8 
March 1869, Senter Papers, Box 3, Folders 2, 6; Nashville Rwublican Banner, 9, 11 March 1869. 
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and, in one instance, recklessly fired at a wagon driver. Although some of the allegations 
against his men were proved false, Gamble meted out harsh punishment to the guilty. In 
March, he convened no less than eight courts martial. For various misdeeds, six non-
commissioned officers were reduced to the ranks, their insignia stripped off in the 
presence of the men. For desertion and chicken-stealing, two privates (on separate 
occasions) had one side of their heads shorn and placards bearing the inscription 
"Deserter" hung around their necks. After suffering this indignity, the two men were 
"dishonorably drummed out of camp and the service ... to the tune of the Rogues 
march." When civil authorities in Pulaski tried to indict one militia sergeant for a 
"malicious shooting," Captain Winters intervened and demanded that the soldier face a 
military tribunal. The magistrates complied, knowing that the defendant would receive 
justice.49 
Gamble's swift punishment of wayward militiamen not only restored discipline 
within his military district but also improved relations with the white populace. Anti-
Radical newspapers commended his leadership. Toward the end of March, the Pulaski 
Citizen stated that everything was "serene" in Giles County. Although Gamble 
periodically reminded the citizenry that "this Kuklux business must be broken up," the 
absence of any real vigilantism compelled him to restrict most of his men to camp. Civil 
authorities in Maury thanked the militia commander for not stationing troops in their 
49 Post Order No. 3, 26 February 1869, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 28; Pulaski Citizen, 19, 26 March, 23 April 
1869; Nashville Union and American, 19, 21 March 1869; Court Martial Proceedings, 1st Regiment, 
Tennessee State Guard, 1, 3, 4, 19, 20, 27 March 1869, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 28; Nashville Republican 
Banner, 19 March 1869. Captain James P. Edmondson investigated a robbery allegedly perpetrated by 
some of his men, but he found that local whites in "soldier's garb" committed the crime. Pulaski residents 
appear to have accepted Edmondson's findings. See Republican Banner, 20 March 1869. 
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county; a detachment of Federal troops helped keep the peace there. As April arrived, 
Gamble's main concern, like that of his colleagues in the other two military districts, was 
not the Klan, but measles and pneumonia. 50 
Like the Civil War armies before it, the State Guard's greatest nemesis was 
disease. With hundreds of men camped in close quarters at each military district, it did 
not take long for measles and other maladies to run through the ranks. At the end of 
March, about 110 militiamen in Pulaski (24 percent of the force stationed there) were 
bedridden with measles or pneumonia; in Humboldt, the sick numbered 125 (30 percent), 
some of whom later succumbed to an outbreak of spotted fever; in Livingston, at least 
thirty-eight men (7 percent) became ill. Fortunately, fatalities among the militia were 
low, but the measles epidemic still afflicted one in five men at the three military districts 
combined. Dr. J. W. Thornburgh, the chief surgeon of the State Guard, and his assistants 
established well-provisioned field hospitals, but their powders, pills, oils, and ointments 
brought little relief. What did help was a sanitation directive that required the militiamen 
to strike tents and air their blankets every other day, replace straw bedding weekly, police 
the grounds for litter and refuse, and improve personal hygiene. Toward the end of April, 
the measles crisis had passed and the Daily Press and Times described the recovering 
militiamen as "vigorous and hearty."51 
50 Nashville Republican Banner, 20 March 1869; Pulaski Citizen, 26 March 1869; Columbia Herald, 12 
March 1869; Nashville Union and American, 3 April 1869. 
51 Nashville Daily Press and Times, 17, 20, 23, 24 March, 13 April 1869; Nashville Republican Banner, 20, 
25 March, 1 April, l June 1869; Nashville Union and American, 20 March, 10 April 1869; Pulaski Citizen, 
26 March, 2 April, 4 June 1869; Hugh D. Barker to Tennessee Adjutant General, 9 April 1869, TAGO, 
Reel 10, Vol. 46; State Guard Officer Roster (1869), TAGO, Reel 13, Vol. 84; Medical Supply Inventory 
Sheets, TAGO, Reel 13, Vol. 83; Sanitation Directive, 27 April 1869, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 28. Sickness in 
1867 appears to have been a minor problem for the State Guard, probably because the units then were 
deployed in smaller, more mobile detachments as opposed to the larger, permanent encampments of 1869. 
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Governor Senter was less sanguine. The futility of the militia campaign was 
becoming more and more obvious to him. The Klan had refused to come out and fight, 
and most citizens were reluctant to hand over known Klansmen to the State Guard. 
Consequently, there was little to do in the way oflegitimate law enforcement for the 
hundreds of militiamen stationed in the three military districts. The Daily Press and 
Times, on more than one occasion, credited the militia with restoring order in the state, 
but while the call for volunteers undoubtedly contributed to the cessation of Klan 
activities, the actual deployment of troops accomplished little. Highlighting the futility of 
the deployment was an event that occurred on 25 March. In response to a supposed Klan 
shooting in Wilson (a county not under martial law), General Cooper dispatched a portion 
of his two-company reserve to arrest the perpetrators. They turned out to be blacks. 
Anti-Radicals had a good laugh: the Union and American sarcastically referred to the 
culprits as the "negro Ku-klux." The men were soon released, but the episode 
demonstrated that the real Klan crisis had passed. 52 
Beginning on 26 March, the Senter administration commenced a large-scale 
reduction of militia forces. The numerous bipartisan and biracial petitions had persuaded 
the governor that the Klan was more or less neutralized, despite the lack of arrests. As he 
issued preliminary orders to disband, General Cooper praised his men for their "good 
behavior their Soldierly appearance and good conduct" in preserving the peace. He 
withdrew to the capital all but two companies in each military district. Left behind were 
52 Nashville Daily Press and Times, 3 April, 5 May 1869; Nashville Union and American 10, 27 March 
1869. The obsetvations presented here corroborate the general findings of historian Allen Trelease. In a 
chapter aptly entitled "Abortive Martial Law," Trelease describes the militia campaign of 1869 as an 
anticlimax. See Trelease, White Terror, 175, 182. 
321 
his most dependable commanders and units: in Humboldt were Major Clingan with 
captains Hicks and Hammer; in Livingston, Major Kirk with captains French, Sanders, 
and Woodsides; in Pulaski, Captain Winters and Captain Manson. Within a fortnight, 
over 1,000 militiamen, under the temporary command of Lieutenant Colonel L.B. 
Gamble, had gathered in "Camp Cooper" on the north side ofNashville.53 
Discipline in Camp Cooper proved an unexpected challenge to the officers of the 
State Guard. Most of the men were anxious to receive their final pay and discharge and 
they were in no mood for Lieutenant Colonel Gamble's strict campground policies. 
Instead of relaxing, the men spent endless hours cleaning their gear and weapons prior to 
tum-in. Furthermore, until the companies were formally mustered out, Gamble placed 
Nashville off limits, warning his men that anyone found outside the encampment, unless 
on official business, would be punished as a deserter. Nonetheless, many volunteers still 
slipped away to the big city only to face a court martial after they had sobered up. 
Evidently fatigued by the tedious daily regimen, Private Thomas Barrett (Company E, 1st 
Regiment) staged a one-man rebellion against the State Guard. On the morning of 8 
April, he flatly refused to participate in a dress parade. When his company commander, 
John Haynes, ordered Barrett to fall out, the private took a swing at the captain. A court 
martial penalized Barrett one month of pay and assigned him ten days of extra duty. 
53 General Order No. 9, 26 March 1869, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 27; Special Order Nos. 55, 57, 58, 68 (26, 29 
March, 12 April 1869), TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 33; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 31 March, 3, 6 April 
1869; Nashville Republican Banner, 1, 3, 7, 9 April 1869; Regimental Order No. 7, 11 April 1869, TAGO, 
Reel 9, Vol. 28. 
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Captain Haynes also appears to have briefly tied the insubordinate private up by his 
thumbs. 54 
Demobilization also produced a few more confrontations between civilians and 
the militia. These incidents, however, grew out of frustration more than a desire to 
overawe or intimidate. On 11 April in Nashville, William L. Hathaway, a colonel 
without a regiment, had a run-in with a citizen named Frank Tealey. As the two men 
waited for a streetcar, Tealey claimed Hathaway "swaggered toward him" and demanded 
to know whether he was "for or against Brownlow"; when Tealey said he was against the 
former governor, Hathaway and some accompanying militiamen surrounded the man and 
began kicking him. According to Hathaway, Tealey instigated the whole difficulty by 
insulting the State Guard "in a very offensive tone"; with his honor besmirched, 
Hathaway accosted the man and knocked him into a gutter. Hathaway was arrested for 
assault and battery and paid a fine. The anti-Radical press claimed that the militia 
colonel then went on a drinking binge until his discharge. 55 
Captain Winters had a similarly disgraceful experience in Pulaski. On 19 April, 
while searching for a deserter, Winters passed by the tin shop of J.M. McKenzie, where 
he heard a "peculiar whistle." Thinking some sort of trick was being played on him, he 
burst into the store and demanded to know what "d--d-s-n-of-a-b-h" had whistled at 
him. According to Winters, the shopkeeper fled at his entrance. According to McKenzie, 
54 Special Order Nos. 70, 74, 75 (13, 16, 17 April 1869), TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 28; General Order Nos. 11-13 
(24, 30 April 1869), TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 27; Nashville Republican Banner, 15 April 1869. 
55 Nashville Republican Banner, 13 April 1869; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 14 April 1869; Nashville 
Union and American, 13 April 1869. Somewhat overshadowed by Hathaway's misdemeanor was an 
embarrassing incident involving militia Lieutenant D. F. Smith. "Under the influence of John Barleycorn," 
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he chased the militia captain away with a shotgun. Winters later returned to the tin shop, 
accompanied by one of his lieutenants and the county sheriff, to exact an apology for the 
whistle. As the three men approached, a large crowd gathered outside the store. To 
Winters they seemed ''the most villainous looking men I ever set my eyes on," and he 
braced for a riot. But at that point, McKenzie came out and offered a humorous 
explanation for the whole affair. Evidently, while constructing a new mousetrap, he had 
caught his fingers in the jaw and let out a whistle of pain, not defiance. Winters accepted 
the story as an apology and, after admonishing the crowd to behave, he left. A week 
later, Winters's company was withdrawn to Nashville, leaving only Captain J. 0. 
Manson's unit in the Pulaski military district. As he departed, Winters reportedly gave 
three cheers for the militia and "three groans for the d--d rebel hole, Pulaski. "56 
Many Radicals in Middle and West Tennessee were distressed by the 
demobilization of the State Guard. Almost from the moment he began withdrawing units 
from the field, Governor Senter began receiving reports of renewed Ku Kluxism and 
requests for militia protection. One alarmed Radical from Maury opined that "to disband 
the militia is to disband the Radical party in this county." To counter the effect of the 
anti-Radical rallies in March, Radicals from Giles held their own meeting on 8 April 
calling on the governor to maintain the militia occupation. "A withdrawal of the militia," 
explained one resolution, "would result in a fresh and increased outburst of lawlessness 
and violence." Radical state senator William A Gamer of Lawrence attended the 
Smith reportedly roamed the streets of Nashville on the night of 14 April, randomly firing pistol shots into 
the air or at passersby. He was arrested and fined $55.00. Daily Press and Times, 16 April 1869. 
s6 Nashville Daily Press and Times, 23, 26 April 1869; Nashville Republican Banner, 25 April 1869; 
Pulaski Citizen., 23, 30 April 1869. 
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meeting and added that the presence of militia was imperative "until every Kuklux ... 
had been ferreted out and punished to the fullest extent of the law." Far from wanting the 
State Guard to leave, other Radicals from southern Middle Tennessee actually requested 
additional militia companies for duty in Lincoln and Marshall, counties where Rebel 
vigilantism was allegedly on the rise. 57 
Signs of renascent Ku Kluxism also appeared in the Livingston military district. 
Around the beginning of May, a dozen Klansmen from Overton entered the county seat 
on horseback. Captain J. C. French attempted to arrest them, but the men evaded capture 
by dashing off into the countryside. Fearing the return of Klan terrorism, one Radical 
from Overton privately expressed the hope that the governor would allow Sheriff Beaty 
to return to help quell various "renewed difficulties" with law enforcement.58 
Whatever crimes the ex-Confederates were committing in Middle Tennessee in 
April and May, the Klan itself appears to have had little to do with them. At a second 
party meeting in Pulaski in early May, when only one militia company remained, many 
Radicals displayed increasing indifference toward the continued presence of the militia. 
When A. B. Charpie, a carpetbagger from Indiana, asked the delegates for personal 
testimonies against the Klan he received "no response." Shortly after this meeting, 
"unknown parties," fired a few shots in the vicinity of the militia camp and then 
vanished. Although some Radicals blamed the Klan, the Pulaski Citizen dismissed the 
s7 Columbia Herald, 12 March 1869; Nashville Republican Banner, 9, 16 April 1869; Nashville Daily Press 
and Times, 12 April 1869; Giles County Petition to Governor Senter, 12 April 1869, Senter Papers, Box 1, 
Folder 2. 
ss Nashville Daily Press and Times, 6 May 1869; A. Cullom to I. D. Louis, 1 June 1869, Senter Papers, Box 
3, Folder 2. 
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incident as a hoax. Militia Captain Manson does not appear to have taken the shooting 
too seriously. 59 
West Tennessee was a different story, however. On 15 May, Major Clingan 
reported from Gibson that the "Kuklux have been raging in this county within last three 
weeks." During that time, "masked men" assaulted freedmen in Gibson on at least seven 
occasions. School superintendent Stilwell privately railed against what he considered 
Governor Senter' s "useless" approach to fighting the Klan. "Oh, if we could have given 
the Rebels the lesson here that Gov. Clayton gave them in Arkansas," he mused, "all 
would soon be well." The situation in Haywood was just as discouraging. That county 
was in a "very feverish & excited Condition," according to local Radicals. They warned 
the governor that "it would not be safe to withdraw the Militia. ,,60 
Interpreting the governor's "modified" martial law as broadly as he could, Major 
Clingan tried to neutralize the Klan menace. At the beginning of May, he established 
strict curfews over Humboldt and Trenton and increased his patrols. He probably 
implemented the same policy in Brownsville (Haywood) and Jackson (Madison), where 
he had deployed detachments from Captain Hicks's company. At one point, he managed 
to arrest a suspected Klansman accused of brutally beating a freedman, but a civil 
magistrate released the defendant despite the strong evidence against him. Mocked by 
local Rebels as the "hero ofForky Deer" and exasperated by his inability to suppress the 
59 Pulaski Citizen, 7, 14 May 1869. 
60 Major Clingan to Governor Senter, 15 May 1869, Senter Papers, Box I, Folder 2; Nashville Union and 
American, 25 April 1869; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 26 April 1869; W. H. Stilwell to John Eaton, 
26 April, 10 May 1869, Eaton Papers, Box 2, Folders 1, 2; Haywood County Petition to Governor Senter, 4 
May 1869, TAGO, Reel 2, Box 11, Folder 4. 
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Klan with the dwindling force at his disposal, Clingan recommended that Senter re-
impose the full weight of martial law and reinforce his command. "Our troops will never 
amount to anything," the major lamented, "unless those parties commiting depredations 
have come to fear them.',61 
Radicals beyond the Humboldt military district shared Clingan' s frustration. 
State legislator James 0. K. Reeves of Fayette implored Governor Senter to declare 
martial law in his county and deploy a company of militia at once. According to him, ex-
Confederate intimidation made registration for the state election in August impossible. 
Apparently expecting the governor to employ the State Guard as Brownlow had during 
the campaign of 1867, Reeves warned Senter that more than 2,000 Radical votes were in 
jeopardy. From Henry County, Senter received a private letter describing a horrifying 
instance of Klan terrorism. Sometime in April or May, four Klansmen entered the home 
of Virgil Bingham, a black tenant farmer, and accused him of having poisoned his 
landlord's horses. Ignoring his pleas of innocence, the intruders first whipped Bingham's 
wife and then hung him up by a rope, three times, in an effort to extract a confession. 
Bingham stoically endured this torment and the Klansmen eventually left, warning the 
freedman to tell no one of his experience. In light of such atrocities, Major Clingan 
probably spoke for most Radicals in West Tennessee, particularly blacks, when he told 
61 Pulaski Citizen, 7 May 1869; Major Clingan to Governor Senter, 15 May 1869, Senter Papers, Box 1, 
Folder 2; W. H. Stilwell to John Eaton, 17 May 1869, Eaton Papers, Box 2, Folder 2. 
Governor Senter that "these people want protection and will support the man who they 
think will do it. ,,62 
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The manifest resurgence in Rebel lawlessness did not affect disbandment. Having 
withdrawn the bulk of the State Guard to Nashville, Governor Senter proceeded to order 
all but five companies to muster out. The process began on 6 May and ended on 14 May, 
with some of the companies from East Tennessee receiving their final pay in Knoxville. 
This left in the field only captains Hicks and Hammer at Humboldt, Captain Manson at 
Pulaski, Captain French at Livingston, and Captain Edmondson in Nashville. 
Furthermore, on 17 May, Senter relieved General Cooper and all field grade officers of 
duty. He then appointed Frank Hyberger the new adjutant general. After barely three 
months of active service, during which time many units saw no action, the Radical army 
was essentially gone. 63 
Although the militia campaign was winding down, the impact of its financial cost 
was just beginning. In April, Major Bayless calculated that at least $63,000 would be 
needed to pay the fourteen companies stationed at Camp Cooper, not to mention the five 
units still in the field. Comptroller George W. Blackbum, however, alarmed the governor 
by telling him that there were virtually no funds available for such a large disbursal. 
62 J. 0. K. Reeves to Governor Senter, 29 April 1869, Senter Papers, Box 1, Folder 5; J.B. to Governor 
Senter, 18 May 1869, Senter Papers, Box I, Folder 2; Major Clingan to Governor Senter, 15 May 1869, 
Senter Papers, Box 1, Folder 2. 
63 General Order Nos. 14-17, 22-23 (6-9, 14May 1869), TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 27; Special Order Nos. 97, 
101, 104 (7, 9, 17 May 1869), TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 33; General Order Nos. 1, 2 (17, 18 May 1869), TAGO, 
Reel 8, Vol. 26; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 24 April, 5, 6, 12 May, 1869. On his return to East 
Tennessee, Martin L. Helton, a former militia sergeant, discovered that Hawkins County was being 
terrorized by a band of Rebels. In addition to harassing blacks and discharged militiamen, these Rebels 
beat a Unionist preacher and drove him out of the county. Helton requested permission from the governor 
to form a special company of State Guard to punish the Rebel vigilantes, but he never received a 
commission. See Martin L. Helton to Governor Senter, 5 June 1869, Senter Papers, Box 1, Folder 3. 
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Only after hastily arranging loans of $50,000 from a bank in New York and $55,000 from 
the First National Bank in Nashville could the Senter administration discharge its Radical 
army with pay. Overall, the total cost of the 1869 deployment amounted to $225,851, 
much of it paid for by loans. 64 
As it had been in 1867, anti-Radical criticism of these expenditures was fierce 
throughout the militia campaign. Before any units had even organized, the Union and 
American wailed that "the credit of the state is to suffer from the mad folly of our Radical 
rulers." Several newspapers cynically claimed that the militia call-up, combined with 
martial law, was part of a corrupt bargain between the Brownlow administration and 
certain New York financiers to bankrupt anti-Radical businesses and property-holders. 
As proof of the conspiracy, they cited a dramatic decline in the value of state bonds. 
Referring to the State Guard as an "elephant" that devoured more than $60,000 per month 
out of the treasury, the Republican Banner declared that the state economy might never 
recover. Angry Radical taxpayers from East Tennessee demanded that their leaders 
enforce the clause in the Militia Act requiring that counties placed under martial law foot 
the bill. Such a policy, however potent it may have sounded at the time it was enacted, 
proved unworkable. The civil authorities from the three counties comprising the 
Humboldt military district, for instance, banded together to resist the "militia tax." 
Branding it "tyrannical legislation," they vowed never to pay it. And they never did. 
Only Fentress County was ever compelled to pay the direct cost of anti-Klan law 
64 Major Bayless to Governor Senter, 14 April 1869, Senter Papers, Box 1, Folder 2; Nashville Daily Press 
and Times, 22, 24 April 1869; G. W. Blackbum to Governor Senter, 23 April, 29 June 1869, Senter Papers, 
Box 1, Folder 2; Nashville Republican Banner, 4, 5 May 1869; Senate Journal, 36th General Assembly, 1st 
Session, Appendix, Comptroller's Report, 76-77. 
enforcement. On 17 May 1869, in a case dating back to the previous year, Judge L. C. 
Houk ordered the chairman of the county court to pay the cost of organizing and 
maintaining SheriffBeaty's special police force. Significantly, Houk grounded his 
decision in the Sheriffs Act, not the Militia Act. It is unclear whether Fentress had to 
pay for Beaty's activities in neighboring Overton County as well.65 
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Political considerations, as well as financial, may also have contributed to 
Senter's decision to disband the State Guard in the face of continued, albeit sporadic, 
Klan activity. Since his inauguration, he had sought to build a following among 
moderate Radicals and Conservatives, groups that opposed both disfranchisement and a 
standing army. In seeking his party's nomination for the upcoming gubernatorial election 
(scheduled for 5 August), however, Senter discovered that many staunch Radicals, 
including several militia officers, did not like his politics. During a chaotic party 
convention in Nashville on 20-21 May, Senter found himself competing with Radical 
hard-liner William B. Stokes for the nomination. Among Stokes's delegates were a 
number of militia officers, most notably William L. Hathaway. As the two factions 
disrupted the proceedings with insults and threats, Hathaway denounced many of Senter' s 
supporters as Rebels and friends ofN. B. Forrest. To be sure, Hathaway did not speak 
for all militia officers-General Cooper, in fact, later joined the Senter camp-but his 
attitude must have disturbed the governor. In the end, the Radical party split, and Senter 
and Stokes both canvassed the state as candidates for governor. (Rather than nominate a 
65 Nashville Union and American, 23 January, 24 March, 7, 8 April 1869; Memphis Appeal, 19, 26 
January; Nashville Republican Banner, 30 January, 20, 28 February, 24 March, 1 May 1869; Nashville 
Daily Press and Times, 13 April 1869; Executive Order, 11 June 1868, GP 21, Reel 1, Box 1, Folder l; E. 
D. Wright v. Claiborne Beaty, 17 May 1869, Houk Papers. 
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candidate of their own, Conservatives opted to back Senter.) The deep divisions within 
the Radical party and the uncertain loyalty of some militia officers probably made 
disbandment seem imperative to Senter lest the State Guard be used against him.66 
Shortly after the convention, on 22 May, General Cooper dutifully stepped down 
(for the second time) as commander of the State Guard. This act was a quiet, though 
significant, moment in Tennessee's Reconstruction. While historians generally focus on 
the autocratic style of Governor Brownlow, some unfairly comparing him to the 
seventeenth century English tyrant Oliver Cromwell, virtually all of them overlook the 
true sword of Radicalism, Joseph A Cooper. It was Cooper, not Brownlow, who most 
resembled the infamous Lord Protector, at least at first glance. Cooper was an 
accomplished military man who, as leader of the State Guard, Tennessee's equivalent of 
Cromwell's New Model Anny, was in the best position to seize or abuse power had he so 
chosen. In early 1869, especially, such opportunity presented itself. At that time, Cooper 
commanded a partisan militia force, whose officers he had essentially handpicked and 
whose enlisted men, like himself, largely came from East Tennessee. More importantly, 
Cooper commanded this standing army during a time of crisis, martial law, and 
gubernatorial transfer of power. As it had in 1867, the anti-Radical press saw the 
potential for a military dictatorship. At one point, the Union and American contended 
that Cooper was "running the machine," while Governor Senter stood timidly in the 
background. But while Cooper did display a degree of ruthlessness in his campaign 
against the Klan, he never superseded the governor's authority. Radicals praised the 
66 White, Messages, 6: 8-16; Hamer, Tennessee, 2: 646-49. Cooper was present at the convention and 
considered it a farce. Urging the delegates to "drink less bad whiskey," the militia general left in disgust 
after the first day. White, Messages, 6: 11. 
general's integrity, and even many anti-Radicals came to respect him. After Cooper 
seriously injured himself in a fall on 3 April, the Union and American actually wished 
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him a speedy recovery. While Governor Brownlow' s actions were in some cases 
indefensible, General Cooper's were almost uniformly admirable. Rather than let the 
State Guard become an instrument of oppression and persecution, or a weapon in intra-
party politics, he ensured that it operated as a responsible defender of both the 
Reconstruction process and the civil rights of the freedmen. In later years, Cooper's 
friends likened him to the ancient military leader, Cincinnatus, who served the Roman 
Republic with honor before returning to his farm or, in Cooper's case, to a new position 
as U. S. internal revenue collector for Knox County. 67 
The remnant of the Radical army outlasted its general by only a few weeks. At 
the end of May, it performed a final, limited service: security for a statewide judicial 
election. Throughout his tenure, Governor Brownlow had appointed judges to the state 
Supreme Court and a number of circuit courts, rather than permit them to be elected as 
the constitution stipulated. In keeping with his more moderate approach, Governor 
Senter, at the behest of the General Assembly, scheduled a special judicial election for 27 
May for all three Supreme Court seats and selected circuit court positions. Much to the 
chagrin of the Conservatives, Senter also ordered the Commissioners of Registration to 
enforce the Franchise Act. The special election posed a problem for those counties still 
under martial law, albeit "modified." Captain Hammer informed the governor that, under 
67 White, Messages, 5: 553; Coulter, Brownlow, 332; Nashville Union and American, 2, IO March, 6 April 
1869; Nashville Daily Press and Times, 11 March 1869; Knoxville Whig. 17 March 1869; Cooper, 
Survivor of Two Wars, 18; Pulaski Citizen, 4 June 1869. During the 1869 deployment, General Cooper 
received $1,360 for his four months of service. State Guard Officer Payroll, TAGO, Reel 13, Vol. 84. 
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the circumstances, he did not think that the Humboldt military district should participate 
in the election. Senter, however, evidently authorized Hammer to permit an election and, 
although there are no details of the militia's exact dispositions, the event passed off 
quietly. Radical candidates won all three seats on the Supreme Court.68 
In contrast to Humboldt, and just about everywhere else for that matter, the 
judicial election in Clarksville (Montgomery) for circuit court officers nearly degenerated 
into a bloodbath. Montgomery was the only county in the Tenth Circuit (which also 
included Cheatham, Dickson, Robertson, and Stewart) where Radical candidates William 
A. Peffer and Jay Buck received a majority for the respective offices of circuit judge and 
attorney general. Anti-Radical fraud and intimidation apparently accounted for the 
Conservative success in the other counties, and only the vigorous enforcement of the 
Franchise Act by Registrar H. W. Bunker enabled the Radical candidates to win in 
Montgomery. Conservatives claimed that hundreds of Kentucky blacks illegally 
participated in the election. Nevertheless, Radicals were still hard-pressed to win the 
county. According to Peffer, ex-Confederates subjected the Radicals, especially whites, 
to "all manner of insult and indignity, Scorn, contempt, and threats." At one polling 
place in Clarksville, an angry citizen obstructed a column of blacks and slapped their 
white leader as they marched toward the ballot box. Elsewhere, blacks and whites were 
seen carrying weapons at they went to the polls. Fearing a riot, Jay Buck telegraphed 
Senter for help: "Union men here are liable to be killed before night. Send troops .... 
68 White, Messages, 5: 595-97; Hamer, Tennessee, 2: 647; Captain Hammer to Governor Senter, 22 May 
1869, Senter Papers, Box 8, Folder 10. 
Don't fail." The governor complied, but immediate relief was not forthcoming; a train 
collision with a cow blocked the rail line until the following day. 69 
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On the morning of29 May, Captain James P. Edmondson arrived at Clarksville 
with a company of about ninety militiamen. Although the election had passed off 
without violence, the town was still unsettled. Rebels stalked the streets vowing that the 
"d-d Yankees and niggers" would not vote in the upcoming August election, and 
rumors abounded that blacks were planning to burn the town. Speaking for the Radicals, 
Peffer confided to Senter that "our lives are now only secure because of the presence of 
troops." Preferring to let the citizens cool off, Captain Edmondson bivouacked his men 
on the grounds of the courthouse. The Clarksville Weekly described them as "very quiet 
and respectful in their demeanor." The excitement soon abated, however, and Clarksville 
returned to its daily routine. Sometime in early June, the company of militia returned to 
Nashville. 70 
By the summer of 1869, if not sooner, the State Guard had become politically 
superfluous. More and more Radicals were ready for a return to normalcy. On 29 May, 
the state Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional Brownlow's practice of invalidating 
county voter registrations. This decision effectively restored the suffrage to at least 
30,000 Conservative Unionists. On 5 June, Governor Senter began publicly repudiating 
disfranchisement and announced his intention to work with the next legislature to remove 
69 Peter H. Argersinger, "The Conservative as Radical: a Reconstruction Dilemma," Tennessee Historical 
Quarterly 34 (1975), 183-85; Nashville Republican Banner, 29, 30 May, 4 June 1869; W. A. Peffer to 
Governor Senter, 31 May 1869, Senter Papers, Box 1, Folder 5; Clarksville Weekly. 5 June 1869; Nashville 
Union and American, 29 May 1869. 
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all remaining political disabilities. In doing so, he gained the support of virtually all 
Conservatives and ex-Confederates, who collectively began calling themselves 
Democrats. Throughout the summer the governor replaced old Brownlow registrars with 
commissioners who basically enrolled any native male of the requisite age. With its 
commander-in-chief now seeking Democratic votes, the State Guard obviously would 
have no role in the August election. On 18 June, the adjutant general abolished the 
Pulaski military district. Grateful whites from Giles County promised the governor their 
votes and their help in making Tennessee "the garden spot of the New World." On 21 
June, the military districts at Humboldt and Livingston were also abolished.71 
Once again, a large contingent of militiamen, impatiently awaiting their 
discharge, occupied Camp Cooper. Captain Edmondson, the new commandant, was less 
rigid than Colonel Gamble, but he still wanted to disband with order and dignity. To this 
end, he established a "ring guard" around the camp to prevent enlisted men from 
sneaking off to town. The enlisted men, however, found other forms of carousal. On 6 
July, volunteers from several companies milled around the camp spring. Some of the 
men were apparently inebriated and looking for trouble, for as Private Samuel T. Cox of 
Company D, 2nd Regiment, arrived to collect water for his unit, Private Wilson Jarmon of 
Company I, 1st Regiment, sidled up to him and insulted Cox's water containers as "S-
Potts." Thinking Jarmon was joking, Cox shot back some profanity of his own. At that 
70 Special Order No. 112, 28 May 1869, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 33; W. A. Peffer to Governor Senter, 31 May 
1869, Senter Papers, Box 1, Folder 5; Clarksville Weekly. 5 June 1869; W. S. Cheatham to Governor 
Senter, 6 June 1869, Senter Papers, Box 1, Folder 2. 
71 Alexander, Political Reconstruction, 214-18; Bergeron, Tennesseans, 177-78; White, Messages, 6: 25-26; 
Frank Hyberger to selected Commissioners ofRegistration, May-July 1869, GP 21, Reel 2, Box 3, Folder 
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point Jarmon tackled Cox and began kicking him. Excited militiamen from both 
companies rushed to the scene; some tried to stop the fight, but most encouraged the 
melee with shouts and laughter. Private John Brown, a self-appointed champion for 
Company D, broke through the crowd, grasped two large rocks, and challenged Jarmon to 
a one-on-one bout. Jarmon gamely accepted, but only after Brown agreed to fight hand-
to-hand. With a corporal acting as an impromptu referee, the two men wrestled for a few 
minutes before a patrol squad intervened. Even then the two pugilists refused to quit, 
Brown hurling one his rocks at Jarmon, and only the arrival of a pistol-waving Lieutenant 
Powell Low ended the row. At bayonet point, Brown and Jarmon were taken to the 
guardhouse, where for two hours they were hung up by their thumbs. 72 
A second controversial incident occurred later that day. Displeased by what he 
considered the unfair treatment of one of his men, Captain Manson of Company I 
released Private Jarmon over the objections of Captain Hicks, the officer of the day. On 
Captain Edmondson' s orders, Hicks and Low arrested Manson for "a breach of 
discipline." A lengthy court of inquiry ensued, during which numerous witnesses 
described the events of 6 July in rather graphic but often conflicting detail. In the end, 
Captain Edmondson restored Manson to his command and attributed the entire 
disturbance to company rivalry. As the units began mustering out the following week, a 
l; General Order Nos. 18, 19 (18, 21 June 1869), TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 27; Giles County Petitions to 
Governor Senter, 16, 17 June 1869, Senter Papers, Box 1, Folders 2, 3. 
72 Major Bayless to Captain Edmondson, 23 June 1869 and Regimental Order Nos. 2-5 (24, 29 June, 6, 14 
July 1869), TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 28; Court oflnquiry, Captain Hammer presiding, 7 July 1869, Senter 
Papers, Box 3, Folder 2. 
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group ofU. S. soldiers from the nearby Federal garrison picked a fight with some of the 
militiamen, exchanging a few gunshots before officers from both sides regained control.73 
Such were the final, inglorious acts of the Tennessee State Guard. By the end of 
July, every militiaman with the exception of a few staff personnel had been discharged. 
For the Radicals, the politics of force was finally over. 
The militia deployment of 1869 was a disappointment. What had started out as a 
bold showdown with the Ku Klux Klan had sputtered into a desultory peacekeeping 
mission, in which the force employed was out of proportion to the danger. Nevertheless, 
the State Guard's overall contribution in neutralizing the Klan cannot by denied. During 
the period of mobilization and during the actual deployment, the Klan was conspicuously 
quiet. Ironically, this inactivity undermined the rationale for martial law and deprived the 
State Guard of its reason for being. Rather than receiving laurels for destroying Klan 
dens and bringing nightriders to justice, the militia endured constant criticism for its 
occasional abuses of authority and its general disruption of daily life. Even many 
Radicals realized that the militia campaign was an excessive and expensive use of force, 
one that contributed to intra-party dissension. Given the outcome, the Klan's avoidance 
of any head-on confrontations with the State Guard must be judged a masterful course of 
action. An unqualified militia triumph over the Klan, or even a few bloody engagements, 
could well have held the Radical party together in the summer of 1869. 
Instead, the Radical party disintegrated. Disenchanted by their governor's 
alliance with the Democrats, several militia officers campaigned against him in the 
73 Court oflnquiry; Captain Edmondson to Frank Hyberger, 7 July 1869, Senter Papers, Box 3, Folder 2; 
Nashville Daily Press and Times, 15 July 1869; General Order Nos. 22, 23 (10, 12 July 1869), TAGO, Reel 
9, Vol. 27. 
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statewide election. While running for seats in the General Assembly, former majors 
Clingan and Kirk canvassed East Tennessee in behalf of Stokes. At one party rally, Kirk 
bellowed, "I oppose Universal Suffrage and spurn the idea of enfranchising a class of 
men known ... as the Ku Klux Klan." Some veterans of the 1867 State Guard also 
fought hard for a Stokes victory. George E. Grisham first tried to buy the Daily Press and 
Times in order to use it against Senter, and then tried to start a new, pro-Stokes 
newspaper in Nashville, but both efforts failed due to insufficient funds. Meanwhile, 
James H. Sumner, the maligned black militia captain, ran for the legislature from 
Davidson County under the Stokes banner. In the end, the militia candidates lost their 
races, as did Stokes, while anti-Radicals gained strong majorities in the General 
Assembly. Infuriated by the outcome, William L. Hathaway shot a Senter supporter in 
DeKalb County during a post-election altercation. Having chased Rebel vigilantes for 
more than three years, the former militia colonel now found himself on the run as a 
fugitive. The defeated Stokes howled that the election was a sham and charged the 
Conservatives with fraud. Moreover, he inexplicably accused Senter of threatening to 
use the militia against him. Senter, of course, had already disbanded the militia. 
Nevertheless, Stokes's accusation, coupled with the political animosity of many militia 
officers toward the incumbent, suggests that Tennessee Radicals came close to taking the 
path of their brethren in Arkansas, where the militia became a combatant in the so-called 
Brooks-Baxter War (1874), a vicious intra-party power struggle.74 
74 Nashville Daily Press and Times, 13 July, 19 August 1869; Jonesboro Union Flag. 16 July 1869; H. 
Pomeroy to John Eaton, 9 June 1869, Eaton Papers, Box 5, Folder 2; Knoxville Whig. 2, 9 June 1869; 
McBride, "Blacks and the Race Issue," 314-15; Hamer, Tennessee, 2: 651-52; Nashville Union and 
American, 18 August 1869; Anonymous to Governor Senter, 19 August 1869, Senter Papers, Box 3, Folder 
2; Singletary, Negro Militia, 50-65. W. H. Stilwell of Gibson contended that Senter's withdrawal of the 
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Regardless of what the militia might have become in the hands of politically 
desperate men, Governor Senter could have used a few companies of State Guard in the 
aftermath of the election. To the surprise and outrage of all Radicals, the Klan resumed 
its terrorist activities. Not content with regaining their political rights, Klansmen viewed 
the demise of Radicalism as an invitation to reestablish racial order. From Dyer, 
Weakley, Rutherford and Sumner counties, among others, came new reports of Klan 
outrages against the freedmen and the powerlessness of the civil authorities to prevent 
them. Adjutant General Hyberger assured Thompson McKinley of Sumner that "active 
measures will at once be instituted to put down such lawlessness." If he was being 
honest, then Hyberger's promise could only have meant a reactivation of the State 
Guard. 75 
There would be no third appearance of the Radical army, however. Democrats in 
the General Assembly repealed both the anti-Klan legislation of 1868 and the militia act, 
including its amended provisions for martial law. In their stead, they passed an 
ineffectual law that delegated punishment of the Klan to the county authorities. Rather 
than veto these measures, Senter tried to reason with his erstwhile political allies. In a 
special message delivered before the Assembly on 2 February 1870, the governor 
affirmed the existence of a "formidable" outlaw "organization" and the need for a force 
militia coupled with his tacit approval of ex-Confederate registration guaranteed Stokes's defeat in West 
Tennessee. "No colored man will now be permitted to vote for Gen. Stokes," he noted just before the 
election, adding that the challenger was "certainly the choice of almost all." W. H. Stilwell to John Eaton, 
20 July 1869, Eaton Papers, Box 5, Folder 2. 
75 J. S. Webb to Frank Hyberger, 28 August 1869, Senter Papers, Box 3, Folder 2; Thompson McKinley to 
Governor Senter, 1 September 1869, Senter Papers, Box 1, Folder 6; Major General Oliver 0. Howard to 
Governor Senter, 13 September 1869, Senter Papers, Box 1, Folder 3; Lewis M. Williams to Governor 
Senter, 14 September 1869, Senter Papers, Box 1, Folder 6; Frank Hyberger to Thompson McKinley, 1 
September 1869, Houk Papers. 
339 
adequate to suppress it. Senter's address, however, was weakened by deferential 
phraseology that reduced his request to a plea. When the legislature ignored him, he took 
his case to the Federal government. Several Tennessee Radicals in Congress, including 
Senator Brownlow, had already preceded him. Alarmed by the rapid decline of their 
party's fortunes, the Tennessee delegation had been lobbying for months to have their 
state subjected to military Reconstruction. But President Grant considered preposterous 
the idea of imposing the Reconstruction Acts on Tennessee. He did augment the state's 
Federal garrison to 430 soldiers, however, although he did not change the army's 
essentially passive mission. 76 
While the Radicals fought futile rearguard actions, the Democrats steadily 
achieved counter-Reconstruction in 1870. At a constitutional convention held in January 
1870, attended by only a few Radical delegates, Democrats introduced revisions designed 
to consolidate and perpetuate their hold on power. The most significant change-
permitting a state poll tax-maintained the legal fiction of black suffrage, but would 
effectively disfranchise most freedmen. Mindful of the key role the State Guard played 
during Reconstruction, the new constitution also placed great limitations on the 
governor's power to employ force. Mobilization of the militia was restricted to times of 
"rebellion or invasion," while martial law was forbidden entirely. On 26 January, the 
convention passed the new constitution, 56-18. Joseph H. Blackbum, a delegate from 
DeKalb and a former militia officer, voted with the minority. On 26 March, the voters 
ratified the constitution and then prepared for the gubernatorial election, rescheduled for 
76 Acts of Tennessee, 36th General Assembly, 1st Session, Chapters 112, I 16; White, Messages, 6: 75-77; 
Queener, "Decade of East Tennessee Republicanism," 72; Trelease, White Terror, 278-79; Sefton, United 
States Army and Reconstruction, 262. 
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November of even-numbered years, in accordance with the new Constitution. Winning 
that election handily, John C. Brown, a former Confederate general and a one-time leader 
of the Ku Klux Klan, became Tennessee's governor in 1871. Democrats took six of the 
eight congressional seats as well. Little more than a year after Senter abandoned the 
politics of force, the Radical party was relegated to the mountains of East Tennessee and 
the Democrats put an end to Reconstruction. Foreseeing this outcome, the anti-Radical 
Nimrod Porter recorded his delight: "Fare well to all Radicals. May you only be known 
by history in the Future, Amen."77 
77 Hamer, Tennessee, 2: 653-57; Hale, History of DeKalb County, 195, 248; Bergeron, Tennesseans, 178-
79; Porter Diary, 5 August 1869. The militia clauses of the 1870 Constitution are Article I, Section 25 and 
Article III, Section 5. 
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CONCLUSION 
The success of counter-Reconstruction demoralized many veterans of the 
Tennessee State Guard and the many citizens who had come to depend on them for 
protection. Former commander George E. Grisham lamented that with the Democrats in 
power, "we are henceforth the serfs-menial slaves of our enemies." Speaking from the 
Radical stronghold of East Tennessee, Grisham was certainly exaggerating his party's 
plight, but his statement aptly described the situation in West Tennessee. With hundreds 
of Klan nightriders still terrorizing that section well into 1870, W. H. Stilwell, a white 
Radical from Gibson County, remarked bitterly that the Union's supposed victory over 
the Confederacy five years earlier was "the most gigantic falsehood of the age."1 
Perhaps sharing this sentiment, several militia officers left Tennessee in search of 
other law enforcement activities. In 1870, George W. Kirk went to North Carolina and 
took command of the militia forces fighting the Klan in that former Confederate state. 
With some 600 troops, many of them Tennessee volunteers, Kirk managed to briefly 
suppress the Klan and make some arrests. Had his new benefactor, Governor William H. 
Holden, not been impeached and removed from office, Kirk might have achieved the 
lasting success that eluded the State Guard in Tennessee. In less spectacular fashion, 
Judge K. Clingan went to the Oklahoma Territory and became a U. S. marshal. James H. 
Sumner became a sheriff in Mississippi, mistakenly believing that blacks had a better 
chance of gaining equality in a Deep South state. Even Joseph A. Cooper eventually left 
1 Jonesboro Union Flag. 18 February 1870; W. H. Stilwell to Senator Brownlow, 18 April 1870, MS 1940, 
Box 1, Folder 13. Ex-Confederate political terrorism in Middle and West Tennessee continued until at 
least 1874. Trelease, White Terror, 279-80; William Gillette, Retreat from Reconstruction, 1869-1879 
(Baton Rouge, 1979), 29, 37,230. 
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the land that he had so ably defended. In 1880, he moved to Kansas. At a ceremony 
honoring the old general in 1895, guest speakers praised Cooper's many military exploits. 
There was no mention of his service in the State Guard, however, for it had been 
inglorious and seemingly fruitless. 2 
This silence is unwarranted, for the State Guard performed remarkably well given 
the trying circumstances under which it operated. As Radical warriors, Tennessee 
militiamen were some of the most active agents of Reconstruction in the state. With 
regard to politics, the State Guard proved an invaluable tool for the Radical party. It did 
not disfranchise the ex-Confederate majority, but it did enforce this controversial 
measure. In doing so, the militia preserved the integrity of the electoral process for the 
state's loyal voters and thereby ensured Radical control over the government. No other 
organization protected the ballot box as effectively, neither county sheriffs, who lacked 
the strength if not the will, nor the Federal garrison, which usually lacked the jurisdiction. 
With regard to racial policies, the State Guard did not grant civil and political liberty to 
the freedmen, but it did its best to make sure that blacks were able to exercise their new 
rights and privileges. In doing so, the militia helped empower a race that often hesitated 
to assert itself without the guaranteed backing of the state. To be sure, most white 
militiamen shared the racism prevalent in America, and they probably viewed black 
suffrage as a political expedient, but while on duty they courageously defended the 
2 Trelease, White Terror, 208-25; McBride, Biographical Directory. 2: 168; Lovett, African-American 
History ofNashville, 209; Cooper, Survivor of Two Wars, 5-6, 14-19. In the late 1870s, Cooper was on the 
losing side of yet another intra-party power struggle, this one involving rival Republican factions in East 
Tennessee. As a result, Cooper lost his position as internal revenue collector. Gordon B. McKinney, 
Southern Mountain Republicans, 1865-1900: Politics and the Appalachian Community (Chapel Hill, 1978), 
85,234. 
freedmen, often at their own peril. Several white militia officers, especially Captain 
Clingan, displayed genuine compassion for the former slaves, while those who 
commanded the mixed companies generally treated their black volunteers as equals of 
their white counterparts. 
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In addition to promoting Radicalism, the State Guard waged an effective police 
campaign against the numerous anti-Radical challenges to Reconstruction. In 1867, 
despite some abuses of power, it successfully shielded the state election from Rebel 
vigilantism and Conservative interference, and then later foiled what could be described 
as an anti-Radical putsch during the Nashville mayoral election. General William P. 
Carlin, head of the Freedmen's Bureau in Tennessee, offered a succinct and fitting 
assessment of this first militia deployment: "the State Militia has probably had a good 
influence in keeping the lawless under subjection and assisting in the enforcement of 
Civil law though in many instances their conduct has been such as not to insure them the 
respect of the people [i.e., anti-Radical whites]."3 
In 1869, the reactivation of the State Guard, coupled with the imposition of 
martial law, halted Klan terrorism in Middle and West Tennessee. Operating out of three 
strong military districts, the State Guard maintained the peace for several months. Most 
scholars have discounted the importance of this second deployment because it lacked 
decisiveness; there was no significant combat between the militia and the Klan. When 
looking for examples of successful anti-Klan operations, historians usually cite Governor 
Powell Clayton's 1868 campaign in Arkansas. Charles J. Rector, for instance, contends 
3 General W. P. Carlin to General 0. 0. Howard, 9 October 1867, Records of the Assistant Commissioner 
for the State of Tennessee, BRFAL, RG 105, Reel 16. 
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that the "Militia War" in Arkansas "may well have been the most successful counter-
terrorism campaign waged by a southern state during Reconstruction." Otto H. Olsen 
asserts that Clayton's policies "constituted the only successful resistance to the Klan that 
occurred anywhere in the Reconstruction South." Rector's statement has merit, but 
timing had much to do with the different outcomes in Arkansas and Tennessee. After 
watching their brethren in Arkansas get thrashed, Tennessee Klansmen adopted a strategy 
of evasion toward the State Guard. In other words, the Tennessee Klan opted not to fight, 
but instead to hide from a superior military force that would likely have defeated it in 
open battle. Nonetheless, as a counter-terrorist organization, the State Guard still 
achieved a qualified success, for while it was deployed the Klan stayed inactive. In this 
sense, Olsen's statement is well off the mark. Where the Arkansas militia won by feat of 
arms, the Tennessee State Guard won by forfeit. 4 
These significant accomplishments notwithstanding, the State Guard ultimately 
failed to sustain Reconstruction in Tennessee. It may have repelled ex-Confederate 
vigilantes in 1867 and briefly dispersed the Klan in 1869, but it never entirely eliminated 
these paramilitary threats, which gradually inflicted fatal wounds on the Radical party in 
many parts of the state. Tennessee Radicals may have agreed that a certain amount of 
force was necessary to protect the loyal citizenry and make the process of Reconstruction 
work, but they vacillated in their commitment to a standing army. Regardless of their 
"radicalism," most Radicals disliked repressive policies. Consequently, the supreme 
4 Charles J. Rector, "D. P. Upham, Woodruff County Carpetbagger," The Arkansas Historical Quarterly 59 
(2000): 59; Otto H. Olsen, ed., Reconstruction and Redemption in the South, (Baton Rouge, 1980), 181. 
Other noteworthy anti-Klan campaigns include the so-called Kirk-Holden war in North Carolina (1870) and 
Governor Edmund J. Davis's use ofa small, mounted police force in Texas (1870-72). See Trelease, White 
Terror, 147-48, 208-25 and Foner, Reconstruction, 440-41. 
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challenge for governors Brownlow and Senter was deciding when to apply force, to what 
degree, and for how long. Where the near totality of the Civil War rarely brought into 
question the use of military power, the quasi-peace of Reconstruction made the politics of 
force an endlessly problematic and frustrating issue. 
Financial considerations further complicated the implementation of force. 
Fielding the Radical army was an expensive undertaking for the Brownlow and Senter 
administrations. In all, the Radicals poured almost $555,000 into the politics of force, 
which amounted to more than 10 percent of the $5 million state debt left behind by the 
Radicals. When viewed in comparative context, however, these expenditures are hardly 
out of line. Republican governors in Arkansas spent about $530,000 on their militia 
forces, most of it during Governor Clayton's imposition of martial law in 1868. In South 
Carolina, where the militia was all-black and sporadically used, the cost was $375,000. 
In Louisiana, the militia cost $100,000, a figure that does not include the large, 
paramilitary New Orleans Metropolitan Police. George Kirk's short campaign against 
the Klan in North Carolina cost the taxpayers of that state nearly $75,000. Although the 
Tennessee State Guard proved the most expensive militia force used by any 
Reconstruction administration, virtually all southern Republican governments were 
breaking open their war chests to combat the ex-Confederate threat. 5 
The overt militancy of counter-Reconstruction demanded a forceful response 
regardless of the cost. While Appomattox marks the traditional end of the Civil War and 
5 Senate Journal, 35th General Assembly, 1st Session, Comptroller's Report, 100-102; Senate Journal, 36th 
General Assembly, 1st Session, Comptroller's Report, 73, 77; Singletary, Negro Militia, 148-50. Historian 
Ira P. Jones claims, without documentation, that the total cost of the State Guard was actually in excess of 
$668,000. See Jones, "Reconstruction in Tennessee," 213. 
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President Johnson's 1866 decrees mark its official end, a civil war raged on in Tennessee 
(as it did throughout much of the former Confederacy). Anti-Radical politicians 
steadfastly rejected the legitimacy of the Radical government, while Rebel vigilantes in 
West and Middle Tennessee made a mockery of peace. Radicals had to suppress these 
subversive activities or lose all credibility as the governing authorities. Any action 
requiring force, however, had to be well thought out. Violence in America, an extensive 
study of organized violence and state response, lists several supposedly universal factors 
essential for effective control of a lawless populace. The state must have a justifiable 
reason for resorting to force. The force must be applied consistently so as to preempt 
violence, not simply react to it, and the force must be proportionate to the threat so as to 
minimize the inevitable repression of civil liberty. Finally, the instrument of force must 
be constituted of determined yet conscientious leaders and a rank-and-file that is "well-
trained, highly disciplined, and loyal. ,,6 
Tennessee's Reconstruction administration met some of these criteria, but fell 
short on others. The violent activities of ex-Confederates vigilantes, Klan or otherwise, 
clearly warranted a resort to force. And the officers and men of the State Guard were 
certainly up to the task, although "highly disciplined" would be an overstatement. 
Unfortunately, the executive branch adopted an erratic course of law enforcement. From 
1865 to 1866, Governor Brownlow tried to rely on the U. S. army or local sheriffs to 
maintain order. The results were unsatisfactory; anti-Radical lawlessness only increased. 
In 1867, Brownlow at last mobilized a powerful militia and deployed it to great effect 
6 Graham and Gurr, Violence in America, 472-78, 639. 
347 
during the various state and municipal elections. In 1868, however, he and the General 
Assembly unwisely disbanded the militia in the face of growing Ku Kluxism, and then 
later temporized over whether to reorganize it, let alone employ it. When Brownlow 
finally unleashed the State Guard again in 1869, its operations verged on overkill; the 
Klan had already gone underground. Under Governor Senter, the militia was further 
handicapped by a vague policy of"modified" martial law and then disbanded altogether. 
The following year, after Democrats had gained control of the legislature, Senter tried in 
vain to reorganize the militia for use against a renascent Klan. Throughout, the Radicals' 
use of force was plagued by paradox. Whenever they employed it, the situation soon no 
longer seemed to require it; whenever they withdrew it, the situation quickly seemed to 
demand its return. Brownlow and Senter were often able to contain anti-Radical 
violence, but they never prevented its recurrence. In short, the Rebels' paramilitary 
defiance outlasted the Radicals' commitment to armed suppression. 
This outcome was not inevitable. Had Brownlow and Senter used the militia 
differently, Reconstruction may have lasted well into the 1870s, thereby giving their 
party time to complete its work. In hindsight, the Radicals might have done better had 
they created a small, but permanent, militia force and deployed it throughout the 
Reconstruction period, or at least from 1867 onward. Such a force might have comprised 
five full companies, equipped with a complete mounted section, and commanded by the 
most capable and dedicated officers. (General Cooper seems to have recognized the 
potential of a few crack militia companies when he created the short-lived "special 
command" in late 1867.) With one unit stationed in Nashville as a ready reserve, the 
other four could have rotated through the most lawless counties of Middle and West 
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Tennessee, staying in a given area for no more than a month at a time, circumstances 
permitting, so as not to overburden the citizenry. Five hundred militiamen judiciously 
employed would have probably been large enough to keep Rebel vigilantes in check, yet 
small enough to assuage concerns about military despotism. 
Had the Brownlow administration retained even a portion of the State Guard in 
1868, much of the Klan's terror might have been forestalled, thereby rendering 
unnecessary the belated and awkward deployment of 1869 with its controversial 
declaration of martial law. A small, standing militia may also have been more 
economical than the two large mobilizations that actually took place. Based on payroll 
and quartermaster data, the yearly cost of fielding a State Guard of five companies would 
have been approximately $230,000. Whereas the actual militia forces cost $555,000 over 
roughly fifteen months of active service (both deployments combined), the hypothetical 
militia force would have cost $460,000 for twenty-four months of service. 7 
While this ideal scenario offers an explanation for how the Radicals might have 
stayed in power, it does not indicate when the politics of force would have ended. At 
some point, the Radicals had to declare their party sufficiently entrenched and the 
freedmen adequately prepared for normal relations to at last resume. To be sure, many 
Radicals believed that political proscription of ex-Confederates had to continue 
indefinitely, but it is hard to imagine anyone tolerating a standing army for however long 
7 This hypothetical cost analysis assumes that companies remain at full strength, including horses, and that 
the men incur no "stoppages" in pay. Yearly expenses for five companies (wages, subsistence, uniforms, 
and horse maintenance only) come to $145,060. Monthly logistical support for five companies comes to 
$6,301, a sum derived from an average of quartermaster figures for May and October 1867, months during 
which no more than six companies were on active duty. For one year, logistical support comes to $75,612. 
Finally, rail transportation for five companies comes to $6,837, a sum that is one-fourth the total spent on 
twenty-one companies in 1867. Overall, the yearly cost ofa five-company State Guard comes to $227,509. 
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that meant. Still, given the success of counter-Reconstruction in 1870, the Radicals 
should have tried using force for a little longer than they actually did. 8 
Conjecture about what the State Guard might have accomplished should not, 
however, overshadow what it did accomplish. As a military organization, it brought 
order to those parts of the state mired in political and racial strife. As a partisan body, it 
enabled the Radical party to exercise authority out of proportion to its numbers, while 
also bringing encouragement to the thousands of freedmen who were participating in 
American democracy for the first time. As an instrument of coercion, it represented a 
model for how a standing army should conduct itself. Despite anti-Radical propaganda 
depicting military despotism, the officers and men of the State Guard generally displayed 
laudable professionalism and rarely infringed on the liberties of law-abiding citizens. 
Reconstruction in Tennessee may continue to receive unfavorable judgments, and the 
Radicals do deserve some historical censure, but the performance of the State Guard 
should be accorded respect. 
8 After the state election in 1867, Tennessee Senator Joseph S. Fowler wrote Governor Brownlow an 
intriguing letter in which he stated, "I think some years will elapse before the genuine rebel will be fit to 
vote. My impression is it will be in the second generation." Like some other Radicals, Fowler later 
softened his views as evidenced by his 1868 vote to acquit President Johnson during the congressional 
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All Joseph H. Blackburn 
B/1 George E. Grisham 
C/1 Robert L. Hall 
D/1 Judge K. Clingan 
E/1 John T. Robeson 
F /1 Shadrick T. Harris 
Appendix A 
Tennessee State Guard, 1867 
Personnel Muster County and Date 
DeKalb (Middle), 1 April 
Washington (East), 1 May 
Knox (East), 31 May 
Bradley (East), 11 May 
Carroll (West), 8 May 
Jefferson (East), 1 June 
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G/1 Silas L. Chambers 
H/1 William 0. Rickman 











Anderson (East), 10 June 
Franklin/Bedford (Middle), 1 May 
Grainger (East), 3 June 
Kil William S. Stuart 
1st Regiment= 1,003 men 
A/2 George W. Kirk 
B/2 Thompson McKinley 
C/2 John L. Kirk 
D/2 Kemp Murphy 
E/2 George Hamilton 
F/2 Joseph M. Alexander 
G/2 James H. Sumner 
H/2 A M. Clapp 
I/2 William N. Purdy 
K/2 Philip J. Flemming 
2nd Regiment = 780 men 
A/3 Michael J. Houston 
B/3? William C. Holt**** 













Putnam (Middle), 1 June 
Greene (East), 6 June 
Sumner (Middle), 10 June 
Greene (East), 6 June 
Knox (East), 19 July 
McNairy (West), 18 June 
Roane (East), 6 July 
Davidson (Middle), 27 June 
Jefferson (East), 26 July 
Monroe (East), 22 July 
Williamson (Middle), 29 July 
Davidson (Middle), 30 July 
[West TN, summer] 
Companies in bold print contained black militiamen 
* Reflects the merger of Robeson's 77 men with William C. Holt's 34 men. 
** Includes 61 men recruited from Montgomery County on 23-27 July. 
*** Clapp's muster roll is incomplete and illegible in places. 
**** A "shadow" company under Captain Robeson. 
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Appendix B 
State Guard Dispositions as of 1 August 1867 
Unit County Location with Approximate Troop Strength 
All DeKalb (Blackburn+ 35), Warren (Cravens+ 30), Cannon (25) 
B/1 Lincoln (Grisham+ 70), Wilson (McLaughlin+ 40) 
C/1 Rutherford (R. Hall + 110) 
D/1 Madison (Clingan+ 75) 
E/1 Obion (Robeson), Dyer (Simpson), Weakley (Fuller), Gibson (Holt+ 30) 
Fil Henry (E. Hall + 55), Stewart (Roberts + 20), Cheatham (30) 
G/1 Gibson (Adkins+ 45), Weakley (Newport + 40) 
H/1 Marshall (Rickman + 65), Giles (Mankin + 25) 
I/1 Humphreys (Evans+ 60), Claiborne (Ellis+ 40) 
Kil White (Stuart + 45), Overton ( 40) 
A/2 Franklin (G. Kirk+ 85), possibly some in Bedford 
B/2 Sumner (McKinley+ 100) 
C/2 Montgomery (J. Kirk+ 100), Robertson (Burchfield+ 30) 
D/2 Knox (Murphy + 70) 
E/2 McNairy (Hamilton + 60) 
F/2 Lauderdale (Alexander+ 50) 
G/2 Williamson (J. Sumner+ 45), Maury (G. Sumner+ 55), Giles (10) 
H/2 Hawkins (Clapp), possibly some in Sullivan 
I/2 Polk (Purdy + 25), Monroe (25), 
K/2 Williamson (Fleming+ 20), Giles (20 attached to H/1 ), Maury (20) 
A/3 Davidson (Houston+ 70), Giles (Durham + 20) 
Total Counties with State Guard on Day of the Election= 33 
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Appendix C 
1867 Gubernatorial Election Returns from "Militia" Counties 
County Radical Vote Conservative Vote 
MIDDLE 
Cannon 430 157 
Cheatham 207 58 
DeKalb 864 182 
Davidson 5,454 1,001 Federal troops present 
Franklin 702 313 
Giles 1,880 152 
Humphreys 267 131 
Lincoln 780 267 
Marshall 831 449 
Maury 2,817 238 Federal troops present 
Montgomery 1,527 588 
Overton 411 17 
Robertson 348 493 
Rutherford 2,939 359 
Stewart 252 631 
Sumner 891 224 Federal troops present 
Warren 415 158 
White 356 28 
Wilson 1,249 788 
Williamson 1 704 574 Federal troops present 
24,324 6,808 
WEST 
Dyer 316 46 
Gibson 687 277 
Henry 0 19 
Lauderdale 296 162 
Madison 343 503 
McNairy 608 127 
Obion 272 67 
Weakley 769 282 
3,291 1,483 
EAST 
Claiborne 795 159 
Hawkins 1,107 186 
Knox 2,880 1,022 
Monroe 978 160 
Polk 211 48 
5,176 1,416 
Total 33,586 9,866 
Tennessee 74,437 22,486 
Counties in bold print highlight a Conservative majority. 
Vote Source: Anne H. Hopkins and William Lyons, Tennessee Votes: 1799-1976 (Knoxville, 1978). 
366 
AppendixD 
Demobilization Chronology of the State Guard 
Unit Last Commander Disbandment Date ( 1867) Days Active 
A/3 Houston 14 August 15 
K/2 Fleming 15 August 17 
B/2 McKinley 16 August 67 
G/2 Sumner 19 August 53 
G/1 Adkins 20 August 71 
F/2 Alexander 21 August 46 
B/1 Grisham 4 September 127 
D/2 Murphy 4 September 47 
H/2 Clapp 4 September 40 
I/2 Purdy 4 September 44 
E/2 Hamilton 5 September 79 
Kil Stuart 7 September 99 
Ill Ellis 10 September 99 
D/1 Clingan 20 September 132 
C/2 J. L. Kirk 21 September 107 
All Blackburn 1 October* 183-97 
A/2 G. W. Kirk 12 October 128 
C/1 R. L. Hall 7 December 191 
F/1 E. R. Hall 7 December 190 
H/1 Mankin 11 February 1868 286 
E/1 Holt 11 February 1868 279 
Units in bold print contain black militiamen 
* mounted section retained until 14 Oct. 
Special Command (1 st Battalion-3 September 1867) 
Major John T. Robeson 
All, B/1 (formerly H/1), C/1, D/1, E/1, F/1, A/2, C/2 
Sources: General Order Nos. 8-11, 16, 18-28, 30, 33, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 27; Special 
Order Nos. 86, 97, 164, 179, 200-201, TAGO, Reel 9, Vol. 33. 
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AppendixE 
1868 Presidential Returns from Former "Militia" Counties 
County Radical Vote <Loss from 1867) Con/Dem. Vote (Gain from 1867) 
MIDDLE 
Cannon 311 (-119) 177 (+20) 
Cheatham 73 (-134) 80 (+22) 
DeKalb 626 (-238) 262 (+80) 
Davidson 4,518 (-936) 1,450 (+449) Federal troops present 
Franklin 82 (-620) 118 (-195) Federal troops present 
Giles 561 (-1,319) 611 (+459) Federal troops present 
Humphreys 102 (-165) 119(-12) 
Lincoln 4 (-776) 558 (+291) Federal troops present 
Marshall 166 (-665) 856 (+407) Federal troops present 
Maury 1,910 (-907) 1,01 I (+773) Federal troops present 
Montgomery 1,034 (-493) 684 (+96) Federal troops present 
Overton 299 (-112) 25 (+8) 
Robertson 212 (-236) 406 (-87) Federal troops present 
Rutherford 956 (-1,983) 842 (+483) Federal troops present 
Stewart 120 (-132) 830 (+199) 
Sumner 465 (-426) 378 (+154) Federal troops present 
Warren 342 (-73) 166 (+8) 
White 165 (-191) 37 (+9) 
Wilson 850 (-399) 1,218 (+430) 
Williamson 561 (-1,143) 835 (+261) 
13,357 (-10,967) 10,663 (+3,855) 
WEST 
Dyer 118 (-198) 346 (+300) Federal troops present 
Gibson 0 (-687) 0 (-277) Federal troops present 
Henry 168 (+168) 148 (+129) 
Lauderdale 67 (-229) 453 (+291) 
Madison 289 (-54) 267 (-236) Federal troops present 
McNairy 520 (-88) 75 (-52) 
Obion 85 (-187) 139 (+72) Federal troops present 
Weakley 506 (-263) 226 (-56) 
1,753 (-1,538) 1,654 (+171) 
Total 15,110 (-12,505) 12,317 (+4,026) 
Tennessee 56,606 (-17,831) 26,151 (+3,675) 
Federal Troops occupied six other counties in 1868: Bedford, Fayette, Hardeman, Shelby, Tipton, and 
Wayne. The Radicals lost votes in Bedford, Fayette, and Wayne, while gaining in the others. 
Conservatives gained in all six. The combined Radical loss for these counties was only 184 votes, but the 
combined Conservative gain was 1,088. 
Counties in bold print highlight a Conservative/Democratic majority. 




Tennessee State Guard, 1869 
Personnel Muster County 
I st Regiment - 902 men (LTC Larken B. Gamble, Major Judge K. Clingan) 
All James P. Edmondson 
B/1 William L. Hicks 
C/1 E. E. Winters 
D/1 George W. Browning 
E/1 John Haynes 
F / 1 E. H. Gurney 
G/1 Alexander R. Toncray 
H/1 Samuel M. Hammer 
1/1 Joseph 0. Manson 





















2nd Regiment - 680 men (LTC William L. Hathaway, Major George W. Kirk) 
A/2 John B. Taylor 
B/2 Levi N. Woodsides 
C/2 Henry C. Sanders 
D/2 Jefferson C. French 
E/2 Joseph A Moore 
F 12 Henry C. Yates 
G/2 Christopher C. Wilcox 
H/2 John L. Murray 























* No precise information on personnel strength for this company could be found. The 
above figure is a supposition based on General Order No. 1, which stipulated that a 
captaincy was contingent on raising a company of at least eighty-four men. Because this 
requirement was obviously not enforced, it is impossible to know even the minimum 
number of men who may have served in this company. 
** Beaty was sheriff of the Fentress County Guards. During the militia campaign, he 
received a special commission in the State Guard and an augmentation in manpower. 
Appendix G 
State Guard Dispositions as of 5 March 1869 
Counties under Martial Law 
Gibson, Haywood, and Madison - with Militia HQ at Humboldt (Gibson) 
Giles, Lawrence, Marshall, and Maury-with Militia HQ at Pulaski (Giles) 
Jackson and Overton-with Militia HQ at Livingston (Overton) 
Livingston (601 men) 
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Humboldt ( 420 men) 
Major Clingan 
B/1 (Hicks) 
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